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Executive Summary
During the past three decades, China has carried out substantial and ambitious
economic reforms, which converted the country from a centrally planned to what
is now called a socialist market economy. The reforms have resulted in impressive
economic growth and a considerable reduction in poverty. The current situation,
however, is also characterised by increasing tensions within the country, caused,
among others, by rising rural-urban and inland-coastal disparities as well as by a
divergent development of the different sectors of the economy. In particular due
the high and persisting disparities between rural and urban areas, rural-urban
migration occupies central stage, both for the livelihoods of rural households and
for the outcome of further policy reforms. In this context, trade liberalisation
for a number of reasons can be expected to play an important role for the future
development of poverty and inequality in the country: first, poverty in China
is still predominantly rural, second, trade liberalisation is likely to unfold its
strongest impacts on the agricultural sector and third, because of its historical
relevance as a factor contributing to inequality.
Current studies on the impacts of trade reform in China mostly apply simula-
tion models at higher, nation-wide or regional, levels of aggregation. These models
are capable of providing insights at a rather general level. They lack, however,
the capacity of taking into account production and consumption patterns, initial
factor endowments, different responses of individual actors or local market con-
ditions in a highly disaggregated manner. Thereby, they neglect decisive factors
which shape the outcomes of policy reforms.
Against this background, the present work analyses and assesses the impacts of
further trade liberalisation efforts on a rural community in Guizhou Province in
south-western China. Recognising the importance of these issues, special emphasis
is put on poverty, inequality and rural-urban labour migration. Subject of the
xxv
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analysis is Changtian village, located in one of the less developed counties of
Guizhou province. Thereby, the case study of Changtian aims not only at shedding
light on the impacts of future trade reforms on this particular village, but also has
the objective of providing more general insights into the mechanisms which are
at work when trade policies are brought down to a local level. The study seeks
to promote an enhanced understanding of relevant processes in similar settings,
allowing for improved assessments in the field of development oriented trade policy
analysis.
The objectives of the study are achieved by the application of a village com-
putable general equilibrium model for Changtian village, which is embedded into
a macro-microsimulation framework. In this framework, aggregate results from a
national level CGE study of unilateral trade liberalisation in China are adminis-
tered as a policy shock to the village model, which offers a highly disaggregated
picture of the village economy and allows for a detailed analysis of the impacts of
trade reform.
The village equilibrium model, which is a CGE representation of the village
economy, forms the core part of the present study. The households, which make
up the village community, are depicted by six representative household groups.
The six groups stratify the village population by household demographics and
income levels, thus distinguishing the households by their migration behaviour
and by relative poverty. Each representative household can carry out up to four
productive activities: agriculture, formal and informal local off-farm work as well
as migration. Agricultural production is modelled with a nested Leontief-Cobb-
Douglas technology. Household consumption is represented by a per-capita LES
which includes self-consumption of agricultural output, purchased goods as well
as leisure. By incorporating the assumption of a perfectly neoclassical village land
market, the model makes a step towards the modelling of land rental transactions
which take place within the village. The land market links the households together
and creates local general-equilibrium effects which greatly affect the outcome of
the policy reform.
The salient feature of the village model, however, is a novel approach towards
the modelling of the households’ labour allocation behaviour, and in particular
the migration behaviour. The approach takes into account household preferences
xxvi
towards work in different types of employment as well as feedback links between
household migration and consumption demand. This is achieved by the assump-
tion of a composite utility function, which defines the behaviour of each house-
hold in the model. The composite utility function consists of a consumption utility
function, which captures utility created by commodity consumption, and a labour
utility function, which allows to account for the utility or disutility associated with
the participation in different types of employment.
By considering the disutility arising from certain employment options, the cur-
rent work offers an important contribution to the methodological development of
village equilibrium modelling. It provides a modelling framework, which paves
the way for similar applications in different settings and opens an interesting field
for future applications, which may also extend to levels of higher regional ag-
gregation. At the same time, the model constitutes a highly valuable tool for
the analysis of the migration behaviour of rural households under different policy
scenarios along the lines of household demographics and income levels. Thereby,
the availability of transparent information on socio-economic characteristics of
the household groups, the remittances behaviour as well as the disutility connota-
tions of migration offer great support to such efforts. Not least, it allows to derive
theoretically sound hypotheses on the migration behaviour of rural households in
different policy situations.
The study is subdivided into eight chapters. Following an introduction, Chap-
ter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature. The chapter starts with a section
on China’s economic reforms, poverty, inequality and migration, aimed at setting
the stage for the present work. Next, theoretical frameworks for the analyses of
trade liberalisation and poverty and of positive impacts of migration on source
communities are discussed. Along with the concept of village economies, which is
also introduced, these frameworks represent the conceptual basis for the analyses
to follow. A third section, which has a methodological focus, gives an overview on
results obtained from previous studies on trade liberalisation in China and reviews
current methodological approaches.
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology, data and the research area. The macro-
microsimulation framework, which links a national CGE model with the village
equilibrium model, is outlined. The census dataset of the 257 households of Chang-
xxvii
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tian village, which was gathered in 2007 in the scope of a comprehensive research
project aimed at studying rural poverty in China and carried out by the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, and Guizhou University, is described. Changtian is characterised as a
poor village, located in a less developed area, whose inhabitants to a great extent
rely on migration to more developed provinces for their livelihoods. The extent
and nature of inequality is discussed. Finally, as an important step towards the
development of the village model, the market integration of Changtian with the
rest of the country is assessed. The results of this assessment show that village
markets for agricultural output and for consumption goods can be assumed to be
integrated, whereas for land an isolated village market exists.
Chapter 4 provides a microeconomic theory of household behaviour. The chap-
ter departs from a basic farm household model, to which the utility considerations
of households regarding different employment options and aspects of migration re-
lated to household consumption demand are added in a stepwise manner. Through
this process, a nonseparable agricultural household model with feedbacks to the
consumption sphere is developed. The core result of this model is that in the
household’s optimum, all activities including leisure yield the same marginal re-
turns to the household, which are equal to the household shadow wage. Unlike in
standard models, however, these marginal returns include the monetary returns
as well as the utility considerations of the household. The model serves as the
theoretical core of the village equilibrium model.
In Chapter 5, a SAM for Changtian village is constructed. The SAM consti-
tutes the core dataset underlying the village equilibrium model and provides a
snapshot of the village economy at the time of the survey. At this, the construc-
tion of the SAM is preceded by econometric work oriented towards the analysis
of households’ migration behaviour and aimed at supporting the construction of
representative household groups. Furthermore, household specific shadow prices
for family labour and land, which are unobserved in the original sample, are esti-
mated.
In Chapter 6, the theoretical household model of Chapter 4 is translated into an
applied village equilibrium model. This work involves the specification of func-
tional forms and the construction of a village equilibrium framework. A first
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section describes these steps and discusses the main assumptions made, resulting
in a full documentation of the applied model. In a second section, a number of
stylised simulations are carried out in order to introduce and discuss the depic-
tion of the labour allocation by the households in the model. This first set of
simulations demonstrates the merits of the approach taken. It shows that the
inclusion of utility considerations in an agricultural household model offers a sub-
stantial degree of flexibility in the modelling of the labour market behaviour of
rural households. Various labour supply patterns such as the different segments
of an S-shaped labour supply curve or complementarity between non-agricultural
household production and wage employment can be modelled.
Chapter 7 applies the village equilibrium model in a macro-microsimulation
framework to the analysis of the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty, in-
equality and migration in Changtian village. The model is applied to a scenario
of unilateral trade liberalisation in China. Overall, four simulations are carried
out. Two different calibrations of the migration behaviour are implemented, one
in which all households have identical own-wage responses in migration and one
in which households with higher shares of dependants exhibit weaker own-wage
responses. This implies the assumption of a lower propensity to migrate for the
latter households. For each of the two calibrations, the impact of trade reforms is
simulated once with the assumption of an absent land market and once allowing
for land rentals within the village.
Overall, the simulations find only comparatively weak impacts of trade liberal-
isation on the village. Returns to land as well as to agricultural labour decrease.
Along with generally lower off-farm wages, this causes losses in income for all
households and leads to slight increases in poverty in the village. Higher relative
income losses for low income households result in higher inequality due to trade
reform.
The specification of the labour allocation behaviour of the households in the
model leads to differences in labour supply responses, in particular in case of
migration. Overall, households with higher shares of dependants tend to return
home, whereas those with less dependants respond more positively to enhanced
incentives to migrate. Thereby, differences arise also within migration groups: low
income households appear to have a stronger affinity to migration and migrate
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more or return home less than other households.
The introduction of a village land rental market into the model leads to more
pronounced adjustments in agricultural production. At this, a relationship be-
tween migration and land rentals can be observed. Households which have stronger
and more positive migration responses make land available on the village market,
whereas others increase their land use. In the consequence, the possibility to trade
land within the village obviously facilitates migration and leads to more migration
from the village. This affects the impacts of trade reform on households’ income
levels in that the presence of a village market accentuates the differences between
migration groups already observed in the set of simulations without a land mar-
ket. In spite of differences at the household level, however, the land market has no
perceivable impact on the poverty outcome of reform. The increase in inequality,
in turn, gets slightly weaker with a land market. This points to an inequality
reducing effect of such an institutional change.
At a policy level, an important insight gained from the modelling exercise is that
trade liberalisation has adverse impacts both on poverty and on the distribution
of income in the village. Against this prospect, the authorities in charge should
seek to improve the social safety net before embarking on further reforms which go
in the direction as those simulated in this study. In addition, a careful approach
to further trade reforms should be taken. In any case it would be preferable to
undertake further reform steps only in the context of multilateral trade reform,
which would entail more positive impacts on the agricultural sector.
The comparison of the simulation results obtained under the two assumptions
regarding the presence of a land market gives hints that a reform of the land rental
regime would partly offset the inequality enhancing effects of trade liberalisation.
Furthermore, the possibility to rent out land without restrictions would facilitate
migration by households that wish to leave and in the consequence lead to higher
levels of rural-urban migration. Thus, land markets could contribute to reduce
rural-urban disparities. On the other hand, this positive assessment should be
considered against the observation that households which migrate more would
be more negatively affected in terms of income losses in a situation with a land
market.
A highly important result of the simulations is that clear differences in the
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impacts of trade liberalisation arise between the two migration groups as well as
within them. The fact that the former as well as the latter can be traced back
to different migration responses clearly shows that the migration behaviour of
rural households matters for the outcome of trade (and other policy) reforms and
underlines the importance of the rural-urban linkages created by migration.
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Zusammenfassung
Im Verlauf der vergangenen drei Jahrzehnte hat China tiefgreifende wirtschaftliche
Reformen durchgefu¨hrt, die das Land von einer Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft zum
dem, was heute eine “Sozialistische Marktwirtschaft” genannt wird, gewandelt
haben. Zwar haben die Vera¨nderungen ein beeindruckendes Wirtschaftswachstum
und eine starke Reduktion der Armut zur Folge, gleichzeitig ist die gegenwa¨rtige
Situation jedoch auch durch wachsende Spannungen innerhalb des Landes ge-
kennzeichnet. Zunehmende Disparita¨ten bestehen sowohl zwischen sta¨dtischen
und la¨ndlichen Ra¨umen als auch zwischen dem Landesinneren und den an den
Ku¨sten gelegenen Gebieten. Als Hauptergebnis des Strukturwandels ist die di-
vergierende Entwicklung der verschiedenen Sektoren der Volkswirtschaft zu nen-
nen. Die zunehmend ungleiche Entwicklung zwischen sta¨dtischen und la¨ndlichen
Regionen fu¨hrt zu einer versta¨rkten Migration von Arbeitskra¨ften. Dieser Prozess,
der von existenzieller Bedeutung fu¨r die Einkommenssituation in den la¨ndlichen
Haushalten ist, wird in starkem Maße von einer Vielfalt wirtschaftspolitischer
Maßnahmen beeinflusst. Es ist zu erwarten, dass insbesondere die zunehmende
Handelsliberalisierung in starkem Maße die zuku¨nftige Entwicklung von Armut
und Ungleichheit im la¨ndlichen Raum beeinflussen wird. Die besondere Bedeu-
tung dieses engen Zusammenhangs ergibt sich auch aus der Tatsache, dass sich aus
dem Abbau protektionistischer außenwirtschaftlicher Maßnahmen Auswirkungen
auf den landwirtschaftlichen Sektor insgesamt ergeben und dass Handelslibera-
lisierung bereits in der Vergangenheit zu einem Anstieg der Gegensa¨tze im Land
fu¨hrte.
Bereits vorliegende Studien u¨ber die Auswirkungen von Handelsliberalisierung
in China beruhen u¨berwiegend auf Simulationsmodellen, die auf ho¨heren Aggre-
gationsebenen, etwa landesweit oder regional, angesiedelt sind. Diese Modelle
ermo¨glichen Einblicke von eher allgemeiner Natur. Sie sind deshalb nicht in der
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Lage, Unterschiede in Produktions- und Konsummustern, Faktorausstattungen,
Reaktionen unterschiedlicher Akteure oder lokale Marktbedingungen in ausrei-
chend disaggregierter Form abzubilden. Dadurch vernachla¨ssigen sie entschei-
dende Bestimmungsfaktoren fu¨r die mo¨glichen Folgen von Politikreformen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert und bewertet die vorliegende Arbeit die
Auswirkungen weiterer Handelsliberalisierung auf ein Dorf in der Provinz Guizhou
in Su¨dwestchina. Dabei liegt besonderes Augenmerk auf Stadt-Land-Migration,
Armut und Einkommensverteilung. Der Gegenstand der Analyse ist Chang-
tian, ein Dorf das in einem weniger entwickelten Verwaltungsbezirk der Provinz
Guizhou liegt. Dabei hat die Fallstudie nicht nur das Ziel, die Auswirkungen
ku¨nftiger Reformen der Handelspolitik auf dieses spezielle Dorf zu beleuchten,
sondern verfolgt auch die Absicht, Einblick in die Mechanismen zu liefern, die am
Werk sind, wenn eine lokale Perspektive einge- nommen wird. Daru¨ber hinaus
mo¨chte die vorliegende Untersuchung zu einem besseren Versta¨ndnis fu¨r Prozesse
in vergleichbaren Situationen beitragen und damit eine genauere Einscha¨tzung der
Wirkungen handelspolitischer Maßnahmen auf Entwicklungsla¨nder ermo¨glichen.
Die Zielsetzungen der Studie werden auf dem Wege der Entwicklung und An-
wendung eines Dorfgleichgewichtsmodells fu¨r Changtian, das in einen Makro-
Mikrosimulationsmodellrahmen eingebettet ist, erreicht. Innerhalb dieses Mo-
dellrahmens werden aggregierte Ergebnisse einer nationalen CGE-Studie unilat-
eraler Handelsliberalisierung in China als Politikschock in das Dorfmodell eingege-
ben, welches ein hochgradig disaggregiertes Bild der Dorfwirtschaft liefert und
damit eine detaillierte Analyse der Politikfolgen ermo¨glicht.
Das Dorfgleichgewichtsmodell, welches eine CGE-Abbildung der Dorfwirtschaft
ist, bildet das Kernstu¨ck der vorliegenden Arbeit. Die Haushalte, aus denen die
Dorfgemeinschaft besteht, werden durch sechs repra¨sentative Haushaltsgruppen
abgebildet. Die sechs Gruppen stratifizieren die Bevo¨lkerung des Dorfes nach de-
mografischen Merkmalen sowie nach Ho¨he der Einkommen und unterscheiden die
Haushalte damit in Bezug auf ihr Migrationsverhalten und ihre relative Armut.
Konkret gibt es zwei Migrationsgruppen, die jeweils in drei Einkommensgruppen
unterteilt sind. Jede Haushaltsgruppe hat Zugang zu vier Produktionsaktivita¨ten:
Landwirtschaft, formelle und informelle lokale nichtlandwirtschaftliche Bescha¨fti-
gung und Migration. Die Abbildung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion erfolgt
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durch eine verschachtelte Leontief-Cobb-Douglas-Technologie. Der Konsum der
Haushalte wird durch ein auf Pro-Kopf-Konsum ausgelegtes lineares Nachfragesys-
tem dargestellt, das den Eigenkonsum landwirtschaftlicher Produkte, den Ver-
brauch auf dem Markt erworbener Gu¨ter sowie Freizeit mit einschließt. Das Mo-
dell unternimmt einen ersten Schritt hin zur Modellierung der Landtransaktionen,
die innerhalb des Dorfes stattfinden, und trifft die Annahme eines perfekt neo-
klassischen Landmarktes. Dieser Markt verbindet die Haushalte miteinander und
ruft lokale allgemeine Gleichgewichtseffekte hervor, die die Auswirkungen der si-
mulierten Politikreformen substanziell beeinflussen.
Das herausragende Merkmal des Dorfgleichgewichtsmodells ist ein neuer Ansatz
der Modellierung des Arbeitsallokationsverhaltens der Haushalte und darin ins-
besondere des Migrationsverhaltens. Der Ansatz beru¨cksichtigt sowohl die Pra¨feren-
zen der Haushalte fu¨r die Arbeit in bestimmten Bescha¨ftigungsarten als auch
Ru¨ckkopplungseffekte zwischen Arbeitsmigration und Konsumnachfrage. Errei-
cht wird dies durch die Annahme einer zusammengesetzten Nutzenfunktion, die
das Verhalten der einzelnen Haushalte im Modell beschreibt. Die zusammenge-
setzte Nutzenfunktion besteht aus einer Konsumnutzenfunktion, die den durch
Gu¨terkonsum geschaffenen Nutzen erfasst, und eine Arbeitsnutzenfunktion, die
es ermo¨g- licht, Nutzen oder Unnutzen, der durch die Teilnahme in verschiedenen
Bescha¨ftigungen entsteht, zu beru¨cksichtigen.
Durch die Beru¨cksichtigung des Unnutzens, der aus verschiedenen Bescha¨fti-
gungsmo¨glichkeiten erwa¨chst, stellt die vorliegende Arbeit einen wichtigen Beitrag
zur methodischen Weiterentwicklung der Dorfgleichgewichtsmodellierung dar. Sie
bietet einen grundlegenden Modellrahmen, der den Weg fu¨r a¨hnliche Anwendun-
gen in anderen Zusammenha¨ngen bereitet und ero¨ffnet ein interessantes Feld fu¨r
zuku¨nftige Anwendungen, die sich auch auf Ebenen ho¨herer regionaler Aggrega-
tionen erstrecken ko¨nnen. Gleichzeitig stellt das Modell ein wertvolles Werkzeug
fu¨r die Analyse des Migrationsverhaltens la¨ndlicher Haushalte unter verschiede-
nen Politikszenarien unter Einbeziehung von Aspekten der Demografie und des
Einkommensniveaus der Haushalte dar.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist in acht Kapitel unterteilt. Nach einer Einleitung
wird in Kapitel 2 eine U¨bersicht u¨ber die relevante Literatur gegeben. Das Kapi-
tel beginnt mit einem Abschnitt u¨ber Chinas wirtschaftliche Reformen, Armut,
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Ungleichheit und Migration. Ziel dieses Abschnittes ist es, den o¨konomischen
Hintergrund zu beschreiben. Darauf folgend werden theoretische Ansa¨tze zur
Analyse von Handelsliberalisierung und Armut und zu den positiven Auswirkun-
gen von Migration auf die Herkunftsorte der Migranten diskutiert. Zusammen
mit einem Konzept fu¨r Dorfo¨konomien, das ebenfalls eingefu¨hrt wird, bilden diese
Ansa¨tze die konzeptionelle Grundlage fu¨r die darauf folgenden Analysen. Ein
dritter, methodisch ausgerichteter Abschnitt, verschafft einen U¨berblick u¨ber die
Ergebnisse bisheriger Studien zu Handelsliberalisierung in China und bespricht
relevante methodische Entwicklungen.
Das Kapitel 3 hat die Methodik, die Daten und das Forschungsgebiet zum
Gegenstand. Der Makro-Mikrosimulationsmodellrahmen, der ein nationales CGE-
Modell mit dem Dorfgleichgewichtsmodell verknu¨pft, wird umrissen. Die durch
eine durch das International Food Policy Research Institute, die Chinesische Aka-
demie der Agrarwissenschaften und die Universita¨t von Guizhou im Rahmen eines
umfassenden Vorhabens zur Erforschung la¨ndlicher Armut durchgefu¨hrte Voller-
hebung von 257 Haushalten in Changtian gewonnenen Daten werden beschrieben.
Changtian wird als von Armut stark betroffenes, in einer unterentwickelten Gegend
gelegenes Dorf, dessen Einwohner in großem Maße von Migration in weiter ent-
wickelte Gebiete abha¨ngig sind, charakterisiert. Das Ausmaß und die Beschaffen-
heit der Ungleichheit innerhalb des Dorfes wird diskutiert. Abschließend wird, als
wichtiger Schritt fu¨r die Entwicklung des Dorfgleichgewichtsmodells, die Marktin-
tegration des Dorfes mit dem Rest des Landes bewertet. Die Ergebnisse dieser Be-
trachtungen fu¨hren zu der Annahme, dass die Dorfma¨rkte fu¨r landwirtschaftliche
Produkte und Konsumgu¨ter mit dem Rest Chinas integriert sind, wohingegen im
Falle von Land ein isolierter Dorfmarkt existiert.
In Kapitel 4 wird eine mikroo¨konomische Theorie des Verhaltens der Haushalte
vorgestellt. Das Kapitel geht von einem einfachen landwirtschaftlichen Haushalts-
modell aus, das schrittweise um die Nutzenerwa¨gungen der Haushalte in Bezug auf
verschiedene Bescha¨ftigungsmo¨glichkeiten sowie um konsumbezogenen Aspekte
der Migration erweitert wird. Im Verlauf dieses Prozesses wird ein nichtsepara-
bles landwirtschaftliches Haushaltsmodell mit Ru¨ckkopplungen in die Konsum-
spha¨re, das als theoretisches Kernstu¨ck des Dorfgleichgewichtsmodells dient, ent-
wickelt. Das wesentliche Ergebnis dieses Modells ist, dass im Haushaltsoptimum
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alle Produktionsaktivita¨ten und Freizeit gleiche Grenzertra¨ge liefern. Diese Grenz-
ertra¨ge wiederum entsprechen dem Haushaltsschattenpreis der Arbeit, enthalten
im Gegensatz zu Standardmodellen jedoch sowohl moneta¨re Ertra¨ge als auch die
Nutzenerwa¨gungen des Haushalts.
In Kapitel 5 wird eine social accounting matrix (SAM) fu¨r Changtian erstellt.
Die SAM stellt den grundlegenden Datenrahmen fu¨r das Dorfgleichgewichtsmo-
dell dar und liefert eine Momentaufnahme der Dorfo¨konomie zum Zeitpunkt der
Datenerhebung. Zur Unterstu¨tzung der Bildung repra¨sentativer Haushaltsgrup-
pen wird die Erstellung der SAM dabei von o¨konometrischen Analysen des Mi-
grationsverhaltens der Haushalte begleitet. Zudem werden haushaltsspezifische
Schattenpreise fu¨r Familienarbeit und Land gescha¨tzt.
In Kapitel 6 wird das theoretische Haushaltsmodell aus Kapitel 4 in ein ange-
wandtes Dorfgleichgewichtsmodell u¨bersetzt. Dieses Vorgehen umfasst die Spezifi-
zierung von Funktionsformen sowie die Implementierung eines Dorfgleichgewichts-
rahmens. Ein erster Abschnitt des Kapitels beschreibt diese Schritte und liefert
eine Diskussion der wichtigsten Annahmen, die getroffen wurden. Das Ergeb-
nis ist eine vollsta¨ndige Dokumentation des Modells. In einem zweiten Abschnitt
werden mit dem Ziel, eine Einfu¨hrung in die Abbildung des Arbeitsallokationsver-
haltens der Haushalte im Modell zu geben, sowie dieses zu diskutieren, eine Reihe
stilisierter Simulationen durchgefu¨hrt. Diese ersten Simulationen verdeutlichen
die Vorzu¨ge des in der vorliegenden Arbeit verfolgten Ansatzes. Es wird gezeigt,
dass die Beru¨cksichtigung von Nutzenerwa¨gungen in einem landwirtschaftlichen
Haushaltsmodell eine große Flexibilita¨t in der Modellierung des Arbeitsmarkt-
verhaltens la¨ndlicher Haushalte bietet. So ko¨nnen unterschiedliche Muster des
Arbeitsangebotes, wie zum Beispiel die verschiedenen Segmente einer S-fo¨rmi-
gen Arbeitsangebotskurve oder komplementa¨re Beziehungen zwischen nichtland-
wirtschaftlicher Haushaltsproduktion und Lohnarbeit, modelliert werden.
Kapitel 7 wendet das Dorfgleichgewichtsmodell in einem Mikro-Makrosimula-
tionsmodellrahmen auf die Analyse der Auswirkungen von Handelsliberalisierung
auf Armut, Einkommensverteilung und Migration, in Changtian an. Insgesamt
werden vier Simulationen eines Szenarios unilateraler Handelsliberalisierung in
China durchgefu¨hrt. Es werden zwei verschiedene Kalibrierungen fu¨r das Mi-
grationsverhalten der Haushalte implementiert: Im ersten Fall werden identische
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Eigenlohnreaktionen in der Migration fu¨r alle Haushalte angenommen, im zweiten
Fall zeigen Haushalte mit ho¨heren Anteilen an Kindern und Alten schwa¨chere
Eigenlohnreaktionen, was der Annahme einer niedrigeren Migrationsneigung fu¨r
diese Haushalte entspricht. Fu¨r jede der beiden Kalibrierungen werden die Auswir-
kungen von Handelsreformen jeweils einmal unter der Annahme eines fehlenden
Landmarktes und einmal mit der Mo¨glichkeit fu¨r Landtransaktionen innerhalb
des Dorfes simuliert.
Insgesamt zeigen die Simulationen nur relativ geringe Auswirkungen der Han-
delsliberalisierung auf das Dorf. Sinkende Ertra¨ge aus Land und landwirtschaftlich-
er Ta¨tigkeit fu¨hren zusammen mit allgemein niedrigeren nichtlandwirtschaftlichen
Lohnsa¨tzen fu¨r alle Haushalte zu Einkommensverlusten. Dies hat einen leichten
Anstieg der Armut im Dorf zur Folge. Da a¨rmere Haushalte im Verha¨ltnis ho¨here
Einkommenseinbußen in Kauf nehmen mu¨ssen, nimmt die Einkommensungleich-
heit im Dorf in Folge der Handelsreformen zu.
Auf Grund der Art der Ausgestaltung des Arbeitsallokationsverhaltens der
Haushalte im Modell treten insbesondere im Falle der Migration Unterschiede
in den Arbeitsangebotsreaktionen auf. In der Tendenz kehren Migranten aus
Haushalten mit u¨berdurchschnittlichem Anteil Nichterwerbsta¨tiger nach Hause
zuru¨ck, wohingegen Haushalte mit relativ wenig Nichterwerbsta¨tigen positiver
auf verbesserte Migrationsanreize reagieren. Dabei treten insbesondere bei Haus-
halten mit niedrigerem Einkommen, die augenscheinlich eine sta¨rkere Affinita¨t
zur Migration an den Tag legen, auch innerhalb der beiden Migrationsgruppen
Unterschiede auf.
Die Einfu¨hrung eines Landmarktes in das Modell fu¨hrt zu sta¨rker ausgepra¨gten
Anpassungen der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Dabei ist auf Grund der Tat-
sache, dass Haushalte mit sta¨rkeren und positiven Migrationsreaktionen Land auf
dem Dorfmarkt verfu¨gbar machen und die u¨brigen ihre Landnutzung ausdehnen,
ein Zusammenhang zwischen Migration und der Pacht von Land festzustellen.
Folglich fu¨hrt die Mo¨glichkeit, Land innerhalb des Dorfes zu pachten und zu ver-
pachten, zu einer sta¨rkeren Migration aus dem Dorf. Dies hat wiederum Konse-
quenzen fu¨r die Auswirkungen der Handelsreformen auf das Einkommensniveau
der Haushalte: Das Vorhandensein eines Dorfmarktes versta¨rkt die Unterschiede
zwischen den Migrationsgruppen, die schon in den Simulationen ohne Landmarkt
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beobachtet wurden. Entgegen der beobachteten Unterschiede auf der Ebene der
Haushalte hat der Landmarkt jedoch keine feststellbare Auswirkung auf die Ar-
mutswirkungen der Reformen. Der Anstiege der Einkommensunterschiede hinge-
gen fa¨llt geringfu¨gig schwa¨cher aus. Dies weist auf einen ungleichheitsreduzieren-
den Effekt dieser Art institutionellen Wandels hin.
In Bezug auf die politische Ebene la¨sst sich als wichtige, aus den Simulationen
gewonnene Einsicht nennen, dass eine unilaterale Handelsliberalisierung Chinas
negative Auswirkungen sowohl auf Armut als auch auf die Einkommensverteilung
im Dorf hat. Vor diesem Hintergrund sollten die verantwortlichen Regierungs-
stellen darauf bedacht sein, vor weiteren Reformen, die in die Richtung derer
gehen, die in dieser Studie analysiert wurden, das soziale Sicherungsnetz auszubau-
en. Weiterhin erscheint es angezeigt, eine vorsichtige Herangehensweise an weitere
Handelsreformen zu wa¨hlen. In jedem Fall wa¨re es vorzuziehen, weitere Reform-
schritte im Rahmen einer multilateralen Handelsreform zu unternehmen, welche
positivere Auswirkungen fu¨r den landwirtschaftlichen Sektor zur Folge ha¨tte.
Der Vergleich der unter den beiden Annahmen bezu¨glich des Landmarktes
erzielten Simulationsergebnisse deutet darauf hin, dass eine Reform der Landma¨rkte
den ungleichheitsfo¨rdernden Wirkungen von Handelsliberalisierung zumindest teil-
weise entgegen wirken kann. Daru¨ber hinaus wu¨rde die Mo¨glichkeit, Land ohne
Beschra¨nkungen verpachten zu ko¨nnen, die Migration von Haushalten, die dies
wu¨nschen, erleichtern und damit zu sta¨rkerer Stadt-Land-Migration fu¨hren. Damit
ko¨nnten Landma¨rkte einen Beitrag zu einer Reduktion der zwischen sta¨dtischen
und la¨ndlichen Gebieten bestehenden Disparita¨ten leisten.
Ein weiteres, sehr wichtiges Ergebnis der Simulationen ist, dass sich die Auswir-
kungen von Handelsliberalisierung sowohl zwischen als auch innerhalb der Migra-
tionsgruppen deutlich unterscheiden. Dabei zeigt die Tatsache, dass beide Arten
von Unterschieden auf unterschiedliche Migrationsreaktionen zuru¨ckgefu¨hrt wer-
den ko¨nnen nachdru¨cklich, dass das Migrationsverhalten la¨ndlicher Haushalte eine
wichtige Rolle fu¨r die Folgen von Handels- oder anderen Politikreformen spielt.
Dies unterstreicht die Relevanz der Stadt-Land-Verflechtungen, die durch Migra-
tion geschaffen werden.
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1. Introduction
More than three decades have passed since China has embarked upon a profound
reform of its economic system. Reforms started in 1978 and initially have been
oriented towards the agricultural sector. The introduction of the household re-
sponsibility system, following more than two decades of collective organisation,
again made the family household the basic unit of agricultural production, giv-
ing rural families the responsibility for their farming operations (Fan and Gulati,
2007). The reform of the rural and urban marketing systems gradually lead to an
end of central planning in the agricultural and later on also in the non-agricultural
sectors of China’s economy. The establishment of township and village enterprises
in rural areas and reforms of state-owned industrial enterprises brought about the
development of a non-farm sector in rural areas (Fan et al., 2005) and changed the
mode of industrial production from a socialist to a capitalist one. A substantial
liberalisation of the trade regime undertaken in the run-up to the accession to
the WTO in 2001 and beyond (Bhattasali et al., 2004) has converted China from
a country, which has been virtually disconnected from international markets to
an open economy, which is one of the most important economic players in the
globalised world of today.
The reforms have been highly effective in promoting economic growth and in
combating poverty. In agriculture, enhanced production incentives contributed to
increases in yields, productivity and efficiency, which allowed the farm sector to
grow by around 5% per year since the onset of reforms to the mid of the first decade
of the 21st century (Huang et al., 2009). The economy as a whole developed even
more rapidly: between 1980 and 2009, average economic growth was at around
9.5% per year (World Bank, 2011). In particular the improvements in economic
conditions in the rural areas of the country have lead to a substantial reduction
in poverty: while in 1980 still around 53% of the population lived in poverty, the
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share of the poor declined to less than 8% in 2001 (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
This impressive development, however, has been accompanied by ever higher
levels of inequality within the country. A divergent development of rural and
urban areas and more rapid progress in coastal as compared to inland provinces
gave rise to growing rural-urban and inland-coastal disparities. Rising differ-
ences within rural or urban areas add to overall inequality, which, as measured
by the Gini coefficient, has reached a level of 44.7% in 2001, up from around
31.0% in 1981 (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). This rising
trend has alarmed both the scientific and the political community, fearing negative
consequences for future economic growth, poverty reduction and social stability
(Benjamin et al., 2008; Dollar, 2007; OECD, 2004).
One major consequence of the growing disparities are migration flows, which
take place at a massive scale (Seeborg et al., 2000). By the mid 2000s, an estimated
100 to 130 million people, or around 20% of the rural labour force, have been
moving from rural to urban areas mainly of coastal provinces in order to find
employment there (Cai et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2009). Migration to a large
extent is seasonal and of circular character, which means that migrants maintain
the links with their home communities and return home after a certain migration
spell (Zhao, 2003). Thereby, migration is of utmost importance, not only for
migrant families themselves, but also for the rural economy as a whole. Flows of
remittances are an increasingly important income source (Benjamin et al., 2005)
and constitute a core element of the livelihoods of migrant households. Local
level economic linkages cause that even non-migrant households are affected by
migration. At a more general level, migration links rural areas to the urban
sectors, constituting an important mechanism for the transmission of economic
shocks, and can be considered to be one of the strongest forces shaping China’s
rural economy.
In the context of China’s economic development, poverty reduction and rising
inequality, issues of trade liberalisation are highly important aspects of economic
policy making. In the past, the country’s opening up to the outside world in terms
of international trade and foreign direct investment has disproportionally favoured
the economic development of the eastern coastal regions, thereby accentuating
inland-coastal disparities and contributing to the increases in overall inequality
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(Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Thus, given present concerns about rising social
disparities, future liberalisation efforts should always be considered in light of
their possible impacts on inequality.
Although at least until 2001 an effect of trade reforms was not perceivable
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007), further liberalisation may well matter for future
progress in poverty reduction in China. Across the world, including China, agri-
culture tends to receive the highest levels of trade protection. Thus, future trade
reforms—unilateral, multilateral or in the scope of regional trade agreements—can
be expected to disproportionally affect the agricultural sectors and the rural econ-
omy. And as poverty in China still is a predominantly rural problem (Yao et al.,
2004), poverty impacts of trade liberalisation will be particularly pronounced.
Against this background, the objective of the present study is to analyse the
impact of further trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality in China. Recog-
nising its high importance both for the livelihoods of the rural population and as
a linkage between rural and urban sectors, a special focus is put on rural-urban
labour migration.
The subject of the analysis is Changtian village, a rural community located in
Guizhou province, south-western China. Guizhou is among the poorest provinces
in China and Changtian lies in one of the less developed counties of the province
(Brown et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2009). Changtian village is only one single case
in a vast country. However, it may share a number of common characteristics
with many communities in rural China: The village is characterised by high levels
of poverty and a substantial degree of inequality. Villagers depend on a variety
of income sources for their livelihood, relying simultaneously on farm production,
local off-farm employment and migration. Indeed, following agriculture, outside
province migration is the second most important source of cash income to the
villagers, with around one fifth of the labour force being employed in this activity,
and at the same time represents a major source of income inequality (Xing et al.,
2009).
Thereby, studying the case of Changtian not only sheds light on the impacts of
future trade reforms on this particular village but also yields important insights
into the mechanisms, which are at work when trade policies are brought down
to a local level. It promotes an enhanced understanding of relevant processes in
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similar settings, allowing for improved assessments in the field of development
oriented trade policy analysis.
The nature of the problem studied calls for a comprehensive methodological
approach. On the one hand, trade liberalisation unfolds economy-wide effects,
such as changes in relative prices, trade flows or government revenues and expen-
ditures. Thus, the ideal approach is capable of capturing these economy-wide or,
if necessary, even global processes. On the other hand, the focus on a single rural
community requires a substantial level of detail. The impacts of policy reforms on
different groups of the local population to a large extent depend on differences in
production structure, consumption patterns or the access to productive resources.
Local market conditions, such as market imperfections or missing markets may
give rise to economic linkages within the community, thus leading to local level
general-equilibrium effects (McCulloch et al., 2001).
Taking these requirements into account, the present study employs a sequential
macro-microsimulation approach, which combines results from a national level
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for China with a village equilib-
rium model for Changtian village. In this modelling framework, the national
CGE model serves as the macro module, yielding simulation results, which are
administered as a policy shock to the village model. At this, the work puts special
emphasis on the development of and simulations with the village model, focusing
in particular on the modelling of labour migration, whereas the macro level results
are taken from a published CGE study on China.
The national level CGE study used for the present purposes is part of a recent
and broad based undertaking to analyse the impact of different types of trade
liberalisation on inequality and poverty (Anderson et al., 2010a). It applies a
comparative static CGE model for the Chinese economy developed by Zhai and
Hertel (2010). The model disposes of several features that allow to take into ac-
count some of the unique institutional factors, which characterise the functioning
of the factor markets in China, such as the household registration (hukou) system
and the land tenure system. In the present study we use results on price and
wage changes from simulations of a scenario of unilateral full trade liberalisation
by China.
The village equilibrium model, which is a CGE representation of the economy
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of Changtian village, forms the core part of the present study. The households,
which make up the village community are depicted by six representative household
groups. Each representative household groups can carry out up to four productive
activities, among them agriculture, formal and informal local off-farm work as
well as migration. Agricultural production is modelled with a nested Leontief-
Cobb-Douglas technology. Household consumption is represented by a per-capita
linear expenditure system (LES), which includes self-consumption of agricultural
output, purchased goods as well as leisure. The model makes a step towards
the modelling of land rental transactions, which take place within the village by
incorporating the assumption of a perfectly neoclassical village land market. This
market links the households together and creates local general-equilibrium effects,
which greatly affect the outcome of the policy reform.
The salient feature of the village equilibrium model, however, is a novel approach
towards the treatment of labour allocation of rural households, which recognises in
particular the relevance of rural-urban migration in China. The approach caters
to two principal issues, which arise in the context of the modelling of migration in
a village CGE model. First, migration always creates feedbacks to a household’s
consumption sphere by altering consumption demand as a consequence of changes
in the household size. These effects constitute a benefit additional to the receipt
of remittances to the household, which impacts the migration behaviour. Second,
migration involves psychological costs to the households, i.e. creates disutility,
which makes engagement in this activity less attractive. These disutilities can
determine the migration behaviour and lead to observable differences in migration
responses among households and, given the role of migration as income source and
a means to cope with economic shocks, different impacts of a given policy reform.
The differences in migration behaviour, in turn, can often be linked to certain
characteristics of the households. The presence of children or elderly, for example,
may make migration a less attractive option for a young couple. Likewise, the
need for childcare may require at least one person to stay at home and make farm
work the preferred option for this person.
Bearing these considerations in mind, a refined depiction of labour allocation is
implemented in the village CGE model. The approach takes into account house-
hold preferences towards work in different types of employment as well as feedback
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links between household migration and consumption demand. This is achieved
by the assumption of a composite utility function, which defines the behaviour of
each household in the model. At this, the approach offers an innovative extension
of previous works on village modelling, such as those by Taylor and Adelman
(1996) and Kuiper (2005), which have not considered the disutility arising from
certain employment options.
As a whole, the village model offers a highly disaggregated picture of the vil-
lage economy, allowing for a detailed analysis of the impacts of trade reform,
in particular on poverty and inequality. The high level of disaggregation offers
the opportunity to take into account differences between households as well as
local market conditions, both of which are relevant for the village level impacts
of trade liberalisation. The approach towards the modelling of labour allocation
for the first time makes it possible to highlight the consequences of differences in
migration responses among households for the village level effects of trade reform.
The present study on the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty and in-
equality in a rural community in south-western China is subdivided into eight
chapters. Following this introduction, the next Chapter 2 is dedicated to a review
of relevant literature. The chapter starts with a section on China’s economic re-
forms, poverty, inequality and migration, aimed at defining the context in which
the present work takes place. A second section provides a discussion of several
theoretical concepts, which will prove useful for the analyses to follow. A third
section, which has a methodological focus, gives an overview on results obtained
from previous studies on trade liberalisation in China and on current methodolog-
ical approaches towards the problem.
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology, data and the research area. It sketches
the macro-microsimulation framework, which is applied in the present study. The
dataset, which is used is described and Changtian village, the research area, is
introduced and characterised.
Chapter 4 provides a microeconomic theory of household behaviour. Pulling
together different strands of the literature on agricultural household models in
an innovative manner, the chapter departs from a basic farm household model,
to which the utility considerations of households regarding different employment
options and aspects of migration related to household consumption demand are
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added in a stepwise manner. Through this process, a nonseparable agricultural
household model with feedbacks to the consumption sphere is developed, serving
as the theoretical core of the village equilibrium model.
In Chapter 5, a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Changtian village is con-
structed. The SAM constitutes the core dataset underlying the village equilibrium
model and provides a snapshot of the village economy at the time of the survey.
At this, the construction of the SAM is preceded by econometric work oriented
towards the analysis of households’ migration behaviour aimed at supporting the
construction of representative household groups. Furthermore, household specific
shadow prices for family labour and land, which have been unobserved in the
sample are estimated.
In Chapter 6, the theoretical household model of Chapter 4 is translated into
an applied village equilibrium model. This work involves the specification of
functional forms and the construction of a village equilibrium framework. A first
section describes these steps and discusses the main assumptions made, resulting
in a full documentation of the applied model. In a second section, a number of
stylised simulations are carried out in order to introduce and discuss the depiction
of labour allocation by the households in the model.
Chapter 7 applies the village model in a macro-microsimulation framework to
the analysis of the impacts of trade liberalisation on migration, poverty and in-
equality in Changtian village. In a first section, the specific set-up of the model
used for the simulation is described. A second section provides details on the
calibration of the model, focusing in particular on the calibration of the house-
holds’ labour market behaviour. A third section deals with the scenarios applied
to the village model. The national CGE study, which is the source of the trade
policy shock, is presented in a more detailed manner. Furthermore, four different
specifications involving two different calibrations of migration behaviour and two
assumptions regarding the village land market, which are used for the analyses
are discussed. In a fourth and final section, the results of the simulations are
presented and discussed.
Chapter 8 summarises the work. The results of the simulations are reviewed
again. Some tentative policy implications are derived and an assessment of the
overall quality of the work as well as of the merits of the present approach is
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provided. Directions for future research efforts are identified.
8
2. Literature Review
The present chapter prepares the ground for the subsequent analysis of the im-
pacts of trade liberalisation on migration, poverty and inequality on a village
community in south-western China. It starts with an overview of the economic
reforms which have been carried out in China during the past three decades and
which have triggered a remarkable economic development and brought about pro-
found changes to the Chinese society. The discussion focuses in particular on the
agricultural sector. The consequences of the reform efforts are analysed, putting
special emphasis on aspects of migration, poverty and inequality. The overall goal
of this first section is to identify relevant issues, thereby defining the overarching
setting of the present study.
A second section introduces theoretical concepts which serve as broad concep-
tual frameworks for the analyses to follow. The section starts out with a framework
for the analysis of the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality,
which helps to formulate the requirements for the analytical approaches employed
in this study. This first part of that section is followed by a detailed discussion
of positive impacts of migration on source communities. The discussion recog-
nises the important role rural-urban migration plays for the current study and
offers insights about further aspects, which have to be taken into account by the
methodological approach chosen. In a third part, the theoretical concept of a vil-
lage economy is introduced, thus providing the conceptual basis for the simulation
model to be developed in later chapters of this study.
In a third section, different analytical approaches which are capable to address
the requirements stated by the theoretical frameworks are presented and discussed.
The section begins with a discussion of simulation based analysis on distributional
impacts of trade reform in China. This part not only gives an overview of the
relevant literature on simulation modelling but also presents insights gained from
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these analyses which are useful for the present study. A second part presents
applications of macro-micro simulation models for trade policy analysis. In this
part, a sequential macro-microsimulation framework consisting of a CGE model
which is linked to a village equilibrium model is identified as the most suitable
approach for the purpose of the current analysis. Accordingly, in a third part of
that section village equilibrium models are discussed in a detailed manner.
2.1. China’s Economic Reforms, Poverty, Inequality
and Migration
2.1.1. China’s Economic Reforms
In the late 1970s, China launched economic reforms that marked the beginning of
the country’s transition from a planned economy toward what is now called a “So-
cialist Market Economy“ (Wang, 2000, p.2). During four phases of reform (Fan
and Gulati, 2007), China’s economic system has been profoundly transformed.
In a first phase from 1978 to 1984, which was aimed at the rural sector, insti-
tutional and pricing reforms have been carried out. The second reform phase,
dated from 1985 to 1993, involved the promotion of urban industrial enterprises
as well as a reform of the domestic agricultural marketing system. A third phase,
which started in 1994 was characterised by broad-based trade liberalisation in
the run-up to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Following 2001, additional
adjustments related to domestic institutional, marketing, and trade reforms have
been implemented (Fan et al., 2005; Fan and Gulati, 2007). In the following, the
different reform phases will be discussed.
During China’s socialist era from 1949 to 1978, rural life was increasingly or-
ganised collectively through people’s communes. A system of rural and urban
residencies, known as the hukou system, tied farmers to their collectives, mak-
ing it impossible for them to move between rural and urban areas (Huang et al.,
2008, 2009). Agricultural production as well as agricultural trade was mainly
centrally planned. State procurement dominated the commercialisation of agri-
cultural output and farmers had to meet compulsory delivery quotas and received
prices set by the central government (Sicular, 1988, 1995). Essentially, marketing
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of outputs and inputs was carried out by designated state agencies. Individuals
or organisations other than the state agencies mentioned have been prohibited
from engaging in trade or long-distance transport (Huang et al., 2009; Sicular,
1995). Although farmers have been able to sell to the state at higher prices once
compulsory delivery quotas had been met and although occasionally small scale
sales of grains or oilseeds on the local market have been permitted (Sicular, 1995),
a market mechanism has been practically absent.
Prices for agricultural output were fixed at low levels in order to provide the ur-
ban population with cheap food. Although this policy may have helped to support
the state’s objective to force the development of military and heavy industries, it
not only entailed the establishment of a food rationing system in urban areas, but
also implied a taxation of the agricultural sector (Huang et al., 2008, 2009; Kanbur
and Zhang, 2005). Along with the incentive problems inherent to the commune
system, this caused that China’s large agricultural sector remained underdevel-
oped and was characterised by low efficiency and low and stagnant productivity
and incomes (Huang et al., 2009).
In the late 1970s, the Chinese government embarked upon a reform of the social-
ist system, starting with the reform of the rural sector. This first phase of reform
is dated from 1978 to 1984 and involved institutional changes and adjustments of
the pricing system in order to improve incentives to agricultural production (Fan
and Gulati, 2007).
The core element of this first reform phase was the de-collectivisation of agri-
cultural production. The former commune system was dismantled and replaced
by the so-called Household Responsibility System (HRS) (Fan et al., 2005; Huang
et al., 2009).1 The new system took the responsibility for agricultural production
away from the collective and put it back into the hands of the individual house-
hold. Households obtained land contracts as well as residual income rights and
became responsible for their own production including the fulfilment of delivery
quotas and the contribution to local collectives’ accumulation and administrative
funds (Fan et al., 2005; Liu et al., 1998). Thereby, in order to ensure an egalitarian
distribution, control over land remained with the local collective and households
1In fact, various forms of decentralised production organisation have been adopted, but the
HRS was the most common (Liu et al., 1998).
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received land contracts which granted them income and control rights, but not
the right to sell land (Huang et al., 2009; Liu et al., 1998).
Along with the introduction of the HRS, initial reforms of the agricultural mar-
keting system have been undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Farm
level procurement prices for the major agricultural commodities have been raised
to market levels and compulsory delivery quotas have been reduced (Huang and
Rozelle, 2006; Huang et al., 2009; Sicular, 1988). Overall, the number of prod-
ucts subject to state procurement has been reduced, thus limiting the volumes of
mandatory, low-price quota deliveries (Liu et al., 1998). Restrictions on trading
activities have been relaxed by granting individuals the permission to small scale
trading operations in animal products, vegetables, minor crops and light manufac-
tures in 1981 and by allowing private and individual commercialisation of grains
once procurement quotas have been fulfilled in 1982. Furthermore, since the early
1980s, state trading agencies negotiated procurement prices, thus becoming more
responsive to market prices (Huang and Rozelle, 2006; Sicular, 1995). This grad-
ual liberalisation of the agricultural marketing system lead to the emergence of
periodic rural markets and ultimately undermined the state procurement system
(Sicular, 1995).
Apart from the changes in the agricultural sector, sub-national governments
started to foster the growth of rural non-agricultural industries (OECD, 2005).
This lead to the emergence of rural industrial clusters in the form of township
and village enterprises and went hand in hand with a relaxation of the hukou
system which reduced restrictions to the movement of labour out of agriculture.
The consequence was the establishment of small rural towns and a strengthening
of rural-urban linkages while at the same time reducing migration from rural to
urban areas (Fan et al., 2005; OECD, 2005).
Following this first phase of reforms, the period from 1985 to 1993 witnessed
a promotion of industrial enterprises in urban areas, the further strengthening of
market institutions, as well as the dismantling of the central planning system.
In the urban industrial sectors, the introduction of a dual-track pricing system
gradually replaced prices set by the central government with market prices, thus
giving an ever greater role to the market. At the same time, the so called en-
terprise contract responsibility system gave enterprises greater autonomy in their
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production and employment decisions (Fan et al., 2005).
Regarding the farm sector, the year 1985 marked the beginning of the second
stage of the reform of the domestic marketing system (Huang and Rozelle, 2006).
Planned procurement for most products except rice, wheat, maize and cotton was
eliminated (Huang et al., 2009). During the late 1980s, procurement prices for
grains and cotton have been increased to market levels and obligatory quotas for
grain delivery have been finally abolished and replaced by voluntary contracts
(Rozelle et al., 1997; Sicular, 1995). These changes in the procurement system
as well as further reductions in the restrictions on domestic trade of commodities
and the gradual commercialization of the state trading system for grains lead to
the creation of markets for agricultural outputs in rural and urban areas (Huang
et al., 2009). As a consequence, the rationing of grain could be phased out by the
early 1990s (Rozelle et al., 1997). Furthermore, the effective isolation of consumers
and farmers from international markets due to the distortions which resulted from
domestic pricing and marketing policies has been gradually reduced and domestic
prices in China became more responsive to world market prices (Huang et al.,
2009).
This latter tendency was reinforced by some first changes in the foreign trade
regime. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the formerly overvalued exchange rate
experienced a sharp depreciation. This removal of an implicit taxation of the
agricultural sector lead to an improvement of the competitiveness of agricultural
exports and rapid export growth (Huang et al., 2007). Furthermore, restrictions to
the access to import and export markets for non-state actors have been gradually
relaxed and the role of state trading enterprises in foreign trade has been reduced
(Huang et al., 2009).
The third reform period, which dates from 1994 to 2001, was shaped by the
perspective of China to enter the WTO. Accordingly, broad-based trade liberali-
sation has been undertaken and the economy has been opened up to foreign direct
investment (FDI) (Fan and Gulati, 2007; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). In this phase,
the socialist market economy which is still primarily under public ownership but
in which resource allocation and distribution decisions are fundamentally driven
by market forces took shape (Fan et al., 2005).
In order to attract FDI and to create strong export sectors, special economic
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zones in coastal cities have been established and tax preferences in coastal provinces
have been introduced. Thus, economic policies became increasingly biased to-
wards the promotion of the areas located at the coast (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).
At a more general scale, the financial and fiscal sectors have been reformed and
rural-urban labour mobility has been facilitated (Fan et al., 2005). Nonetheless,
the hukou system as such has still been maintained.
Regarding trade policies, the exchange rate was allowed to appreciate again
since 1992. At around 30% as compared to a depreciation by more than 400%
since the onset of reforms (Huang et al., 2007), however, this appreciation was
comparatively small.2 Import tariffs have been reduced systematically, falling for
food products, for example, from a simple average of 42% in 1992 to 21% in 2001.
Further liberalisation involved the abolishment of export subsidies, the further
relaxation of licensing procedures for foreign trade, the reduction of non-tariff
barriers as well as the tariffication of import quotas (Huang et al., 2004).
Following the entry of China to the WTO in December 2001, the fourth phase
of reforms began. This phase involved a further deepening of the reforms carried
out up to that time. Domestic institutional reforms, as well as reforms of the
marketing system and trade reforms have been accelerated (Fan and Gulati, 2007).
In case of the agricultural sector, the remaining restrictions on domestic marketing
have been removed and government intervention in grain prices fully eliminated
(Huang and Rozelle, 2006).
The three decades of reforms have left China as a broadly liberal economy.
Product markets across the country have become increasingly integrated and effi-
cient. Labour is more mobile across sectors and in particular rural labour markets
are more integrated than before(Huang and Rozelle, 2006; Zhang and Tan, 2007).
Nevertheless, obstacles to rural-urban migration, in particular the hukou system
and the land tenure system, remain (Fleisher and Yang, 2006) and cause con-
tinued and significant segmentation (Zhang and Tan, 2007). In contrast to the
developments in product and factor markets, however, distortions appear to have
increased in the capital market which has become more fragmented (Zhang and
Tan, 2007).
2This also explains the continuing pressure on China to further appreciate its currency (see,
for example, The Economist, 2010).
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In case of land markets, the current land tenure arrangements under which
land is still collectively owned and leased to farm households for a period of 30
years are seen to lead to tenure insecurity and limit the amount of land market
transactions (OECD, 2005). This is seen by many authors as an obstacle to
improving competitiveness of agricultural production (Carter et al., 2009; Huang
et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2010). Furthermore, the tenure insecurity which stems
from the present arrangements constitutes a barrier to migration, as households
which leave the village to migrate run the risk of losing their land use rights. This
is all the more important as land still fulfils an important social security function
in China by providing households with at least a basic source of income (Huang
et al., 2008; Tao and Xu, 2007).
Regarding trade policies, China has become fairly open to the outside world.
Overall levels of trade protection are low. By 2009, the simple average of applied
most favoured nation tariffs, which are typically higher than applied rates, was
9.6%. Tariffs on agricultural goods were at 15.6% on average and non-agricultural
sectors have been protected by average tariff rates of 8.7% (WTO, 2010). However,
concerns persist about non-tariff barriers to trade, such as customs procedures,
import restrictions, technical regulations or standards, as well as restrictions on
foreign investment (WTO, 2008).
In the realm of agriculture, China has now a relatively liberal farm sector in
which markets play a central role for the allocation and distribution of inputs
and outputs and in which government intervention, apart from the land tenure
regime, is limited (Huang et al., 2009). In general, from 1998 onwards the focus of
agricultural policies has shifted from increasing agricultural production towards
supporting rural incomes. Overall levels of farm support in China, however, are
still comparatively low. In 2007, the producer support estimate (PSE) expressed
as percent of gross farm receipts was at 8.7%, but had followed a rising trend
throughout the preceding decade (OECD, 2010). Support, however, varies greatly
among products. Importables such as sugar, milk or cotton tend to be more
highly protected, with the commodity specific %PSE averaging between 17% for
soy-beans and 39% in case of sugar between 2000 and 2003. Exportables, such as
livestock or fruit and vegetables, in contrast, tend to receive lower or even negative
levels of protection (OECD, 2005).
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Support to China’s agricultural sector is provided through a range of domestic
policy measures, such as input subsidies for water, electricity, transport, seeds,
direct payments based on area farmed with rice, wheat or corn as well as pay-
ments for returning farmland to forests (OECD, 2005, 2010). Regarding trade,
some protection in the form of import tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and ex-
port subsidies, the latter in form of domestic marketing, transport and storage
subsidies, is retained (Huang et al., 2009). State trading is only relevant for goods
covered by TRQs (OECD, 2005).
As already mentioned in the introductory part to this section, China’s economic
reforms have lead to a profound transformation of the country. Certainly the
most cited among the manifold changes which have occurred is the rapid economic
growth. According to the World Bank (2011), between 1980 and 2009 the Chinese
economy has grown by 9.5% per year on average. This has lead to an increase in
the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from 193 current US$ to 3744 US$
during the same period.
Just as the economy as a whole, the agricultural sector benefited from the
reforms. Increases in yields, productivity and efficiency lead to a growth in agri-
cultural GDP by around 5% per year since the onset of reforms to 2004, although
growth rates have been higher at around 7% at the beginning and declined to
slightly over 3% to the end of that period (Huang et al., 2009). Overall, agricul-
tural production became more diversified and international trade expanded. As
a consequence of the opening of trade to international markets, a specialisation
in trade on labour intensive commodities such as fruits and vegetables or meat
products at the cost of land intensive commodities like grains, soy-beans, edible
oils or cotton could be observed (Huang et al., 2009; OECD, 2005). As growth
rates in agriculture have been consistently lower than in the economy as a whole,
however, the relative importance of the sector in terms of its contribution to the
national GDP declined from around 30% in 1980 to 10% in 2009 (World Bank,
2011). Similarly, farming became less important as a source of employment, re-
ducing its contribution to total employment from 71% at the end of 1970s to 42%
in 2003 (OECD, 2005).
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2.1.2. Poverty and Inequality
China’s economic growth and development during the reform period lead to im-
pressive progress with respect to poverty reduction: from 1980 to 2001 the overall
poverty headcount ratio fell from approximately 53% to less than 8%; poverty in
rural areas declined from 76% to around 13% (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).3 As the
authors point out, the major part of poverty reduction, however, occurred after
the initial phase of the reforms. In fact, most of the progress achieved can be
attributed to reforms in the agricultural and rural sector, i.e. to the introduction
of the HRS in the early 1980s and the reform of the agricultural marketing system
in the 1990s, and the resulting growth in the primary sector. Thereby, the posi-
tive impact of agricultural growth was enhanced due to the equitable distribution
of land which followed from the pre-reform era (Montalvo and Ravallion, 2010;
Ravallion and Chen, 2007). In addition, directed government spending had some
poverty reducing impact. The contribution of trade reforms, however, is unclear
and at least until 2001 no impact could be identified (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
Ravallion and Chen (2007) also observe that the pace of poverty reduction has
slowed down during the reform era and expect more difficulties in achieving further
progress in the future. These difficulties are rooted in the fact that economic
growth increasingly comes from sources which contribute less to the reduction in
poverty, such as the industry and services sectors rather than the primary sector.
This latter aspect is particularly critical as poverty still is a predominantly rural
problem (Yao et al., 2004). A further cause for the expected difficulties in future
poverty reduction is a persistently high and rising inequality which can be found
across the country, between and within rural and urban areas as well as between
China’s inland provinces and the coast (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
Indeed, the dramatic economic development and the successes in poverty reduc-
tion have been accompanied by growing disparities and inequality within China.
3The authors use a poverty line of 850 yuan per year for rural areas and 1,200 yuan per year
for urban areas in 2002 current prices, which corresponds to a daily consumption allowance
of US$ 1.08 (adjusting for differences in purchasing power). These values are chosen to allow
for food consumption of 2,100 calories per person and day plus an allowance for non-food
consumption. It should also be noted that poverty figures of course differ when using different
poverty lines, such as China’s official one, which is much lower. The trend of falling poverty,
however, remains the same under different poverty lines (Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Chen
and Ravallion, 2008).
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After declining from about 2.3 at the onset of reforms to around 1.6 by the mid-
1980s, the ratio of urban to rural incomes steadily increased to a value of 2.5
in 2001 (Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Other authors present values ranging be-
tween 2.3 and 3.2 for the year 2002 or 3.5 in 2003 (Fan et al., 2005; Sicular et al.,
2007). Thereby, a further important dimension of inequality are disparities be-
tween coastal areas and inland provinces which have grown during the reform
era. As a consequence of the growing divides in the Chinese society, indicators on
overall inequality follow rising trends during the past decades.
The Gini index for China as a whole, for example, has risen from around 31.0%
in 1981 to 44.7% in 2001, thus having reached its highest levels in the country’s
communist history (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Other
authors even deem these estimates to be too conservative and speak of a Gini
index which most likely is higher than 50 (Benjamin et al., 2008). This would
imply that the coefficient has reached a critical value, which means that China has
passed the threshold to a polarized society in which richer population groups reap
most benefits of economic growth, whereas poor people face difficulties to secure a
subsistence level of living (Feng, 2004). On the other hand, the pronounced rural-
urban divide causes the overall Gini index to be lower than those for either rural
or urban areas, which were estimated at around 36.5% and 32.3%, respectively,
in 2001.4 The trend in these indices, however, is also rising (Ravallion and Chen,
2007). In rural areas, for example, the annual income growth rate from 1980-2001
for the poorest decile of the population was at 3%, whereas incomes of the richest
decile increased by 8% per year on average (Huang et al., 2009).
Scholars of the Chinese economy present several interpretations of the devel-
opment of the disparities in the country. In general, the initial reforms steps
which focused on the rural areas and the agricultural sector are seen to having
brought about a reduction in inequality which reached a through in 1984 (Kan-
bur and Zhang, 2005; Yao et al., 2004). This observation corresponds to the
comparatively strong decline in poverty during the first period described above.
In subsequent reform periods, the focus of economic policy shifted away from
4As in case of the overall Gini index, Benjamin et al. (2008) again consider these values to be
too low. They rather reckon the Gini in both urban and rural areas to be between 40% and
50%.
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the rural economy and toward the promotion of the formal urban sector. This
policy also had a strong coastal bias, as for example manifested in the establish-
ment of special economic zones, and fostered the development of China’s eastern
provinces, thus leading to the growing rural-urban and inland-coast disparities.
At this, an important role was also played by the opening up to foreign trade and
foreign direct investment which further contributed to the economic advances of
the coastal regions (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). In addition, policies of decentral-
isation caused that local administrations increasingly had to rely on their own
tax base. This enhanced the significance of historical levels of development and
differences in geographical location for overall inequality and put coastal areas
which could benefit from a better agricultural production environment, proximity
to foreign markets, a higher initial economic development, better infrastructure
and better human resources at further advantage (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Yao
et al., 2004; Zhang, 2006). In this context, persisting barriers to rural-urban mi-
gration through the hukou system helped to maintain the rural-urban as well as
the inland-coastal disparities (Sicular et al., 2007). On the other hand, recent
research carried out by Zhang et al. (2010) finds that nationwide labour shortages
have lead to increases in real wages in all provinces since 2003. This development
would cause inland provinces to catch up and may result in a reduction of this
dimension of inequality.
Regardless of these recent developments, high and growing levels of inequality
in China are of great concern and keep occupying central stage in the political and
academic debate (see, for example, Benjamin et al., 2008; Dollar, 2007; OECD,
2004). In this context, inequality matters not only from an ethical or philosophical
point of view, but also because of its possible consequences for economic growth
prospects. Related to the former are, for example, the relationship between in-
equality and poverty or under-nutrition whereas in case of the latter aspects such
as the impact of inequality on aggregate savings rates or the efficiency of capital
and other markets may play a role (Ray, 1998). In fact, in case of China rising
inequality is found to make further reductions of poverty increasingly difficult, as
it causes the poor to benefit less from overall income growth in the economy and
thereby dampens the poverty reducing impact of economic growth (Ravallion and
Chen, 2007; Yao et al., 2004). Moreover, higher levels of inequality might pose a
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threat to social stability (OECD, 2004) and are even considered to cast doubt on
the overall legitimacy of China’s economic reforms (Qin, 2009).
2.1.3. Migration
While rural-urban and inter-provincial disparities in China increase, a further
effect which must not be neglected are the massive population movements which
are driven by just these disparities, as well as by rising labour demand in expanding
industrial and services sectors, land scarcity and few off-farm opportunities in
many rural areas (de Brauw et al., 2002; Seeborg et al., 2000; Zhao, 2005). By
the mid 2000s, the number of migrants from rural areas has been estimated at
between 100 and 130 million (Cai et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2009; Wang and Cai,
2007), with approximately 20% of the rural labour force working as migrants
within China (de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Murphy,
2006). Following the gradient of economic development in the country, rural-urban
migrants usually come from rural areas of the poorer inland provinces and from
regions with poorly developed non-farm sectors. Furthermore, they tend to go
to wealthier, urban regions, in particular they migrate to the economically more
developed coastal provinces in the eastern part of the country (Carrillo Garcia,
2004; Tian et al., 2004; Zhao, 2005).
To a large extent, rural-urban migration is temporary and seasonal. Migrants
maintain links with their villages of origin and circular migration dominates (Cai,
2003; Hare, 1999; Zhao, 2003), ensuring an intensive exchange between the mi-
grants and their home communities. It is due to this exchange, combined with
the mere scale of migration, that migrants can be expected to play an important
role in the development of the communities of origin and thereby of the poor rural
areas of the country.
This is of particular importance as non-farm employment in general and es-
pecially migration have become an increasingly important source of income for
rural households in China during the past three decades (Benjamin et al., 2005).
Reflecting this fact, as well as migrants’ high propensities to remit, remittances
make up a substantial share of the income of recipient households and of rural
communities as a whole. For example, in 1995 remittances accounted for 25% of
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income of recipient households in 19 provinces (Cai, 2003). In a 2002 household
survey from Hubei province, Zhu and Luo (2008) even find 55% income shares
of remittances. Consequently, it is observed that migration increases the (per
capita) income of migrant sending households (de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; Du
et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2003). At the same time, migration benefits poorer
households, contributing to the alleviation of rural poverty (de Brauw and Giles,
2008a; Du et al., 2005). On the other hand, it is also found that different access
to migration can enhance inequality at the level of rural communities (Xing et al.,
2009). Regardless the actual direction of this impact, migration can be considered
to be one of the strongest forces affecting the rural economy in the past.
The goal of the preceding explanations was to shed light on the developments
which have taken place in China since the onset of the economic reforms in the
late 1970s and thereby to define the broader context of the present study. It
becomes clear that China has made great advances in increasing the overall in-
come levels of its population and in reducing poverty. Furthermore, growing and
persisting inequality can be identified as a highly relevant issue for the future de-
velopment of the country. Thereby, the role of migration for contributing to the
livelihoods of the rural population, in linking rural economies with urban sectors
and in transmitting impacts of policy reforms to rural households can hardly be
overestimated.
While trade reform is found to having had only limited impacts on poverty
reduction (at least until the early 2000s), it appears as a relevant factor for ex-
plaining the regionally divergent development of the economy. In addition, not
least due to the relatively high levels of protection which remain in the agricul-
tural sector, further liberalisation can be expected to affect in particular this part
of the economy. This is particularly relevant against the background that poverty
remains a predominantly rural phenomenon. As the impacts of trade reform will
not be limited to the farm sector and the rural economy alone, however, migration
may fulfil a decisive function in determining the ultimate outcome of reforms.
Proceeding towards an analysis of village level impacts of trade liberalisation,
the following section is concerned with theoretical concepts which may prove useful
for such an undertaking. Three theoretical frameworks, each of which focusing
on a different dimension of the problem, are presented. This more theoretically
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oriented section is followed by a third part dealing with analytical approaches
which are useful for the purpose of the present study.
2.2. Theoretical Concepts
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical background for the analyses
carried out in this study. It starts with an analytical framework for the analysis of
the manifold relationships between trade liberalisation and poverty. In a second
subsection, positive impacts of migration on source communities are discussed.
This part recognises the particular importance of migration for the current anal-
ysis and is aimed to enhance the understanding of relevant local level processes
associated with this phenomenon. A third subsection presents the analytical con-
cept of a village economy which constitutes the basis for the modelling framework
developed later on.
2.2.1. Analysing Trade Liberalisation and Poverty
When dealing with trade liberalisation and poverty, it is paramount to dispose
of a clear conceptual framework regarding the causal connections between trade
policy changes and household welfare. Such a general framework which describes
the ways how trade policy shocks affect the poverty of households is proposed by
McCulloch et al. (2001) and Winters (2002).5
The basic analytical unit identified by the authors is the farm household as de-
scribed by Singh et al. (1986a,b). The household, which is depicted in the bottom
part of Figure 2.1, controls productive resources—labour, land and capital—and
seeks to maximize its welfare by making decisions on production, consumption
and labour allocation. Trade policy reforms affect household welfare via changes
in prices for consumption goods and goods produced by the household, wages and
employment, other factor rewards, and changes in taxes and government spend-
ing; effects, however, are not uniform across households. Next to the structure of
household production, consumption, and factor endowments, the existence of eco-
nomic alternatives and a household’s ability to shift to such alternatives, matter.
5Unless stated otherwise, the present section draws upon these studies.
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At this, the ability of the household to adjust depends on a number of factors.
These factors comprise the endowment with physical and natural assets and hu-
man capital and the institutional environment which includes variables such as
social barriers that might impede the realization of benefits from liberalisation,
the existence and structure of markets for goods, services, and labour and the
access to market information. In a survey of the evidence regarding trade liberali-
sation and poverty, Winters et al. (2004) highlight the importance of adjustments
in production and consumption as a response of households to trade policy shocks
and the relevance of these reactions for the welfare outcome of reforms. Schiff and
Montenegro (1997) study the responses of agricultural producers to price incen-
tives and find that producers tend to be more responsive if they have better access
to inputs, information and credit. Likewise, Lopez et al. (1995) present evidence
that farmers with low levels of capital input tend to be less responsive to price
changes. In this context, they detect a correlation of price responses with access
to credit, the level of education, and the quality of land.
Having identified and characterised the household as the basic analytical unit,
McCulloch et al. (2001) and Winters (2002) describe the transmission channels
between the level at which trade policy changes take place and the household level.
The three channels of transmission distinguished by the authors are enterprises,
the distribution sector and the government. The three channels are represented
by the three columns which make up the conceptual framework in Figure 2.1.
The distribution channel, broadly located in the middle part of the figure, is
responsible for the transmission of price changes to the household level. In an
import situation, world market prices translate into border prices, depending on
the exchange rate, trade policy instruments such as tariffs or quantitative restric-
tions, and the structure of the import trading sector. At this stage, an alteration
in the trade policy instruments applied exerts its most direct influence by chang-
ing the translation of world market prices into border prices. The transmission
of price changes to the household level, however, still is determined by the trans-
lation of border prices into wholesale and retail prices, the latter being those
the households ultimately face. Manifold factors influence the price transmission
through the distribution channels: further taxes and regulations might be ap-
plied, the structure of the trading sector and the level of competition herein play
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Source: McCulloch et al. (2001).
Figure 2.1.: Trade policy and poverty.
a role and the way how households access the market—perhaps being organized
in cooperatives—matter. In this context, McCulloch et al. (2001) highlight the
households’ characteristics as well as their access to technologies and exposition
to random shocks like weather. The latter two are emphasized because of their
crucial influence on productivity and hence the potential to impact on the gener-
ation of welfare at any given set of prices. Against this picture, the importance
to obtain a clear picture of the transmission channels, including aspects such as
the behaviour of the agents or the existence of market links, becomes clear.
A growing body of evidence is available which confirms the importance of taking
into account the actual levels of price transmission when carrying out household
level analyses. Kleinwechter and Rojas Lara (2010), for example, find that the
transmission of prices from the Peruvian coast to the Amazon gets gradually
weaker when crossing the Andean mountains. Schu¨ttel et al. (2010) present anal-
yses which show a strong transmission of world market prices to agricultural mar-
kets in Bolivia. Luckmann et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive analysis of the
marketing chains for maize and rice in Vietnam and find mixed evidence regard-
ing the transmission of world market prices to provincial levels: some provinces
appear to be perfectly integrated with world markets, whereas others lack this
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connection. Nicita (2006) incorporates aspects of price transmission into a CGE
analysis for Mexico and shows that differences in price transmission cause the
impacts of trade liberalisation to differ between provinces.
In the context of price transmission, indirect effects and the domain of trade
play another important role. Indirect effects refer to second round effects caused
by the adjustment reactions of economic actors. Changes in supply and demand
cause further adjustments of relative prices on the markets. Thereby, shocks may
also be transmitted to markets which are not directly affected by the trade policy
reforms. The strength of the second round effects, in turn, is determined by the
domain of trade, which is depicted on the right hand side of Figure 2.1. The
domain of trade refers to the level at which a certain good or factor is traded
and defines the level at which price formation takes place. Different domains,
such as the international, national, regional or local level can be distinguished. In
general, the smaller the domain of trade, the larger the second round effects can be
expected to be. Subsistence production is also included into these considerations,
because it provides, from a conceptual point of view, goods which are nontraded
at the household level.
The second channel of transmission of trade policy shocks to the household
identified by McCulloch et al. (2001) and Winters (2002) is the enterprise chan-
nel. Enterprises are seen to act on markets for outputs, intermediate inputs and
production factors. Thereby, they are affected by policy induced price changes,
but, due to their supply and demand responses, also exert an influence on market
prices. In this indirect way households are affected by the activities of enterprises.
More directly, however, households receive earnings from the enterprises in the
form of profits and wages. For wage earning households, it is also the level of
employment which matters and which might be altered by trade policy reforms.
In this context, household demographics play a role, as both remuneration and
employment prospects may differ by gender or age groups.
The third transmission channel is the government, which is included on the
right hand side into the framework in Figure 2.1. The government receives in-
come from tariff revenues and taxes. These revenues may be spent in ways which
affect the welfare of the households, for example via direct transfers or through
public health or education systems. Mainly two major concerns are raised regard-
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ing the effect of trade reforms on the government channel. The first concern is
that trade liberalisation may lead to falling government revenues. A reduction
in tariff revenues might follow the reduction or abolition of tariffs. Furthermore,
openness reduces the ability of governments to tax mobile factors (Rodrik, 1997)
and increasing competition makes it more difficult to tax exports. In the conse-
quence, governments might have to cut back on social expenditures or introduce
alternative taxation schemes, which might shift the tax burden away from capi-
tal and towards the labour factor (Rodrik, 1997). Under this scenario, negative
impacts on household welfare and in particular on the poor are possible. Nega-
tive consequences of trade reforms on the poor, however, might not be inevitable.
Trade liberalisation may actually lead to increases in government revenues, for ex-
ample during tariffication processes at early stages of trade liberalisation, in cases
where initial tariffs exceed the revenue maximising rates or through the abolish-
ment of tariff exemptions. Similarly, the impact of alternative taxes may depend
on how they are applied and governments may set priorities when deciding upon
the reduction of spending (McCulloch et al., 2001).
The second concern relates to the ability of governments to manage spending
and taxation in a way that impacts poverty. Commitments on trade liberalisation
made for example in multilateral or bilateral trade agreements may reduce the
”policy space” of governments by constraining the use of potentially pro-poor
policies such as variable levies or production subsidies. An alternative point of
view, however, might be that commitments made in the scope of trade reforms
my constrain governments ability to manipulate policies in arbitrary ways, thus
potentially limiting redistribution from poor to rich and reducing uncertainties
which inhibit productive investments (McCulloch et al., 2001).
An example for the effects of trade reforms on government revenues is given by
a study on fiscal implications of structural adjustment loans by Greenaway and
Milner (1991). Comparing the experiences of five developing countries, the au-
thors find trade reforms leading to revenue enhancement in three of the countries,
whereas two had to cope with decreases in revenues. According to the authors,
increases in revenues can be traced back to initial tariff levels above the revenue
maximising rate, the replacement of import quotas with equivalent tariffs and the
withdrawal of tariff exemptions. The countries which suffer a depletion in rev-
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enues, in contrast, had lower initial tariffs and maintained quantitative restrictions
instead of replacing them by tariffs.
In addition to the conceptual framework presented by Figure 2.1 and discussed
in the preceding paragraphs, McCulloch et al. (2001) discuss the issues of shocks,
risks and vulnerability as important aspects for the analysis of trade liberalisation
and poverty. The ability to handle economic shocks—of which trade reform is a
representative—is identified as an important dimension of poverty. Consequently,
if households are poor at the onset, they might be less capable to deal with a
given trade policy shock. Similarly, vulnerable households, defined as those which
have a high probability of being below the poverty line, may be more negatively
affected by trade reforms than others. Trade reform in itself, in turn, may in-
crease the vulnerability of households. This can happen if trade policy induced
changes in prices, wages and employment bring households closer to the poverty
line. Furthermore, trade liberalisation can affect the risk faced by households,
both through changes in price variability due to market integration and/or the
restriction of price stabilisation measures and through changes in production pat-
terns in response to changing prices. At this, the empirical evidence of the impact
on trade liberalisation on price risk faced by agricultural households points into
both directions. Gilbert and Varangis (2003) find increased price variances for
cocoa in west Africa. Del Ninno and Dorosh (2001), in contrast, present evi-
dence of price stabilising effects of private imports under a liberal trade regime in
Bangladesh.6
The conceptual framework developed by McCulloch et al. (2001) and Winters
(2002) provides a valuable check-list on the multitude of linkages which have to be
taken into account when analysing household level impacts of trade liberalisation.
It also underlines the complexity of the processes at work which at large lead to
the particular outcome of a specific trade reform. Reflecting this complexity, the
empirical evidence regarding the size and direction of the impact of trade liberali-
6As a final aspect, McCulloch et al. (2001) mention economic growth as a way in which trade
liberalisation affects poverty. They argue that the dynamic effects of openness materialized
through economic growth are a crucial determinant of the poverty impacts of trade liberali-
sation. As the current study takes a rather short-term perspective, this dimension has been
left out of the discussion. In any case, evidence regarding the relationship between trade
liberalisation and economic growth is still subject to debate (Dollar, 1992; Rodr´ıguez and
Rodrik, 2000).
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sation through the various channels is typically mixed (Winters et al., 2004). For
example, it cannot be generalized that trade liberalisation raises agricultural prices
or unskilled wages and hence has a poverty-alleviating effect. Rather, the analysis
of trade liberalisation and poverty requires comprehensive, case-specific examina-
tions. In this context, Kanji and Barrientos (2002) and Imber et al. (2003) suggest
that a comprehensive analysis of trade policy impacts on welfare and poverty at
the household level requires consideration of macroeconomic changes as well as
micro-level analyses. Imber et al. (2003) introduce the concept of trade realities:
with this approach they refrain from the concept of perfect markets and explain
differential impacts of trade policy reforms by the uneven transmission of prices
to economic actors, specific market structures, access to capital, the institutional
and policy environment, standards and regulations, and domestic market devel-
opments. Kanji and Barrientos (2002) also call for an approach that differentiates
aggregate macroeconomic effects according to their impact on specific groups.
The preceding discussion provides a guideline along which to proceed in the
present analysis. In addition, the insights gained also define a benchmark against
which the methodological approach of this study should be assessed.
2.2.2. Positive Impacts of Migration on Source Communities
An important focus of the present study is on migration and its impacts on poverty
and inequality in rural communities. These impacts ultimately depend on the
effects migratory activity unfolds on the economy of the village in question. Ac-
cordingly, the following section is dedicated to a review of the empirical evidence
on the positive impacts of migration on source communities. The insights gained
are summarised in a conceptual framework which serves as guideline for the sub-
sequent analyses, but which also helps to assess the scope and limitations of the
analytical approach chosen in this study. Corresponding to the focus of the study,
the review deals exclusively with literature on rural-urban migration in China.7
7This section represents an extract of a paper titled “Rural-urban migration in China: An
empirically based framework of diasporas’ contributions to rural development” which has
been presented at the Conference on Diaspora and Development in Washington D.C., July
13-14, 2009 (Kleinwechter, 2009). The paper provides an extensive review of the literature
on rural-urban migration in China and deals not only with the positive impacts on migration
presented here but also with institutional, administrative and social factors which exert an
influence on these impacts.
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From the perspective of the migrant sending community, migration means out-
flows of people and resulting return flows of remittances and return migration.
These return flows create a number of positive impacts on the communities, rang-
ing from the widely discussed effects of remittances over return migrants’ contri-
butions to local development to less obvious general equilibrium effects.
As already discussed in Section 2.1.1, non-farm employment and especially mi-
gration play an increasingly important role for the livelihoods of rural households
in China. Higher incomes, for example, which potentially result from migration
leave households with the choice of how to spend additional funds. Different ways
of spending, such as increased consumption or investment in productive activities,
assets, health and education are conceivable. Several authors confirm the positive
effects of migration on the consumption level of households in source communi-
ties (Cai, 2003; de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Tian
et al., 2004). Theoretically, additional funds available through remittances should
loosen credit constraints faced by households, thus allowing the exploitation of
investment opportunities (Rozelle et al., 1999; Stark, 1982; Zhu and Luo, 2008).
Evidence regarding the impact of migration on productive investments, however,
is mixed. Generally, no strong link between migration and productive investment
has been empirically established yet (de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; de Brauw and
Rozelle, 2008; Murphy, 2006). Nevertheless, de Brauw and Giles (2008a) detect
higher productive investment among richer households. De Brauw and Rozelle
(2008) find higher investment levels among non-poor households, but with more
rigorous testing reject the hypothesis of higher productive investment. The sit-
uation somewhat changes when analysing consumptive investments. The studies
reviewed agree that remittances lead to higher expenses on durable goods and
assets, such as housing and consumer durables, and thus to an improvement in
living conditions (de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Mur-
phy, 2006). A third field of possible investment is health and education. Murphy
(2006) argues that, due to the relatively high costs of health care and education
in rural areas, people commonly use remittances for these purposes; however, she
only presents scarce empirical evidence, citing a study by Huang and Zhan (2005)
which underlines her statement.
Besides remittances, the second return flow to communities of origin is migrants
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returning home. In principle, return migrants have a high potential to contribute
to the development of their communities by bringing back savings, technology,
entrepreneurship and experience gained during their stays at the destinations
(Murphy, 2006; Zhao, 2002). With respect to the use of savings, households with
return migrants are found to have higher investments in production machinery,
especially in machines used for farming. Furthermore, return migrants are also
found to own more consumer durables and housing stock (Zhao, 2002). Evidence
of return migrants creating new businesses is scant and of limited geographical
scope. Nevertheless, instances of successful business establishment by returnees
and positive development contributions are reported. Murphy (1999) finds that
returnees created rural industries in South Jianxi in the late 1990s. Relying on a
sample from nine provinces taken in 1997, Ma (2001) finds that return migrants
help families engage in commercial activities. The author argues that through a
general strengthening of human capital these entrepreneurial activities have sub-
stantial positive impacts on other households as well. Murphy (2006) summarizes
the evidence stating, ”[. . . ]even though returned migrants who create businesses
may not be large in number [. . . ]”, they may have an ”[. . . ] impact on the local
economy [. . . ] greater than their numbers alone suggest” (Murphy, 2006, p.26).
So far, the discussion has mainly focused on the impact of the flows associated
with migration on the migrant households themselves. Indirect effects on non-
migrant households have only been studied peripherally. Such indirect effects can
be summarized as general equilibrium effects which affect local economies via the
working of factor and product markets.
In theory, migration has the potential to affect the supply and demand for com-
modities, labour and other production factors, which in turn may change relative
prices and wages in the local economy. These effects are stronger the more imper-
fect the market environment and the weaker the market integration of the locality
is with the outside world (Taylor and Adelman, 1996). The reviewed literature
on migration in China reports impacts on labour and land markets, which in turn
lead to consequences for non-migrant households. With respect to labour markets,
out-migration is expected to reduce the local labour force, leading to an increase
in marginal productivities of labour. Furthermore, to the extent that migrant
employment allows households to invest in productive activities and construction,
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local labour demand may increase. This may result in higher returns to labour in
both home production and off-farm employment (Cai, 2003; de Brauw and Giles,
2008a,b). Indeed, a number of studies, albeit carried out at a rather aggregate
level, seem to confirm this hypothesis. Tian et al. (2004) studied the contribu-
tions of rural laborers to agricultural and non-agricultural GDP and found that
a transfer of rural laborers to off-farm activities increases labour productivities.
This result is supported by Zhang and Tan (2007) who, over the period of China’s
economic reforms, analyzed the facilitation of rural-urban migration, finding in-
creasing and converging marginal products of labour in rural areas. De Brauw
and Giles (2008b) analyse the effect of migration on educational attainment of
young rural residents and show that migration decreases middle and high school
enrolment of both young people with migration opportunities and young peo-
ple staying in communities with high out-migration. This observation points to
increased opportunity costs of attending school through higher returns to local
employment.
In addition to the labour market impacts of migration, several authors show
that higher availability of land after out-migration benefits households which stay
behind. De Brauw and Giles (2008a) report an increase in land per capita after
migration. Furthermore, in spite of restricted land markets, poorer households
appear to be able to take advantage of larger farm sizes. Zhu and Luo (2008)
state that migration reduces demand for land and helps in ”breaking up the vicious
cycle of poverty – extensive cultivation – ecological deterioration – poverty” (Zhu
and Luo, 2008, p.6). Although not strictly of empirical nature, a simulation study
employing a village equilibrium model in Jianxi province provides further insights
into the workings of these general equilibrium effects. Simulating the impact of
a 10% increase in migration from a village, the author shows how households
without migrants gain through the increase in (shadow) wages associated with a
reduction of the village labour force and also benefit from a decreased demand for
animal traction services (Kuiper, 2005).
To conclude this discussion of positive impacts of migration on source commu-
nities, it may prove interesting to take a more general perspective and look at the
relationship between migration and income distribution in source communities.
In fact, according to the reviewed studies, migration can be seen as a means to
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Figure 2.2.: Positive impacts of migration on source communities.
reduce income inequality and is found to disproportionately benefit poorer house-
holds, thus leading to a reduction in income gaps within villages (Benjamin et al.,
2005; de Brauw and Giles, 2008a; Zhu and Luo, 2008).
The review of the empirical evidence in the previous section offers the opportu-
nity to identify impacts of migration and allows extracting the main mechanisms
at work. Figure 2.2 summarizes these impacts and mechanisms, proposing a con-
densed framework of positive impacts of migration at the local level.
The oval shape in the figure depicts the local community, consisting of migrant
and non-migrant households. At the lower part of the diagram, the flow of mi-
grants out of the village is shown. This outflow leads to a depletion of the labour
force and to higher returns to labour, transmitted through higher land/labour
ratios. This implies higher incomes for non-migrant households and for non-
migrated members of migrant households.
The upper part of Figure 2.2 displays the return flows to the community, which
consist of remittances and return migration. Remittances directly increase the in-
come of migrant households. Extra income is spent on either current consumption
or on investment. Investment includes productive and consumptive investment,
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as well as spending on health and education. Productive investments, including
business creation in particular and investment in house construction, have the
potential to enhance local labour demand, further increasing returns to labour.
Return migration, the second return flow as indicated by the second upper arrow
in the graph can further enhance business creation through financial and human
capital brought by returnees.
In summary, the preceding discussion shows that migration unfolds manifold
impacts on migrants’ source communities, which an analysis focusing on migration
most ideally should take into account. Apart from potential benefits which accrue
to the households directly involved in migration and more mid- and long-term
effects on economic development, general equilibrium effects are highlighted. In
the following section, a more general view on these general equilibrium effects is
taken by introducing a theoretical framework of village economies.
2.2.3. Village Economies
Recognizing that economic relationships between households which live together in
rural communities are often characterised and shaped by interactions on local level
commodity and factor markets, Taylor and Adelman (1996) propose a conceptual
framework for the analysis of village economies.8 Their framework provides for
the existence of local income linkages and general-equilibrium feedbacks which
arise from the interactions between households and which may to a large extent
shape the outcomes of a given change in policies, markets, or the environment,
both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view.
The starting point of Taylor and Adelman (1996) is the acknowledgement that
markets in rural communities in developing countries frequently are imperfect or
even missing. These imperfections greatly determine the domain of trade of the
goods and factors supplied and demanded in the village and may give rise to
village-wide economic effects.
According to the authors, different levels of market development and thereby
different levels of integration of rural households and villages with the rest of the
world can be distinguished. At the one extreme, markets for goods and factors
8Unless stated otherwise, this section draws on the contents of the first two chapters of Taylor
and Adelman (1996).
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Source: Taylor and Adelman (1996).
Figure 2.3.: Village economy at intermediate level of market development.
would be entirely absent. In this case, households would act in isolation from
each other, using only own resources to provide for the own subsistence.9 At
the other extreme, markets would be fully developed and the village would be
perfectly integrated with the outside world. Markets would be perfect in the
neoclassical sense. In such a situation, linkages between households in the village
would become negligible and households would interact directly with the outside
world. The situation in reality, however, most likely might be one in between
these two extremes. While some goods or factors may be easily traded beyond
village borders, others might only be traded within the villages and some markets
might still be completely absent. In this case, the village economy would be at an
intermediate level of market development.
Figure 2.3 depicts such a village economy at an intermediate level of market
development. The basic production and consumption unit is the rural house-
hold, several of which constitute the village community. The households engage
in the production of agricultural products for subsistence purposes as well as for
commercialisation and work in off-farm jobs. For agricultural production, inter-
9Of course, there may still be rich social interactions. As the perspective of the present analysis,
however, is economic, these aspects are neglected here.
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mediate inputs imported into the village, inputs purchased from a village market
and inputs owned by the households are used. Outputs are, as mentioned, either
exported, marketed within the village, or directly consumed by the households.
Subsistence consumption is supplemented by the consumption of commodities
bought from village markets and imported into the village.
The short description of the framework already pointed to a differentiation of
commodities and factors which is crucial for the model of a village economy. In
the model, goods and factors are classified according the their level of tradability.
The level of tradability is akin to the domain of trade and determines the level at
which price formation takes place. At the lowest level are nontradables. These are
goods or factors households do not trade at all and for which a household internal
balance of supply and demand is established. In theory, the household balance is
achieved under an unobservable shadow price. The existence of nontradables is
often explained by the presence of transaction costs. These costs—conceptually a
mark-up on sales or purchase prices—create a price band which causes households
to choose a position of autarky instead of carrying out transactions on a market.
In other instances, for example in case of family labour and hired labour, limited
substitutability between the goods or factors supplied by the household and those
traded on the market will again lead the household to become autarkic in the
respective item (de Janvry et al., 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003; Lopez,
1986; Singh et al., 1986a,a; Skoufias, 1994).10
Next to nontradables, there can be village nontradables. Village nontradables
are traded only within the village. Village supply and demand are reconciled
through transactions on a village market. A uniform village market price for the
respective village traded item is the result of a price formation process which
takes place at the village level. Village nontradables can be, for example, surplus
production or inputs provided from within the village (see Figure 2.3). In case of
village nontradables, the village will be self-sufficient, whereas single households
may be net-sellers or net-buyers (or, if they choose autarky, even self-sufficient).
The third class of goods and factors dealt with in a village model are village
tradables. Village tradables are traded beyond village borders. As a principal
10Nontradables are dealt with extensively in the context of agricultural household models. The
interested reader might wish to refer to the cited sources for more information.
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characteristic, the village is a price-taker for these items. Akin to economic trade
theories, the village is considered to be a small economy which cannot exert any in-
fluence the prices which are formed at the regional, national, or even international
level. Typical examples for village tradables would be intermediate agricultural
inputs, agricultural output bound for commercialisation, imported manufactured
consumption goods or migrant labour (see Figure 2.3).
The fact that economic feedbacks and linkages which are mediated via local level
price formation mechanisms exist implies that outcomes of a given policy shock
are shaped by local general-equilibrium effects (recall the discussion in Section
2.2.1). While the strength and relative importance of such second round effects
depends on the level of market development, they may influence policy impacts
both quantitatively and qualitatively and ignoring them might distort economic
analyses to a non-trivial extent. These concerns which have arisen from the theo-
retical contemplation of village economies have lead to the development of village
CGE models. Being an approach which occupies the ground between agricultural
household models and more aggregate (e.g. national level) CGE models, village
equilibrium models allow to capture economic interactions which take place at
the local level and hence permit to account for local general-equilibrium effects
in the analysis. Following sections on simulation based analyses on distributional
and poverty impacts of trade liberalisation in China and on the application of
macro-micro models for trade policy analysis, a more detailed discussion of the
methodology is provided in Section 2.3.3.
2.3. Analytical Approaches
In the previous Section 2.2, theoretical concepts for the analysis of trade liberal-
isation and poverty and of the impacts of migration on source communities are
discussed. Furthermore, a conceptual framework of village economies in develop-
ing countries is introduced. More than all, the discussions show that analysing
migration, poverty and inequality in the context of trade liberalisation is a com-
plex endeavour.
The apparent complexity of the processes to be analysed calls for a method-
ological approach which is comprehensive but at the same time capable to offer
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sufficient level of detail. Processes which take place at national or even global
levels have to be captured at the same time as aspects which are relevant at the
household and village level have to be taken into account. Simulation models
which are based on economic theories of partial or general equilibrium represent
obvious candidates. Equilibrium models are not only comprehensive in their cover-
age and able to capture the different feedback relationships and interdependencies
which characterise economic systems. They also offer substantial flexibility and
thereby are attractive tools to address a great variety of research questions.
The following sections are dedicated to a review of studies employing equi-
librium modelling techniques. Due to the sheer size of the body of literature
available, the review is limited to studies of direct relevance for the present analy-
sis. In a first section, on overview on simulation based analyses on distributional
and poverty impacts of trade liberalisation in China is presented. A second sec-
tion deals with the application of macro-micro models for trade policy analysis.
In the final section of this chapter, the village equilibrium modelling approach is
discussed in a detailed manner, and a special focus is put on the modelling of
migration in this type of models.
2.3.1. Simulation based analyses on distributional and poverty
impacts of trade liberalisation in China
Since the mid-1990s, China’s trade policies have increasingly attracted the interest
of researchers. Early studies typically employed CGE models to assess the welfare
impacts of different trade liberalisation scenarios (Gilbert and Wahl, 2002; Wang
and Zhai, 1998; Yang and Huang, 1997). After 2001, several studies analysed
China’s WTO accession and later on possible impacts of the Doha Round, as well
as other, more stylised, liberalisation scenarios. Research employed PE agricul-
tural sector models (Huang et al., 2003, 2007), CGE models (Anderson et al.,
2004; Diao et al., 2003a,b; Hertel et al., 2004b; Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004;
Li et al., 2006; Zhai and Wang, 2002; Zhai and Hertel, 2006, 2010), or combined
macro-microsimulation approaches (Chen and Ravallion, 2004; Kuiper and van
Tongeren, 2006a; Yang et al., 2010; Zhai and Hertel, 2010).
Using an agricultural sector model (CAPSiM), Huang et al. (2007) found that
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trade liberalisation may contribute to poverty alleviation in some provinces, but
can lead to adverse poverty and equality impacts in others. Poor households
in northern and western provinces gain proportionally less, due to their initial
production structure including a high share of products with little competitive
advantage and limited access to off-farm labour.
In the area of CGE models, some studies use the GTAP global trade model
(Hertel, 1997). Research by Anderson et al. (2004) and Ianchovichina and Martin
(2004) found increasing farm/non-farm inequality as a result of trade liberalisa-
tion. The authors all agree that households are likely to benefit from trade reforms
if they are able to send members to jobs in the expanding industrial and service
industries. This highlights the importance of rural-urban migration.
Zhai and Wang (2002) and Hertel et al. (2004b) incorporate explicit treatment
of the rigidities of the Chinese labour market in national CGE models for China.
Results show that WTO accession leads to the expansion of labour-intensive ex-
ports. Due to labour mobility restrictions, gains from the corresponding expan-
sion in the manufacturing sector are smaller for rural households than for urban
households, which leads to an increase in rural-urban income disparities. House-
hold gains increase along the gradients of rural-urban location and specialization
in non-farm labour income (Hertel et al., 2004b).
In a later study which employs an updated version of their model, Zhai and
Hertel (2010) simulate the impacts of unilateral trade liberalisation by China. A
scenario of full unilateral liberalisation shows that the removal of the relatively
higher protection in the agricultural sector leads to lower returns to farm land
and unskilled labour. This triggers increased rural-urban migration and causes
rises in poverty and inequality.
Regional impacts of WTO accession are emphasized by Diao et al. (2003a,b),
who apply a regionally disaggregated CGE model for China. The effects on agri-
cultural households depend on their production structure, which differs regionally.
Access to non-farm labour plays an important role, as returns on non-agricultural
activities rise relatively more.
The first application of a macro-microsimulation approach to Chinese trade
policies was performed by Chen and Ravallion (2004). In order to derive welfare
changes, results from GTAP are mapped into households’ marginal utility func-
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tions. Overall, there is almost no impact on inequality but a slight increase in
poverty. The authors conclude that ”the most vulnerable households tend to be in
rural areas, dependent on agriculture, with relatively fewer workers and with weak
economic links to the outside economy through migration” (Chen and Ravallion,
2004, p.20).
More recent works address the likely impacts of a conclusion of the WTO Doha
Round and of global free trade scenarios (Kuiper and van Tongeren, 2006a; Yang
et al., 2010; Zhai and Hertel, 2006, 2010). As a common characteristic, the studies
all employ coupled modelling frameworks which use global CGE models as macro
modules to provide shock variables for lower level models, such as national CGE
or PE models or village equilibrium models.
Zhai and Hertel (2006) draw upon global results from the GTAP model which
are fed into a version of the national CGE model already used in Zhai and Wang
(2002) and Hertel et al. (2004b). Their analysis shows that—due to its low import
protection after WTO accession—China’s future welfare gains will come entirely
from liberalisation of other countries. Liberalization does lead to expanded out-
puts of some manufacturing sectors, but output of other sectors might decline.
Agricultural outputs increase as well, and, consequently, labour is diverted from
high-productivity manufacturing sectors to low-productivity agricultural sectors.
Rural agricultural households are expected to see the greatest gains, while the
smallest welfare increases are with urban, diversified households. For both sce-
narios, the overall result is a small decline in poverty and in rural-urban income
inequality.
Using a policy shock generated with the World Bank’s Linkage model and an
updated version of their model already mentioned, Zhai and Hertel (2010) assess
the impacts of trade liberalisation in the rest of the world. In this simulation,
similarly to those described before, improved access to agricultural export markets
would favour China’s farm sector and lead to a reallocation of labour away from
non-agricultural sectors and thereby to less rural-urban migration. Such reform
would favour the rural poor and entail reductions in poverty and inequality.
Yang et al. (2010) link the GTAP model to a version of the CAPSiM agricultural
sector model and simulate different Doha Round proposals. While the simulated
reforms in general favour the agricultural sector as a whole and lead to increases
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in incomes of all farmers, more wealthy farmers benefit from disproportionally
higher increases whereas poorer and ethnic minority households have lower income
growth. Furthermore, there are differences across the provinces of China. Similar
to Huang et al. (2007), the authors explain this result with differences in initial
production structures.
While the studies by Zhai and Hertel and Yang et al. still take a rather ag-
gregate perspective, Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006a) provide the first analysis
to bring trade policies down to the level of a rural community. Relying upon the
same GTAP results as Zhai and Hertel (2006), they present a village equilibrium
model of a Chinese village economy and emphasize that uneven access to migra-
tion transmits rural-urban inequalities to the village and increases intra-village
inequality. However, this effect might be mitigated by specialization of house-
holds without access to migration, leading to ambiguous inequality effects. The
study reveals that the impact of trade reforms on poverty and inequality results
from a complex process that is shaped “by the interplay of initial endowments,
village markets for inputs and outputs, and market imperfections” (Kuiper and
van Tongeren, 2006a, p.241).
The conclusions from the studies reviewed are relevant to the present work
for two main reasons. First, many of the authors emphasize the importance of
non-farm incomes and rural-urban migration for poverty alleviation. This im-
plies that effects of trade policy on rural communities need to be analysed in an
economy-wide framework that includes urban sectors as well. Second, changing
rural-urban inequality, different regional impacts, and different impacts within vil-
lage economies are explained, to a large extent, by production and consumption
patterns as well as initial factor endowments. Therefore, these aspects must be
depicted at a disaggregated level, such as in microsimulation models.
The major drawback of the studies reviewed in this section with respect to
poverty and income distribution lies in their high level of aggregation, which
permits only rough statements about the differential responses of individual actors
and does not take local market conditions into account. An exception is the
sequential macro-microsimulation approach applied by Kuiper and van Tongeren
(2006a). Following the route shown by this study, the following section provides
an overview on integrated macro-microsimulation approaches that are suitable to
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address the issues which are in the focus of this research.
2.3.2. The application of macro-micro models for trade policy
analysis
The basic idea of macro-micro simulation is to assess the effects of macroeconomic
changes at the micro-level (e.g., households), taking into account the heterogeneity
of individuals and households. The distinguishing features of these approaches
are that the microeconomic assumption of a representative agent is fully or partly
abandoned (Reimer, 2002) and that local economic conditions can be taken into
account.
According to Boccanfuso et al. (2008), there are three distinct groups of macro-
microsimulation models: the fully integrated multi-household model (IMH-CGE),
the CGE microsimulation sequential (CGE-MSS) approach, and the CGE top
down-bottom up approach. For the IMH-CGE, disaggregated household data
and microsimulation specifications are integrated into a national CGE model. In
so doing, the models allow calculation of welfare changes for individual households
while accounting for equilibrium effects in the economy.
An example of this approach is given by Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), who
integrate an econometrically-estimated labour allocation model for 4,508 house-
holds into a general equilibrium model and simulate the impact of different growth
strategies on poverty and income distribution in Madagascar. A second example
is a study by Cockburn (2004). In a CGE model that is designed to depict poverty
impacts of trade liberalisation in Nepal, the number of household categories in the
model is increased to match the actual number of households from a nationally
representative sample. More recent studies using IMH-CGE models (Cororaton
and Cockburn, 2007; Emini et al., 2006) draw upon these approaches. These
models eliminate the representative household hypothesis, but the impact of local
market conditions still is not captured.
To apply the CGE-MSS approach, a two-staged modelling framework is con-
structed. First, changes in aggregate economic variables (e.g. prices) are calcu-
lated, usually by an economy wide CGE-model. In a second step, the results of
this first simulation are fed into a post-simulation framework that allows com-
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puting effects on real or highly disaggregated representative households. Poverty
and distributional impacts can be calculated by applying poverty and income dis-
tribution measures to the data obtained from the second step of the simulation
(Reimer, 2002).
In their pioneering study, Robilliard et al. (2001) use a CGE-MSS approach
to quantify the effects of the 1997 financial crisis on poverty and inequality in
Indonesia. A standard CGE model is applied to generate a vector of changes in
prices, wages, and aggregate employment. The post-simulation framework con-
sists of a combination of an econometrically estimated occupational choice model
with an income generation model. The occupational choice model allows individ-
uals to switch their sector of employment, depending on macroeconomic changes
and individual characteristics. The income generation model allows calculation
of household income as a function of attributes of individual household members
and general household characteristics. Several studies have followed this approach,
with slight variations with respect to the macro model and with varying econo-
metric specifications of the occupational choice model and the income generation
model (Arntz et al., 2008; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Bussolo et al., 2006; Ganuza
et al., 2005; Herault, 2006; Lay et al., 2008; Vos and de Jong, 2003). In a related
manner, Filho and Horridge (2006) used a household model to simulate income
generation, household demand, and labour supply in an analysis of the WTO
Doha Round in Brazil.
Other authors limit their microsimulation module to a pure income genera-
tion model without occupational choice specifications (Nicita, 2006). Chen and
Ravallion (2004) use a CGE-MSS approach to assess the welfare effect of China’s
accession to the WTO based on a household utility function. Unlike the work
of Robilliard et al. (2001), this specification of a microsimulation model also ac-
counts for changes in consumption and expenditure and thus allows for a more
comprehensive welfare analysis. Similar applications of this utility function-based
approach are found in Hertel et al. (2004a) and Arndt (2006). An extension is
the work by Ravallion and Lokshin (2008) who use first-order approximations
of households’ revenue and demand functions to derive welfare impacts of trade
reform in Morocco.
Overall, the approaches discussed up to this point advance the practice of con-
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sidering household characteristics. Actual market conditions, however, are still
neglected. This becomes different in the study by Kuiper and van Tongeren
(2006a) already mentioned above. In their village level analysis of the impacts
of a WTO policy scenario on rural China, the authors explicitly account for the
fact that some production factors, as well as locally-produced consumption goods,
are not traded outside the village and depict price equilibriums on village mar-
kets disintegrated from national or world markets. Furthermore, imperfect labour
and land markets are considered. The modelling framework used in that study
consists of the GTAP model that simulates changes in commodity prices and
manufacturing labour demand and a village equilibrium model such as originally
proposed by Taylor and Adelman (1996). The basic units of village models are
agricultural household models. These models are used to depict production and
consumption decisions of agricultural households, if necessary under conditions of
market imperfections that lead to non-separability of household decisions (Singh
et al., 1986a; de Janvry et al., 1991). The village equilibrium framework connects
several household models through a set of local general equilibrium closures that
allow general equilibrium effects to be captured within a local economy (Taylor
and Adelman, 1996).11
The CGE top down-bottom up approach was pioneered by Savard (2003).
Savard combines a national CGE model for the Philippines with a household
model. Household behaviour (i.e., consumption, income generation, and occupa-
tional choices) is excluded from the CGE model and simulated with a household
model for individual households from a nationally-representative sample. To solve
the combined model, results are fed iteratively from the CGE-model to the house-
hold model and back until solutions converge. Thus, the approach differs from
the CGE-MSS approaches in that communication between the models not only
takes place from the top down, but a recursive link back from the micro level
is integrated. Further studies by Savard (2005), Thierfelder et al. (2007) and
Bourguignon and Savard (2008) build upon this approach.
For the present work, a CGE-MSS approach is envisaged, as the focus is on a
specific village in Guizhou province which is not representative of rural China and
therefore does not allow results to be fed back into a national CGE level. CGE-
11For a more detailed discussion of the approach, see the following Section 2.3.3.
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MSS approaches are well developed; however, to the knowledge of the author,
a specification of micro-modules that convincingly brings together the depiction
of local market conditions and occupational choices, especially with respect to
labour migration, is still missing.
2.3.3. Village Equilibrium Models
Village equilibrium models are CGE implementations of agricultural household
models in a village equilibrium framework. Developed on the basis of the theo-
retical framework presented in Section 2.2.3, they are used to describe and de-
pict village economies in developing countries. As an overlap of micro-level agri-
cultural household models and more aggregate CGE models, village equilibrium
models have the salient feature of being able to take into account heterogene-
ity of economic actors up to a substantial degree as well as to capture general
equilibrium effects arising at the rural community level. The provision for hetero-
geneous agents reduces the aggregation bias inherent to macroeconomic modelling
approaches. At the same time, the consideration of interactions among agents,
which take place at a local level, catches important characteristics of economic sys-
tems which are neglected in microeconomic agricultural household models. Thus,
village equilibrium models constitute useful tools to analyse policy outcomes for
small groups with varying characteristics within a population, while these models
accurately capture the transmission of a particular economic shock throughout a
local economy.
Village equilibrium models are built upon micro-level SAMs which, by provid-
ing a consistent snapshot of a village economy at a certain point in time, have
soon become the preferred framework for carrying out further analyses. Depart-
ing from village SAMs, early village level modelling studies applied SAM mul-
tiplier approaches, including multiplier decomposition (Pyatt and Round, 1979)
and structural path analysis (Defourny and Thorbecke, 1984), with the aim of
exploring the nature and strength of economic linkages within as well as assess-
ing the impact of economic shocks on local economies. Issues which have been
studied include, for example, the effect of changes in inflows of remittances and
government transfers (Adelman et al., 1988), impacts of output fluctuations and
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investment in irrigation (Subramanian and Sadoulet, 1990) or the assessment of
alternative rural development schemes (Parikh and Thorbecke, 1996).12
Recognizing the rather restrictive assumptions of the SAM multiplier approach,
Taylor and Adelman (1996) developed a first village CGE model by embedding a
neoclassical agricultural household model (Singh et al., 1986a) into a local general
equilibrium framework. Compared to SAM multiplier models, the village equilib-
rium model has the advantage of abandoning the fixed price assumption as well as
the advantage of allowing for a much more flexible depiction of the behaviour of
economic agents. Moreover, the Taylor-Adelman model incorporates the assump-
tion of nonseparable household decisions, an important feature of agricultural
household models which helps to explain behavioural patterns which otherwise
might appear irrational from an economic perspective (de Janvry et al., 1991;
de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003). The main insight from nonseparable household
models is that decisions of a household subject to nonseparability are not gov-
erned by market prices, which are exogenous to the household alone, but are
instead governed by endogenous shadow prices determined inside the household.
Nonseparability implies that household behaviour can no longer be analysed in a
separable and recursive manner by first optimizing income from household pro-
duction and then utility from consumption (Singh et al., 1986a). It is rather
necessary to consider maximization of profit and utility as interdependent opti-
mization processes. As this interdependence affects the comparative statics of a
household model (Singh et al., 1986a; Lopez, 1986), its implementation in a village
equilibrium model constituted a major step towards a more realistic depiction of
household behaviour.
Following Singh et al. (1986a), Taylor and Adelman (1996) assume missing mar-
kets for family labour and land as the reason underlying the nonseparable nature
of household decisions in their model; however, household decisions may become
nonseparable due to a larger variety of conditions. Nonseparability may occur
when farm households act in an imperfect market environment (de Janvry et al.,
12Although not strictly at the village but rather at a regional level, a study by Lewis and
Thorbecke (1992) which analyses aggregate and household level impacts of sectoral changes
in production should be mentioned in this context, as well. Furthermore, more recent studies
which apply multiplier approaches to village level data exist (Yun˜ez Naude et al., 2006;
Subramanian and Qaim, 2009).
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1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003; Singh et al., 1986a). Reasons why markets
might be imperfect or even fail include variable transaction costs on product or
factor markets, fixed transaction costs which constitute market entry barriers or
constraints on market participation, and missing markets such as for capital, land
or labour (see, for example, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003). Apart from mar-
ket imperfections, nonseparability may be caused by imperfect substitutability
between hired labour and family labour or by preferences of households regard-
ing the participation in certain employment activities (Lopez, 1986; Singh et al.,
1986a; Skoufias, 1994)13. Nevertheless, these reasons for nonseparability have not
been considered yet in village equilibrium models.
Kuiper (2005), however, recognizes the rather strong character of the assump-
tion on the reason which underlie the nonseparability of household behaviour in
the Taylor-Adelman model. Offering an extension of the village equilibrium ap-
proach, she introduces fixed transaction costs in product and factor markets into
her village equilibrium study of a rural community in China. This implementa-
tion of the price band model proposed by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) relaxes
the strong assumption of missing factor markets and allows for the consideration
of imperfect markets as an intermediate case between a perfect and a missing
market. To date, the Kuiper model represents the latest development in village
equilibrium modelling.14
The modelling of migration in village equilibrium models exploits the possibility
to flexibly incorporate assumptions on household behaviour. This offers scope for
a realistic depiction of the migration behaviour of households and their migration
responses due to economic shocks. Moreover, village equilibrium models are able
13There are a number of studies available which carry out analyses based on a nonseparable
agricultural household model under different assumptions regarding the reasons which lead to
nonseparability. Benjamin (1992), Sadoulet et al. (1998), Sonoda and Maruyama (1999) and
Sonoda (2008), for example, assume imperfect labour markets. Carter and Yao (2002) carry
out an analysis of nonseparability due to imperfections in the market for land. Benjamin
(1992) adds the case of nonseparability caused by imperfect substitutability of hired and
family labour and Lopez (1984, 1986) presents a nonseparable model in which households
have preferences regarding different occupations.
Please also note the conceptual parallel to the theoretical discussion of Section 2.2.3, where
the concept of nontradables has been introduced. As supply and demand are reconciled
within the household in case of nontradables, a shadow price which is endogenous to the
household arises and the model becomes nonseparable.
14Applications of this model include Heerink et al. (2006), Heerink et al. (2007) and Kuiper and
van Tongeren (2006a).
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to capture potential impacts of economic shocks which can be, for example, an
assumed variation in migration or flows of remittances or any change in economic
policies which in turn may provoke alterations in migration and remittances on
all members of a local community, including those who are not directly involved
in migration. Accordingly, the approach has been successfully applied to study
different aspects of migration. Taylor et al. (1999a) and Taylor et al. (1999b), for
instance, analyse the impacts of alternative agricultural and trade policy scenarios
on production, income and migration in rural Mexico.15 Kuiper (2005) simulates
the effects of an increase in migration on production and consumption in a Chi-
nese village. In a similar fashion, Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006a) administer
a migration shock which is part of a broader Doha Round trade liberalization
scenario to the same Chinese village model. All studies highlight the importance
not only of migration, but also of economic interactions within a village and local
general equilibrium effects for the nature of a particular policy outcome.
With respect to the modelling of migration, the village equilibrium studies
cited above use two different approaches. Taylor et al. (1999a) and Taylor et al.
(1999b) apply the model developed by Taylor and Adelman (1996). In this model,
the level of migration is determined endogenously, as households allocate labour
to migration until the marginal returns to migration (i.e. remittances) equal the
marginal returns from labour in each alternative income generating activity. The
marginal returns, in turn, correspond to the household shadow wage. The house-
hold shadow wage itself reflects the marginal valuation of family time and leisure.
That is, the extent to which a household engages in migration is determined to
be an equilibrium between the allocation of family time to migration and other
activities and the consumption of leisure. While this approach offers the great ad-
vantage of allowing for endogenous changes in the level of migration as a response
to a given economic shock, it captures only two ways of how migration impacts
the household economy; namely the income from migration which accrues to the
household and the competition between migration, other activities and leisure for
the scarce time the household is endowed with Taylor and Adelman (1996). It
neglects, however, the impact of migration on consumption demand due to mi-
15Further studies, which apply the approach economy-wide are Materer and Taylor (2003) and
Taylor and Dyer (2009).
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gration related changes in the household size which can constitute an additional
benefit to the household.16 Furthermore, the approach does not take into account
potential disutility generated through the engagement in migration. This, as the
authors themselves acknowledge, may lead to an overestimation of the level of
migration (Taylor and Adelman, 1996). Kuiper (2005) tackles the issue of the
consumption impacts of migration by implementing a per capita LES, thus creat-
ing a feedback between the level of migration and the consumption sphere of the
household. The change in migration, however, is modelled as an exogenous shock
and not as a decision endogenous to the household.
Following this discussion, two major challenges with respect to modelling migra-
tion in village equilibrium models can be identified. The first challenge consists of
modelling migration as a decision endogenous to the household while simultane-
ously taking into account the impact of migration on consumption demand. The
second challenge, related to the question of disutilities arising from participation
in migration, involves a more general issue with respect to the depiction of the
migration responses of households. In principle, both Taylor and Adelman (1996)
and Kuiper (2005) model migration as demand driven in the sense that an ex-
ternal demand shock triggers a supply response by households. Such an external
demand shock can either consist of changes of the wage rate in migration, i.e. in
the returns to migration as in case of Taylor and Adelman (1996), or of a change
in employment in migration as in the studies by Kuiper. In reality, however, it
can be observed that households respond differently to changes in incentives to
migration and these differences are often due to supply side characteristics of the
households. The presence of children or elderly, for example, may make migration
a less attractive option for a young couple. Likewise, the need for childcare may
require at least one person to stay at home (i.e. on the farm) and make farm work
the preferred option for this person. It can be argued that in both of the current
village equilibrium modelling approaches it is possible to accommodate migration
responses which differ among households. In the Kuiper model one could simply
define household group specific migration shocks according to assumed differences
16It constitutes a benefit in case of increasing household migration as there will be less persons
with demand for consumption. In case of decreasing migration, total demand inside the
household will increase. Hence, the competition for income intensifies.
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in migration responses. In the Taylor-Adelman model differences in migration
responses can be implemented through the household specific calibration of an
elasticity of remittances with respect to family time allocated to migration which
forms part of a remittances function.17 Nonetheless, both approaches would be
rather ad hoc and would lack a sound theoretical base with respect to the sup-
ply side considerations mentioned above. Thus, while village equilibrium models
appear to be a promising choice for the present study, there is still scope for
improvement related to the modelling of migration in such models.
2.4. Summary
The discussions of China’s economic reforms make clear that the country has car-
ried out substantial and ambitious reforms during the past three decades. These
reforms have resulted in impressive economic growth and a substantial reduction
in poverty on the one hand and in increases in inequality on the other hand. In
particular as substantial disparities between rural and urban areas persist, rural-
urban migration occupies central stage both for the livelihood of rural households
and for the outcome of further policy reforms. In this context, because of the fact
that poverty is still predominantly rural, the likely impacts on the agricultural sec-
tor as well as its historical relevance as a factor contributing to inequality, trade
liberalisation can be expected to play an important role for the future development
of poverty and inequality in the country.
From an analytical point of view, when seeking to analyse impacts of trade
reform at the household level, a number of different factors and impact pathways
have to be taken into account as well as a broad range of complex interactions
among them. Thereby, the ultimate outcome of trade reform depends on char-
acteristics of individual actors as well as on local market conditions. Similarly,
in the specific case of the effects of migration on source communities, direct and
indirect effects which also involve non-migrant households play a role.
These findings call for a methodological approach capable of taking economy-
wide processes into account while at the same time being able to offer a detailed
17Taylor and Adelman (1996) do exactly this, but state differential access to migrant labour
markets rather than supply side factors as the underlying rationale.
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perspective at the level of individual actors as well as covering local market con-
ditions. Here, macro-microsimulation approaches can be identified as the method
of choice and in particular a village equilibrium model coupled to a CGE model
constitutes the most adequate tool for the purposes of the present study. In such
village models, special emphasis should be put on the depiction of households’
labour migration decisions. Building upon these insights, the following chapter
proceeds with the presentation of the methodological approach taken. In addition,
information on the data as well as on the research area is provided.
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During the discussions of the theoretical approaches related to the analysis of
impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality, macro-microsimulation
approaches are identified as the most suitable methodology. The following section
provides a first general overview of this methodological framework. Following
a presentation of the general set-up of the framework, it is discussed against the
background of the theoretical concepts introduced in Section 2.2. A second section
offers an introduction to the data used and provides detailed information on the
research area.
3.1. Methodological Framework
In order to assess the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality
on a rural community in south-western China, the present study applies a village
equilibrium model in a macro-microsimulation framework. The modelling frame-
work, depicted in Figure 3.1, consists of a national level CGE model which serves
as a macro-module and a village equilibrium model which constitutes the micro-
module. From a conceptual point of view, the national CGE model represents
the rest of the world for the village and provides national level changes in prices
and wages following trade reform. The price and wage changes are fed as a shock
into the village equilibrium model. The village model itself facilitates a disaggre-
gated contemplation of a number of household groups, which represent the village
population. It depicts comparative static adjustment reactions while taking into
account local market conditions, such as missing markets or the presence of village
markets.
In order to limit the scope of the present study, the focus is put on the village
equilibrium model. Starting from a theory of household behaviour to the creation
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Source: Adapted from Kuiper (2005).
Figure 3.1.: Village equilibrium model in a macro-microsimulation framework.
of a village SAM and the establishment of the final model, it is developed in
the following Chapters 4 to 6. Results from a national CGE model are taken
from published studies and used for policy simulations. Details are presented in
Chapter 7. As no feedback between the village model and the national CGE
model is established, the framework constitutes a sequential top-down approach.
The bottom part of Figure 3.1 offers a schematic overview of the village equilib-
rium model. In the model, the village is made up by a number of representative
households. The households demand and supply commodities from and to village
markets.1 Village surplus is exported from the village and anything the village
1The term “commodities“ used here refers to both goods and factors. According to the discus-
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cannot provide on its own in sufficient amounts is imported. Household and village
level market balances constitute the general equilibrium framework of the model
and define the domain of trade. Depending on whether a commodity is nontrad-
able, village nontradable or village tradable, the general equilibrium framework
determines the level of price formation: Prices can be formed within the house-
hold, at the village level or in the rest of the world, in the latter case taken as
exogenous by the village.
The village equilibrium framework connects a number of agricultural household
models, which constitute the basic building blocks of the village model. The agri-
cultural household models are extensions of the basic model proposed by Singh
et al. (1986a) and define the behaviour of each representative household group.
Households are assumed to maximise utility subject to production functions, com-
modity balances and a cash income constraint. The models take into account
nonseparability of households’ production and consumption decisions. Nonsepa-
rability stems from two sources. First, family labour and hired labour are assumed
to be imperfect substitutes in agricultural production. Second, utility consider-
ations are taken into account in the modelling of households’ decisions on the
supply of labour to local off-farm employment and migration.
The proposed approach to the modelling of off-farm labour supply represents
the methodological novelty in this study. The approach allows for an incorpora-
tion of supply side related differences in migration responses between households,
which arise due to differences in socio-economic characteristics into a village equi-
librium model. Thereby, it addresses the methodological challenges related to
the modelling of migration which have been formulated in Section 2.3.3 and con-
tributes a proposition for a refined treatment of migration to the literature on
village equilibrium models.
The review of the theoretical approaches to the poverty impacts of trade lib-
eralisation in Section 2.2.1 and the effects of migration on source communities in
Section 2.2.2 provide the guideline for the choice of the methodological framework
used in this study. In addition, the review constitutes a benchmark against which
to assess the scope and the limitations of the approach chosen. Accordingly, a
sion in Section 2.2, these can comprise intermediate inputs, produced outputs, manufactured
consumption goods, as well as land and labour.
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number of limitations of the proposed modelling framework are highlighted in
the discussion to follow. However, rather than leading the reader to dismiss the
approach as insufficient, it is aimed at providing a background for the interpre-
tation of the simulation results presented in later parts of this study. The goal
is to prevent the results from being taken at face value and to force the reader
to recognise the real character of the present work: a modelling exercise based
on a set of restrictive assumptions which nevertheless has the potential to yield
interesting and new insights into an arguably complex matter.
At the household level, the analytical framework for the impact of trade liberal-
isation presented in Section 2.2.1 highlights a number of factors which determine
the poverty effects of trade reforms: next to the structure of household production,
consumption and factor endowments, it is the existence of economic alternatives
as well as households’ ability to adjust which matters. The latter, in turn, is
related to households’ endowment with physical assets and human capital as well
as the institutional environment, such as social barriers to market entrance or
the existence of markets for commodities or credit. Finally, aspects of risk and
vulnerability are mentioned. By taking an explicit micro-level perspective, the
village equilibrium model applied in this study is well suited to address a broad
range of these factors.
Although not depicted as individual units, households are dealt with in a highly
disaggregated manner. Thus, differences in production, consumption and factor
endowments are taken into account up to a certain point. The existence of eco-
nomic alternatives is considered insofar as households can adjust to trade reforms
by choosing out of the portfolio of activities they have been engaged in in the
initial situation. The set of activities, however, is static and no new alterna-
tives can be developed.2 Regarding households’ ability to adjust, the model takes
a simplistic approach. As the model constitutes a comparative static analysis,
households can reallocate their production factors and adjust their consumption
pattern following changes in relative prices. Aspects of human capital are taken
2This problem is similar to the so called ”small shares stay small problem“ known from the CGE
literature. It refers to the problem that in CGE trade models, which apply the Armington
approach (i.e. the modelling of imports and exports as imperfect substitutes using Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions) the trade impact of tariff reductions will be small
or nil if there is no or little trade in the base period (Kuiper and van Tongeren, 2006b).
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into account insofar as the approach to the modelling of migration and off-farm
labour allocation takes an explicit supply side perspective, rooted in an analysis
of the socio-economic characteristics of the households. Further aspects, in partic-
ular those which are related to the dynamics of households’ adjustment reactions,
are neglected. With respect to market institutions, the model departs from the
standard neoclassical assumption of perfect markets and allows for market imper-
fections, which lead to nonseparability of household decisions and the existence
of village markets. Thereby, it makes a significant step towards a more realistic
analysis. On the other hand, credit markets, which can be expected to play an
important role for the dynamics of adjustment, are not modelled. Likewise, the
model does not account for other institutional factors such as social barriers to
market entrance, which might be of particular relevance in the Chinese context.
The dynamic aspects of risk have been neglected due to the comparative static
nature of the model and issues of vulnerability have not been taken into account.
In the context of the pathways via which impacts of trade reforms are trans-
mitted to the household level, the theoretical framework discussed distinguishes
three different channels: the distribution channel, which determines price trans-
mission, the enterprise channel and the government channel. At this, the challenge
is to take into account the different channels in a comprehensive manner and to
capture the complex interactions which take place between the different channels.
Not least due to its comprehensiveness and internal consistency, the national CGE
model this study draws upon can be expected to serve well to address these chal-
lenges. As always, however, the simulation results the village equilibrium model
are shocked with depend to a substantial degree on the design of and the assump-
tions made in the CGE model. As no own CGE analysis is carried out, these
assumptions cannot be influenced nor are fully transparent. Similarly, the CGE
analysis cannot be tailored to exactly fit the needs of the current analysis and
some assumptions regarding the transferability of results have to be made.3
According to the framework discussed in Section 2.2.2, positive impacts of mi-
gration on source communities comprise direct as well as indirect effects and com-
parative static as well as dynamic effects. Direct effects include the impact of
remittances as well as lost labour effects on migrant households themselves. Sim-
3A detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 7.
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ilarly, return migrants which bring home savings and experience may directly
benefit the migrant sending household. Indirect effects include general equilib-
rium effects generated through migration induced changes in demand for goods
and factors. Furthermore, migration can unfold general development impacts
which can benefit the community as a whole. The village modelling approach
taken in this study is able to capture the effects of remittances on the income
and consumption of migrant households. Similarly, lost labour effects as well as
second round effects which are transmitted via village markets are taken into ac-
count. Again, due to its comparative static nature, the model, however, fails to
account for dynamic effects, which arise from investment and business creation
and which are more likely to influence the development of the village in the longer
run. Furthermore, relevant dimensions of return migration, namely the savings
and experience brought along by return migrants, are omitted.
The present section introduced the modelling framework—a village equilibrium
model in a macro-microsimulation framework—which is employed in the present
study. The goal was to offer a general overview and to discuss the scope and
limitations of the approach. More details are provided throughout the follow-
ing chapters which are dedicated to develop the village equilibrium model and
to provide a detailed documentation of the model. In Chapter 4, a theory of a
nonseparable agricultural household model with a special focus on the modelling
of migration is presented. This model forms the theoretical basis for the village
equilibrium model, which is the subject of Chapter 6. The national CGE study,
which forms the macro module in the present modelling efforts is discussed more
in detail in the context of the presentation of the policy scenario in Chapter 7.
It should be noted that the framework described in this section constitutes the
methodological core of the present study. In addition to the simulation models,
complementary econometric techniques are applied where appropriate. The cor-
responding methodological discussions will be provided at the respective places.
3.2. Data and Research Area
The subject of the present study is Changtian village, a rural community in Puding
county in the Chinese province of Guizhou. It is one of three villages which have
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been surveyed in the years 2005 and 2007 in the scope of a comprehensive research
project aimed at studying rural poverty in China, which has been jointly carried
out by IFPRI in Washington D.C., the CAAS in Beijing and Guizhou University
in Guiyang.
During the duration of the research project, two rounds of surveys have been
conducted in three administrative villages, which together consist of 26 natural
villages in 2005 and 2007.4. The data covers the years 2004 and 2006. The vil-
lages have been chosen in order to represent the range of economic development
in the county (Brown et al., 2010). The surveys employed structured question-
naires, took a census form and covered 805 households which constitute the three
villages. The questionnaires have originally been designed for the purposes of the
overall research project, but have been adapted to the requirements of a village
modelling study under cooperation of the author. Depending on the information
requested, recall periods ranged from ten years in case of major family events and
related expenses/income to a year in case of household demographics, production
and employment, living conditions and public goods, land use and income and
expenditure. The work resulted in a rich set of socio-economic data, including the
mentioned aspects of demographics, employment, income, expenditure, agricul-
tural production, as well as natural resources, health, asset ownership or access
to public services.
For the present study, Changtian, one of the three administrative villages has
been selected. The data used comes from the 2007 survey, thus the period covered
is the year 2006. Changtian consists of 11 natural villages in which 257 households
reside. In the following section, Changtian village is presented in detail, following
overviews on Guizhou province and Puding county.
3.2.1. Guizhou Province and Puding County
The province of Guizhou has a total area of 176,167 sq.km. and is situated in the
south-western part of the People’s Republic of China, bordering the provinces of
Sichuan and Chongqing in the north, Hunan in the east, Guanxi in the south and
Yunnan in the west. It is of high geographic diversity (Xing et al., 2009), with
4In China, the term administrative village refers to an administrative unit, which consists of a
number of hamlets, or natural villages.
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hilly regions to the west and relatively flat areas to the east, and a subtropical
humid climate (Britannica, 2011).
In 2005, Guizhou had a population of 37.3 m people, making up 2.9% of the total
population of China. Around half of the population belongs to ethnic minorities
(Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2011). With 26.9% of the population
living in urban and 73.1% residing in rural areas, the degree of urbanization is
lower than in China as a whole (see Table 3.1).
Guizhou is rich in natural resources, comprising a broad range of minerals, coal
and hydro-energy (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2011). The mild cli-
mate without freezes in winter permits year-round agricultural production (Xing
et al., 2009). Major agricultural products are corn, rice, tobacco, tubers and rape-
seed, as well as tea, fruits and vegetables and medical herbs. As a consequence
of the wealth in natural resources, a substantial share of the province’s industrial
output consists of electricity, heat and gas (23.6% of industrial value-added) and
the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metal (15%). Further important in-
dustries are the manufacturing of tobacco (11.4%) and beverages (8.4%) as well
as the chemical industry (7.7%). Furthermore, Guizhou is an important tourist
destination in China (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2011).
As was the case for the whole country, the economy of Guizhou grew rapidly
during the first five years of the century. The average growth rate was 10.2%,
and the GDP of the province reached a level of 197.9 bn yuan in 2005, which
corresponds to 1.1% of the Chinese GDP (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS),
2006). This disproportionately low contribution to the national economy stems
in parts from the still comparatively high significance of the primary sector and
the lower level of development of the industrial sector, as reflected both by the
sectoral composition of GDP and the structure of employment (see Table 3.1).
Some authors relate the comparatively low level of industrial development to the
limited integration of the province with the world outside China: in 2003, Guizhou
had the fourth lowest value of foreign direct investment out of 31 Chinese provinces
and cities and was insignificant as a destination of imports and origin of exports
(Lin and Liu, 2006). Labour productivity in industrial enterprises is comparatively
low, accounting only for around 82% of the national average.5 Accordingly, official
5Figure based on a labour productivity measure of yuan per person and year in enterprises
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Source: Wikimedia Commons (2011).
Figure 3.2.: China and Guizhou.
statistics show that wages paid in the province are also below the national average,
accounting for between 76% to 93%, depending on the type of ownership of the
enterprise (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2006).
Compared to China as a whole, rural as well as urban incomes are low. In
2006, the disposable income of urban households was only 77.5% of the Chinese
average, reaching a level of 9,117 yuan per capita at current prices. In case of rural
households, the difference was even more pronounced. With an average value of
1,985 yuan of annual net income per capita, Guizhou’s rural population earned
around 55.3% of the national average (compare Table 3.1). Both in terms of net
income and living expenditure of the rural population, the province ranked last
among the 31 provinces in mainland China (UNDP, 2008; Xing et al., 2009).
“above designated size” (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2006).
59
3. Methodology and Data
The relatively low level of economic development of Guizhou is reflected by the
poverty situation in the province. Official figures put the rate of rural poverty
in Guizhou at 10.7% in 2002. This was the fourth highest out of China’s 31
provinces and cities (NBS, cited from Lin and Liu, 2006), making Guizhou one
of the poorest provinces in the country.6 The trend in poverty, however, follows
the general trend in China: as incomes rise, poverty declines. Ravallion and Chen
(2007) estimate that the incidence of rural poverty declined by 6.5% per year in
the period from 1988 to 2001. The reduction in urban poverty was even more
pronounced, declining at a rate of 18% per year (Montalvo and Ravallion, 2010).
The decline in poverty, however, was accompanied by an increase in inequality by
1.0% per year (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).7
The general level of human development in Guizhou mirrors the low level of
economic development and the high poverty rates. Illiteracy is higher than in most
of the other provinces of China, the live expectancy of the population is lower and
access to health services and education is poor compared to the rest of the country
(UNDP, 2005, 2008). The United Nations Development Program summarizes
these and other dimensions of human development in the Human Development
Index (HDI). For Guizhou, the HDI is significantly below the Chinese average and
comparable to that of Botswana or Namibia (UNDP, 2008, see Table 3.1).
The lagging economic development certainly plays a role in the conversion of
Guizhou into one of the principal labour exporting provinces in China during the
1980s and 1990s. In fact, the provincial government long tried to encourage rural
surplus labour to search for job opportunities in other provinces, thus pursuing a
”labour export for development” policy (Zhang, 2003, p.143). Estimates of the net
out-migration state population losses of 2.27 m people due to migration between
1990 to 2000. With a decline of the population by -7.0%, this is the highest
6Please note that the figures presented depend very much on the poverty line chosen. Ravallion
and Chen (2007), for instance, estimate the poverty headcount for China as a whole at 12.5%
in 2001. Given that Guizhou is a comparatively poor province, it is unlikely that its poverty
headcount is below the Chinese average. Xing et al. (2009), for example, mention that in
1998 the poverty rate was 42% and almost the double of the national average. Nonetheless,
as the current discussion is about the relative position of Guizhou in the national context,
the official figures are sufficient.
7The authors measure inequality with the Gini index, which stood at 23.4% in 1988. Unfor-
tunately, the figure for 2001 is not provided, but using the growth rate provided, the Gini
index for Guizhou can be estimated at around 26.6 in 2001 and 28.0 in 2006.
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Table 3.1.: Selected statistics of China and Guizhou, 2006.
National total Guizhou
Population
Population (m persons) 1,314.5 37.6
Urban population (% of total, 2005) 43.0 26.9
Economy
GDP (bn yuan, 2005) 18,308.5 197.9
Per capita GDP (yuan, 2005) 16,084 5787
GDP - Sectoral composition (%, 2005)
Primary sector 11.6 18.6
Secondary sector 49.0 41.8
Tertiary sector 39.4 39.6
Employment structure (%, 2005)
Primary sector 44.8 57.4
Secondary sector 23.8 10.3
Tertiary sector 31.4 32.3
Per capita income (yuan)
Urban households, disposable income 11,759 9,117
Rural households, net income 3,587 1,985
Per capita living expenses (yuan)
Urban households 8,697 6,848
Rural households 2,829 1,627
Human development
Human Development Index 0.78 0.66
Live expectancy (years) 72.5 66.0
Adult literacy ratio (%) 91.0 81.2
Combined school enrolment ratio (%) 66.6 60.0
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2006), UNDP (2008), own calculations.
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rate of all Chinese provinces (Johnson, 2003). The main destinations of migrant
workers are the eastern provinces. According to estimates from 1997, around 90%
of migrant workers from Guizhou had gone mainly to the coast, where they found
employment mostly as factory workers, cleaners, security guards and construction
workers. This reflects the typical ”interior-to-coastal” migration pattern in China
(Zhang, 2003, p.144).
Puding county, in which the study villages are located, is situated in the central
part of Guizhou province. It lies about 120 km west of Guiyang, the provincial
capital and 20 km from the prefecture city of Anshun. Puding consists of 11
townships and 317 administrative villages and had a population of 402,000 people
in 2004. Just as the rest of Guizhou province, the county is ethnically highly
diverse. About 20% of the population belong to one of over 20 ethnic minority
groups, such as, for example, Miao, Blang, Bouyei, Gelao or Yi. The county is
predominantly rural, around 94% of the population lives in rural areas and about
63% of the labour force is employed in agriculture. Puding is one of the 592
counties which have been designated as poor by the central government; by the
end of 2002, 31% of the population lived below the official poverty line (Xing
et al., 2009).
3.2.2. Changtian Village
3.2.2.1. General Overview
Changtian consists of 11 natural villages, in which 257 households reside (see
Table 3.2). Around 79% of the population belong to ethnic minority groups and
different dialects are spoken apart from Han. Changtian is located around ten km
from the county seat and has only poor road connections. Thus, among the three
villages surveyed, it is the most remote from major markets and offers the most
limited marketing and the fewest non-farm opportunities. It is located in a hilly
landscape, and only 40% of the agricultural area is flat (Brown et al., 2010). Each
household holds on average 3.72 mu of agricultural area, of which around 92% is
non-irrigated land.8 In dry seasons, water shortages can turn severe. In 2004, for
8In China, land is communal property and land use rights are granted to the households by
the village authorities for a period of 30 years (Huang et al., 2008).
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Table 3.2.: Basic village characteristics.
Population
Households 257
Individuals 1,089
Ethnic minority population (%) 78.7
Migration
Migrants in working age population (%)1 20.7
Households with at least one migrant (%) 50.0
Land resources
Contract land (mu/household) 3.72
Irrigated 0.28
Non-irrigated 3.43
Land in use (mu/household) 4.48
Irrigated 0.41
Non-irrigated 4.07
Income
Net income per capita (yuan) 1,084
Net income per adult equivalent (yuan) 1,464
Poverty & inequality
Poverty headcount (P0)
Low poverty line 0.22
High poverty line 0.45
Poverty gap (P1)
Low poverty line 0.05
High poverty line 0.11
Poverty severity (P2)
Low poverty line 0.02
High poverty line 0.04
Gini (%) 29.4
1Persons older than 14 and younger than 60.
example, about 80% of the families reported that they had problems with access
to drinking water (Brown et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2006, 2009).
Changtian is the poorest of the three villages surveyed by the research project.
Annual net income reached 1,084 yuan per capita or 1,464 yuan per adult equiva-
lent in 2006.9. Based on consumption expenditure and depending on the poverty
line chosen, the poverty headcount was 0.22 and 0.45 for the low and for the high
poverty line, respectively.10 The poverty gap index was 0.05 and 0.11 and the
9For the calculation of adult equivalents the OECD adult equivalent scale has been used
(Haughton and Khandker, 2009):
AE = 1 + 0.7× ((N − C)− 1) + 0.5× C)
where N is the household size and C is the number of children older than 14.
10Following Brown et al. (2010) and Xing et al. (2009), the low poverty line is 668 yuan and the
high poverty line is 892 yuan per capita and year in 2004 prices. The low poverty line reflects
China’s official poverty line. The high poverty line corresponds to a daily consumption
allowance of US$ 1.08. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology used for the
measurement of poverty and inequality, see Annex B.
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poverty severity index was estimated at 0.02 and 0.04. The Gini coefficient on
consumption expenditure was 29.4% in 2006.
In their detailed study of the economic situation of the three surveyed villages
in 2004, Xing et al. (2009) analyse the determinants of income, poverty and in-
equality. According to their results, income levels are correlated with endowments
with productive assets, human capital, as well as geographical factors. In fact,
variables representing average years of schooling, job training, family relationships
to government employees as well as the per capita area of contract land have a
significantly positive influence on income levels. Household size, ethnic minority
status and the distance to the township capital, in turn, cause income levels to
be lower. Related to poverty, Xing et al. (2009) accordingly find that the poor
dispose of lower land areas, have comparatively low levels of educational attain-
ment and higher dependency ratios in the household. The authors also analyse
the sensitivity of poverty measures with respect to changes in income from differ-
ent sources and highlight the relevance of agricultural production, migration and
blood donations for poverty alleviation.
With respect to inequality, Xing et al. (2009) identify local off-farm income,
including full-time employment, part-time jobs and self-employment, as well as
remittances as the primary sources of income inequality. Income from blood
donations, in turn, reduces inequality.11 The endowment with contract land,
household size, human capital, minority status as well as the distance to the
county seat, again, are identified as contributors to overall inequality.
3.2.2.2. Income Sources and Expenditure Patterns
Table 3.3 gives an overview on the composition of household income in the village.
The larger part, around 61%, stems from agricultural production, in the form of
both cash income for sales and self-consumption.12 Within agriculture, crops con-
11In the past, many households (around 41% in Changtian) supplemented their incomes by
selling blood. However, as blood donation stations in the county were shut down in 2006,
this source of income became less relevant by the time of the second round of the survey
(Brown et al., 2010).
12For the valuation of self-consumed agricultural products sales prices reported in the survey
have been used. In case, a household had not reported any sales, self-consumption has been
valued with the village median of the respective sales price. In case of rice, which has only
been sold by two households in the village, the median value of all three villages which have
been surveyed has been taken.
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Table 3.3.: Composition of household income.
Share in total value
Agricultural income 0.61
Crops 0.49
Maize 0.24
Rice 0.01
Rape 0.17
Fruits & vegetables 0.04
Other crops 0.02
Livestock 0.12
Pigs 0.07
Cows 0.02
Other livestock 0.01
Other produced 0.04
Non-agricultural income 0.39
Employment 0.24
Wage employment 0.01
Seasonal employment 0.09
Self employment 0.01
Remittances 0.13
Other sources 0.15
Blood donations 0.04
Other non-agricultural income 0.11
Total 1.00
tribute a much higher share to overall income than livestock. The most important
crops are maize and rapeseed for the purpose of oil production. The typical crop-
ping pattern is to produce maize or rice in the main season and rapeseed as well
as vegetables in the slack season (Xing et al., 2009). The main livestock products
are pigs.
Non-agricultural income accounts for about 39% of total household income of
which the largest part stems from different types of employment. Other non-
agricultural income sources comprise blood donations as well as gifts, transfers
(from government and private sources), or interest income. The figures in Table
3.3 illustrate the high importance of migration as a livelihood strategy. Income
from remittances makes up 13% of total household income and represents on
average the third most important item in the income portfolio of the households
in the village. Given that maize is mainly self-consumed, it even constitutes the
second most important source of cash income to the village. The high contribution
of remittances to household income also reflects the high share of migrants in the
population—around 21% of the working age population has migrated in 2006 and
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50% of the households had at least on migrant (see Table 3.2).13
Apart from remittances, income from employment stems from seasonal em-
ployment, which comprises irregular agricultural and non-farm jobs and accounts
for 9% of total income on average. Wage work, i.e. employment as government
official, as teacher, or at state-owned, collective or private companies, on aver-
age contributes by 1% to total household income. Self-employment, for example
through the processing of agricultural products, construction, the provision of ser-
vices or the provision of education or health care, with another 1% also makes up
a minor share of overall household income.
Of their total gross income, households spend on average 41% on farm in-
puts. The remaining net income, accounting for around 59% on average, serve to
cover the households’ consumption needs. The distinction of broad categories of
expenditure—food and non-food expenditure and expenses on savings, transfers
and other purposes—shows that food accounts for the largest share of households’
total consumption expenditure, The average Engel coefficient in the village is 0.58
(see Table 3.4). Non-food expenditures make up about a quarter of total expenses
on average and savings, transfers and other expenses sum up to slightly more than
an eighth.
Households either purchase the food they consume on the market or consume
products produced on the own farm. Overall, staples have a very prominent po-
sition in the food consumption basket. In value terms, own-consumption, which
consists mainly of maize, accounts for about a third of food consumption expen-
diture and around 17% of the total. The major item in purchased food products,
which contribute about two thirds to food and on average 41% to total consump-
tion expenses, is cereals (rice, wheat, etc.), followed by processed food products
(including eating out and condiments) and fruits and vegetables. In spite of the
overall modest levels of income, a rather high share of 5% is spent on tobacco and
beverages.
Non-food expenditures consist mainly of purchased services. Health and edu-
cation feature prominently here and together account for a higher share than all
other services, which include transport, communication, water and energy, among
13Brown et al. (2010) even report that the share of households with at least one migrant has
increased from 31% to the mentioned 50% between 2004 and 2006.
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Table 3.4.: Composition of household consumption expenditure.
Share in total value
Food 0.58
Own-consumption 0.17
Maize 0.11
Other crops 0.05
Livestock products 0.01
Purchased food 0.41
Cereals 0.19
Fruits & vegetables 0.06
Processed food 0.08
Livestock products 0.03
Drinks and Tobacco 0.05
Non-food 0.28
Durable consumption goods 0.05
Services 0.22
Health 0.07
Education 0.05
Other services 0.10
Other non-food 0.01
Savings, transfers and others 0.14
Gifts 0.05
Big events 0.02
Interest 0.03
Housing 0.04
Total 1.00
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Table 3.5.: Composition of household expenditure on farm inputs.
Share in total value
Inputs for crop production 0.59
Fertiliser 0.48
Seeds 0.08
Others 0.03
Inputs for livestock production 0.40
Feed 0.21
Livestock replacement 0.18
Veterinary services 0.01
Other inputs 0.01
Total 1.00
others, combined. About 6% of net income is spent on durable consumption
goods, including clothing, and other non-food items.
The third broad category of expenditure comprises savings, transfers and other
expenditures. The most important item here are gifts. Together with expenses on
big family events, such as weddings and funerals, gifts play an important role in
the village society to establish and maintain social relationships.14 Expenses on
housing make up about 4% of household consumption expenditures on average.
As sales and rentals of houses are prohibited, this figure, however, only includes
expenditures on construction incurred during the period covered by the survey.
Accordingly, the average figure masks a high variability between the households.
Finally, interest payments account for 3% of household expenditure on average.15
Table 3.5 provides an overview on the composition of household expenditure
on farm inputs. Inputs for crop production make up 59% on average, inputs for
livestock production around 40%. Other inputs, which include inputs used for
fishery and forestry, have a share of 1%.16 Fertilizer has the highest value share
of all crop production inputs. followed by seeds and other inputs, like pesticides,
for example. Inputs for livestock production consist mainly of feed and young
animals for the purpose of livestock replacement. A minor item is expenditure on
veterinary services, consisting mainly in the vaccination of the animals.
14A detailed study on positional spending is provided by Brown et al. (2010). The authors
analyse the role of expenses on gifts, weddings and funerals in the quest for social status and
discuss the welfare implications of these, in particular for poor households.
15Household savings other than the investment in housing have not been reported in the survey.
16Expenses on purchased inputs used in other economic activities are also included in this item,
but play only a marginal role.
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3.2.2.3. Commercialisation and Price Transmission
The discussions in Sections 2.2 and 3.1 have highlighted the importance of the
domain of trade for the analysis of village level impacts of trade reforms. In
essence, it is about finding out how and to which extent prices are transmitted
from the outside world to the village and identifying at which levels price for-
mation processes take place. Most ideally, this would involve the combination
of a qualitative analysis of the commercialisation of products and factors and an
econometric price transmission analysis. Due to the lack of the necessary price
series data, however, it is not possible to carry out own price transmission analy-
ses in the scope of the present study. Instead, householders have been asked for
details about the commercialisation of agricultural products in the survey in order
to allow for an assessment of price transmission and the domains of trade. The
results of these efforts are presented in the first part of this section. In the second
section, the integration of the village with national and international markets is
discussed. This part relies on results from unstructured interviews carried out in
early 2007 on wholesale markets in Guiyang and on evidence from the literature
on price transmission in China.
In order to obtain a picture of the commercialisation of the village’s farm output,
villagers have been asked about the way they commercialise their output as well
as about the destination of the products. Furthermore, to assess the relative
importance of sales and subsistence consumption, the corresponding shares are
calculated from the survey data. In case of land, the locations of land rentals,
whether inside or outside the natural village, are distinguished. The ultimate
goal of this analysis is to identify products or factors for which a village market,
i.e. local price formation mechanisms which have to be modelled in the village
equilibrium model, exists.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the analysis of the commercialisation of different
agricultural products. The absolute numbers of sales reported in column four
of the table show that the most commercialised products are maize and corn as
well as rapeseed and oil produced of this. Rapeseed is the most important cash
crop in the village, more than two thirds (77%) of all households sell it to earn
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some income and virtually the entire harvest (96%) is sold.17 Maize and corn is
sold by 41% of all households, and the sales share is much lower than in case of
rapeseed. Both paddy and rice and fruits and vegetables are mainly produced for
subsistence purposes. In case of rice, hardly any sales take place, at all. In case
of fruits and vegetables only 12% of the output is sold on the market, on average.
Table 3.6.: Commercialisation of agricultural products (absolute numbers and shares).
Selling way Total Sales
Village fair Trader Other share1
Maize & corn 58 47 2 107 0.23
0.54 0.44 0.02
Paddy & rice 1 1 0 2 0.05
0.50 0.50 0.00
Rapeseed & oil 108 89 0 197 0.96
0.55 0.45 0.00
Fruits & vegetables 19 5 0 24 0.12
0.79 0.21 0.00
Pigs 20 25 2 47 0.87
0.43 0.53 0.04
Cows 8 3 1 12 1.00
0.67 0.25 0.08
Other livestock 13 0 2 15 0.45
0.87 0.00 0.13
1Sales share refers to the quotient of sales value and total output value.
In case of livestock products, mostly pigs are sold. The sales share is high,
reaching 87% of total output value. Much lesser cases of cow sales have been
reported and no self-consumption of cows took place in 2006. Other output from
livestock (poultry, eggs, etc.) is marketed on a similarly small scale. Sales account
for about 45% of the output value. Agricultural output is mainly sold on a village
fair—a weekly market held at a location close to the village—and to traders which
visit the village to purchase products. In case of maize, rice, rapeseed and pigs,
about half of the sales go to each of the two channels. Fruits and vegetables, cows
and other livestock products are sold more on the village fair.
Table 3.7 reports the answers of the villagers on the destination of the agricul-
tural output sold. Except in case of pigs, consistently more than half stated the
county, in fact the county capital, as the destination. In case of pigs, the figure
still accounts for 37%. The next important destination is the village itself. Other
17Rapeseed oil makes up only a marginal share. Most sales are rapeseed for processing.
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destinations, such as the township or regions outside the county are of minor
importance.
Table 3.7.: Destination of agricultural products (absolute numbers and shares).
Destination Total
Village Township County Outside
county
Maize & corn 42 5 52 0 99
0.42 0.05 0.53 0.00
Paddy & rice 0 0 2 0 2
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Rapeseed & oil 82 9 102 1 194
0.42 0.05 0.53 0.01
Other grains 5 0 13 0 18
0.28 0.00 0.72 0.00
Fruits & vegetables 5 1 17 0 23
0.22 0.04 0.74 0.00
Other crops 4 1 12 0 17
0.24 0.06 0.71 0.00
Pigs 25 4 17 0 46
0.54 0.09 0.37 0.00
Cows 4 1 7 0 12
0.33 0.08 0.58 0.00
Poultry & eggs 3 1 11 0 15
0.20 0.07 0.73 0.00
The results of Table 3.7 show that substantial trade of agricultural products
takes place within the village. The importance of agricultural trade beyond vil-
lage borders, however, also shows that the village is integrated with the outside
world. Following this observation, it would be hard to assume that markets for
agricultural output are confined to the village and that price formation takes place
at the village level.18
A different picture reveals the analysis of land rental transactions by the vil-
lagers. As Table 3.8 shows, most land rented is non-irrigated land. Only seven
out of the 59 households which report having rented in or out land have done so
with irrigated land. Furthermore, the table reveals a large discrepancy between
the number of households which rent in land (47) and those which rent out (11).
Two explanations for this observation can be found. First, as land rentals are not
18This careful formulation has been consciously chosen. For more reliable evidence it would be
necessary to test for co-integration of village markets with the markets outside the village.
As mentioned above, however, the necessary price data could not be obtained and it was not
possible to carry out the corresponding analyses.
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yet fully legally sanctioned, householders may have an incentive to under-report
when they rent out land in order to avoid losing (parts of) their contract land.
Second, much of the land rent in may come from households which have left the
village and migrated to other parts of the country. As these households have been
absent at the time of the survey, land rented out by them is not recorded. Indeed,
Brown et al. (2010) state that during the time of the survey of 183 out of the 987
households which officially reside in the three villages no household member could
be met. According to the authors, neighbours had reported that most of these
households had migrated out of the county. Given that this number makes up
almost one fifth of all households, land rentals by absent households can largely
explain the discrepancies.1920
Table 3.8.: Location of land rentals (absolute number of cases and share).
Location Total
Within Outside
natural village natural village
Irrigated land Rent in 3 2 5
0.6 0.4
Rent out 2 0 2
1.0 0.0
Non-irrigated land Rent in 39 3 42
0.93 0.07
Rent out 8 1 9
0.89 0.11
All land transactions 52 6 58
0.90 0.10
The main result of Table 3.8 is that 90% of the land rental transactions take
place in the natural village. In only 10% of the cases land is rent in from or
rent out to outside the natural village. Moreover, although the corresponding
information is not available, out of the transactions from or to places outside
the natural village the largest part can be assumed to happen still within the
administrative village. Hence, as land transactions appear to be confined to the
village, the existence of a land rental market with price formation at the village
19See also Zhang (2010).
20Theoretically, there would also be a third explanations according to which larger plots are
rent out to several households. Due to the general scarcity of land and the overall small plot
sizes, however, this option appears to be little conceivable. Moreover, the survey data did
not point into this direction.
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level can be assumed.
Purchased consumption goods and services in their great majority, some house-
holds services such as transport might be an exception, come from outside the
village. Hence, the village can be assumed to be a price taker for these items
and the remaining good or factor to be discussed is labour. The discussion of
households’ income source above already revealed that labour in general is traded
beyond the village borders: villagers take local employment outside the village or
even migrate. Likewise, agricultural labour is contracted from outside the village.
Accordingly, wage rates can be assumed to be determined by the outside world.
In any case, labour will receive a distinctive treatment in the model, which will
largely determine price and wage formation mechanisms (see Chapter 4).
A further point worth mentioning, in this context is the presence of labour
exchanges in the village: It is common for villagers to support each other by
helping in case of need, which is in particular the case at the time of maize
harvest. According to reports from the village, this type of labour exchange, which
forms part of the complex system of social interactions, which exist in the village,
makes up the major part of labour traded among the residents. As the exchange
of labour is based on reciprocity, wages are generally not paid. Furthermore,
exchange labour has not been reported in the survey and the information to carry
out a deeper analysis is not available. Hence, exchange labour is neglected here
and in the following.21
As the preceding discussion shows, prices for most goods and factors purchased
or sold in the village are determined by price formation mechanisms, which take
place at domains beyond the village levels. Only for agricultural land, a village
market has to be assumed and taken into account in the modelling exercise to
follow. In case of the village traded goods (i.e. those which are traded beyond the
village borders), the relevant domain for price formation remains to be identified.
The results presented in Table 3.7 suggest that most trade takes place within the
county. This, however, represents the perspective of the villagers and the actual
domain of trade might be much larger. Moreover, markets of Puding county itself
may be integrated with the rest of the country and take national prices as given.
Indeed, Puding county disposes of sufficient road infrastructure to keep transport
21For a further discussion on this issue, see Chapter 5.
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costs to and from other parts of the country low. Furthermore, wholesale markets
across Guizhou province communicate strongly with wholesale markets in the
province capital of Guiyang, both involving flows of information on prices and
through trade flows. Regarding the integration of provincial markets with the
rest of the country, interviews carried out on the wholesale markets for fruits and
vegetables and for cereals in Guiyang revealed that Guizhou is connected through
trade flows to places throughout the country. In case of fruits and vegetables,
for example, products from the province are distributed to provinces as distant
as Xinjiang. During winter, products are imported from different parts of China
as well as from abroad. The like can be said of cereals. Furthermore, with the
dismantling of delivery quotas for grains in 2006, domestic agricultural markets
are now fully liberalised and markets can be expected to work more efficiently.
Likewise, government efforts to promote transparency through the publication of
prices may enhance price transmission and improve the integration of the province
with national agricultural markets.
While these considerations point to an integration of agricultural markets of
Guizhou province with the rest of the country, and hence a good transmission
of prices, it unfortunately is hard to find up-to-date empirical evidence on the
integration of China’s domestic markets, which would confirm this hypothesis.
Available studies, however, agree in their findings that throughout the reform
period market reforms have increased the integration and the efficiency of agricul-
tural markets in China. In a cointegration analysis of price series from the period
from 1987-1998, Wu (2001), for example, finds that prices follow a common long-
term trend. Cointegration is found between all pairs of wheat and corn markets
of 15 provinces, including Guizhou. In case of hogs, markets are found to be
cointegrated in 80% of the cases. In a later study, Wu and McErlean (2003) test
for market efficiency in Chinese wheat markets. Their results show that wheat
markets have become more integrated and therefore more efficient between the
late 1980s and the late 1990s. However, following the criterion that the law of one
price holds, markets could not yet be considered efficient.22 Huang and Rozelle
22According to the definition of the authors, the law of one price holds if price transmission is
estimated to be perfect and the differences between two prices is zero in the context of a
vector error correction model.
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(2006) analyse price series of rice, maize and soy bean from 15 provinces from
the period 1996-2000 and test for pairwise cointegration. As a general result,
they find increases in the share of cointegrated market pairs throughout the 1990s
and even mention that in case of maize and soy bean almost 100% of all market
pairs have been integrated after 2000. The authors state a steady improvement
in agricultural commodity markets during the period considered.
From the reviewed studies arises the consistent picture that changes in agricul-
tural prices are transmitted throughout the country. Not all markets, however,
appear to be integrated nor is more precise information on the actual degree of
price transmission available. On the other hand, market reforms have been com-
pleted in the decade which followed the studies and the trend towards increasing
market integration can be expected to have been continued. In fact, upon re-
quest one of the authors of the studies mentioned confirmed that he expected
agricultural markets in 2007 to be fully integrated. He argued with the increas-
ing efficiency of grain markets, which have been the last to be liberalised and
thus would provide the most conservative estimate of market integration (Huang,
2007).
Following these considerations, we assume that agricultural markets in Guizhou
are well integrated with national markets. Price changes, such as those induced
by trade reforms, are assumed to be fully transmitted to the provincial and county
levels.
The present section introduced the research area, Changtian village, located in
Puding county in the Chinese province of Guizhou. In terms of economic and
human development, the provinces lags compared to the rest of China. Likewise,
Puding county is officially designated as poor and the village is the poorest of the
three communities which have been surveyed. Village inequality is high. Agricul-
tural production has been identified as the principal income source in the village,
and food production for subsistence purposes still plays a major role in covering
households consumption needs. Migration constitutes an important component of
the households’ livelihood strategies. The analysis of product and factor market
in the village shows that village markets are generally integrated with the rest of
the country. The exception are land rental markets, where most transactions are
confined to the village level. In the following chapter, an agricultural household
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model, which represents the theory of households behaviour to be used in the
subsequent modelling efforts is developed.
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In this chapter the agricultural household model, which serves as the theoretical
foundation for the subsequent analyses, namely the estimation of shadow prices,
tests for nonseparability of household decisions, the analysis of determinants of
household migration decisions and finally the derivation of the behavioural as-
sumptions implemented in the applied village equilibrium model is developed.
Bearing in mind the central position it assumes in this study, special emphasis
is put on the analysis of household migration. The goal is to obtain a theoret-
ically consistent framework, which allows households to be engaged in various
productive activities at the same time while allowing for differences in wage rates
between sectors and locations. Furthermore, the model shall provide space to
model differences in migration behaviour between households, which are rooted
in the households’ socio-economic characteristics. As an attempt to satisfy these
demands, which stem from real world observations from Guizhou province (see
Chapter 5), an agricultural household model with the salient feature of an endoge-
nous allocation of labour to migration is constructed. This goes in hand with the
incorporation of interactions between migration and consumption demand and
different (dis)utilities arising to the household due to its participation in different
productive activities, leading to nonseparability of household decisions.
Thereby, a number of considerations make the assumption of nonseparability
of household decisions in Guizhou province a priori a conceivable option. First,
land and labour markets can be expected not to work smoothly, leading to market
imperfections and market failures (Liu et al., 1998; Kung, 2002; Yao, 2000). This
is also supported by recent studies on nonseparability from different provinces in
China, which reject the separability hypothesis in agricultural household models
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(Bowlus and Sicular, 2003; Kuiper, 2005; Carter and Yao, 2002). Second, and
more importantly, the survey data from the Guizhou villages exhibits a high share
of households, which do not participate in local labour markets. In the entire
sample, around 40% of the households don’t participate in local labour markets
at all. In Changtian, around 60% of the households neither sell nor hire labour
on and from local off-farm labour markets. Furthermore, the higher share of
households participating in migration in Changtian (52.4% as opposed to 43% in
all villages) suggests that migration constitutes a substitute for restricted local
off-farm opportunities.
As a starting point, a basic household model with endogenous migration de-
cisions in the fashion of Singh et al. (1986a) is constructed in Section 4.1. The
requirements with respect to the depiction of the households’ labour allocation, in
particular to migration, which ought to be met by the theoretical model to be used
in this study are discussed against the results obtained from this first basic model.
After a short excursus to the literature on the treatment of migration in village
equilibrium models in Section 4.1.3, the basic model is amended to introduce
nonseparability induced by imperfect substitutability of productive activities. In
Section 4.3 the basic model is modified to allow for a feedback between household
migration and the consumption sphere. In Section 4.4 the results obtained up
to that point are pulled together into a nonseparable household model with en-
dogenous migration decisions and feedback to the consumption sphere. This last
section summarizes the theoretical model.
4.1. A Basic Model with Endogenous Migration
Decisions
4.1.1. Set-up of the Model and First Order Conditions
The basic model closely follows the approach developed and first presented by
Singh et al. (1986a). The household is assumed to operate in an environment of
perfect markets in the neoclassical sense, that is, there are no transaction costs, no
barriers to market entry and the household disposes of perfect information, leading
to separability of household production and consumption decisions. Migration is
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included into the model as a normal off-farm activity. Land endowments are
assumed to be fixed and only interior solutions are allowed for.
The household is assumed to maximize utility through the consumption of an
agricultural good Xa produced by the household, a manufactured market pur-
chased good Xm and leisure Xl measured in time units1:
max U(Xa, Xm, Xl) (4.1)
w.r.t Xa, Xm, Xl, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, V and assuming strict concavity of the utility
function and with Lf being family labour used on the farm, Lof and Loi formal
and informal local off-farm work, respectively, Lm migratory work and V a vector
of variable inputs.
Utility is maximized subject to the production constraint
Qa = f(Lf , V ;A) (4.2)
where Qa is the quantity of the agricultural good and A is land area. Produced
quantity and inputs are related through a production technology f(·).2
In addition to the production constraint, the amount of time allocated to the
different uses, namely, farm work, formal and informal local off-farm work, mi-
gratory work and leisure must be equal to the total family time endowment T :
Lf + Lof + Loi + Lm +Xl = T (4.3)
Total family income I consists of agricultural income, formal and informal off-
farm income and remittances, which accrue to the household, described by the
1The term ”leisure” has to be interpreted here as a broader concept. It may comprise leisure
in its literal sense as well as any other time spent for activities with a purpose other than
earning money such as childcare, housework, etc.
2The possibility of hiring farm labour is ruled out by assumption. The inclusion of hired
labour in the nonseparable versions of the model would require additional assumptions on
the workings of the market for hired labour or the substitutability of hired and family labour
on the farm in order to avoid the model to become separable. Although this is in principle
feasible, it would complicate the analyses without yielding important additional insights.
The neglect of hired labour for sure is a simplification, but due to the low importance of the
factor in farm production a defensible one (in Changtian village only 4% of the households
rely on hired labour at all).
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remittance function r(Lm;wm):
I = paQawofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm) (4.4)
with pa being the price of the agricultural commodity, wof and woi are the pre-
vailing wage rates at the formal and informal local labour markets, respectively,3
and wm is the wage rate at the destination of migration. The remittances func-
tion r(Lm;wm) incorporates the assumption that remittances are a function of the
time dedicated to migration Lm and the wage rate at the destination wm. Finally,
total expenditures must be equal to total income I:
paXa + pmXm +
∑
i
viVi = paQawofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm) (4.5)
where pm is the price of the manufactured commodity and v is the vector of
variable input prices.
(4.2) and (4.5) can be collapsed into a combined full income constraint:
paf(Lf , V ;A) +wofLof +woiLoi + r(Lm;wm) = paXa + pmXm + vV ≡ I (4.6)
The household optimization problem can be summarized by the objective func-
tion (Equation 4.1), which is subject to the time constraint (Equation 4.3) and
the combined full income constraint (Equation 4.6). Let λ and ψ denote the Lan-
grange multipliers of the income (Equation 4.6) and time constraint (Equation
4.3), respectively, the Lagrangian for the households optimization problem is as
follows:
L = U(Xa, Xm, Xl) +
+ λ[paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)−
− paXa − pmXm − vV ] +
+ ψ(T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl) (4.7)
Partial differentiation of the Lagrangian leads to the following first order con-
3Formal and informal local off-farm activities are distinguished as they will be treated differ-
ently in the applied village model.
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ditions:
∂L
∂Xa
= ∂U
∂Xa
− paλ = 0 (4.8a)
∂L
∂Xm
= ∂U
∂Xm
− pmλ = 0 (4.8b)
∂L
∂Xl
= ∂U
∂Xl
− ψ = 0 (4.8c)
∂L
∂Lf
=λpa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
− ψ = 0 (4.8d)
∂L
∂Lof
=λwof − ψ = 0 (4.8e)
∂L
∂Loi
=λwoi − ψ = 0 (4.8f)
∂L
∂Lm
=λ∂r(·)
∂Lm
− ψ = 0 (4.8g)
∂L
∂V
=λpa
∂f(·)
∂V
− λv = 0 (4.8h)
∂L
∂λ
=paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi (4.8i)
+ r(Lm;wm)− paXa − pmXm − vV = 0
∂L
∂ψ
=T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl = 0 (4.8j)
4.1.2. Analytical Results
4.1.2.1. Household Demand
An analysis of the first order conditions concerned with the household’s demand
for consumption goods and leisure yields the standard results from consumption
theory:
• Demand is described by :
∂U
∂Xa
= λpa (4.9a)
∂U
∂Xm
= λpm (4.9b)
∂U
∂Xl
= λwof = λwoi =
ψ
λ
(4.9c)
which follows from equations (4.8a) - (4.8c), (4.8e) and (4.8f).
• Each good yields the same marginal utility per unit of income spent on that
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good:
∂U
∂Xa
pa
=
∂U
∂Xm
pm
=
∂U
∂Xl
wof
=
∂U
∂Xl
woi
= λ (4.10)
This follows straight from (4.9).
• The ratios of the marginal utilities of the goods consumed are equal to the
inverse price ratios of the goods, which in turn are equal to the marginal
rate of substitution:
MRS(Xa for Xm) :=
∂U
∂Xa
∂U
∂Xm
= pm
pa
(4.11a)
MRS(Xa for Xl) :=
∂U
∂Xa
∂U
∂Xl
= wof
pa
= woi
pa
(4.11b)
MRS(Xm for Xl) :=
∂U
∂Xm
∂U
∂Xl
= wof
pm
= woi
pm
(4.11c)
• The price of each good represents the evaluation of the utility generated to
the consumer through the last unit consumed:
∂U
∂Xa
λ
= pa
(4.12a)
∂U
∂Xm
λ
= pm
(4.12b)
∂U
∂Xl
λ
= wof = woi
(4.12c)
• In case of leisure the price is its opportunity cost, which is the local off-farm
wage wof or woi or the shadow wage ψλ .
4.1.2.2. Allocation of Labour to Productive Activities and Migration
A first step of the analysis of the labour allocation of the household is the result
from (4.8e) and (4.8f) according to which the household shadow price in the
optimum is equal to the wage rates in the formal and informal local off-farm
labour markets:
ψ
λ
= wof = woi (4.13)
Through this condition it becomes evident that in order to make the household
allocate labour to both formal and informal local off-farm jobs, the wage rate in
both sectors must be equal. As in practice the wage rates are exogenous to the
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household it would shift all its labour into the activity, which offers the higher
wage rate in case the wages differ. The household would be fully specialized in its
local off-farm activities and the sector with the lower wage rate would drop out of
the model. It is precisely this problem, which is subject of a later modification of
the model. For the moment, however, and assuming equal wage rates, equations
(4.8c) and (4.8d) - (4.8g) along with the result from (4.13) can be used to describe
the household’s allocation of labour to the different local productive activities,
migration and leisure:
pa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
= ∂r(·)
∂Lm
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Xl
= ψ
λ
= wof = woi (4.14)
According to equation (4.14) the household puts its labour to the different
uses in a way that their respective marginal returns in monetary terms equal the
household shadow wage. In case of farm labour this is the marginal value product,
in case of migration the remittances and in case of leisure it is the marginal utility
divided by the marginal utility of income. The household shadow wage, in turn,
is equal to the wage rate of the local off-farm market. The amount of labour
allocated to local off-farm work can be determined from (4.8j) as the residual
of the total time available to the household. As wof and woi are assumed to
be equal, the mix between formal and informal local off-farm work, however, is
undetermined.
4.1.2.3. Factor Demand
The conditions for the demand of variable inputs used in farm production follows
from equation (4.8h):
pa
∂f(·)
∂V
= v (4.15)
This is the standard result from production theory for optimal factor allocation,
which states that at the optimum the marginal value products of the production
factors must equal their market prices.
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4.1.3. Caveats to the Treatment of Labour Allocation in the
Model
The aim of this first basic analysis was to provide a theoretical benchmark for
the depiction of labour allocation and, in particular, migration in an agricultural
household model. There are two major caveats regarding the treatment of house-
holds’ labour allocation as proposed by this model.
The first caveat, which has already been touched in the discussion of results
(4.13) and (4.14), concerns the requirement imposed by the model that the wage
rates in different local off-farm sectors have to be equal should the household
be engaged in more than one local off-farm activity. This is contrary to the
observation that households have diversified off-farm income sources. Applied in
a simulation model it will lead, as mentioned above, to complete specialization of
the household with respect to its off-farm activities. Furthermore, even in case
the wage rates are equal, the model does not provide a means to determine the
exact amount of labour allocated to the different activities, as the household is
indifferent to either alternative.
The second concern refers to the treatment of migration in the model. As one
can safely assume that r(Lm;wm) is only a fraction of the migrant’s earnings,
the difference between wof/woi and the wages earned at the destination have to
be very high to make sure that condition (4.14) can actually be fulfilled. In the
likely case that the wage difference is too small, no migration would take place.
While a level of migration of zero could in principle be allowed for through the
formulation of the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions, in practice migration
appears to take place. Another alternative would be to include a margin into
the remittances function r(Lm;wm), which accounts for the difference between
wof/woi and the household returns from migration. While an interpretation of
this margin would be that it represents additional value (e.g. utility) accruing to
the household, which goes beyond the mere monetary value of the remittances,
this approach is weak from a theoretical point of view.
In order to address the concerns expressed in a theoretically sound manner,
two solutions are proposed. First, it may be taken into account that people,
and thereby households, may have preferences with respect to different types of
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employment. That is, a decision maker could be assumed to experience additional
utility or disutility from being engaged in a particular activity. This would allow
households to work in different employments at different prevailing wage rates.
Likewise, a first contribution would be made to explain the occurrence of migration
in the presence of relatively small differences between wage rates at areas of origin
and destination.
The second solution to be proposed is an extension of the impact of out-
migration on the economy of the household. According to the basic model the
household trades migration against the use of labour in other production activities
and against the consumption of leisure. But beyond that, the considerations of
the household should also include the fact that migration changes the demand
of the household for other goods than leisure, as the household (temporarily)
becomes smaller. Hence, the marginal benefit accruing to the household from
an additional migrant is not only ∂r(·)
∂Lm
but also a benefit due to lower consump-
tion demand. With lower consumption demand considered it appears more likely
that the marginal benefit from migration actually can equal the local wage rates
wof/woi. A calibration of the remittances function as mentioned above may be a
way to implicitly including the lower consumption demand. At his point, however,
it remains questionable whether this is sufficient to adequately consider the inter-
actions between migration and household consumption demand in the household’s
decision making.
A short excursus to the literature on applied models, which have an agricultural
household model at their core, namely equilibrium studies of village economies by
Kuiper (2005), Materer and Taylor (2003) and Taylor et al. (1999a), shows that
an implementation of the two solutions proposed above will fill a still existent
research gap. The studies by Materer and Taylor (2003) and Taylor et al. (1999a)
rest on a theoretical model developed by Taylor and Adelman (1996). In this
model, migration is determined endogenously as households allocate labour to
migration until the marginal returns to migration (i.e. remittances) equal the
household shadow wage. This approach corresponds to the basic model presented
in this section. While it seems that in case of the applied studies (Materer and
Taylor, 2003; Taylor et al., 1999a) the problem of a too small difference between
household shadow wages and household returns to migration is solved through
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a corresponding calibration of the remittances function, the link between migra-
tion and the households’ consumption demand is not taken into account. The
associated consequences for the households’ incentives to migrate are not consid-
ered. Kuiper (2005) solves this problem by applying a per capita equivalent LES,
which defines per capita consumption in the household as a function of income per
capita. Still, Kuiper (2005) models changes in migration as an exogenous shock
and not as a decision endogenous to the household. So, the challenge of modelling
migration as a decision endogenous to the household while at the same time taking
into account the impact of migration on consumption demand remains.
The following section 4.2 proceeds with a modification of the basic model, which
includes labour market choices into the preference structure of the household, lead-
ing to nonseparability of the household’s production and consumption decisions.
In section 4.3 the basic model is extended to take into account the feedback of mi-
gration to the household’s consumption sphere. A synthesis, which combines the
aspects of the two previous variants of the model in a single, unified framework is
presented in section 4.4. This framework serves as the reference for the analyses
carried out in the subsequent chapters.
4.2. A Nonseparable Household Model with
Endogenous Migration Decisions
The first caveat to the treatment of labour allocation in the basic model stems from
the requirement of local off-farm wage rates being equal, preventing the household
from being engaged in several local off-farm activities at the same time. Following
an approach pioneered by Lopez (1984, 1986) and applied by Sonoda (2008), the
solution to this problem, which is set out in this section is the inclusion of choices
of labour market participation into the preference structure of the household.
Households are assumed to have certain preferences regarding the different types
of activities. This implies that the different activities are imperfect substitutes
from the perspective of the household. As mentioned before, the rationale behind
this is that households might experience different utility or disutility from working
on the farm, on local off-farm labour markets or from migration. The presence
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of children or elder, for example, may make migration a less attractive option for
the household. Likewise, the need for childcare may require at least one person
to stay at home (i.e. on the farm) and make farm work the preferred choice for
this person. Hence, the problem may boil down to intra-household distribution
of labour due to the different fitness of different members of the household to
perform different tasks (Sonoda, 2008). As is shown below, this approach leads to
the household’s decisions of labour allocation and leisure demand to be governed
by a shadow wage endogenous to the household rather than an exogenous market
wage rate. In the consequence, production and consumption decisions of the
household become nonseparable in the sense described in section 2.3.3.4
4.2.1. Set-up of the Model and First Order Conditions
In order to formalize nonseparability in the household model, the utility function of
the basic model from equation (4.1) now includes the time spent by the household
on work in the different activities:
max U(Xa, Xm, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, Xl) (4.16)
w.r.t Xa, Xm, Xl, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, V .
It is important to note that Lf , Lof , Loi and Lm are directly included in the
utility function. Since no further assumptions are made, this implies that it is
a priori undetermined whether the utility function is increasing or decreasing in
the different amounts of time spent on the different activities. That is, a certain
4It can be argued that nonseparability of household decisions may not be caused by the im-
perfect substitutability of different labour market choices alone. Land and labour market
imperfections or the imperfect substitutability of family and hired labour can be a reason for
nonseparability, as well (de Janvry et al. (1991); de Janvry and Sadoulet (2003); Singh et al.
(1986b), for a formalization, see for example Benjamin (1992)). In fact, from an empirical
point of view such a situation is entirely conceivable in Guizhou, as the survey data from the
villages exhibits a high share of households which do not participate in local labour markets.
In the entire sample, around 40% of the households do not participate in local labour markets
at all. In Changtian, around 60% of the households neither sell nor hire labour on and from
local off-farm labour markets. Furthermore, the higher share of households participating in
migration in Changtian (52.4% as opposed to 43% in all villages) suggests that migration
constitutes a substitute for restricted local off-farm opportunities. Unfortunately, as villagers
appear to have unrestricted access to an informal local off-farm labour market as well as to
migration, a model with imperfect labour markets would not be able to explain the prevail-
ing patterns of labour market participation of the households. Nonetheless, a restriction on
formal local off-farm employment will be introduced into the model at a later point.
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activity can create either additional utility of disutility to the household. This can
be interpreted as a more general approach than the models by Lopez (1984, 1986)
and Sonoda (2008) who assume that all time worked in any activity decreases the
household’s utility.
As the production function (4.2), the time constraint (4.3) and the cash income
constraint (4.5) faced by the household remain as before, the Lagrangian of the
modified model becomes:
L = U(Xa, Xm, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, Xl) +
+ λ[paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)− paXa − pmXm − vV ] +
+ ψ(T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl) (4.17)
While the conditions governing the demand for consumption goods (4.8a) and
(4.8b), leisure (4.8c) and variable production factors (4.8h) do not change, the first
order conditions for the allocation of labour allocation to the different activities
have to be altered:
∂L
∂Lf
= ∂U
∂Lf
+ λpa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
− ψ = 0 (4.18a)
∂L
∂Lof
= ∂U
∂Lof
+ λwof − ψ = 0 (4.18b)
∂L
∂Loi
= ∂U
∂Loi
+ λwoi − ψ = 0 (4.18c)
∂L
∂Lm
= ∂U
∂Lm
+ λ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
− ψ = 0 (4.18d)
4.2.2. Analytical Results
Along with the first order condition for leisure demand (4.8c), the conditions
governing the allocation of labour by the household to the different activities
(4.18a) - (4.18d) can be manipulated and combined to obtain
ψ
λ
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Xl
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lf
+ pa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lof
+ wof =
1
λ
∂U
∂Loi
+ woi
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= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lm
+ ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
(4.19)
Equation (4.19) shows that in the optimum the household allocates labour in a
way that the marginal returns from each activity and leisure equal the household
shadow wage ψ
λ
(i.e. the marginal utility of time translated into monetary terms
by division by the marginal utility of income). In case of leisure the marginal
returns still consist of the marginal utility of leisure expressed in monetary terms.
With respect to each productive activity the monetary marginal return is now
corrected by a term which takes into account the marginal utility of participation
in the respective activity. The consequence from an analytical point of view is
that household decisions have become nonseparable. Unlike in the basic model
from section 4.1, household labour allocation is now governed by the household
shadow price of labour, which is no longer equal to the off-farm market wages, but
which depends on the preference structure of the household. As desired, the model
also includes the possibility of the household being engaged in different activities
simultaneously while wage rates are allowed to differ. Nonetheless, under the little
restrictive assumptions of the model it remains undetermined how the household
shadow wage relates to the market wage rates. In case utility is an increasing
function of the time spent in an activity the shadow wage may be higher than
the respective wage. In case utility decreases with increasing time worked,5 the
household shadow wage can be expected to be lower than the market wage. The
actual decision which assumption will be more valid, meanwhile, is an empirical
matter.
In particular with respect to migration, the model opens an interesting option.
Since the utility connotation of migration is explicitly included, a theoretical base
is provided to model migration responses, which are different among households.
Depending on considerations as those presented in the introductory part of this
section, households may exhibit stronger or weaker responses to changes in incen-
tives to migration, i.e. to changes in relative wage rates. Subsequent analyses, in
particular the applied model, will exploit this property of the model.
5This is the assumption made by Lopez (1984, 1986) and Sonoda (2008).
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4.3. A Household Model with Endogenous
Migration Decisions and Feedback to the
Consumption Sphere
The first modification of the basic model included labour market participation
choices into the preference structure of the household. While this can already
contribute to the explanation of the occurrence of migration in situations with
comparatively low differences in wage rates at areas of origin and destinations,
the inclusion of a feedback from migration to the household’s consumption sphere
adds another important aspect of households’ migration decisions to the model.
Starting again from the basic model from section 4.1, a framework is constructed,
which depicts migration decisions as endogenous to the household while consider-
ing the consumption impact of migration. The section basically draws on a work
by Wouterse (2006) who analyses migration of rural households in Burkina Faso
with an agricultural household model, offering an adequate base for the model to
be presented in the following.
4.3.1. Set-up of the Model and First Order Conditions
As before, the household is still assumed to maximize utility through the con-
sumption of an agricultural good, a manufactured market purchased good and
leisure
max U(Xa, Xm, Xl) (4.20)
w.r.t Xa, Xm, Xl, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, V , but unlike in the previous utility function
(4.1) consumption is now defined per adult equivalent.
While the production constraint remains as before ((4.2)), the time and the bud-
get constraint have to be modified in order to take into account that consumption
of leisure and goods has been defined in per adult equivalents:
T = Lf + Lof + Loi + Lm +Xl(N −M)
= Lf + Lof + Loi + Lm +Xl(N − Lm
E
). (4.21)
90
4.3. Feedback to the Consumption Sphere
The term (N−M) describes the number of household members in the active age
living in the household. It is the difference between the total number of members
in the active age N and the number of migrants M . M , the relevant number of
migrants is calculated as Lm
E
with E being the time covered by the survey and Lm
the time worked in migration, expressed in the same unit of measurement; so, if
the survey covers one year, a migration duration of 365 days would be equivalent
to one economically active person less in the household.
Taking into account the new way consumption is defined, the combined cash
income constraint becomes:
paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)
= (N −M + γD)(paXa + pmXm) + vV ≡ I (4.22)
or
paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)
= (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm) + vV ≡ I (4.23)
Here, through multiplication with (N −M + γD) or (N − Lm
E
+ γD), respectively,
consumption of Xa and Xm is scaled to total amounts consumed, with a parameter
γ, which scales the number of dependants to adult equivalent consumption levels.
By combining the utility function (4.20) with the time constraint (4.21) and
the combined cash income constraint (4.23) the Lagrangian expression associated
with this problem becomes:
L = U(Xa, Xm, Xl)+
+ λ[paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)−
− vV − (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm)]+
+ ψ[T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl(N − Lm
E
)]
(4.24)
Partial differentiation of the Lagrangian shows that the first order conditions
for consumption demand including leisure as well as the one for migration change
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according to the new formulation of the model:
∂L
∂Xa
= ∂U
∂Xa
− λpa(N − Lm
E
+ γD) = 0 (4.25a)
∂L
∂Xm
= ∂U
∂Xm
− λpm(N − Lm
E
+ γD) = 0 (4.25b)
∂L
∂Xl
= ∂U
∂Xl
− ψ(N − Lm
E
) = 0 (4.25c)
∂L
∂Lm
= λ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
+ 1
E
[λ(paXa + pmXm) + ψXl]− ψ = 0 (4.25d)
The conditions for the allocation of household labour to farm production (4.8d)
and local off-farm activities (4.8e) and (4.8f) as well as the demand for variable
farm inputs (4.8h) remain the same.
4.3.2. Analytical Results
According to equations (4.25a) - (4.25c), (4.8e) and (4.8f), the conditions govern-
ing household demand become:
∂U
∂Xa(N − LmE + γD)
= λpa
∂U
∂Xm(N − LmE + γD)
= λpm
∂U
∂Xl(N − LmE )
= λwof = λwoi (4.26)
This resembles the results of equations (4.9), with the difference that consump-
tion of an adult equivalent is now scaled to the entire household by multiplication
with (N − Lm
E
+ γD) and (N − Lm
E
), respectively.
The most important insight for our purposes, however, is provided by a contem-
plation of equation (4.25d), which describes the allocation of labour to migration
in the household’s optimum. After combination with equations (4.25c) and (4.8d)
- (4.8f) and division by λ, the equation yields the following result:
ψ
λ
= ∂r(Lm)
∂Lm
+ 1
E
[(paXa + pmXm) +
ψ
λ
Xl]
= pa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
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= 1
λ
1
(N − Lm
E
)
∂U
∂Xl
= wof = woi (4.27)
As (4.27) shows, the household allocates labour to migration in a way that the
marginal returns from migration, the marginal utility of leisure expressed in mon-
etary terms and the marginal returns from work on the farm equal the household
shadow wage. The household shadow wage itself corresponds to the market wage
rates wof and woi, which constitute the marginal returns from local-off farm work
in both the formal and informal sector. Most importantly, the marginal returns
from migration now consist of the marginal amount of remittances plus the returns
accruing to the household in form of a lower demand for consumption and leisure.
As both paXa+pmXm and Xl are decreasing in Lm, demand for consumption and
leisure decreases with higher levels of migration.
According to these results, the critical points made in the discussion of the
treatment of migration in the standard model presented above can be consid-
ered to be resolved. First, the model now explicitly accounts for the interactions
between the allocation of labour to migration and the consumption side of the
household instead of hiding it in the remittances function. This leads to more
adequate decision rules. Second, as the benefits, which accrue to the household
from lower consumption demand, add to the marginal returns of remittances it
is more conceivable that the total marginal returns from migration can equal the
marginal returns of a unit of labour supplied to the local labour market or to the
farm. Hence, migration becomes ’competitive’ with other activities.
4.4. Synthesis: A Nonseparable Household Model
with Endogenous Migration Decisions and
Feedback to the Consumption Sphere
The extensions of the basic agricultural household model with endogenous mi-
gration decisions, which are presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3 have demonstrated
how the concerns raised in the discussion of the basic model in section 4.1 can
be addressed. This final section of the theoretical chapter pulls the two models
93
4. A Theory of Household Behaviour
together to obtain a unified framework—a nonseparable household model with
endogenous migration decisions and feedback to the consumption sphere. After
setting up the model and deriving the first order conditions, the insights gained
from sections 4.1 - 4.3 are repeated and summarized.
4.4.1. Set-up of the Model and First Order Conditions
In order to allow for the household’s consumption of the agricultural good, the
manufactured good and leisure to be defined in per adult equivalents while the
time allocated to the different activities still is considered in total amounts of time,
the combined model features a composite utility formulation. In the composite
utility function, total utility consists of two elements; the utility the household
gets through its participation in the labour market, which is depicted by a function
UL and the utility, which stems from consumption, captured by a function UC .
Utility generated through UL is added to the utility from UC . 6 Correspondingly,
the problem of the household becomes
max
[
UC(Xa, Xm, Xl) + UL(Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm)
]
(4.28)
w.r.t Xa, Xm, Xl, Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm, V .
Utility is maximized subject to a production constraint
Qa = f(Lf , V ;A), (4.29)
a time constraint, in which Xl is scaled to adult equivalents by multiplication with
the term (N − Lm
E
):
T = Lf + Lof + Loi + Lm +Xl(N − Lm
E
), (4.30)
and a cash income constraint, where consumption of Xa and Xm is scaled to total
amounts consumed through multiplication with (N − Lm
E
+ γD), where γD is the
6This also offers the advantage that both functions and the associated demand systems can be
specified independent from each other.
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number of dependants scaled to adult equivalents:
paQa + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)
= (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm) + vV ≡ I. (4.31)
The cash income constraint (4.31) and the production function (4.29) are col-
lapsed into a single combined constraint
paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)
= (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm) + vV ≡ I (4.32)
The Lagrangian expression associated with this problem is:
L = U [UC(Xa, Xm, Xl) + UL(Lf , Lof , Loi, Lm)] +
+ λ[paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)−
− (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm)− vV ] +
+ ψ[T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl(N − Lm
E
)] (4.33)
Partial differentiation of the Lagrangian leads to the following first order con-
ditions:
∂L
∂Xa
= ∂U
C
∂Xa
− λpa(N − Lm
E
+ γD) = 0 (4.34a)
∂L
∂Xm
= ∂U
C
∂Xm
− λpm(N − Lm
E
+ γD) = 0 (4.34b)
∂L
∂Xl
= ∂U
C
∂Xl
− ψ(N − Lm
E
) = 0 (4.34c)
∂L
∂Lf
= ∂U
L
∂Lf
+ λpa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
− ψ = 0 (4.34d)
∂L
∂Lof
= ∂U
L
∂Lof
+ λwof − ψ = 0 (4.34e)
∂L
∂Loi
= ∂U
L
∂Loi
+ λwoi − ψ = 0 (4.34f)
∂L
∂Lm
= ∂U
L
∂Lm
+ λ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
+ (4.34g)
+ λpaXa + pmXm
E
+ ψXl
E
− ψ = 0
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∂L
∂V
= λpa
∂f(·)
∂V
− λv = 0 (4.34h)
∂L
∂λ
= paf(Lf , V ;A) + wofLof + woiLoi + r(Lm;wm)− (4.34i)
− (N − Lm
E
+ γD)(paXa + pmXm)− vV = 0
∂L
∂ψ
= T − Lf − Lof − Loi − Lm −Xl(N − Lm
E
) = 0 (4.34j)
4.4.2. Analytical Results
4.4.2.1. Household Demand
The conditions governing the demand for consumption goods of the household
result from (4.34a) and (4.34b).
∂U
∂Xa(N − LmE + γD
= λpa ;
∂U
∂Xm(N − LmE + γD
= λpm (4.35)
Accordingly, the household consumes a product up to the point where the marginal
utility of consumption of the good scaled to the household level is equal to the
marginal utility of the income spent on the marginal unit consumed. As in the
basic model, this is the standard results from demand theory.
Household demand for leisure is given by equation (4.34c). This equation can
be rearranged and manipulated to yield:
1
λ
∂U
∂Xl(N − LmE )
= ψ
λ
(4.36)
The equation implies that demand for leisure is governed by the household
shadow price of labour. Leisure is demanded up to the point where the marginal
utility of leisure is equal to its opportunity cost in terms of foregone income.
4.4.2.2. Allocation of Labour to Productive Activities and Migration
The allocation of labour to migration is described by equation (4.34g). The equa-
tion can be rearranged to obtain
1
λ
∂U
∂Lm
+ ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
+ 1
E
(paXa + pmXm +
ψ
λ
Xl) =
ψ
λ
(4.37)
96
4.4. Synthesis
Equation (4.37) shows that in order to maximize utility the household allo-
cates labour to migration up to the point where the change of utility due to the
engagement in the migration activity expressed in value terms plus the returns
from migration in terms of remittances plus the gains (in value terms) from lower
demand for consumption and leisure equal the household shadow wage. This anal-
ysis can be extended to include the allocation of labour by the household to all
productive activities as well as its leisure demand, resulting in a complete picture
of labour allocation:
ψ
λ
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Xl(N − LmE )
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lf
+ pa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lof
+ wof
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Loi
+ woi
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lm
+ ∂r(Lm;wm)
∂Lm
+ 1
E
(paXa + pmXm +
ψ
λ
Xl) (4.38)
Equation (4.38) implies that in the household’s optimum, all activities including
leisure yield the same marginal returns to the household. These marginal returns
include the monetary returns as well as a utility component and are equal to
the household shadow wage ψ
λ
. The nonseparable nature of the model becomes
evident from the fact that ψ
λ
is not equal to any of the market wage rates.
4.4.2.3. Factor Demand
The result for the demand for variable inputs is straightforward. From (4.34h)
follows
pa
∂f(·)
∂V
= v (4.39)
which implies that a variable input is demanded up to the point where its marginal
value product equals the factor price. This, again, is a standard result from
production theory.
By providing conditions for consumption demand, labour allocation and factor
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demand, the nonseparable agricultural household model with endogenous migra-
tion decisions and feedback to the consumption sphere represents a consistent
framework for the analyses carried out in the subsequent parts of this study. In
Chapter 5 it is used for the estimation of household shadow wages, a test for non-
separability and the analysis of migration decisions. In Chapter 6 based on this
theoretical framework an applied village equilibrium model is constructed, which
finally is used for the simulation analyses in Chapter 7.
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The crucial initial step of any CGE-modelling exercise is the preparation of a
SAM which constitutes the core dataset underlying the model. In principle, a
SAM is a square matrix whose entries represent transaction which take place
in a given socio-economic system during a particular period of time (Breisinger
et al., 2009; Round, 2003; Schneider and Zenios, 1990). In its most simple form, a
SAM distinguishes productive activities, production factors like labour and land
as well as institutions such as households, firms or the government.1 Each of
these elements of the SAM is represented by an account in the matrix (see Figure
5.1). Value-added generated by production activities flows to the production
factors. Returns to factors, in turn, make up the primary income of institutions.
Expenditures of institutions on goods and services produced by the activities,
finally, complete a circular flow of payments within the system (Schneider and
Zenios, 1990; Robinson et al., 2001).
The underlying principle of a SAM is the organisation of double entry account-
ing in a single entry matrix. This implies that the receipts and expenses of each
account must balance or, speaking in matrix terms, that all row and column totals
must be equal (Breisinger et al., 2009; King, 1985; Robinson et al., 2001). In the
consequence, all incomes and expenditures are taken into account, making the
SAM a complete and consistent representation of a given socio-economic system.
Supporting the corresponding economic theory, the consistency properties of the
SAM framework impose a general equilibrium on the economy depicted. In fact,
the double-accounting principle of the SAM guarantees all kind of equalities which
are necessary for an economy to be in general equilibrium. The SAM framework,
1The usage of the term ’institutions’ in a SAM context differs from the meaning usually given
in economics. While ’institutions’ in the latter case describes the rules according to which
an economy functions, in the former case it simply refers to categories of economic actors
(compare Taylor and Adelman, 1996).
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Source: Adopted from Schneider and Zenios (1990).
Figure 5.1.: Monetary flows in a simplified SAM structure.
for instance, ensures that supply equals demand, that total value-added be equal
to final demand or that total factor demand corresponds to total factor supply
(Pyatt and Round, 1985a). Having said this, a SAM can be characterized as
”a snapshot of the critical variables in a general equilibrium model
describing the circular flow of financial transactions in an economy”
(Schneider and Zenios, 1990, p.440).
Having a limited temporal coverage—typically a period of one year—a SAM
constitutes a static image of a socio-economic system (King, 1985). Depending
on the degree of detail present in the SAM, it conveys, however, a great deal
of information on the structure of the system and its interdependencies (Round,
2003). By providing a picture of the levels and structure of income and transfers
as well as the flows between the elements of the system like firms, factors or insti-
tutions, a SAM offers a suitable tool for analysing topics of income distribution
and inequality (Dervis et al., 1982). The great strength of the SAM framework
thereby is its extension beyond the mere production side of an economy towards
the coverage of any kind of institutions, households, socio-economic groups, etc.,
giving central importance to ”people, not commodities” (Pyatt and Round, 1985a,
p.1).
As the preceding discussion already indicates, the design of a SAM in practice
100
is more complicated than the simple activities–factors–institutions structure pre-
sented in Figure 5.1. Depending on the actual structure of the economy in focus
as well as on the requirements posed by the research problem to be addressed, the
accounts which constitute the basic structure can be disaggregated and amended
by additional kinds of accounts, such as trade or savings-investment accounts. A
village SAM, in this context, has to be adapted to the peculiarities of the detailed
depiction of a small economy, which is characterized by a potentially large degree
of integration with the rest of the world and the presence of non monetized trans-
actions such as own consumption or the use of family owned production factors
in household production activities (see also Taylor and Adelman, 1996).
The village SAM, which constitutes the basic data input for the village equilib-
rium model, summarizes and illustrates the explicit and implicit (i.e. monetized
and non monetized) transactions within the village and between the village and
the rest of the world. These transactions comprise the flows of inputs and income
between agricultural production and other production activities in the village and
the flows of income from production activities to production factors and ultimately
to the households of the village. On the expenditure side the village SAM depicts
the use of household incomes for consumption, savings and investments and fi-
nally, as mentioned above, contains the exchange of goods, services and factors
between the village and the outside world (Taylor and Adelman, 1996).
The construction of a village SAM involves a number of work steps to be car-
ried out. Before embarking upon the actual compilation it is necessary to define
the representative household groups (RHG), which are represented by the house-
hold accounts in the SAM. Although certain formal recommendations have been
made, the criteria for the definition of the RHG ultimately derive from the focus
of the research and are only limited by the availability of the data (Pyatt and
Thorbecke, 1976; Round, 2003). Accordingly, RHG of the SAM for Changtian
village are constructed to reflect the focus of the present research on migration,
income distribution and poverty. The following Section 5.1.1 is dedicated to this
step of the construction of the SAM. A further important issue is associated with
the non monetary character of many village transactions mentioned above. The
value of the household labour employed in household production activities, for
example, is reflected by an unobserved household specific shadow wage. Likewise,
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the overwhelming part of the village land is used by the households themselves
and the rental prices observed on the village rental market do not allow to derive
reliable estimates of the value of land. Hence, the estimation of shadow prices
for these production factors, which is subject of Section 5.1.2 of this chapter, is
a further step to be completed before the compilation of the SAM. Having con-
structed the RHG and estimated shadow prices, Section 5.2 presents the village
SAM for Changtian village. The first part 5.2.1 of that section introduces the
SAM in the form of a general overview, followed by a second part 5.2.2 in which
the SAM is presented in detail. The chapter is concluded by a section in which
some elaborations on the compilation and the balancing of the SAM are provided.
5.1. Preliminary Works
5.1.1. Construction of Representative Household Groups
The actual impact of macroeconomic shocks, such as trade reforms, on households
to a large extent depends on the characteristics of the households themselves. The
discussions in sections 2.2.1, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 highlight the relevance of prevailing
patterns of household production, consumption, and factor endowments as well
as differences in household behaviour for the effects of trade reforms on house-
hold poverty and inequality. In SAM based applied equilibrium models this is of
particular importance for the construction of representative household groups. In
general, there are concerns that the aggregation of households in representative
household groups masks the heterogeneity of households with respect to charac-
teristics such as factor endowments, labour supply and consumption behaviour,
asset profiles, location, household composition or education, for example, which
may lead to misleading results due to the loss of potentially important informa-
tion (Bourguignon et al., 2003; Cockburn, 2004; de Maio et al., 1999; Winters
et al., 2004). Unless further intra-group analyses are added, the use of repre-
sentative household groups confines the analysis of the distribution of income to
a depiction of changes in inequality between groups. Income within groups is
assumed to follow an exogenously given distribution which responds to a policy
shock only through a change in its first moment. Changes of inequality within
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representative household groups are neglected although within group inequality
may also be affected, depending on the characteristics of individual households
(Bourguignon et al., 2003; Cockburn, 2004; Cogneau and Robilliard, 2000; Savard,
2005). Furthermore, aggregating households in representative household groups
implies the assumption that the behaviour of the representative agent depicted in
the model is identical to the sum of the behaviour of the individual households.
Apart from imposing identical behaviour to each household, this assumption does
not allow for the dynamic complexity which may arise from individual behaviour
(Cogneau and Robilliard, 2000). These different concerns related to the represen-
tative household groups approach have prompted the development of macro-micro
simulation approaches which allow to fully or partially get rid of the assumption
of a representative agent (recall the discussion in Section 2.3.2).
The village model developed in this study maintains the assumption of the
representative agent. Hence, households in the village SAM are aggregated in
representative household groups. As the focus of the study is on poverty and in-
equality, households are stratified according to the level of their living standard.2
Further, as household migration takes centre stage in the analysis, a way is sought
to group households in a way that the groups reflect different propensities of the
households to send migrants. The result is a number of representative household
groups with different migration behaviour which are further subdivided by the
level of their living standard. The stratification of households according to their
living standard is straightforward. The grouping of households according to their
migration behaviour, however, is more challenging. Indeed it might be possible
to group households according to observed migration, e.g. the share of migrants
in the household. But as observed, migration is subject to the circumstances at
the time of the survey, it can be expected to be more accurate to revert to vari-
ables which underlie households’ migration decisions and ultimately determine the
migration behaviour of the households. Consequently, an analysis of household
migration with the aim of identifying characteristics of households relevant to their
migration decisions is carried out. It is shown that household composition plays
a crucial role in explaining households’ migration decisions and households conse-
quently are grouped according to the size of the household dependency ratio. As a
2The level of expenditure is used as a proxy for the household living standard.
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consequence of the stratification by the level of income and the dependency ratio,
the final SAM has six representative household groups, consisting of two groups
of households with low and high propensities to migrate. Each of the groups is
further subdivided into three subgroups with low, middle and high income.
Certainly it can be argued that through the adherence to representative house-
hold groups the concerns regarding this concept presented above are not addressed
and the critique, hence, remains valid. Households within one particular group
still are assumed to exhibit identical behaviour, representative household groups
still may consist of household which are heterogeneous with respect to charac-
teristics potentially relevant for the analysis and still only changes in inequality
between groups are depicted. Nevertheless, as the SAM and the model only cover
one single village, heterogeneity with respect to location remains only of minor
importance. Likewise, representative household groups consisting of 30 to 60
households as in the village SAM to be presented are already very small, at least
by standards of CGE modelling, and the village model can be considered to be
highly disaggregated and to reflect a high degree of detail. Although this does not
entirely invalidate the concerns presented above, they are weakened considerably
and the level of aggregation chosen and the homogeneity taken into account can
be accepted as being sufficient for the analyses to be carried out.
5.1.1.1. Analysis of Households’ Migration Decisions
The first step towards the construction of the representative household groups is
the identification of household characteristics and other factors which influence
households’ migration decisions. To this end, potential variables are selected with
the help of a review of empirical studies on labour migration which analyse mi-
gration as a decision at the household level. This information serves to define the
variables and provides support in the formulation of the hypotheses. In addition,
the list of variables obtained is amended, taking into account further considera-
tions on the particular situation in Guizhou province. In particular, variables are
selected to allow for the investigation of links between household demographics
and the health status of grandparents and migration which arise from the division
of labour within the households. A logit model of the decision of households to
migrate is estimated in order to assess the significance of the variables for the
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Guizhou sample and to test some hypothesis on household demographics, health
and migration.
The empirical studies reviewed are based on different theoretical models of
labour migration, such as the Harris-Todaro model (Harris and Todaro, 1970;
Zhao, 1999b), models of household utility maximization (Hoddinott, 1994) and
the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor
et al., 2003; Wouterse and Taylor, 2006). In spite of the different theories used,
the determinants of migration that are taken into account are similar. A first
determinant of migration considered is household size. The underlying rationale
would be that under conditions of imperfect labour markets, larger households
would have a higher potential to send migrants (Taylor et al., 2003; Zhao, 1999b).
Other household demographics, including the share of dependants, inactive or
children, the gender ratio or the share of married persons in the household, are
hypothesized to influence migration decisions as well (Hoddinott, 1994; Taylor
et al., 2003; Zhao, 1999b). Ethnicity, as taken into account by Zhao (1999b), may
also be included into this category. Further, human capital is expected to play
a role. This may comprise age variables, work experience, or education (Hod-
dinott, 1994; Taylor et al., 2003; Zhao, 1999b). Variables of household wealth and
productive assets may include the size of land holdings (Hoddinott, 1994; Taylor
et al., 2003; Zhao, 1999b) or indicators of household wealth (Taylor et al., 2003;
Zhao, 1999b). Taylor et al. (2003) also hypothesize an influence of previous mi-
gration experience and the access to migrant networks on the migration decision.
Finally, studies which use cross regional data include village characteristics, such
as non-farm employment opportunities, village population, transport and commu-
nication infrastructure, or geographical characteristics (Taylor et al., 2003; Zhao,
1999b). However, as the villages in Guizhou are very similar and as the SAM is
constructed for only one village, this may be neglected for now.
In addition to the variables identified from the literature, there is anecdotal
evidence from the villages on a likely interaction between household demograph-
ics, health and migration. According to these accounts, migration happens in the
context of intra household division of labour. As children require care and su-
pervision, persons in the typical migration age with children (between 16 and 39,
according to sample data) are less likely to migrate. However, as soon as the elder
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parents of the prospective migrants still live in the household, they can provide
childcare, allowing their sons and daughters with children to temporarily leave the
home village. This may work as long as the migrants’ parents3 have no chronic
illness which would prevent them from taking care for children and may make
them demand care for themselves, thus again impeding the persons in migration
age from migrating. To include this account into the model, dummy variables
for the respective constellations of prospective migrants, children, grandparents
and their health status are defined and the significance of grandparents’ health in
explaining the migration decision is tested for.
3In the following referred to as ”grandparents.”
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The variables used to explain the household migration decision (1 if at least one
household member has migrated in 2006, 0 otherwise) are described in Table 5.1.
The variables on household size and the share of married persons are straightfor-
ward. The share of males in persons in the migration age (between 16 and 39)
takes into account a possible gender bias in possibilities to migrate. The interac-
tions between household demographics and health are captured with the help of a
number of dummy variables. The reference case (all dummies zero) is a household
with no children and no elder parents, where children are household members be-
low 14 and elder parents are persons older than 60. The dummy “Household has
children, no grandparents“ is 1 for all households with children and without grand-
parents. The expected effect of this variable on migration is negative. A dummy
“Household has children, healthy grandparents“ equals 1 for all households with
children and at least one healthy part of the grandparents. The hypothesized
effect is neutral or at most slightly negative, as the presence of a healthy grand-
father or grandmother who can take care for children can compensate for the
negative effect of children and also for a potential negative effect of a chronically
ill grandfather or grandmother. “Household has children, all grandparents are
chronically ill“ is 1 for a household with children in which all grandparents are
chronically ill. The expected effect of this dummy is negative. Households without
children and with grandparents of which at least one is healthy are captured by
a value 1 in the dummy “Household has no children, healthy grandparents“. The
hypothesized effect of this variable is neutral or slightly negative, as also healthy
parents might require some care or support. Households without children and
with only chronically ill grandparents are assigned a 1 in the variable ”House-
hold has no children, all grandparents are chronically ill”. The expected effect is
ambiguous, as ill grandparents might require more care, whereas the presence of
chronically ill persons in the household may create the need for generating more
income through migration. As a human capital variable, the work experience of
the household head was selected. Household wealth is captured by the value of
durable assets per capita and the per capita area of contract land available to the
household. Finally, some variables related to social capital or networks, namely,
the membership in the communist party of at least on household member, eth-
nicity (1 if all household members belong to an ethnic minority) and the previous
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migration experience of at least one household member are included.
The empirical model is specified and estimated as a logit model (Greene, 2003).
The general setup of the model is
Prob(Y = 1 | x) = e
x’β
1 + ex’β = Λ(x’β),
with Y being the dummy for the household migration decision and x being a vector
of independent variables as listed in Table 5.1. Different versions of the model
are estimated, starting with a model which includes all the variables in Table 5.1.
Subsequent likelihood ratio tests are carried out to test hypotheses regarding the
links between household demographics, health and migration. Depending on the
test results, the original model is re-estimated in a simplified manner. Although
this section is already concerned with the SAM for Changtian village, the model is
estimated using the full sample of all three villages. Assuming that results can be
generalized across villages, this allows to take advantage of the larger sample size.
The results of the estimation of the full model which includes all variables confirm
the hypotheses on the effects of household size, the share of married persons in the
household, the share of males among the household members in migration age as
well as the hypotheses on ethnicity and previous migration experience. Household
wealth and the communist party membership of household members are found to
be not statistically significant (see Table 5.2).
The coefficient on the dummy for households with children but without grand-
parents indicates that these households are significantly less likely to migrate than
households which have neither children nor grandparents. The coefficients on the
dummies for households with children and healthy grandparents and for house-
holds with children and chronically ill grandparents are both significantly nega-
tive. The coefficients on the dummies for households without children are slightly
negative but statistically not significant. These results suggest that household de-
mographics play a role for migration decisions insofar as families with children and
grandparents are significantly less likely to engage in migration than households
without children and elder members. At the same time the higher magnitude of
the coefficients on “Children, healthy elderly“ and “Children, all elderly chroni-
cally ill“ as compared to “Children, no elderly“ suggests that the combined effect
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Table 5.2.: Estimation results, full model.
Estimate Pr( > |z| )
Variable
Intercept -2.708 0.003∗∗∗
Household size 0.585 0.000∗∗∗
Children, no elderly -1.588 0.000∗∗∗
Children, healthy elderly -3.950 0.000∗∗∗
Children, all elderly chronically ill -2.407 0.000∗∗∗
No children, healthy elderly -0.944 0.186∗∗∗
No children, all elderly chronically ill -0.427 0.572∗∗∗
Share married -1.435 0.045∗∗∗
Share male in migration age 0.910 0.039∗∗∗
Labour market experience of hh head 0.025 0.039∗∗∗
Assets per capita 0.000 0.333∗∗∗
Land per capita 0.098 0.523∗∗∗
Communist party member in hh -0.156 0.770∗∗∗
Ethnic minority household 0.613 0.035∗∗∗
Migration experience in hh 1.104 0.000∗∗∗
LR 127.56∗∗∗
AIC 407.86∗∗∗
McFadden-R2 0.252∗∗∗
Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sign. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%.
of children and grandparents in the same household seems to be even stronger
than the effect of children alone (“Children, no elderly“). This result is contrary
to the hypothesis formulated beforehand which would have expected a coefficient
on ”Children, healthy elderly” of lower magnitude than the one on the dummy for
households with children alone. In contrast, in households where there are only
elder members but no children the effect of the presence of elder in the households
on the migration decision appears to be negligible.
Another striking aspect of the results is that households with children and
healthy grandparents are even less likely to migrate than households with children
and chronically ill grandparents. An explanation could be that while chronically
ill parents may require more care, there is also the need to generate more income
for medical treatment through migratory employment. Partly, this explanation
is also reflected in the differences between the not significant coefficients on the
dummies “No children, healthy elderly” and “No children, all elderly chronically
ill”.
While the “No children, healthy elderly” and “No children, all elderly chronically
ill“ can safely be assumed to be equal (as their are not statistically significant)
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and the effect of health consequently can be neglected here, it is advisable to
formally test for a difference in the coefficients on “Children, healthy elderly“
and “Children, all elderly chronically ill“. First, a test would help to confirm the
hypothesis of the previous paragraph. Second, if the respective coefficients are
not significantly different from each other the interaction between grandparents’
health and migration put forward above would play no role in explaining the
migration decision. Hence, it might be possible to neglect health and combine
“Children, healthy elderly“ and “Children, all elderly chronically ill“ into a single
dummy variable ”Children, elderly” which equals 1 for households with children
and grandparents and 0 otherwise. Likewise, “No children, healthy elderly” and
“No children, all elderly chronically ill“ could be collapsed into a single variable
”No children, elderly” for households without children but with members older
than 60 years. Formally, the equality of the coefficients on “Children, healthy
elderly“ (β3) and “Children, all elderly chronically ill“ (β4) can be tested using a
likelihood ratio test:
• Grandparents’ health in households with children does not contribute to
explaining the migration decision: H01: β3 = β4 ; HA1: β3 6= β4
The results of the test of the restricted against the unrestricted model is as follows:
• LR1 = 3.35 < LR∗1 = 3.84 → Cannot reject H01 with α = 0.05 and 1
DF.
According to this result, the probability of households decision to migrate can
be explained without taking into consideration the health status of grandparents.
The results of the simplified model are presented in Table 5.3. The estimated
coefficients on the variables retained from the previous version of the model appear
to be robust to the change. The coefficient on households with children and
grandparents (”Children, elderly”) is significantly negative and of a magnitude
between the values of the coefficients on “Children, healthy elderly“ and “Children,
all elderly chronically ill“ in the previous version of the model. The coefficient on
households without children but with elder members (”No children, elderly”) is
negative but not significant.
The conclusions from this estimation are that children have a negative influence
on the probability to migrate. Contrary to the hypothesis stated at the beginning
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Table 5.3.: Estimation results logit model, neglecting health.
Estimate Pr( > |z| )
Variable
Intercept -2.753 0.003∗∗∗
Household size 0.587 0.000∗∗∗
Children, no elderly -1.578 0.000∗∗∗
Children, elderly -3.458 0.000∗∗∗
No children, elderly -0.717 0.200∗∗∗
Share married -1.492 0.035∗∗∗
Share males in migration age 0.901 0.035∗∗∗
Labour market experience of hh head 0.026 0.039∗∗∗
Assets per capita 0.000 0.302∗∗∗
Land per capita 0.095 0.539∗∗∗
Communist party member in hh -0.162 0.755∗∗∗
Ethnic minority household 0.585 0.042∗∗∗
Migration experience in hh 1.140 0.000∗∗∗
LR 123.87∗∗∗
AIC 407.56∗∗∗
McFadden-R2 0.245∗∗∗
Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sign. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%.
this influence is not counteracted by grandparents in these households. Rather,
households with children and elder members are even less likely to engage in
migration than their peers who have only children or who have neither children
nor elder members. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish between these two types
of households. Similarly, it is sensible to contemplate households without children
but with elder members separately.
The estimations performed up to now help to decide to what extent household
demographics as reflected by the presence of children and elder members in the
household and their health shall be considered as separate factors influencing the
migration decision. In the next step and in order to exploit the potential of the
data at hand, the demography dummies included in the last version of the model
are replaced by the share of children under 14 and the share of persons older than
60 in the household. Results are presented in Table 5.4.
The coefficients on the variables maintained from the previous version again
are robust to the change. The coefficients on the new demography variables are,
as expected, negative and significant. Again it is striking that the coefficients on
the share of children and the share of elderly persons are of similar magnitude. In
case the coefficients are equal it would be possible to collapse the two variables
into a single one, namely the household dependency ratio. Hence, a further LR
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Table 5.4.: Estimation results: demography dummies replaced by shares.
Estimate Pr( > |z| )
Variable
Intercept -1.624 0.156∗∗∗
Household size 0.377 0.000∗∗∗
Share children -4.015 4.80E-008∗∗∗
Share elderly -4.096 2.70E-004∗∗∗
Share married -1.977 0.006∗∗∗
Share males in migration age 0.854 0.056∗∗∗
Labour market experience of hh head 0.028 0.026∗∗∗
Assets per capita 0.000 0.638∗∗∗
Land per capita -0.213 0.165∗∗∗
Communist party member in hh -0.251 0.633∗∗∗
Ethnic minority household 0.751 0.011∗∗
Migration experience in hh 1.136 0.00∗∗∗
LR 125.39∗∗∗
AIC 404.09∗∗∗
McFadden-R2 0.248∗∗∗
Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sign. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%.
Table 5.5.: Estimation results: shares replaced by dependency ratio.
Estimate Pr( > |z| )
Variable
Intercept -1.239 0.120∗∗∗
Household size 0.338 0.000∗∗∗
Dependency ratio -4.038 0.000∗∗∗
Share married -1.984 0.005∗∗∗
Share males in migration age 0.847 0.049∗∗∗
Labour market experience of hh head 0.028 0.008∗∗∗
Assets per capita 0.000 0.641∗∗∗
Land per capita -0.213 0.164∗∗∗
Communist party member in hh -0.253 0.633∗∗∗
Ethnic minority household 0.710 0.011∗∗∗
Migration experience in hh 1.136 0.000∗∗∗
LR 125.33∗∗∗
AIC 402.09∗∗∗
McFadden-R2 0.248∗∗∗
Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sign. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%.
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test on the equality of the coefficients is carried out. The hypothesis to be tested
is: The effect of the share of children and of elderly in the household on the
migration decision is equal. The two variables can be collapsed into the household
dependency ratio: H02: β2 = β3 ; HA2: β2 6= β3.
The LR test statistic is LR2 = 0.004 which is clearly lower than the critical
value LR∗2 of 3.84 at α = 0.05 with 1 DF. As the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected, a final version of the model replacing the share of children and the share
of elderly with the dependency ratio is estimated. This final version of the logit
model on household migration confirms the insights gained before and shows that
the dependency ratio can be used to take into account household composition
without loosing information and without worsening the performance of the model
(see Table 5.5).
At this point it is possible to make statements about the determinants of house-
holds’ migration decisions in Guizhou province. Household demographics, includ-
ing household size, its age structure and the marital status of household members,
are found to have a significant influence on the probability of households to engage
in migration. Migration decisions also appear to be influenced by human capital,
such as the labour market experience of the household head and previous migra-
tion experience of the household. Finally, members of ethnic minorities are sig-
nificantly more likely to migrate. The more complex hypotheses on the interplay
between household demographics and health, however, are rejected. Neither tak-
ing into account the health status of grandparents nor treating grandparents and
children separately contributes to the explanatory power of the model. Rather,
the presence of children and grandparents in the household can be dealt with by
using a single variable, the dependency ratio.
With respect to the construction of representative household groups, the most
ideal way would be to group households based on these variables. In principle,
this could be achieved using cluster analysis techniques which would allow to
combine households into groups in a way that differences within the groups with
respect to the variables in question are minimised while between group differences
are maximised. Such groups could be expected to exhibit different migration
behaviour which captures the influence of a variety of influencing factors. In this
study, however, for the sake of simplicity only a single variable is selected to serve
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Table 5.6.: Effect of the omission of single variables on model fit.
Variable excluded AIC
Household size 413.87
Dependency ratio 446.37
Share married in hh 410.82
Share males in migration age 466.80
Labour market experience of hh head 408.69
Ethnic minority household 406.78
Migration experience in hh 421.19
as the base for the construction of the household groups.
The anecdotal evidence on the role of household demographics for migration
mentioned above as well as the research interest arising from these accounts makes
the dependency ratio an attractive candidate for the variable to be used as the
grouping factor. In order to provide further empirical foundation for this choice,
an additional set of logit models of household migration are estimated. Starting
from the last model (Table 5.5), the variables found to be significant are piecewise
omitted and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of the resulting restricted
model is computed. As the explanatory power of the model decreases, the omission
of single variables causes the AIC to increase. The higher the contribution of a
variable to the explanation of households migration decision, the higher is the
increase in the AIC.4 As the results in Table 5.6 show, the dependency ratio
causes the second highest loss of explanatory power. Thus, the choice of this
variable as the grouping factor for the household migration groups appears to be
justified also on an empirical base.
5.1.1.2. Construction and Description of the Representative Household
Groups
After having selected the dependency ratio as a core determinant of household
migration, households are subdivided into two groups. The first group consists of
those households with a dependency ratio larger or equal to the median, which is
0.4. This group of 147 households is assumed to have a comparatively low propen-
sity to migrate. The second group is made up by a number of 134 households with
4The AIC is selected here, as it penalizes losses of degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of
additional variables into a model.
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a dependency ratio lower than the median and which are assumed to have a higher
propensity to migrate. In fact, this assumption is confirmed by the comparison of
migration activity between the two household groups (see Table 5.7). Households
in the low migration group have a lower number of migrants in the household.
Accordingly, the share of migrants in the overall household and in the household
labour force is lower.5 In addition, further differences between household groups
reflect the insights gained through the previous analysis of household migration
decisions. Households in the high migration group tend to be larger and have a
higher share of male labourers, which can be regarded as a proxy for the variable
of share of males in migration age used in the econometric model. Likewise, the
high migration group exhibits a higher average education of household members
older than 15, which is akin to the positive effect of the labour market experience
of the household head found in the regression. Regarding land endowment, high
migration households have a lower area per labourer at their disposal. The only
difference at odds with the econometric analysis is the fraction of married in the
household, which is higher for high migration households; however, this might be
because households are grouped according to the dependency ratio and not to the
outcome of the migration decision itself and does not necessarily invalidate the
assumption of different migration behaviour of the households in the two groups.
Beyond the expected determinants of households’ migration decisions, differ-
ences with respect to the economy of the households occur. While gross income
per adult equivalent is roughly equal, high migration households have a lower net
income. Although the contribution of local off-farm income to total gross income
is similar, high migration households derive a larger share of their income from
agriculture. The share of income from remittances is slightly higher for the low
migration households. As these results appear to be counter-intuitive—one might
expect high migration households to participate less in the local off-farm labour
market and to have a higher share of remittances income—it should be pointed
out again that the grouping of households is made on the basis of a determi-
nant of households’ migration decisions and not of the outcome of these decisions
themselves. In fact, a comparison of migrant and non-migrant households reveals
5As we are dealing with census data, it is not necessary to test for statistical significance of
the differences.
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Table 5.7.: Characteristics of households by migration group.
Migration group: Low migration High migration
N= 147 134
Household demographics and education
Household size 4.49 4.87
(2.09) (1.95)
Labourers 1.87 3.65
(1.12) (1.41)
Share male labourers 0.22 0.43
(0.16) (0.18)
Share female labourers 0.18 0.36
(0.13) (0.15)
Dependency ratio 0.64 0.20
(0.17) (0.16)
Migrants 0.54 1.20
(0.83) (1.05)
Share migrants 0.11 0.25
(0.18) (0.22)
Share migrants in labour force 0.28 0.32
(0.39) (0.27)
Share married 0.46 0.48
(0.25) (0.23)
Average adult education (years) 2.58 3.98
(2.07) (2.13)
Household economy
Gross income per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 2,047 2,093
(1,994) (1,690)
Net income per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 1,590 1,325
(2,026) (1,664)
Share agricultural income 0.66 0.72
(0.39) (0.35)
Share local off-farm income 0.11 0.13
(0.20) (0.22)
Share formal local off-farm income 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.07)
Share informal local off-farm income 0.10 0.12
(0.18) (0.21)
Share remittances 0.14 0.13
(0.29) (0.21)
Expenditures per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 2,864 3,344
(2,616) (3,090)
Expenditures per adult equivalent, adjusted (yuan/year) 2,560 2,801
(1,899) (1,566)
Share food expenditure 0.62 0.52
(0.22) (0.20)
Land
Total contract land 3.50 3.96
(3.72) (2.86)
Contract land per adult equivalent 1.35 1.74
(1.36) (1.57)
Contract land per labourer 1.85 1.18
(1.96) (1.03)
Land in use per labourer 2.22 1.39
(2.24) (1.19)
Mean values, standard deviations in parentheses.
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that migrants have lower shares of agricultural and remittances income and higher
shares of local off-farm income (results not reported). Regarding expenditures,
high migration households exhibit higher levels, with respect to both measures
used. The apparent inconsistency with the results on income, meanwhile, is due
to higher expenditures on housing and big events in the high migration group.
These expenses tend to be financed not out of current income, but out of debts or
savings. Finally, the differences in the shares of food in total expenditures points
to differences in consumption patterns between the household groups.
Following the division into two migration groups, households are further strat-
ified according to their level of living standard. For this second stratification,
terciles of adjusted household expenditure per adult equivalent—the indicator
chosen for living standard—are calculated6 and households are assigned to the
corresponding tercile. The result are groups with low and high propensity to mi-
grate which each consist of three subgroups of households with high, middle and
low living standard (see Table 5.8).
The results of the descriptive statistics on household demographics and land re-
veal differences between the household groups with respect to factor endowment.
More wealthy households tend to have a higher share of labourers, in particular
males, and correspondingly a lower dependency ratio. Reflecting returns to human
capital, they also have a higher average educational attainment. Likewise, more
wealthy households dispose of a higher area of contract land per adult equivalent,
albeit not per labourer.7 Regarding the economy of the households, poorer and
households of a medium level of wealth on average derive larger shares of their
income from agriculture than more wealthy households. The relatively wealthy
households, in turn, exhibit the highest share of remittances income. The differ-
ences in the fraction of income derived from remittances corresponds to figures on
household migration in the upper part of the table and underline the importance
of migration for the household economy and the distribution of income within the
village. Apart from wealthy households being virtually exclusively participating
in formal activities in the low migration groups, no clear pattern with respect to
6The 33% and 66% terciles are at 1,806 yuan and 2,674 yuan, respectively.
7This confirms results obtained by Xing et al. (2006) in their study of village inequality in
Puding county.
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Table 5.8.: Characteristics of households by representative household group.
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
N= 44 41 62 51 52 31
Household demographics and education
Household size 4.95 4.41 4.21 4.53 5.02 5.16
(1.60) (2.20) (2.30) (1.76) (1.97) (2.18)
Labourers 2.21 1.80 1.67 3.49 3.63 3.94
(0.86) (1.09) (1.26) (1.19) (1.31) (1.84)
Share male labourers 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.47 0.39 0.41
(0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21)
Share female labourers 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.34 0.37 0.37
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18)
Dependency ratio 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.17 0.21 0.22
(0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Migrants 1.00 0.47 0.25 1.39 1.08 1.04
(0.90) (0.73) (0.70) (0.94) (1.08) (1.16)
Share migrants 0.21 0.11 0.05 0.32 0.22 0.19
(0.20) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
Share migrants in labour force 0.48 0.28 0.11 0.40 0.28 0.24
(0.43) (0.39) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.23)
Share married 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.49
(0.18) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Average adult education (years) 3.54 2.18 2.14 4.61 3.75 3.31
(2.09) (1.77) (2.04) (2.23) (1.81) (2.22)
Household economy
Gross income per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 3,278 2,103 1,143 3,067 1,777 1,076
(2,717) (1,719) (689) (2,101) (1,155) (559)
Net income per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 2,721 1,556 815 2,083 996 669
(2,913) (1,716) (638) (2,263) (1,050) (634)
Share agricultural income 0.58 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.76 0.76
(0.43) (0.39) (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36)
Share local off-farm income 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.15
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23)
Share formal local off-farm income 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08)
Share informal local off-farm income 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.13
(0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22)
Share remittances 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.05
(0.39) (0.29) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.11)
Expenditures per adult equivalent (yuan/year) 5,600 2,310 1,299 5,023 2,762 1,649
(3,349) (544) (458) (4,183) (1,547) (1,112)
Expenditures per adult equivalent, adjusted 4,713 2,204 1,277 4,284 2,220 1,414
(2,180) (274) (370) (1,628) (244) (352)
Share food expenditure 0.43 0.62 0.76 0.44 0.55 0.63
(0.20) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Land
Total contract land 3.54 3.62 3.38 3.88 3.73 4.45
(2.99) (2.88) (4.67) (3.00) (2.75) (2.88)
Contract land per adult equivalent 1.55 1.34 1.22 1.95 1.56 1.69
(1.41) (1.00) (1.53) (1.88) (1.43) (1.23)
Contract land per labourer 1.67 1.97 1.92 1.25 1.08 1.23
(1.40) (1.68) (2.55) (1.34) (0.79) (0.83)
Land in use per labourer 2.27 2.02 2.33 1.43 1.36 1.39
(2.15) (1.68) (2.70) (1.57) (0.79) (1.03)
Mean values, standard deviations in parentheses.
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local off-farm employment arises. This suggests that the type of aggregation used
blurs a large heterogeneity among the households, which is also reflected in the
high variability within the groups, as reflected by the high standard deviations.
However, a part of an explanation could be that informal local off-farm employ-
ment combines occasional irregular work as well as self-employment, where the
latter in single cases generates very high incomes which can drive the results pre-
sented in the table. Engel coefficients decrease with increasing wealth, reflecting
differences in consumption patterns between the household groups.
In summary, the presentation of the representative household groups to be used
in the village SAM shows that the grouping of households according to the depen-
dency ratio and household wealth lays the foundation for a differentiated analysis
of the impact of trade liberalisation on income distribution with a special empha-
sis on the poor. As differences with respect to household demographics, factor
endowments and consumption patterns are captured, households in the different
household groups can reasonably be assumed to exhibit diverse behavioural re-
sponses to changes in the economic environment and to be affected differently by
changes in relative prices and wages.
5.1.2. Estimation of Shadow Prices and Test for
Nonseparability
Along with considerations regarding imperfections in factor markets (de Janvry
and Sadoulet, 2003), the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 4 shows that the
implicit price of labour, i.e. the household shadow wage can systematically deviate
from prevailing market wages, ultimately leading to nonseparability of production
and consumption decisions. A corollary of this observation is that household
labour allocated to farm or household production cannot be valued using market
wage rates. This poses a particular challenge to the construction of the village
SAM, which is set up in value terms and hence requires information not only on
quantities but also on prices. Similarly, land is to a large extent non-traded and
the land leases which are actually observed take place at a high range of prices,
including a considerable number of gratis transactions. In the consequence, it is
impossible to derive a meaningful value, such as the mean or the median, which
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could be used for the valuation of non-traded land. A solution to this problem
is offered by approaches to estimating shadow wages and prices which have been
originally developed as a preliminary step in the study of labour supply behaviour
of rural households. The traditional approach to the estimation of shadow wages
has been proposed by Jacoby (1993) and relies on the result derived from theoret-
ical models of farm production that the shadow wage corresponds to the marginal
value product of labour (MV Pl) on the farm. Accordingly, the approach involves
the estimation of a production function from which the MV Pl is derived as the
first partial derivative with respect to labour. The approach has become a sort
of standard technique which has been widely applied (see, for example, Abdu-
lai and Regmi, 2000; Cook, 1999; Lambert and Magnac, 1994; Sicular and Zhao,
2004; Skoufias, 1994). Kuiper (2005) has extended the approach towards the in-
clusion of the estimation of shadow prices for land and other non-traded factors
and demonstrated the applicability for the purpose of the construction of a village
SAM. Having said that, starting with the paper by Jacoby (1993) a number of
issues associated with the approach have been recognized.
A problem related to the estimation of production functions in general is a
possible correlation of one or more of the inputs used with the error term. This
endogeneity may arise, for example, due to the presence of unobserved inputs
such as a farmer’s managerial capability, differing land qualities or the anticipa-
tion of exogenous random shocks (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Zellner et al.,
1966). In order to avoid the resulting simultaneity bias, authors either apply in-
strumental variables (IV) techniques (in cross-section data, Jacoby, 1993; Lambert
and Magnac, 1994; Le, 2009) or, in case a panel data set is available, estimate
fixed effects models thus capturing time-invariant unobserved factors (Skoufias,
1994). Further, less general issues may arise depending on the actual methodol-
ogy chosen and the data used. In case it is necessary to estimate the model on
a sub-sample of households, for instance if, as in our case, a household is only
included into the estimation when it carries out own agricultural production, a
sample selection bias may occur and can be dealt with through the application of
a Heckman-2-step estimation procedure (Heckman, 1979; Jacoby, 1993). In case
a Cobb-Douglas production functional form8 is chosen, instances of zero-input use
8Or any other functional form which requires input variables to be expressed in logarithms.
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are problematic. The workaround applied in the studies estimating shadow wages
is the addition of a small non-zero constant to all the inputs entering the produc-
tion function (Jacoby, 1993; Kuiper, 2005). However, as Battese (1997) notes, if
the zero-observations make up a substantial proportion of the sample this practice
can lead to biased parameter estimates. Instead, it is recommended to revert to
the use of a technique which introduces a dummy for each explanatory variable
with takes the value one in case the variable is zero and the value zero otherwise
(see below). Finally, Jacoby (1993) and Le (2009) raise the concern that the use of
values instead of quantities in the production function potentially leads to biases
in the estimation if the variation in prices in the sample is high; however, as in
this case only a single village is dealt with this can safely be assumed to be less
relevant.
In parts in response to the issues related to the Jacoby approach to the es-
timation of household shadow wages, recent works propose alternative meth-
ods. Barrett et al. (2008) no longer rely on a production function but rather
compute MV Pls and shadow wages from production frontiers. Le (2009) com-
pletely abstains from the estimation of the production technology and recovers
shadow wages from a direct estimation of labour supply functions. Although
both approaches have their appeals both from a theoretical and empirical point of
view, they involve bootstrapping bias correction and general method of moments
(GMM) estimation techniques whose application is beyond the scope of this study.
To summarize, sample selection bias, problems of endogeneity in the estimation
of the production functions, the choice of a functional form and the occurrence
of zero-observations of some inputs can be identified as issues which have to be
addressed when estimating shadow prices of rural households. As virtually all
households (about 96%) in Changtian village are engaged in agriculture, a se-
lectivity bias can be expected to be very small or even irrelevant and, hence, is
neglected. A likely endogeneity bias should be taken more seriously, first due to
the reasons discussed above, second due to a variable which for sure has been
omitted, as data on exchange labour is not available from the survey. As men-
tioned above, fixed-effects and IV estimations can be used to tackle this problem.
In this study, we revert to IV estimation rather than a fixed-effects model. This
choice can be defended given the fact that fixed-effect regressions do not capture
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time-varying independent variables (Wooldridge, 2006). These are likely to be rel-
evant in the case of agricultural production functions, as the amount of exchange
labour most likely does change over time, but also with respect to instances of
land degradation or the anticipation of random weather shocks mentioned above.
Regarding the choice of the functional form, a Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nology is assumed for the sake of consistency with the applied village model9. In
this context, zero-observations is dealt with by the application of both approaches
which can be found in the literature - adding one to each observation (Jacoby,
1993; Kuiper, 2005) and using the dummy variable approach proposed by Battese
(1997).
The model to be estimated following this discussion is given in equation 5.1
lnY = α +
M∑
i=1
βm lnLm + γ lnT + δ lnK +
K∑
i=1
ϕkCk + ε (5.1)
where Y is the gross value of agricultural production (gross revenue from crop
and livestock production), L is the time worked in agriculture by male adults,
female adults and elderly and children and T is the total area of land in use.
Variable inputs are aggregated in K, which represents the total value of variable
inputs including hired labour, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, livestock replacement,
veterinary costs and other expenses on agricultural inputs. Ck contains control
variables, namely proxies for managerial capacity and land quality (see Table 5.9).
In order to deal with endogeneity, this model is estimated using both OLS and
IV (two-step least squares).
The version of the model using the Battese (1997) dummy variable approach is
lnY = α +
M∑
i=1
(βDm DLm + βm lnL∗m) + γ lnT + δ lnK +
K∑
i=1
ϕkC + ε (5.2)
where DLm = 1 if Lm = 0, DLm = 0 if Lm > 0 and L∗m = max(Lm, DLm). As neither
land nor variable inputs contain zero observations, dummies are introduced only
9In fact, using the Pe test by MacKinnon et al. (1983) the Cobb-Douglas specification has been
found to be superior to a linear model. Furthermore, other specification errors of the C-D
model could be rejected by a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969).
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Table 5.9.: Variables used for the estimation of agricultural production functions.
Variable Description Mean
(Std.dev.)
Value of agricultural output Total value of agricultural production (yuan) 2721
(2145)
Male labour Hours worked by male adults on farm 1716
(older than 14 and younger than 61 years) (1589)
Female labour Hours worked by female adults on farm 1789
(1404)
Elder/child labour Hours worked by elderly and children on 751
farm (1682)
Land area Land area in use (mu) 4.59
(3.80)
Variable inputs Value of variable inputs (yuan) 1702
(1415)
Perennials Household cultivates perennial crops 0.2
(0=No, Yes=1) (0.4)
Share irrigated land Share of irrigated land (%) 6.10
(14.7)
Education of household head Years of formal education of household head 3.8
(3.1)
Age of household head Age of household head (years) 46.4
(13.9)
Instrumental variables: Log of household composition variables: Number of male and
female adults, children and elderly; Log of prices of maize seeds, urea, chemical fertilizer
and rapeseed.
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for household labour. This version of the model is estimated using OLS. 10
Subsequently, the shadow wages of the households are computed as the first par-
tial derivative of the estimated production function with respect to the respective
type of labour 11
wˆfm = βˆm
Yˆ
Lm
(5.4)
where, following the notation used in Chapter 4, wˆfm is the shadow price implicitly
paid to household labour of type m employed the farm, βˆm is the estimated
coefficient on labour of type m, Yˆ is the fitted value of total agricultural output
and Lm are the hours of labour of type m worked on farm by the household. In
the same fashion, the shadow price Ψˆ of land is calculated as
Ψˆ = γˆ Yˆ
T
(5.5)
where γˆ is the estimated coefficient on land and T is the area of land in use.
Estimation results are reported in Table 5.10. The estimates of the coefficient
on male labour appear to be largely robust to the different versions of the model.
The estimate from models OLS I (without dummies for zero-observations) and
10 In addition to the questions dealt with above, a further theoretical issue deserves to be
discussed. Equation 4.38 of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 4 states that the
household shadow wage equals the marginal value product of household labour plus the
marginal utility arising from the engagement in farm labour:
ψ
λ
= 1
λ
∂U
∂Lf
+ pa
∂f(·)
∂Lf
(5.3)
The estimation of the household shadow wage as the partial derivative of the production
function, however, would require the assumption that the marginal utility of farm labour
be zero. Otherwise, the shadow wage would be different from the estimated marginal value
product and the estimation procedure would not be valid. Fortunately, there is evidence
available which allows to argue for an assumption of at least being no disutility associated
with farm labour: When analysing labour supply behaviour of rural households in China,
Sicular and Zhao (2004) find that household supply more (less) labour to the market when
a decrease (increase) in the agricultural shadow wage cause a change in the ratio between
the agricultural shadow wage and the market wage, but not vice versa. According to the
authors, this implies that ”high market wages do not ’pull’ labour out of agriculture; rather,
low marginal returns to work in agriculture ’push’ labour into wage employment” (Sicular
and Zhao, 2004, p.240). This suggests that agriculture is the preferred activity of households
and that it at least does not generate disutility to the households.
11The partial derivative can be used directly because the production function is estimated in
value terms.
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Table 5.10.: Agricultural production functions: estimation results.
Estimate
(Std.dev.)
Model: OLS I OLS II 2SLS
Variable
Intercept 3.498∗∗∗ 3.111∗∗∗ 3.937∗∗∗
(0.289)∗∗∗ (0.596)∗∗∗ (0.440)∗∗∗
Male labour 0.044∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗ (0.029) ∗∗∗
Female labour 0.001∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.070)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Elder/child labour 0.011∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
Land area 0.203∗∗∗ 0.198 ∗∗∗ 0.123 ∗∗∗
(0.074)∗∗∗ (0.075) ∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗
Variable inputs 0.489∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗
Perennials 0.135∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.099)∗∗∗ (0.100)∗∗∗ (0.104)∗∗∗
Share irrigated land 0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Education of household head 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
Age of household head -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004) ∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.545∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
F-test on model significance 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(p-value)
Test on heteroskedasticity 0.416∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗
(p-value)
Over-identification test 0.666∗∗∗
(p-value)
F-test on endogeneity 0.079∗∗∗
(p-value)
Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sign. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%.
OLS I: OLS model without dummy variables for zero-observations; OLS II:
OLS model with dummy variables; 2SLS: IV estimate of model without dummy
variables; Coefficients on dummy variables are not reported.
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2SLS are positive and significant. The estimate from model OLS II appears to be
slightly larger, but is not significantly different from zero. In fact, the estimates
are practically of the same size, with the IV point estimate lying within the
95% confidence interval of the OLS I, and the OLS II estimate within the 90%
confidence interval (not reported). The coefficients on female adult labour are
slightly positive in case of the OLS models and slightly negative in case of the IV
model. The estimation of model OLS II yields a coefficient which is of a higher
magnitude. Although the estimates are in no case significantly different from zero,
this points to a potential bias due to the addition of one to all zero-observations
which is done in case of models OLS I and 2SLS. Likewise, the coefficients on
labour of children and elderly are not significantly different from zero, but also
differ in size. Both land, with the exception of model 2SLS, and variable input
use show a significantly positive effect on the value of agricultural output which in
case of the OLS models appears to be robust to the different model specifications.
The control variables introduced into the model in neither case show a significant
influence on output value. In general, the results, including the low significance
of the coefficients on labour, are in line with the results obtained by other studies
(Cook, 1999; Kuiper, 2005). All in all, the models have a high overall significance
and a moderate fit, explaining around 54% of the variation in the dependent
variable. Heteroskedasticity appears not to be a problem and the IV models
pass the Hausman (1983) over-identification tests. Interestingly, in spite of the
concerns related to problems of endogeneity to be encountered in relation to the
estimation of agricultural production function, the corresponding F-test carried
out rejects the Null-hypothesis of the exogeneity of all explanatory variables only
at a level of significance of 10%. Especially the omission of exchange labour in
the production function does not appear to be of much relevance. A likely reason
could be that exchange labour does not contribute much to total farm output,
a result which was found by Kuiper (2005) who obtains slightly negative and
non significant coefficients on exchange labour in the estimation of a production
function for a village in Jiangxi province, China.
In particular the results of the tests on model specification facilitate the choice of
the model version to be used for the calculation of the household shadow prices. As
the IV estimator in small and moderate samples is less efficient than OLS (Greene,
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Table 5.11.: Household shadow prices, Changtian village.
Male adult Female adult Elder/child Land
labour labour labour (yuan/mu)
(yuan/hr)
Min 0.02 0.00 0.00 37.0
1st Quartile 0.01 0.01 0.02 195.6
Median 0.10 0.01 0.03 286.6
Mean 0.18 0.02 0.12 342.4
3rd Quartile 0.02 0.07 0.10 430.8
Max 1.76 0.31 2.66 1,877.0
Std. Dev. 0.27 0.03 0.39 233.3
2003), the latter should be preferred over the former in case there is no statistical
evidence for the presence of endogeneity. Because of this fact, along with the
point made by Battese (1997) on a likely bias of the estimates of a production
function associated with the practice of adding a small positive constant to each
observation, the results from model OLS II in Table 5.10 are used in the following.
The lack of significance of the coefficients on labour in this model should not pose
an obstacle as the point estimates both from model OLS I and 2SLS lie within
the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates obtained from model OLS II. A
final point against the use of the results from the IV estimation is the negative
coefficient on female adult labour, which would lead to negative shadow wages, a
theoretically impossible result.
Table 5.11 presents the summary statistics of the estimated household shadow
prices in Changtian village. In case of the different types of labour, the median
and mean values as well as the 25% and 50% quantiles of the estimated wages
suggest that hourly shadow wages are low on average and for the majority of the
households, ranging between virtually 0 and 1.76 yuan/hour in case of male adult
labour and 2.66 yuan/hour in case of elder / child labour. Due to some extreme
values, the mean values which lie between 0.02 yuan/hour (female adult labour)
and 0.18 yuan/hour (male adult labour) differ somewhat from the medians, which
range from 0.01 (female adults) to 0.10 (male adults). The comparatively low
marginal returns to female adult labour reflect a division of labour along gender
lines with women primarily doing homework and work on the farm during the year,
while men work off-farm or in migration. This in turn, is related to customs as well
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Figure 5.2.: Density estimates of household shadow prices.
as a restricted access for women to local off-farm jobs. The higher shadow wages
of elder / child labour as compared to female adult labour may reflect the fact that
a number of households only consist of elder persons which may face a relative
scarcity of labour, leading to elevated marginal returns. The distributions of the
shadow wages are depicted in Figure 5.212. The graphs indicate that, apart from
some extreme values in the right tail, the shadow wages follow an approximately
normal distribution.
While the relative marginal returns to labour obtained from the estimation can
12For a better representation extreme values in the right tail of the distribution have been cut.
In case of shadow wages for male adult labour, these have been 13 values and for elder /
child labour three values.
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be explained, the absolute levels cast some doubt on the validity of the results.
Calculated on a daily basis and assuming a working day of seven hours, the
mean shadow wages add up to 1.28 yuan for male adults, 0.14 yuan for female
adults and 0.87 yuan for elder and child labour. This is far below the average
daily local off-farm wage reported by the households in the village, which is 19.31
yuan and substantially lower than the price of family labour of 15.30 yuan/day
reported in the official statistics for Guizhou province (Guizhou Statistical Office,
2007).13 A similar picture arises from a comparison with figures obtained from
other estimations of shadow wages for rural China; for a village in Jiangxi province
Kuiper (2005) reports a mean agricultural shadow wage of 0.6 yuan per hour,
which would be around 4.2 yuan/day. Sicular and Zhao (2004) predict 0.5 yuan
per hour or 3.5 yuan/day as the mean value of nine Chinese provinces14. An older
study by Cook (1999) finds an average marginal value product in agriculture of
1.23 yuan per eight hour day, using data from 16 villages in Shandong province.
Assuming the shadow wages have not been underestimated, the results would
point to a labour surplus story in which rural households oversupply labour to
their farm as a response to a lack of off-farm opportunities. Such an interpretation
would support the view maintained by several authors of the presence of surplus
labour in rural China (Cook, 1999; Knight and Song, 1995, 2003), at least in
land scarce villages (Bowlus and Sicular, 2003). The differences in shadow wages
as compared to other provinces could be explained by differences in economic
development within China in which Guizhou as one of the poorest provinces is a
laggard.
Having said that, the fact that households do have the possibility to work
off-farm, either through formal and in particular occasional informal local em-
ployment or migration speaks against this interpretation and the assumption that
shadow wages have not been underestimated. In particular, in light of the sheer
size of the gap between shadow wages and off-farm wages it seems unlikely that
households did not respond more to the incentives to shift more labour from farm
13The average local off-farm wage includes income from occasional jobs, wage employment and
self-employment.
14The authors use data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey which covers Hei-
longjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou and Liaoning
provinces.
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to off-farm work, even with a theory as presented in Chapter 4 in mind. An un-
derestimation of the shadow wages, in turn, following equation 5.4, could result
from either an underestimation of βˆm or Yˆ in the econometric model or from
over-reporting of or measurement error in the time of labour dedicated to farm
work. An underestimation of Yˆ may result from under-reporting of farm revenues
by farmers, which is hard to deal with given the lack of information about a sys-
tematic bias in the data. An error in the time of labour might stem from the
calculation of total hours dedicated to animal production through the multiplica-
tion of the daily hours indicated by 365 which lead to very high values in some
cases. In the attempt to deal with this particular problem, the models have been
re-estimated using only the value of crop output and the inputs including labour
allocated to crop production. The estimates of βˆm, however, are robust to this
modification of the model. In a second modification of the model, only the days
worked on farm instead the total hours (the product of daily hours and days re-
ported) have been used, which resulted in negative and non-significant coefficients
on labour.
With respect to the construction of the village SAM, given the very low esti-
mates of the shadow wages there are two options which arise. First, one can accept
the results and use the low shadow wages to value household labour used on the
farm with the consequence that the corresponding entries in the SAM have very
low values, as well. The second possibility is to abstain from using the estima-
tion results and instead assume that household shadow wages make up a certain
share of the agricultural wages or off-farm wages. The shadow wages estimated
by Kuiper (2005), for example, are 18% of the local agricultural wage. Sicular
and Zhao (2004) report agricultural shadow wages which are 22% of the employed
wage rate. This latter possibility, however, represents a too large deviation from
the empirical results. Therefore, the first option is chosen for the construction of
the SAM.
With respect to land, marginal returns per standard mu range from 37 to 1,877
yuan, with a median of 287 and a mean of 342 yuan. Again, the shadow prices are
lower than those from the only available study dealing with shadow prices for land
in China by Kuiper (2005) who estimates 600 yuan/mu for non-irrigated land and
1,721 yuan/mu for irrigated land. Although this difference is still substantial, it
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is by far not as large as in the case of labour and can be explained by the much
poorer land quality in Guizhou as compared to Jiangxi.
A question related to the estimation of household shadow prices is the nonsep-
arability of household decision. In the theoretical model of Chapter 4 household
production and consumption decisions are assumed to be nonseparable. Under
this assumption household decisions regarding the allocation of labour to pro-
ductive activities and leisure are governed by household internal shadow wages.
An empirical test for nonseparability would allow to verify this assumption. In
the literature, different approaches to testing for nonseparability can be found.
Lopez (1984) tests the hypothesis of heterogeneity between on- and off-farm
labour through the estimation of a separable and nonseparable structural house-
hold model. The test for nonseparability is carried out using a test for the com-
parison of the parameters of two non-nested models (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1981). Benjamin (1992) investigates the presence of labour market constraints
and imperfect substitutability of family and hired labour by testing for an influ-
ence of household characteristics on on-farm labour supply. In a similar fashion,
but extending the approach towards the inclusion of a hypothesis of constrained
land rental markets, Carter and Yao (2002) test for nonseparability by checking
for an influence of the household land-labour endowment ratio on the labour in-
tensity in agricultural production, highlighting the importance of the households’
labour market participation regimes. Further studies using the Benjamin (1992)
approach are Bowlus and Sicular (2003) and Sadoulet et al. (1998). A test, fi-
nally, which relies on the comparison of household shadow wages with market
wages is proposed by Jacoby (1993). Assuming that under perfect markets, the
marginal value product of labour, i.e. the household shadow wage, should equal
the market wage, the former is compared to the latter through a regression of
the estimated MV Pl on observed market wages. The approach accommodates
different assumptions regarding the reasons which may lead to nonseparability,
including imperfections in the labour market, imperfect substitutability of on-
farm and off-farm employment or heterogeneity of family vs. hired labour (Le,
2009; Skoufias, 1994; Sonoda and Maruyama, 1999).
As both estimated marginal returns to labour and market wages are available,
this study chooses the approach by Jacoby (1993) to test for nonseparability of
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Table 5.12.: Test for nonseparability.
Estimate
(Std.Dev.)
Variable
Intercept 1.278∗∗
(0.581)∗∗
Market wage 0.002∗∗
(0.032)∗∗
F-test on H0 (p-value) 0.000∗∗∗
Signif. code: ** sign. at α=5%.
household decisions. The empirical model to be estimated is
MV Pl = α + βw + ε (5.6)
where w is the observed wage obtained by an individual in off-farm occupations.
The combined Null-hypothesis of equality of shadow and market wages is H0 :
α = 0 and β = 1. For the purpose of estimation, the estimated shadow wage
is regressed on the observed wage in local odd jobs. First, because this is the
occupation where most data is available, second, because the wage from odd jobs
is lowest and henceforth most likely to be closest to the household shadow wage
and third, because the labour market for odd jobs is the least constrained by
access restrictions. The combined Null-hypothesis is tested using an F-test.15
Table 5.12 presents the results of the estimation and the test for nonsepara-
bility. Not surprisingly, given the very low estimates of the shadow wages, the
intercept term is significantly different from zero. The F-test rejects the combined
separability hypothesis at a level of significance of less than 1%. Hence, household
decisions can assumed to be nonseparable, albeit subject to the qualifications with
respect to the validity of the estimated shadow wages made above.
15The model also has been estimated using the average wage in all local off-farm jobs (odd jobs,
employed wage work and self-employment) as a regressor. Furthermore, IV estimations have
been carried out with age, years of education and the squared terms of each as instruments.
In the IV estimations the hypothesis of exogeneity of the regressors could not be rejected
and in general the results (not reported) are robust to each of the model variants.
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5.2. A SAM for Changtian Village
5.2.1. Outline of the SAM
After the construction of representative household groups and the estimation of
household shadow prices it is now possible to construct the SAM for Changtian
village. The general outline of the SAM is presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
The verbal entries in the SAM outline represent the different sub-matrices which
together constitute the village SAM.
Moving column-wise from left to right and row-wise from top to bottom, the
SAM distinguishes three different types of commodities: An agricultural commod-
ity produced by the households, village traded commodities and imported com-
modities. Payments from the produced commodity account to the agricultural
activities accounts represent the agricultural output of the village (see details in
Table 5.15 below). Receipts of the produced commodity account from households
and from outside the village constitute households’ own consumption (Table 5.24)
and market sales (Table 5.28), respectively. This implies that all products sold by
the households are assumed to be exported from the village. Although households
also sell products within the village, this simplification is necessary because of the
lack of data on the relative quantities traded within and outside the village. How-
ever simplifying, as village product markets are assumed to be fully integrated
with the outside world the same prices apply for transactions within and outside
the village. Hence, a distinction between inside village transactions and exports is
not necessary, at least from a modelling point of view. The produced commodity
and the agricultural activities represent aggregations of various products, namely
rapeseed, maize, rice, other grains, other crops, pigs, cows, poultry, eggs and other
animal products as well as forestry and fishery. Incomes from land rentals and
processing which make up only a very small fraction of agricultural income (< 1%)
reported by the households are included here, as well.
Village traded commodities include commodities households trade among them-
selves on the village market. As a consequence of the considerations with respect
to the produced commodity made above, only land and labour are included here.
Land, which is disaggregated into irrigated and non-irrigated land, is the only
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good which is only traded within the village and not beyond the village borders.
Accordingly, the price of this good is determined through equilibrium processes
taking place at the village level. The second village traded commodity is labour
traded between households for employment in agricultural production activities.
As agricultural off-farm labour is also traded beyond village borders it would in
principle have been possible to treat village traded labour just as the produced
commodity. This would imply to include household supply of labour as exports
from and demand by agricultural activities as imports into the village. However,
information on the time worked by households in the different off-farm occupa-
tions was available disaggregated by location and, for the sake of increasing the
information content of the SAM, it was preferable to explicitly include this infor-
mation. Further, it should also be mentioned that due to the omission of exchange
labour, the values of village traded agricultural labour recorded in the SAM omit
a part of the total amount of labour traded between the households. In fact, the
only feasible way to deal with this type of labour was to assume that each house-
hold receives as much exchange labour services as it supplies and leave it out of
the SAM.16
As the village traded commodities ultimately reflect agricultural production
factors supplied by households, the village traded commodity accounts pay to the
factor accounts. These payments reflect the returns from village traded factors
(see Table 5.25). Due to their use in agricultural production activities, village
traded commodities receive payments by the agricultural activity accounts. The
corresponding sub-matrix represents the demand by agricultural activities for vil-
lage traded inputs (Table 5.16).
The third type of commodities comprises commodities imported into the village.
These include capital (intermediate) and labour inputs demanded by agricultural
production activities as well as commodities consumed by households. The latter
consist of food products of plant and animal origin, non-food products and ser-
vices. All imported commodities pay to the outside village account, thus depicting
the value of village imports (Table 5.26). Imported commodities receive payments
from the agricultural activity accounts—the intermediate input demand detailed
16From a modelling point of view, the contribution of exchange labour to production is captured
in the efficiency parameters of the agricultural production functions.
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Table 5.13.: Outline of the Changtian village SAM - Part 1.
Commodities Activities
Produced Village Imported Agriculture Off-farm Blood
traded sales
Commodities
Produced
Village traded Village
Land traded
Labour input demand
Imported
Intermediates
Labour Intermediate
Plant products input
Animal products demand
Non-food
Services
Activities
Agriculture Farm output
Off-farm
Formal local
Informal local
Migration
Blood sales
Factors
Labour
Male farming
Male formal off-farm
Male informal off-farm
Male migration Returns Agricultural Value-added
Male leisure from value-added to household
Female farming village to household labour
Female formal off-farm traded owned factors from off-farm
Female informal off-farm factors activities
Female migration
Female leisure
Land
Institutions
Households
Low migration, high income
Low migration, middle income Income
Low migration, low income Profits from
High migration, high income from off-farm blood
High migration, middle income activities sales
High migration, low income
Migrated
Transfers
Savings
Government
Outside village Village imports
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Table 5.14.: Outline of the Changtian village SAM - Part 2.
Factors Institutions Outside
village
Labor Land Households Transfers Savings Government
Commodities
Produced Own cons. Sales agr. output
Village traded
Land
Labour
Imported
Intermediates
Labour
Plant products
Animal products Imported
Non-food consumption
Services
Activities
Agriculture
Off-farm off-farm
Formal local Local
Informal local off-farm
Migration Migration
Blood sales Blood sales
Factors
Labour
Male farming
Male formal
Male informal
Male migration Leisure
Male leisure Leisure
Female farming
Female formal
Female informal
Female migration Leisure
Female leisure Leisure
Land
Institutions
Households
11
12
13 Distribution of Income from
21 value-added transfers & savings
22
23
Migrated
Transfers Transfers &
Savings savings
Government
Outside village Cap. imp. Gov. transfers
137
5. A Village SAM
in Table 5.16—and from the household accounts—the consumption of imported
goods and services shown in Table 5.24. Related to the case of the produced
agricultural commodity, a further simplifying assumption had to be made here:
It is well conceivable that parts of the expenditures on food products reported by
households have been made on food produced by other households inside the vil-
lage. Unfortunately, the data does not allow to distinguish between food products
purchased from the village market and those imported from outside. Accordingly,
all market purchased food products (as opposed to own-consumption) had to be
assumed to be imported. While this assumption may be simplifying, it likewise
can fit into an archetype of seasonal agricultural production for self-consumption:
in times of high availability farmers consume their own products, in times of
scarcity they purchase from the market. As this behaviour is synchronized across
the village, it is likely that in any case little exchange of food products inside the
village takes place.
The activity accounts include the agricultural activities already discussed, off-
farm activities and an activity which represents the donation of blood by the
households. The agricultural activities, as already mentioned above, receive pay-
ments from the produced commodity and pay their input use to commodity and
factor accounts. Apart from village traded and intermediate/capital inputs, agri-
cultural activities employ factors owned by the households who carry out the
respective activities themselves. The payments to these factors termed agricul-
tural value-added to household owned factors in Table 5.13 are presented in Table
5.16 along with the payments to village traded and intermediate inputs.
Off-farm activities are divided into formal local off-farm employment, infor-
mal local off-farm employment and migration. Formal off-farm activities are all
employments with formal work contracts, such as employments as village cadre,
teacher, or in state owned or private enterprises. Informal off-farm activities com-
prise irregular off-farm jobs in which people work as day-labourers or peons, both
in agriculture or in the non-farm sector. Furthermore, self-employment and own
business activities are considered as informal local off-farm, as well. The distinc-
tion between formal and informal local off-farm activities was made due to the
differences in the workings of the labour markets in the formal and informal sec-
tor. The formal sector is assumed to pay a higher wage rate, and access by the
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households to this segment is restricted. Rather than being a competitive market,
the formal segment is characterised by non-wage rationing mechanisms, such as
social networks or kinship (known as guanxi in China, see, for example, Bian and
Ang, 1997; Zhang and Li, 2003). The informal sector, in contrast, tends to be
more like a competitive neoclassical market in which labour supply and demand
are matched by a competitive wage rate and which households can access without
facing (overly restrictive) entry barriers. Beside the disaggregation of the two
segments of the labour market in the SAM, the assumed differences in market
functioning later on lead to differences in the modelling of the labour market.
The third off-farm activity in the SAM is migration, i.e. all employment taken
outside Puding county for a period longer than three months. As the informal
sector, migration is assumed to be accessible at a competitive wage rate without
particular restrictions to the households.
The associated payment flows in the SAM have the same pattern for all off-
farm activities and migration. The activities pay to the factor accounts of the
household labour employed and to the household accounts and receive payments
from outside the village (Table 5.28). This implies that off-farm activities are
modelled as employing household labour to produce a service which is directly
exported out of the village. The value of this service corresponds to the total
income which accrues to the households’ due to the participation in the respective
activities.17 In case of migration, the export assumption is straightforward. In
case of the local-off farm activities, again, some simplification is involved as a
part of the local-off farm employment takes place within the village. However,
as the village market for off-farm labour is assumed to be integrated with the
outside world with the same wage rates applying within and outside the village
it was easier to assume that all off-farm labour is exported. Furthermore and
most importantly, the export assumption reduces the degree of disaggregation of
the labour factor accounts (see below), thus limiting the size of the SAM without
compromising its usefulness for the modelling of the village economy.
17Arguably, the self-employment activity included in informal local off-farm employment may
produce other outputs than the mere labour service and likewise may use other inputs than
household labour. However, as neither information on the use of other inputs nor on the
production of outputs is available from the survey, self-employment is treated as the other
local-off farm occupations.
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As already noted above, the payments by the off-farm activities are split into
payments to the household labour factor accounts and payments made directly to
the households. The payments to the labour accounts represent the value-added
to household labour from off-farm activities and correspond to the value of labour
allocated to the respective activity. The time allocated to each off-farm activity
is valued at the household shadow price of labour, thus reflecting the opportu-
nity cost of the households of participating in the activity (see Tables 5.18 and
5.19). As the household shadow wage usually is lower than the marginal returns
from off-farm employment, households earn a premium over their opportunity
cost. Following other authors who apply this approach in their village SAMs and
according to its nature as a markup on factor cost, this premium can be labelled
profits (see, for example, Kuiper, 2005; Parikh and Thorbecke, 1996; Subrama-
nian and Sadoulet, 1990; Subramanian, 1996). In the context of this research and
the theoretical model presented in Chapter 4, however, the premium receives a
further interpretation. According to the theory the marginal returns to labour in
the different off-farm activities in the optimum must be equal to the household
shadow wage and the marginal utility of the participation in the respective activ-
ity. Hence, the premium paid by the activities on top of the opportunity cost can
be interpreted as an additional compensation for the utility experienced by the
household due to its labour market participation. Accordingly, it may be termed
utility compensation. The payments from the off-farm activity accounts to the
household accounts are presented in detail in Table 5.21.
The final activity distinguished in the SAM is the donation of blood for income
generating purposes. Although no longer as important as in previous years (see
Xing et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2010), blood donation remains an income source
which is different from all others and therefore is included separately into the
SAM. The activity receives payments from outside the village (included in Table
5.28) and pays the amounts received directly to the households. These amounts
appear in Table 5.13 as income from blood sales and are presented in detail in
Table 5.21. The major factor input to the activity are household labour. The time
dedicated to blood donation, however, has not been recorded separately by the
survey and consequently is included in the households’ leisure demand. Further-
more, excessive blood donation may come at a cost in the form of health damages
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which, speaking in economic terms, may reduce the capacity of householders for
economic activity (compare Xing et al., 2009). As data on these implications of
blood donation is currently not available and as dealing with the issue more in
detail goes beyond the scope of this study, blood donation is given the simplified
treatment as depicted in the SAM.
Moving further in the SAM, the next group of accounts are the factor accounts.
In general, two factors - household labour and land - are distinguished, each
of which is further disaggregated. Household labour is divided into male adult
labour, male labour of children and elderly as well as female adult and female child
and elderly labour. Land consists of two accounts, one for irrigated and another
for non-irrigated land. As discussed above the factor accounts receive payments
from the village traded commodity accounts and from agricultural and off-farm
activities. Furthermore, households pay the value of the leisure (time evaluated
at the shadow wage) consumed to the respective labour accounts (see Table 5.24).
The income of the factor accounts, i.e. the total factor value-added, is distributed
to the household groups according to households’ endowments with the respective
factors (Table 5.20).
Next to the factor accounts are the institutions accounts, consisting of accounts
for households, transfers, savings and the government. Following the construction
of representative household groups presented in Section 5.1.1.2, six households are
distinguished: Three households with low propensity to migrate, each with high,
middle and low income, and three households with high propensity to migrate,
again with high, middle and low income. In addition, a seventh, the migrated,
household is included into the SAM. The migrated household receives income
from rent out land and transfers this income out of the village (find more details
below). The transfers accounts cover all kind of transfers made and received by
households such as gifts, alms, inter-household cash or in-kind transfers, expenses
on big family events like weddings or funerals or transfers made or received in the
context of shocks like natural disasters, loss of livestock or thefts. The savings
account covers savings and dis-savings and is—as is shown later on—subdivided
into a pure savings account and a construction account which captures investments
made in house construction.
Most of the receipts of the household accounts are already discussed before:
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Households receive profits or utility compensation from off-farm activities, income
from blood donations (both in Table 5.21) and value-added from factors employed
in the different activities (Table 5.20). It should be noted that the latter include
the value of leisure. This implies that leisure is reflected in the SAM as a payment
which households make to themselves, thus allowing for the explicit modelling of
households’ demand for leisure. A final component of household income which
has not been discussed, yet, is income from transfers and savings (see Table 5.22),
originating from the respective accounts, including the government.
Household expenditures consist of own consumption (payments to the produced
commodity accounts), consumption of imported goods and services, consumption
of leisure and expenses on transfers and savings. The details are presented in
Table 5.24.
The differences between household income from and household payments to the
transfers, savings and government accounts leave these accounts unbalanced. The
balancing of these accounts is achieved via payments to outside the village. These
payments, as is discussed in more detail below (Table 5.27), can become negative
and represent the village’s capital imports and government transfers to the village
as a whole.
5.2.2. The SAM in Detail
Tables 5.15 to 5.28 present the details of the different sub-matrices introduced in
the previous section, which together constitute the complete village SAM. In the
following, the sub-matrices are discussed in detail in order to give evidence on the
dataset used for the model analyses and to provide a comprehensive picture of
the village economy. All sub-matrices contain absolute values. For shares, refer
to the coefficient matrix which is contained in the electronic annex.18
5.2.2.1. Agricultural Activities
Agricultural production is represented in the SAM by the sub-matrices on agri-
cultural output (Table 5.15) and agricultural input use (Table 5.16). The table on
agricultural output use contains the payments made by the produced commodity
18See Annex A.
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Table 5.15.: Agricultural output (yuan).
Commodities
Agricultural
Activities
Agriculture
11 293,658
12 193,999
13 209,491
21 338,768
22 381,623
23 136,962
Total 1,554,501
account to the agricultural activities. It should be noted that the commodity ac-
count pays only to the agricultural activity accounts,which implies the assumption
that each activity produces only a single agricultural output. Thus, the produc-
tion of by-products, such as straw from rice production, is neglected. However, as
no use of such by products in other production activities has been recorded in the
survey, this neglect is of minor importance. As the other activities, agricultural
production activities are disaggregated by households, which are coded by the
numbers 11-13 and 21-23 and correspond to the households introduced in Table
5.13. The need for a household specific definition of activities in the SAM arises
from the structure of the village equilibrium model in which production activities
are modelled per representative household group, allowing for household group
specific changes in shadow wages due to assumed differences in labour allocation.
Furthermore, the disaggregation of activities by households offers the advantage
of providing additional information on differences in agricultural production be-
tween the household groups. High migration households (21-23) tend to produce
higher values of output. With respect to the level of wealth, however, no clear
pattern arises.
Table 5.16 presents the input use by agricultural activities as in the SAM. For
easier interpretation, the absolute values are translated into cost shares in Table
5.17. The table illustrates that in terms of cost shares land, urea and animal feed
and livestock replacement are the most important inputs used. On average, land
has a cost share of 31%, urea accounts for 18% and animal feed and livestock
replacement for 15% and 14%, respectively. Compared to these, labour—which
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Table 5.16.: Agricultural input use (yuan).
Activities
Agriculture
11 12 13 21 22 23
Commodities
Irr. land 0 0 538 634 0 1,063
Nonirr. land 15,760 4,141 2,544 14,519 26,565 4,440
Village labour 233 2,666 2,737 608 3,533 0
Urea 54,993 31,018 42,954 54,771 64,785 27,802
Pesticides 863 237 221 555 161 79
Fertilizer 17,143 8,647 9,091 17,859 19,967 4,706
Seed 10,078 6,129 5,942 9,174 10,478 3,550
Feed 48,866 29,056 27,869 62,993 56,108 13,195
Breed 27,664 30,020 22,046 55,633 62,557 20,525
Veterinary 104 110 76 703 647 241
Machines 3,261 26 10 673 303 219
Hired labour 3,184 2,611 0 2,385 798 438
Water 1,294 211 0 1,330 570 44
Energy 1,294 7 608 3,705 0 22
Factors
Male adult labour 17,383 11,560 12,277 18,967 25,673 11,288
Male elder & child labour 768 3101 3,175 1,033 944 227
Female adult labour 2,385 1,339 1,425 2,747 3,138 1,213
Female elder & child labour 678 2,421 1,640 1,037 554 1,021
Irr. land 5,316 4,978 7,794 6,066 3,686 2,761
Nonirr. land 82,391 55,721 68,544 83,376 101,156 44,128
Total 293,658 193,999 209,491 338,768 381,623 136,962
144
5.2. A SAM for Changtian Village
Table 5.17.: Cost shares in agricultural input use (%).
Activities
Agriculture
11 12 13 21 22 23 Average
Commodities
Irr. land 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.2
Nonirr. land 5.4 2.1 1.2 4.3 7.0 3.2 3.9
Village labour 0.1 1.4 1.3 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.6
Urea 18.7 16.0 20.5 16.2 17.0 20.3 18.1
Pesticides 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Fertilizer 5.8 4.5 4.3 5.3 5.2 3.4 4.8
Seed 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.9
Feed 16.6 15.0 13.3 18.6 14.7 9.6 14.6
Breed 9.4 15.5 10.5 16.4 16.4 15.0 13.9
Veterinary 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Machines 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3
Hired labour 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.6
Water 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2
Energy 0.4 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3
Factors
Male adult labour 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.6 6.7 8.2 6.4
Male elder & child labour 0.3 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7
Female adult labour 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8
Female elder & child labour 0.2 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.6
Irr. land 1.8 2.6 3.7 1.8 1.0 2.0 2.1
Nonirr. land 28.1 28.7 32.7 24.6 26.5 32.2 28.8
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Values derived from SAM entries as in Table 5.16.
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is further disaggregated in adult labour and labour from children and elderly—
accounts only for a smaller value share of total input use (8% on average). These
low shares, however, are in parts due to the low shadow wages used to value the
labour time dedicated to the activities.19
5.2.2.2. Off-farm Activities
The allocation of labour by the households to formal and informal local off-farm
activities and to migration is depicted in Tables 5.18 and 5.19, respectively. Table
5.18 shows that the participation in formal local off-farm employments is generally
low. The only households with significant receipts to labour from the activity are
the high income households of both migration groups. The remaining households
either do not work in formal off-farm activities at all or only to a very low extent.
Although the general involvement is higher, the picture looks similar in case of in-
formal local off-farm work: The high income households in both migration groups
allocate most labour to the activity, whereas the participation of the middle and
low income households is lower.
In case of migration, the corresponding sub-matrix (Table 5.19) reveals a clear
pattern according to which the high migration households generally allocate more
labour to the activity. Furthermore, within each group the high income households
work most in migration, followed by the middle and then the low income house-
holds. This points to the role of migration as a determinant of income differences
within the village (compare Xing et al., 2009).
19In order to deliver more information on agricultural production and to model it in a more
detailed manner, it would be desirable to further disaggregate agricultural activities in the
SAM. Unfortunately, the survey data did not contain information on activity specific use
of capital inputs. Therefore, the construction of the SAM would have required the use of
strong assumptions on the allocation of inputs between disaggregated agricultural activities
and the decision was made to include only one agricultural activity in the SAM.
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Table 5.19.: Labour allocation to off-farm activities - Migration (yuan).
Activities
Migration
11 12 13 21 22 23
Factors
Migration
Male adult labour 32,136 12,273 8,878 53,200 40,252 21,104
Male elder & child labour 0 0 2 0 0 0
Female adult labour 3,357 351 348 3,861 6,795 934
Female elder & child labour 0 0 1,635 651 0 0
Total 186,107 60,812 23,048 114,374 79,349 5,136
5.2.2.3. Household Income
The discussion of the outline of the SAM made clear that household income con-
sists of different components, namely factor returns, returns from labour in form
of profits or disutility compensation, and income from transfers and savings. Out
of the factor returns, depicted in Table 5.20, the larger share of about 55% on av-
erage comes from labour (incl. leisure), the remaining part from land. While these
figures have to be interpreted with care due to the low valuation of labour with
the estimated shadow wages, they reveal information on the differences between
household groups with respect to factor endowments. Summing up the values
of the two households of each income level, the high income households are also
those with the highest endowments of labour and land, low income households
have the lowest endowments. The differences are, however, not so clear cut with
respect to the migration groups. In the high migration group it is the low income
household which derives the highest returns from labour and in the low migration
group the returns from land of the middle income household exceed those of the
high income household. Nevertheless, the SAM generally reflects the contribution
of differences in asset ownership to income differences and therefore is in line with
the findings from Xing et al. (2009).
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The differentiation by age groups and gender reveals that female labour gener-
ates the smaller share of the returns to labour which accrue to the households. In
agriculture, female labour on average accounts for about 16% of the total value
of labour employed, reflecting the fact that women are largely responsible for
household related tasks such as house-keeping or water gathering. In the off-farm
activities it is much lower, ranging between zero percent in formal off-farm work
(exception: the high migration, low income household) and 10% on average in mi-
gration. It should be noted, however, that the estimated shadow wage for female
labour is much lower than the one for male labour, contributing to the low values
which appear in the SAM.
The value the work of children and elder contributes to the labour factor returns
of the households is about 15% on average. From the table it becomes clear that
elder and children mostly work in agriculture, illustrating that at least a part of
the persons who are not counted as economically active well do contribute to home
production activities. In case of elder and children, leisure time is only valued for
individuals who had indicated having worked in any of the activities in the survey.
In addition to the six household groups defined in Section 5.1.1.2 a seventh,
migrated, household appears in Table 5.20. The migrated household represents
the households which have migrated out of the village but which still hold land
there, receiving payments from land leases. These payments, which are calculated
as the difference between expenses on and income from land rentals reported
by the households in the survey accrue to the migrated household as payments
from the land factor accounts. The migrated household, as shown later on, pays
the received amount directly out of the village, thus creating a flow from the
households still living in the village to those which have been migrated.
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Table 5.21 contains the income households receive from off-farm activities be-
yond the factor returns. The entries are calculated as the reported income from
the respective activity minus the value of the time allocated to the activity. In all
except one case—the payment from migration to the low income household in the
high migration group—the payments made by the activities to the households are
positive. Following the theory set up in Chapter 4, this implies that households
experience a disutility from the participation in the respective labour market seg-
ment for which they are compensated by a markup paid over the opportunity cost
of labour. The case of the negative entry in cell representing the payment from
the migration activity to the low income household of the high migration group,
in turn, is also in line with the theory: The households which constitute the group
appear to get additional utility from the migration of some family members and
hence are satisfied with a monetary return from migration, which is lower than
the opportunity cost. Such positive utility can consist of the diversification of
income sources, for example. At this, it is no coincidence that the negative value
of the utility compensation appears in the migration activity because migrants
often send small amounts or even nothing back home.
In case of formal local off-farm employment, pattern observed follows the labour
allocation reported in Table 5.18. The high income households in both migration
groups receive relatively high payments, the low income household in the low
migration group gets a lower amount, reflecting its comparatively low involvement
in this activity.
The levels of utility compensation received by the households from informal
local off-farm work broadly follows the wealth ranking of the household groups.
High income households of the two migration groups together receive the highest
payments, the middle and low income households in the sum lie close together,
although the utility compensation received by the two low income households is
slightly higher in the sum (∼6,000 yuan). Regarding the migration groups, the
high migration group jointly benefits from larger receipts than the low migration
group (166,926 vs. 120,570 yuan).
A detailed look at the direct returns from the migration activities reveals that
the ranking of the amount of the payments follows the wealth ranking of the
household groups. High income households get the highest receipts, low income
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Table 5.22.: Household income - Transfers and savings (yuan).
Institutions
Transfers and savings Government
Transfers Savings
Institutions Gifts Shocks Savings Construction Government Total
Households
11 37,974 1,380 148,943 0 7,133 647,915
12 26,478 600 28,889 0 15,536 288,129
13 7,211 2,030 10,919 0 16,652 297,613
21 23,360 0 129,307 0 23,059 655,268
22 17,527 0 56,819 0 10,812 432,820
23 4,615 400 21,869 0 4,196 174,885
households the lowest. The utility compensations received by the households of
the high migration group are far lower than those received by the low migration
group. The low migration group jointly receives 210,987 yuan whereas the receipts
of the high migration group add up to 72,062 yuan, although the latter appears
to allocate much more labour to migration (see, for example, Table 5.20 for the
values). Although this observation does not conform to the standards of a formal
empirical analysis it can be considered as a support of the theoretical model de-
veloped above: Those households which due to their demographic characteristics
are more constrained in their decision to migrate need a higher compensation for
the disutility experienced when doing so.
Although being of a somewhat different type than the direct returns from the
off-farm activities, the income from blood donations is included into Table 5.21, as
well. Here, no clear pattern with respect to the distribution according to income
groups can be identified. Likewise the overall sums received by the two migration
groups lie close together (64,243 yuan of the low migration group compared to
61,436 yuan of the high migration group).
Household income from transfers and savings is presented in Table 5.22. The
institutions columns in the table are subdivided into two groups of accounts, the
transfers and savings accounts and the government account. The government
account is not further disaggregated. The transfers and savings accounts consist
of one account for transfers from gifts and one for transfers which arise due to
shocks experienced by the household (see above). The savings accounts comprise
one account for savings in general and one account which contains the payment
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flows associated with house construction. The latter are grouped with the savings
accounts, as house construction due to its long-term character can be considered as
a saving. As households only pay for houses and do not generate any income from
them (house sales are prohibited in Guizhou) no payments from the construction
account are recorded in Table 5.22. The simple savings account, in turn, covers
all remaining payment flows from or to an existing capital stock. Dis-savings are
recorded in Table 5.22, savings in Table 5.24.
As only income from and expenditure on interest payments instead of total
amounts of savings and dis-savings have been asked in the survey, however, the
entries of the savings account in Table 5.22 represent estimates of households’
dis-savings. The estimation of the amounts of dis-savings is based on the ob-
servation that around 86% of the households in Changtian stated some form of
dis-saving like the use of self-deposit savings, sales of family property or loans as
the major source for big expenditures (e.g. house construction, illness, death of a
family member or theft). Hence, for SAM construction the simplifying assump-
tion is made that 85% of household expenditures on items which comprise the big
expenditures are covered by payments from the savings account.
The result is that of all receipts of the households reported in Table 5.22, those
from savings make up the largest share, followed by gifts and government transfers.
Transfers made due to shocks (i.e. support received by the households following
big family events like funerals, illness, theft or the like) are only of minor im-
portance. The distribution of total income from transfers and savings as before
follows the wealth ranking of the household groups. The sums of the receipts of
the two migration groups, however, are almost equal (303,745 yuan to the house-
holds of the low migration group vs. 291,964 yuan to the households of the high
migration group).
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For a number of reasons, the treatment of savings in the context of household
income as explained above constitutes a critical part of the SAM. The first point
in question is that, as can be seen in Table 5.23, the large payments streams from
the savings account cause transfers to make up substantial shares of the house-
holds’ total income. This is in particular the case for the high income households,
where the share of transfers and savings reaches up to 32% and 28%, respectively
(the shares of savings alone are 24% and 20%). These values can be considered
excessively high and thereby cast doubt on the validity of the assumptions used to
generate them. If one bears in mind the average savings rate of rural households
in China of around 16% (Kraay, 2000) and accepts the possibility that dis-savings
are of a similar scale, the high shares, however, appear to be acceptable.
The in parts high amounts of dis-savings also potentially affect the simulation
results obtained from the village model, as they introduce a comparatively large
fixed income component into the model.20 This has the consequence that net
income changes as, for example, triggered by trade reform would in the tendency
be underestimated, should the income originating from dis-savings really be too
high.21
The second critical point is that the substantial dis-savings, which for their
largest part lack corresponding payments of households to the savings accounts,
mean that households run a financial deficit.22 Thus, households constantly liq-
uidate assets they have saved without replacing them. Further, the village con-
stantly imports capital from the outside world. In the longer run, this situation
obviously is unsustainable. On the other hand, Brown et al. (2010) report that
social pressure to spend on social events has increased considerably in the village
over the past decade. According to the authors, some households in the village,
which can afford to do so, appear to set a standard for spending on big events,
such as weddings. Others try keeping up with them. In this situation, it would be
entirely conceivable that households tend to overspend and that they get indebted
20See Section 6.1, in particular Equation 6.7, which states that income from savings is a fixed
component of households’ net income.
21Stylised calculations have shown that the magnitude of underestimation is at around 20% in
case of the high income household of the high migration group. A 1.8% increase in income,
for instance, which originates from rises in income from farming and off-farm activities would
roughly be 2.3% if income from dis-savings were 50% lower than currently assumed in the
SAM.
22See also Tables 5.24 and 5.27 and the corresponding discussions.
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over time. Furthermore, a part of the household income from dis-savings and the
associated capital flows into the village can be interpreted as representing income
components which have been under-reported in the survey.
An alternative way of dealing with the problem of savings in the SAM would be
to assume lower values for the households’ dis-savings as those reported in Table
5.22 and thereby seeking to the reduce the financial deficit of the households
and the amount of capital imports into the village. In order to reach at the
households’ income levels needed to cover the reported expenditures, however, this
would also require to proportionately inflate the households’ income from other
sources. Given that, as mentioned above, most households reported to cover big
expenditures from the liquidation of assets or loans, however, this also appears to
be little realistic. Likewise, for the reasons discussed, a balanced savings account
for each household might also be a questionable assumption.
5.2.2.4. Household Expenditure
The detailed sub-matrix of household expenditures is presented in Table 5.24.
Household expenditure in the SAM can basically be divided into four broad cate-
gories: Own consumption, consumption of purchased goods and services, leisure,
and expenditure on transfers and savings. According to the classification criterion
applied for the construction of the representative household groups, expenditure
on commodities, transfers and savings are highest for the high income households
and lowest for the low income households. An notable observation which can be
made from the SAM, however, is with increasing income, households rely less on
own consumption. Expenses on purchased food exceeds own consumption in case
of high income households, while consumption of the own produced commodity is
higher in case of the low income households.
Payments from the household accounts to the labour factor accounts represent
the consumption of leisure by the households. The value of leisure is calculated
as the difference between total endowment of the household with the respective
labour type and the time of this labour type allocated to the different occupations
(on the farm, off-farm and migration) multiplied with the household shadow wage.
It was assumed herein, that the time available to each individual for all activities
including leisure was 16 hours per day and that the year consisted of 365 days. As
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Table 5.24.: Household expenditure (yuan).
Institutions
Households
11 12 13 21 22 23 Migr.
Commodities
Own consumption 91,247 73,878 90,444 128,673 115,855 45,112
Purchased
Food
Grains 59,813 44,055 42,871 52,752 53,837 22,356
FFV 25,986 12,408 14,425 19,605 18,962 5,682
Processed food 31,431 14,405 12,521 27,242 20,853 7,183
Animals 20,545 11,188 6,252 11,569 5,049 4,690
Non-food
Durables 36,895 8,459 4,415 24,106 16,081 2,489
Stimulants 20,825 12,042 13,957 14,024 10,005 4,500
Other 5,477 986 664 1,749 2,812 128
Services
Water 55 30 0 610 249 40
Energy 18,305 11,224 6,586 20,290 10,098 3,469
Transport 50,358 10,106 6,461 30,572 14,100 6,523
Household 3,200 1,149 1,169 3,540 1,411 611
services
Health 84,964 13,500 7,941 58,044 15,863 7,182
Education 25,895 6,479 7,804 41,162 23,376 4,838
Factors
Leisure
Male
Adult 25,585 23,216 25,264 60,126 31,948 22,049
E&c 1,382 2,956 18,864 14,695 4,927 989
Female
Adult 2,998 2,046 1,814 5,973 5,062 2,047
E&c 1,005 2,700 18,599 3,447 2,073 2,978
Institutions
Transfers
Gifts 36,390 12,135 8,553 33,810 18,592 7,685
Shocks 25,444 1,374 4,271 18,225 17,371 5,424
Savings
Construction 64,818 19,113 633 75,857 35,975 13,122
Savings 15,297 4,680 4,105 9,197 8,321 5,788
Outside village 31,694
Total 631,790 276,270 284,350 647,519 410,350 162,800 302,39
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mentioned above, leisure consumption of children and elder is only included into
the SAM in cases an individual reported time worked in any of the occupations.
This means that most children and elder, except those who had reported some
activity, are considered as economically inactive and without demand for leisure.
As leisure includes also time dedicated to housework, the values in the SAM by
trend underestimate the contribution of elder or children who exclusively perform
tasks dedicated to the household or the family. As the value of leisure depends on
the time endowment of the household rather than on its level of wealth, no clear
pattern arises with respect to this factor. In general, the effect of the inclusion
of leisure in the SAM is that the ranking of total household expenditure in the
last line of the table no longer fully corresponds to the wealth ranking of the
households. Rather than having the lowest expenditure in the low migration
group, the low income household exhibits total expenditures slightly higher than
the middle income household. Nevertheless, as noted above and most important
for the model analyses the ranking is maintained with respect to households’ total
expenditure on consumption of commodities and services as well as on transfers
and savings.
The final expenditure category are transfers and savings. The missing govern-
ment account reflects the fact that there are no taxes households in the village
have to pay to the government. The construction account, as noted above, con-
tains expenses on house construction, which are considered as savings in the SAM.
The values recorded as household payments to the savings account are the inter-
est payments reported by the households in the survey. Accordingly, the only
actual savings of households considered in the SAM are household expenditures
on construction and—as savings in a broader sense—expenses on durable goods
(the durables commodity in the table). As already mentioned above, the receipts
of the savings account are far lower than the payments which originate from it
(Table 5.22). In order to balance the account, a negative payment from the sav-
ings account to outside the village which corresponds to the difference between
the payments received and the expenses is introduced. This assumption can be
maintained as households in order to cover big expenditures either sell assets or
take loans. The latter can safely be assumed to originate from outside the village,
while assets can be sold to outside the village. The implication is that the village
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is a capital importer. Rooted in the scarce availability of data and as already
discussed above, the described treatment of savings and investment in the SAM
for sure is provisional. As the depiction of the village capital market, however, is
not at the focus of this study, it can be considered to be sufficient for the present
purpose.
Payments of the migrated household to outside the village constitute the last
element of Table 5.24. As discussed above, the migrated household receives the
expenses on village traded land, which are not matched by rental incomes reported
by the households. These receipts are transferred out of the village, indicating
that migrated households still receive rents from the contract land they have been
allocated.23
5.2.2.5. Village Trade
The sub-matrices of the SAM, which describe the trade which takes place within
the village and between the village and the outside world are shown in Tables
5.25 - 5.28. The returns from village traded labour are received by the informal
off-farm activity (Table 5.25). As in other instances before, no clear pattern with
respect to the wealth ranking of the households arises. A careful interpretation,
however, would be that the households of the low migration group appear to seek
employment in agriculture in the village to a larger extent than those of the high
migration group. The amounts paid from the land commodity accounts to the
respective factor accounts illustrate that the major part of land traded in the
village is non-irrigated. This reflects the lower availability of irrigated land in the
village, but also the tendency of households who own irrigated land to farm it by
themselves.
The sub-matrix on village imports (Table 5.26; transposed SAM excerpt) shows
the imports of the different commodities and services demanded by and imported
into the village. The payments made by the commodity accounts to outside the
village correspond to their total receipts, i.e. it is assumed that none of these com-
modities is produced within the village. With respect to the food commodities—
23An alternative assumption would be that households have an incentive to under-report income
from land rentals as this activity is not legally sanctioned. Given the current practice that
migrated households formally remain the owners of the contract land they have been allocated
the approach chosen in the SAM appears to be preferable (Zhang, 2010).
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Table 5.25.: Returns from village traded factors (trade within village) (yuan).
Commodities
Irrigated Non-irrigated Village traded
land land labour
Activities
Informal off-farm
11 233
12 2,666
13 2,737
21 608
22 3,533
23 0
Factors
Irrigated land 2,235
Non-irrigated land 67,969
Total 2,235 67,696 9,777
which arguably may be produced in the village, as well—this assumption can
be defended with the arguments stated in Section 5.2.1. In case of most pur-
chased goods and services and the intermediate inputs the assumption is entirely
plausible. Exceptions are the transport, health and other services demanded by
the households which at least in parts are supplied by households located inside
the village and traded on a village market. The labour time allocated to these
activities as well as the income generated with them are recorded in the con-
text of the informal local off-farm activities, which include the relevant types of
self-employment. The survey data, however, did not provide sufficiently detailed
information on the location of the sales of these services by the households. But
again, the simplifying assumption that all services demanded by the households
are imported to and all services supplied are exported from the village is in line
with the assumption of the village market for goods and services being perfectly
integrated with the outside world.
Regarding the values contained in Table 5.26, urea, animal feed and livestock
for replacement are the most important intermediate inputs which are imported
into the village. Among the consumed commodities, grains make up the largest
share, followed by processed food. Taken together, food products account for
around 44% of all consumption goods and services imported into the village.
The sub-matrix of the village SAM shown in Table 5.27 depicts the payments
made by the institutions accounts to the rest of the world. The values of this
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Table 5.26.: Village imports (yuan).
Outside Total
village
Commodities
Intermediate inputs
Urea 276,323 276,323
Pesticides 2,116 2,116
Fertilizer 77,413 77,413
Seed 45,351 45,351
Feed 238,087 238,087
Breed 218,445 218,445
Veterinary 1,881 1,881
Machines 4,492 4,492
Labour
Hired labour 9,416 9,416
Food
Grains 275,684 275,684
FFV 97,068 97,068
Processed 113,635 113,635
food
Animal 58,724 58,724
products
Non-food
Durables 93,014 93,014
Stimulants 75,353 75,353
Other 11,816 11,816
Services
Water 4433 4433
Energy 75,608 75,608
Transport 118,120 118,120
Household 11,080 11,080
Health 187,494 187,494
Education 109,554 109,554
Transposed version of the SAM entries.
Table 5.27.: Imports by institutions (yuan).
Institutions
Transfers Savings Government
Transfers Shocks Construction Savings Government
Outside village 0 67,699 209,518 -349,358 -77,388
Total 117,165 72,109 209,518 47,388 0
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matrix have mainly been generated by the need to balance the SAM and are to a
large extent assumption driven. The zero entry in the cell of the transfers account
reflects the assumption that transfers between households (i.e. gifts and local
intra-household transfers) are balanced within the village. As income from and
expenses on transfers did not balance in the original data, this assumption has
been introduced during the SAM balancing process. It rests on the consideration
that there is a priori no reason to believe why the village should be a net payer
or recipient of gifts or intra-household transfers. That said, the village well is
a net recipient of remittances (see Table 5.28). Most of the expenses related to
shocks and big family events (the shocks account in the table) are assumed to
flow out of the village, as well. In fact, the small share remaining in the village
corresponds to the shock related income reported by the households in the survey.
A great part of the expenses on shocks involves outlays for festivities (weddings
or funerals). These can be assumed to consist of goods and services originating
from outside the village, hence creating a payment flow as represented in Table
5.27. According to the entry in the savings-construction account, all expenses
made on house construction go to the rest of the world. The payments reflect
the purchase of construction material and labour services, which have not been
reported separately in the survey. It is possible that some double counting is
involved with respect to the hired labour commodity account, but as the value
of hired labour imports is comparatively low, it can be neglected (compare Table
5.26). The strongly negative entry of the savings-savings account accounts for
the difference between household receipts from savings (i.e. dis-savings) and the
rather low savings reported by the households. As discussed above, the entry
represents the net imports of capital into the village. Similarly, the government
account has a negative payment to the rest of the world which corresponds to
the payments of the account to the households. Accordingly, the village is a net
recipient of government transfers, an obvious observation in a situation in which
no taxes are paid to the government.
The sub-matrix of village exports is presented in Table 5.28. Of the produced
commodity, exports are made up of the share of village production which is not
consumed by the households themselves. Here again, all trade which might take
place inside the village is included into the export accounts (recall the discussions
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Table 5.28.: Village exports (yuan).
Outside Total
village
Commodities
Agricultural 1,009,292 1,554,501
Activities
Formal local off-farm work
11 30,611 30,611
12 0 0
13 0 0
21 29,111 29,111
22 0 0
23 5,961 5,961
Informal local off-farm work
11 55,819 56,052
12 27,031 29,697
13 48,324 51,061
21 111,998 112,606
22 42,151 45,684
23 32,469 32,469
Migration
11 186,107 186,107
12 60,812 60,812
13 23,048 23,048
21 114,374 114,374
22 79,349 79,349
23 5,136 5,136
Blood sales
11 32,311 32,311
12 11,459 11,459
13 20,473 20,473
21 18,858 18,858
22 34,852 34,852
23 7,726 7,726
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above).
As described before, income generated from local off-farm activities is assumed
to originate almost in its entirety—except for the comparatively small amounts
of agricultural labour traded inside the village—from the outside world. This is
reflected in the payments from the outside village account to the respective off-
farm work accounts. The receipts of each account represent the full income earned
by each household specific activity, which later on is split into payments to the
labour factor accounts and payments which go directly to the households in the
form of utility compensations.
The receipts of the local off-farm labour accounts at a glance provide a picture
of the distribution of the corresponding income between the households. By far
the largest share of formal off-farm income is earned by the high income house-
holds. Of the remaining households, only the low income household in the high
migration group receives income from this activity at all. The situation is more
balanced in case of informal local off-farm work in which all household groups
participate. Nonetheless, the income flowing to the accounts of the informal local
off-farm activities of the high income households still exceed the joint receipts of
the accounts of the middle and low income households.
Unlike in local off-farm work from which the full income earned accrues to the
activity accounts and thereby to the households, the payments received by the
migration activities from outside the village only reflect the value of remittances
sent by the migrants. The receipts of the migration activity accounts show that
the high income households receive the highest amounts of remittances and the low
income households the lowest. Comparing the migration groups, the joint receipts
of the low migration group (269,967 yuan) exceed those of the high migration
group (198,859 yuan). The explanation would be that due to the higher share of
dependants in the families, migrants from the low migration group have a stronger
incentive to remit.24
Blood is the final export good of the village. As the receipts of the activities
are directly paid to the household accounts, the details are discussed in relation
24The larger population size of the low migration group does not play a role here. The receipts
per household in the low migration group are 1,791 yuan, compared to 1,442 yuan of the
high migration group.
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to Table 5.20.
Comparing the shares of the different categories, produced commodities con-
stitute the most important export of the village, accounting for 51% of the total
export value. Local off-farm activities account for a minor share of 19% (formal
local off-farm work: 3%; informal local off-farm work: 16%) which is exceeded by
the contribution of migration of 24%. Blood donations add up to a share of 6%
of total village exports.
5.2.3. SAM Construction and Balancing
The present section provides some more technical details regarding the construc-
tion and, in particular, the balancing of the SAM. The disclosure of the main
choices made are supposed to facilitate the assessment of the reliability of the
SAM, given that the matrix represents an estimated snapshot of the village econ-
omy during the year 2006 whose entries deviate in parts considerably from the
survey data.25
Regarding the balancing of a SAM, in general, one can distinguish manual
balancing and balancing based on some sort of algorithms implemented in the
form of a computer program. The most popular examples for algorithm based
balancing procedures are cross-entropy methods, versions of the RAS method or
the so called Stone-Byron Method (see, for example Round, 2003; Schneider and
Zenios, 1990; Fofana et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2001; McDougall, 1999). Among
CGE modellers, the cross-entropy method has assumed particularly high popu-
larity (Robinson et al., 2001; Round, 2003). Although convenient to apply, the
disadvantages of algorithm based balancing are that they constitute a ’black box’
in which changes of SAM entries made by the algorithm in order to achieve a
balanced SAM cannot be traced (Kuiper, 2005). This is of particular concern in
instances, where due to large discrepancies in the original data—as is the case
with respect to incomes and expenditures in the household data in this study—
substantial adjustments have to be made in the SAM. Making some bold decisions
regarding SAM adjustments may be preferable in this situation to applying an
25The intention of the section is to give an insight into the SAM construction and balancing
process. For more details, see the code written for carrying out the operations in R (R Devel-
opment Core Team, 2009) in the electronic annex (Filename: ’samcompile prof hhdisagg
actagg agragg.r’).
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algorithm which may change values within the SAM in an uncontrollable man-
ner. In general, some authors recommend to make careful use of SAM balancing
algorithms and better compile SAMs based on judgement and manual data manip-
ulation rather than some mechanical method (Fofana et al., 2002; Round, 2003).
Hence, the decision was made to manually balance the Changtian village SAM.
In the construction and the balancing of the SAM, two major problems had to
be overcome. First, the values of agricultural input use as reported in the survey
and as calculated with the estimated shadow wages did not exhaust the receipts of
the agricultural activities. Second, the survey data suffered the common problem
experienced by household surveys in developing countries that reported expen-
ditures exceed reported incomes to a substantial degree.26 Both problems had
to be dealt with during the balancing of the SAM. Due to the linkages between
the SAM accounts, both problems required a number of adjustments of the entire
matrix, leading to considerable changes in the values of the SAM entries. In the
following, the main choices made with respect to the compilation and the balanc-
ing of the SAM are outlined and a rough comparison of some core characteristics
of the initial unbalanced SAM and the balanced SAM is presented.
5.2.3.1. Balancing the SAM
Bearing in mind the average surplus of the accounts, the approach to balance the
agricultural activity accounts considered initially, but not pursued, was to increase
the household shadow wage, which, as had been repeatedly discussed above, have
been estimated at rather low values. Yet, the reduction of the accounts’ surpluses
would have required an about ten-fold increase in the household shadow wages.
This would have constituted an extreme and no longer justifiable deviation from
the empirical estimates. Instead, the input values of the agricultural activity of
each household have been scaled proportionally using household group specific
scaling factors to match payments and receipts of the activity accounts. The
26Referring to one of the rounds of the Ghana Living Standards Survey carried out by the
Ghana Statistical Service in cooperation with the World Bank in the 1990s, Round (2003), for
example reports that depending on the definition of income, household income was between
32% and 41% lower than expenditures. This discrepancy is of the magnitude of the differences
found in the data for the Guizhou villages. More generally Haughton and Khandker (2009)
elaborate on the problems associated in particular with the accuracy of household income
data and Fofana et al. (2002) appreciate the problem in a context of SAM construction.
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scaling factors applied in this initial step were 1.16 on average, ranging between
0.98 and 1.57. This means that the accounts have been scaled to new values which
account for between 98% and 157% of the initial ones.
Obviously, the scaling of the payments by the agricultural activities lead to
new imbalances in the intermediate commodity and factor accounts due to a net
increase in input use. In case of intermediate commodities the balancing has been
straightforward by simply defining the value of imports (i.e. payments from the
commodity accounts to the rest of the world) as the sum of the receipts of the re-
spective accounts. Increases in the receipts of the land and labour factor accounts
had to be matched by higher payments from the factors to the households. This
procedure increased household income on average by 17%, thus contributing to
the reduction of the gap between incomes and expenditures. Via the commodity
account for village traded labour, the adjustment of agricultural input use has
also changed the amount of village labour employed. In the consequence this
required a change in the receipts and payments to and from the informal local
off-farm activities. In order to do so, the SAM has been programmed in a way
that payments from the the village traded labour account to the informal local
off-farm activity automatically adjust to changes in the use of village labour in
agriculture. Payments from informal local off-farm work to households, however,
have not been changed. This implied that changes in agricultural input use did
not affect income of households from informal local off-farm work but rather the
composition of income from this activity with respect to the two different income
sources—local off-farm work inside and outside the village—combined in this ac-
tivity. Thus, income from village traded labour increases, income from the other
sources agricultural and non-agricultural informal employment outside the village
and self-employment must decrease. This can be considered acceptable, as all in-
formal off-farm income sources are treated as a single activity with a single wage
rate in the model.
Following the balancing of agricultural input use and the completion of the
adjustments triggered by this first big balancing step, household incomes still
accounted for only 62-75% of household expenditures. In order to reduce the
difference between receipts and payments of the household accounts, household
income has been scaled up proportionally by multiplication with a household
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specific scaling factor. This proportional scaling, however, was preceded by scaling
of the transfers-gifts account. In the unbalanced SAM, with a surplus of about
25% this account was the most unbalanced one which consequently could accept a
large part of the adjustment. Assuming that household expenses on and receipts
from gifts and local intra-household transfers are balanced within the village and
further assuming that households receive gifts and local transfers according to the
proportions reported in the survey, the receipts by all households have been scaled
proportionally by the multiplication with a uniform scaling factor.
As in case of agricultural input use, the adjustments of household income cre-
ated the need for readjusting all other accounts. In case of the off-farm activities,
increased expenses by factors and the activities themselves have been matched
by a multiplication of the corresponding SAM entries with activity and house-
hold specific scaling factors. The receipts of the activity accounts from outside
the village have been scaled accordingly. Due to the simultaneous use of family
labour and land, the adjustments of the agricultural activity accounts was not as
straightforward. To achieve the best possible balancing, payments made by the
agricultural activities together have been scaled for each household to minimize
the sum of squared differences between receipts and payments of the agricultural
labour factor accounts and the land factor accounts. The resulting changes in the
receipts of the commodity accounts of the intermediate inputs used in agriculture
have been accommodated automatically by defining the corresponding amounts
of imports as the sum of the receipts of the respective accounts.
As a further consequence, the change in the agricultural activities accounts
caused new imbalances in the corresponding commodity accounts. As this would
leave the households’ consumption patterns unchanged, an elegant way to bal-
ance the accounts would be to scale up only the payments from the rest of the
world to the corresponding commodities. However, due to the high share of self-
consumption, this would require to scale up receipts from outside the village dis-
proportionately. This would distort the ratio of sales and self-consumption of the
households. Scaling self-consumption of the households by the same factor, in
turn, would distort the relative budget shares of the self-consumed vs. purchased
commodities. The choice made here is scale the payments from outside the village
disproportionally higher, thus somewhat distorting both shares but each one less
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than when scaling either only payments from outside the village or both payments
from outside the village and self-consumption by the same factor.
The final group of accounts which have been directly affected by the adjustments
of household income have been the blood donation accounts. In order to match
receipts and balances of these accounts, receipts from outside the village have
been expressed as the sum of the payments of the accounts.
An effect of the adjustments of the receipts of the agricultural commodity ac-
counts was a new deficit of the households due to increased self-consumption.
This deficit, however, has been much lower than the one in the initial situation.
As a correction step to address these imbalances the assumption was made that
expenses on everything except self-consumption and leisure have been too high.
Accordingly, expenses of households except self-consumption and leisure have been
scaled down to balance the household accounts. This constituted a further move in
the direction of increasing self-consumption at the cost of purchased consumption
goods.
The outcome of the operations undertaken up to that point was a SAM from
which the major imbalances due to agricultural input use and discrepancies in
household incomes and expenditures have been purged. Seven accounts, namely
the agricultural labour accounts, the land accounts and the outside village ac-
counted remained unbalanced. The remaining fine-tuning of the SAM has been
done through a sequence of smaller scaling operations related to the farm labour
accounts, the land accounts and household expenditures.
The explanations regarding the construction and balancing of the SAM made in
this section illustrate that due to the characteristics of the underlying household
data substantial data manipulation have to be carried out. Inevitably, this has
lead to considerable changes both in the levels of the payments recorded in the
SAM and in the proportions of the values of the SAM entries relative to each
other. Focusing on the latter—which are more relevant from a modelling point of
view—the following section presents some figures which shall help to assess the
magnitude of the changes the SAM has experienced during the balancing process.
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5.2.3.2. Assessment of the Balanced SAM
Table 5.29 contains a selection of income and expenditure shares which provide
a general picture of the composition of the SAM. Regarding the share of agri-
cultural income in the total gross income of the village (excluding transfers) the
figures indicate that the balancing process has caused an increase in the share of
agricultural income. With an increase from a 58% share in total village income to
61%, this increase is only of minor magnitude.27 Somewhat larger changes have
occurred in the composition of non-agricultural income. Due to the disproportion-
ately higher scaling of all income sources except transfers and gifts, the latters’
contribution to non-agricultural income has decreased in favour of increases in
the shares of the other off-farm income sources, including blood sales. The most
pronounced change has taken place in migration, with an increase from 24% to
30%. The distribution of income among the different household groups, again,
has remained largely unchanged.
On the expenditure side, the share of food products in the consumption expen-
diture of the village has increased in the balanced SAM from 38% to 44%. This
increase stems from increases of the food expenditure of all household groups
which in turn have been caused by the increase in the relative importance of
self-consumption. The shares of self-consumption in total consumption of the dif-
ferent household groups have conserved their initial ranking, but relatively high
changes have occurred here. The shares of self-consumption increased by margins
of between eight and 14 percentage points, where the highest changes have taken
place in the expenditures of the low-income households of both migration groups.
Although the adjustments made here are in parts substantial, they constitute an
unavoidable trade-off related to the need of matching incomes and expenditures
which differed considerably in the original survey data.
Summarizing the considerations on the compilation and the balancing of the
SAM, it becomes apparent that the consistency requirements inherent to the SAM
structure required a high degree of data manipulation. Due to extensive inconsis-
tencies present in the original dataset, the preferred way of doing so has been a
27It should be noted that due to the use of different aggregations and definitions the shares
presented in Table 5.29 are not directly comparable to the figures presented in Chapter 3.
They rather serve to uncover changes in the composition of the SAM which have occurred
during the balancing process.
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Table 5.29.: Key characteristics of the balanced and unbalanced SAM.
SAM version: Unbalanced Balanced
Income
Shares in total income
Agricultural 0.58 0.61
Non-agricultural 0.42 0.39
Shares in non-agricultural income
Formal local off-farm 0.03 0.04
Informal local off-farm 0.18 0.22
Migration 0.24 0.31
Blood donations 0.07 0.08
Transfers/gifts 0.48 0.34
Shares of household groups in total village income
11 0.24 0.26
12 0.12 0.12
13 0.12 0.12
21 0.29 0.31
22 0.16 0.17
23 0.07 0.07
Expenditures
Share of food products in consumption expenditure
Village level 0.38 0.44
Household level
11 0.31 0.35
12 0.48 0.54
13 0.50 0.56
21 0.30 0.37
22 0.42 0.50
23 0.42 049
Share of self-consumption in consumption expenditure
Village level 0.15 0.27
Household level
11 0.10 0.18
12 0.17 0.29
13 0.19 0.32
21 0.14 0.25
22 0.19 0.33
23 0.20 0.34
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manual balancing procedure, as this approach allowed to consciously manage and
trace the adjustments that had to be made. Yet, the comparison of the balanced
with the unbalanced SAM shows that the basic characteristics of the SAM regard-
ing income and expenditure structure could be preserved. However, in particular
with respect to the shares of self-consumption in total consumption expenditures
it has not been possible to avoid non-trivial changes in expenditure patterns.
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6. An Applied Village Equilibrium
Model
Following the development of the theoretical model of household behaviour in
Chapter 4 and the construction of the village SAM in Chapter 5, this chapter
is dedicated to the presentation of an applied village equilibrium model. In the
following section, the theoretical household model is translated into a village CGE
format.1 Choices regarding the specification of functional forms for utility func-
tions, remittances functions and production functions are made explicit. Further-
more, assumptions regarding the tradability of commodities and factors which are
already outlined during the construction of the village SAM are incorporated into
the model. The resulting village equilibrium model is presented in its algebraic
representation in this section.
In Section 6.2, a number of simulations are carried out in order to illustrate the
workings of the model and to demonstrate the high degree of flexibility it offers
for the depiction of the labour market behaviour of rural households. Using a
simple version of the model, a migration wage shock is analysed under different
values for the parameters of the functions which govern the labour allocation by
the households. Results on key variables are presented and discussed.
6.1. The Village Equilibrium Model
As mentioned above, the translation of the theoretical household model of Chap-
ter 4 into a village equilibrium model which can be used to carry out simulation
analyses requires the specification of functional forms for the utility functions, the
1Section 6.1 in parts draws on Kleinwechter (2010), where a stylized version of the village
equilibrium model has been presented.
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remittances function and the agricultural production function. Furthermore, as-
sumptions have to be made regarding the tradability of commodities and factors.
A village equilibrium framework which accommodates these assumptions needs to
be constructed. In the final model, the activities of the households which consti-
tute the village community take place within this framework. This section starts
with the assumptions on the functional forms of household utility, remittances
and production as well as the tradability of products and factors.
6.1.1. Assumptions on Functional Forms and Tradability of
Products and Factors
As becomes clear in Chapter 4, the allocation of labour to migration, other pro-
ductive activities and leisure is largely determined by utility considerations of the
households: The households derive utility from the consumption of leisure and
their level of utility is affected by participation in different productive activities.
Accordingly, the composite utility function proposed (recall Chapter 4) consists
of a part reflecting consumption utility and a part generating utility from labour
market participation. Due to the necessity of capturing the effects of changes in
household consumption demand which arise following changes in migration, the
consumption utility function UC is specified as a per capita expenditure system.
As a compromise between keeping matters simple and achieving a realistic depic-
tion of household behaviour, a per adult equivalent Stone-Geary utility function
is chosen to represent consumption demand (see Kuiper, 2005, for a former ap-
plication of this approach). The labour market participation component UL of
the composite utility function in this illustrative application is assumed to exhibit
negative marginal utility (i.e., disutility) of labour allocated to the different ac-
tivities. Furthermore, it is assumed that the marginal disutility increases with
the amount of labour allocated to a particular activity. This implies that house-
holds experience a certain degree of disutility from participation in any income
generating activity which increases with the amount of labour. A simple sum of
power functions is proposed here. To avoid undue complexity of the model, remit-
tances and agricultural production are dealt with using rather simple functional
forms. Remittances are assumed to be a linear function of the product of time
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allocated to migration and the wage rate. A nested Cobb-Douglas (C-D) produc-
tion technology is used to model agricultural production. Non-farm production
technologies are a one-to-one mapping of the labour allocated to the respective
activity into a labour service commodity to be traded on the market.
Assumptions regarding the tradability of products and factors determine the
mechanisms of price formation and lead to the general equilibrium framework of
the model. Generally, three levels of tradability are distinguished in the model.
Agricultural output commodities, purchased consumption goods and the pur-
chased inputs to agricultural production are assumed to be traded outside the
village. Following Taylor and Adelman (1996), these goods, which can be ex-
ported and imported at prices given by the outside world, are denoted village
tradables. Within this group, the model further differentiates between commodi-
ties which are exported from the village (agricultural output) and imported into
the village (purchased consumption goods and inputs). The next level of tradabil-
ity is represented by land, which is assumed to be traded inside the village. This
gives rise to a village rental market in which the rental rate for land is determined
by supply and demand within the village. Goods or factors, such as land in this
model, which are traded among households within the village and not with the
outside world are referred to as household tradables (Taylor and Adelman, 1996).
Family labour, finally, takes a special position. While labour is also traded outside
the village, different wage rates including the household shadow wages apply. The
wage rate in off-farm activities is fixed outside the village. The household shadow
wages, however, which ultimately govern the time allocation of the households are
determined within the households. Furthermore, the assumption that labour can-
not be purchased by households plays a role in defining the households’ balance
of family labour (see below).
Before beginning the presentation of the village equilibrium model, some aspects
regarding notation should be mentioned. Unlike in Chapter 4, the notation in this
chapter is adapted to the representation used in GAMS.2 This refers to variable
names as well as sets. As this chapter is intended to be the core part of the
documentation of the model, comparison with the GAMS code is facilitated.3 A
2For the GAMS code a notation along the lines of the GLOBE global CGE model (McDonald
et al., 2007) and the IFPRI standard model (Lo¨fgren et al., 2002) has been chosen.
3The interested reader might wish to refer to Kleinwechter (2010) for a representation of (a
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complete list of set nomenclature and parameter and variable names can be found
in Annexes C and D, respectively.
6.1.2. Household Utility
Following the considerations made above, the composite utility function is
Uh = UCh + ULh =
=
∏
c∈CD
(
QDch − σch
)γch
+
∑
a∈AO
(
−εahFDDδahfah
)
∀ h ∈ H ∧ f ∈ FU.
(6.1)
The first term on the right hand side (the second line) is the consumption utility
function UC in which all QDch are defined per adult equivalent. σch describes the
fixed committed (or subsistence) consumption quantities and γch are the marginal
expenditure shares (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). The consumption utility
function is defined over all commodities consumed by the households h, entering
a set CD.
The second term of the composite utility function constitutes the utility func-
tion for labour market participation UL. Time worked in the different activities is
expressed in terms of a factor demand variable FDDfah. The set FU contains the
’utility’ factors, i.e. the production factors which bear a utility connotation.4 The
parameters εah and δah determine how the time allocated to a particular activ-
ity translates into utility. The negative sign which precedes εah ensures that the
households experience a disutility from labour market participation. Note that
only time worked in off-farm activities, represented by the set AO, is included
into the labour utility function. The omission of own-farm work implicitly in-
corporates the assumption that no utility considerations are attached to work on
the own farm. This means that households have a neutral attitude towards this
kind of work. As will be shown later, this has the effect that labour allocation
to agriculture is driven by the choices made by households regarding work in off-
farm activities. So, the allocation of labour to own-farm work cannot be directly
stylized version of) the model in the notation of the theoretical model of Chapter 4.
4This set in the current model only contains labour. It allows, however, for further disaggre-
gation, e.g. by gender.
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influenced by the modeller and the flexibility of the modelling of labour allocation
behaviour is reduced by a certain degree. An inclusion of own-farm work into
the labour utility function, however, would have required to make assumptions
on the size of a utility term which drives a wedge between the marginal returns
to labour in agriculture and the households shadow wage. Such an assumption
would be difficult to make, given that the shadow wage by definition is unobserv-
able. Furthermore, it would be incompatible with the assumptions regarding the
equality of the marginal value product and the marginal cost of labour used in
the estimation of the household shadow wages 5
6.1.3. Household Expenditure
Constrained maximization of the utility function (6.1) with respect to consump-
tion goods and leisure leads to a per capita linear expenditure system (LES)
(Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; Kuiper, 2005). In the LES, household demand is
described by
QDch =
PDch ∗ σch + γch ∗ (HEXPCPh −∑c∈CD PDch ∗ σch)
PDch
∀ ∈ CD ∧ h ∈ H
(6.2)
where PDch is the consumer price of good c and HEXPCPh is the per adult
equivalent consumption expenditure of household h. PDch is exogenously given
for almost all consumption goods and thus the same for all households, The ex-
ception is the case of leisure, where the consumer price is the household specific
endogenous shadow wage. The great advantage of the LES is its simplicity, re-
flected in particular in the fact that it requires a very limited number of parameters
and that its calibration only requires prior knowledge of income elasticities of the
goods included into the system. Although the LES fulfils the restrictions of addi-
tivity, homogeneity and symmetry commonly imposed on demand systems (Stone,
1954), its simplicity also entails a number of weaknesses. First, Engel curves are
assumed to be linear with a slope which is equal to the marginal expenditure share
γch. This linear nature of the Engel curves implies that predictions made with
5Recall Equation 4.38 in Chapter 4 and the discussion in Footnote 10 in Chapter 5.
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the system are only accurate over a limited range of variation in income. Second,
the expenditure (or income) elasticity of each commodity in the system is larger
than zero, meaning that inferior commodities are not allowed for. Third, the own
price elasticities following in an LES always lie between −1 and 0, thus there is
only inelastic demand for all goods. Finally, all cross-price elasticities are smaller
than zero, so that all goods are gross complements (de Boer, 2009; Sadoulet and
de Janvry, 1995).
In principle, the weaknesses of the LES can be overcome by the use of more
flexible specifications of the demand system which would resemble observed con-
sumption behaviour more closely. Examples for more flexible specifications which
are also commonly used in CGE analyses would be the Almost Ideal Demand Sys-
tem (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) or demand systems based on Constant
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) func-
tions (Martin, 1997). As the focus of the present analysis is on household labour
market behaviour, however, the depiction of the demand side is kept compara-
tively simple.
Apart from the consumption of the goods covered by the LES, households spend
their income on several other items, comprising house construction, gifts, expendi-
ture on shocks and big family events and household savings and interest payments.
Of these, the only item which is modelled endogenously to the model is expendi-
ture on construction HEXPCONSh. Assuming a fixed expenditure share which
is expressed as a share of total household income Y Hh, expenditure on construc-
tion is given by
HEXPCONSh = hoexpconsshh ∗ Y Hh (6.3)
The remaining expenditure items are assumed to be fixed and included into
the income constraints of the households (see Equation 6.22). The main reason
for this simplifying assumption lies in the appearance of the items on the income
and on the expenditure side. Due to the design of the model as a nonlinear
maximization problem in which total village income is maximized, the modelling
of gifts, shocks or savings as fixed expenditure shares, for instance, would create
a circular flow of income within the village through which household incomes
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are maximized to infinity. This would render the model insolvable. A further
argument is given by the results of a study by Brown et al. (2010) on the same
villages in Guizhou. The authors find that social spending, i.e. expenditure on big
family events and gifts, is motivated by status concerns and may follow a pattern
of herding behaviour. This suggests that the proper modelling of households’
expenditure on the items mentioned would require a much more detailed approach.
Simplifying assumptions, such as fixed expenditure shares in any case would fall
short of the more complex reality. Although an incorporation of the findings by
Brown et al. (2010) into the model not only from a methodological point of view
would constitute a highly interesting aspect, it is clearly beyond the scope of this
study.
The definition of quantities and consumption expenditure in per adult equiva-
lent terms in Equations 6.2 and the fact that in the remaining parts of the model
total quantities and values per household are used requires the establishment of a
relationship which scales the variables expressed as per adult equivalents to total
quantities and values. The scaling function for per adult equivalent consumption
is:
QDTch = QDch ∗HSh ∀ c ∈ CD ∧ h ∈ H (6.4)
Likewise, per adult equivalent consumption expenditure is scaled to total house-
hold consumption expenditure by
HEXPCh = HEXPCPh ∗HSh ∀ h ∈ H. (6.5)
The variable HSh which appears in the two scaling equations is the endogenous
household size and defined by Equation 6.24 below.
Equations 6.2 to 6.5 together constitute the expenditure block of the village
equilibrium model comprising demand for consumption commodities, leisure and
housing. As a result of the expenditure system being defined on a per adult
equivalent basis, the time dedicated to migration (i.e. the time spent by a mi-
grant outside the household) exerts a direct influence on consumption demand
via Equations 6.4 and 6.5 and the endogenous household size Equation 6.24. This
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establishes the feedback between migration and household consumption.
6.1.4. Household Income
Turning from the expenditure to the income side of the households, the model
contains two equations for each household which describe its income. For the
remittances function 6.6 a simple linear specification has been chosen:
Y Rh =
∑
a∈HAOM
κh ∗ PAah ∗QAah ∀ h ∈ H (6.6)
According to this equation, migrants send a constant fraction κh of their income
in form of remittances Y Rh back home. Migrant income, in turn, is expressed as
the product of the price of the migration activity PAah, i.e. the wage rate at
the destination, and the amount of the labour service commodity QAah supplied.
The amount of the labour service commodity is the time worked in migration
(see Equation 6.9). Returns from migration are summed over a set HAOM which
contains the household specific migration activities as elements.6 This formulation
offers the possibility of a further disaggregation of migration, e.g. by sector or by
region.
The simple and linear form of the remittances function again is a pragmatic
choice. First, it implies the assumption that the remitting behaviour of migrants’
captured by the parameter κh is constant over time and invariant to economic
developments in the village community. It thereby ignores the complexity of the
motivations to remit (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Furthermore, the linearity of remit-
tances in migration time and wage, i.e. the constant marginal rate of remittances,
rules out the possibility that the share of income remitted may change with the
time worked in migration or with changes in wages. A study by Cai (2003), for
example, finds that migrants become more likely to remit (although not to remit
more) up to a certain duration of migration but that this likelihood declines with
the migration spell extending further. Such observations might suggest the exis-
tence of nonlinear remittances functions. Having said that, the linear form chosen
6As will be explained below, activities in the model are household specific. That is, each house-
hold disposes of an own set of functions associated with the different production activities.
Sets as HAOM are cross-sets defined from the household set H and the activity set A (or
its subsets) and map each single activity to the corresponding household.
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may be a considered a first order approximation to any remittances function and
can be expected to be sufficiently precise over the comparatively small range of
changes in migration wages and time to be analysed with the present model.
Remittances, however, form only one component of the full income of the house-
holds which is given by Equation 6.7:
Y Hh =
∑
f∈FU
∑
a∈HAC
WFfh ∗ FDCfah +
∑
f∈FU
∑
a∈HAOL
PAah ∗ FDDfah + Y Rh
+
∑
f∈FN
FSHfh ∗WFfh
+ hogiftconst(h) + hogovconst(h) + hoshoconst(h)
+ hosiconst(h) + hobloodconst(h)
+
∑
c∈CN
PDch ∗QDTch ∀ h ∈ H
(6.7)
According to Equation 6.7, households derive income from labour employed in
farm production, local off-farm activities and migration (in form of remittances).
The time spent in agricultural production, which makes up the set HAC of house-
hold C-D activities, is FDCfah. THe household time spent in local off-farm activ-
ities, all members of the set HAOL, is FDDfah. Time spent in farm production
is evaluated at the household shadow wage WFfh, time worked in local off-farm
activities at the respective activity price PAah, which corresponds to the market
wage rate. Please note that the market wage rates can be decomposed again into
the shadow wage and the marginal disutility compensation.
Apart from labour, households receive factor returns from contract land they
dispose of. This income component enters the income equation as the households’
endowment with land FSHfh evaluated at the household shadow price for land.
The definition of the sum over the set FN containing the ’nonutility’ factors which
have no utility connotation attached ensures that only the members of this set
are taken into account.
Next to factor returns comes a group of exogenously fixed values which rep-
resent other income earned by the households. This income consists of transfers
in form of gifts, government transfers and transfers received in the context of
adverse shocks as well as income from savings and blood donations. For the dif-
ferent income elements different reasons suggested to abstain from a behavioural
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modelling of the respective element. In case of gifts, shocks and savings, the same
argumentation as brought forward in context of the expenditure block applies. In
case of government transfers, the lack of an institution representing the govern-
ment in the village and the lack of a modelling of taxes (as households do not
have to pay any) makes it difficult to make assumption on an endogenous change
in this kind of payments. Keeping government transfers exogenously fixed, how-
ever, is a closure rule chosen in many CGE applications, such as the models by
Lo¨fgren et al. (2002) or McDonald et al. (2007), for example.7 As regards to in-
come from blood donations, the observation that blood donations constitute an
important livelihood strategy for people in the village living close to the poverty
line (Xing et al., 2009) hints to a more complex pattern underlying blood donation
behaviour. Exploring this and incorporating it into a village model again would
be a worthwhile endeavour, but goes beyond the scope of this work.
The last line of Equation 6.7 counts the value of leisure as income. This is neces-
sary because leisure is included into the model as a consumption good and implies
that households purchase amounts of leisure they consume from themselves.
Equations 6.6 and 6.7 together calculate the total income of the households. A
final equation, which completes the income block, is an equation for total village
income Y T :
Y T =
∑
h∈H
Y Hh (6.8)
Apart from representing a rough indicator of total village welfare, Y T constitutes
the maximand (or minimand) of the nonlinear optimization problem the village
equilibrium model is cast as.
6.1.5. Non-farm Activities
Ultimately, the factor returns which constitute a great part of household income
are generated in the productive activities of the households. The model broadly
distinguishes two types of activities, agricultural production and non-farm ac-
7In the IFPRI standard model, government transfers are indexed on the consumer price index
(Lo¨fgren et al., 2002). The GLOBE model (McDonald et al., 2007) has exogenously fixed
government expenditures.
184
6.1. The Village Equilibrium Model
tivities. The two types of activities differ with respect to the specification of the
production technologies and the associated factor allocation functions. As already
indicated above, any kind of off-farm employment is treated as a production ac-
tivity and the output of this activity is a commodity sold to the labour market.
Consequently, a simple production function directly maps the amount of labour
by the household into an output of the respective activity.
QAah =
∑
f∈FU
FDDfah ∀ A ∈ HAO ∧ h ∈ H. (6.9)
As already noted, the output QAah of non-farm activities can be considered as a
labour service commodity which is traded on the market.
The level of non-farm production is governed by the first order conditions ob-
tained from the constrained maximization of the utility function and take the
form
κh ∗ PAah =WFfh + 1
λh
∗ εah ∗ δah ∗ FDD(δah−1)fah
− pcscalh ∗
∑
c∈CD
QDch ∗ PDch
∀ a ∈ HAOM, f ∈ FU, h ∈ H
(6.10)
for migration and for local off-farm activities the form
PAah = WFfh +
1
λh
∗ εah ∗ δah ∗FDD(δah−1)fah ∀ a ∈ HAOL, f ∈ FU. (6.11)
The two equations play the role of factor allocation functions for the non-farm
activities and therefore in the following are denoted as such.8
In case of migration Equation 6.10 states, as in the theoretical model presented
8In fact, these functions as well as the functions for input demand of the agricultural activities
represent the conditions for optimal factor allocation by the household. While the analogues
of these functions are called factor or input demand functions in the CGE literature (Lo¨fgren
et al., 2002, p.34) this denotation is less clear for the present model. In case of labour the
functions represent both the demand for labour by the respective productive activities car-
ried out by the households and the supply of labour of the households to these activities.
Hence, the more general terms ”factor allocation functions” or ”labour allocation functions”
are adopted in this study. In case of the functions derived from the Leontief C-D production
technology assumed for agriculture the convention introduced by Lo¨fgren et al. (2002) is fol-
lowed and the functions are called ”input demand functions” and ”factor demand functions”,
respectively.
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above, that in the optimum the households equate marginal returns from migra-
tion with marginal costs. The marginal returns are the activity prices, or the
wage rates at the destination, multiplied with the remittance factor κh. The
marginal costs consist of three components. The first component is the household
specific shadow wage WFfh, i.e. the opportunity cost of the factor. The second
component 1
λh
∗ εah ∗ δah ∗ FDD(δah−1)fah , which will be discussed in detail below,
reflects the disutility arising from migration to the specific household. This gen-
erates a markup to the shadow wage and, equivalently, diminishes the value of
the returns from migration. The third component (pcscalh ∗∑c∈CDQDch ∗ PDch)
emerges due to the definition of a per capita LES. As this third component takes
a positive value, it works contrary to the disutility component and increases the
marginal returns from migration. This latter component represents the second
part of the feedback between migration and the consumption sphere. During the
work with the model it turned out that an unforeseen effect of this component
is that an increase in any of the local off-farm wage rates may lead to a positive
migration response. This happens because an increase in income has the same
effect on per capita consumption as a decrease in household size, thus offering an
additional incentive to migrate. In order to reduce the magnitude of this (coun-
terintuitive) effect, an additional parameter pcscalh has been introduced into the
equation. This parameter scales the total value of the per capita consumption to
a value significantly smaller than the household shadow wage.9
The mechanics of Equation 6.10 are best illustrated through the effect a sup-
posed increase in PAah. First of all, a rising PAah requires that the right hand
side of the equation increases, too. This raises the household shadow wage and the
time allocated to migration. However, both movements are counteracted by an
increase in the term (pcscalh ∗∑c∈CDQDch ∗ PDch). This increase happens due
to the higher shadow wage, a higher income and, as a consequence of the latter
and a smaller household size, an increase in per capita consumption quantities.
Ultimately, a new equilibrium—which also involves second round effects through
changes in income and quantities consumed—with a higher level of migration is
9For the simulations, a value of 15% of the shadow wage has been chosen, incorporating the
assumption that the effect of migration on per-capita consumption subtracts 15% from the
opportunity cost of labour in the base situation.
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established.
At this juncture the overall behaviour of the equation and, in particular, the
amount of labour shifted to migration as a response to the wage shock, hinges on
the calibration of the parameters λh, εah and δah. First of all, the initial values of
all terms other than the disutility component are determined a priori through the
data used in the SAM which underlies the village equilibrium model. Likewise,
the initial amount of time FDDfah dedicated to migration is also given. This
implies that λh, εah and δah have to be calibrated in a way that the value of the
disutility component allows the equation to be true. In other words, the value of
the disutility component must equal the difference between the marginal returns
from migration and the shadow wage minus the value of per capita household
consumption. In addition, the values of λh, εah and δah determine how fast the
disutility component changes from a change in migration, i.e. how much labour
has to be shifted to migration to achieve a given change in marginal disutility.
The less labour is necessary for a given change in disutility, the faster the equi-
librium is established and the weaker is the migration response of the household.
Consequently, Equation 6.10 represents a utility function based implementation
of different migration responses of agricultural households, allowing to account for
supply side factors in a theoretically consistent manner.
In case of local off-farm activities, Equation 6.11 ensures that the wage earned
equals the household shadow wage minus a utility component which reflects the
disutility generated through the participation in the activity. As in case of migra-
tion, the disutility component drives a wedge between the shadow wage and the
market wage rate. The points made above about the calibration of the parameters
λh, εah and δah apply. Again, rooted in the utility concept it is possible to incor-
porate assumptions which exert an influence on the strength of the households’
responses to changes in the market wage rate.
6.1.6. Agricultural Production
Following the approach by Lo¨fgren et al. (2002), agricultural production activi-
ties are modelled as a nested technology in which the activity level is a Leontief
function of the quantities of value-added and intermediate input use. In this
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nested technology, aggregate intermediate input demand QINTAah and the level
of value-added QV Aah are expressed as fixed shares of the level of the activity
QAah
QINTAah = intaah ∗QAah ∀ a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H (6.12)
and
QV Aah = ivashah ∗QAah ∀ a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H. (6.13)
The demand for each individual intermediate input commodity QINTach, each
a member of a set CI, is derived as a fixed share of the aggregate intermediate
input demand
QINTach = icaach ∗QINTAah ∀ a ∈ HAC, c ∈ CI, h ∈ H. (6.14)
Agricultural value-added is assumed to be produced of the available factor in-
puts (land and labour in case of this application) using a C-D production tech-
nology:
QV Aah = αah ∗
∏
f∈F
FDC
βfah
fah ∀ a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H (6.15)
As usual, the αah are efficiency parameters while the parameters βfah represent
the cost shares of the respective inputs. From the first order conditions for profit
maximization follow the factor demand functions
FDCfah =
βfah ∗QV Aah ∗ PAah
WFfh
∀ a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H. (6.16)
Unlike the factor allocation functions for the non-farm activities, these are stan-
dard functions which do not include a disutility component.
As the LES used to depict household consumption, the C-D technology assumed
for agricultural production exhibits a number of shortcomings. These are mainly
rooted in its restrictiveness and inflexibility. In fact, in the C-D production func-
tion substitution elasticities between factors are restricted to unity (Feger, 2000).
188
6.1. The Village Equilibrium Model
Further, the C-D technology incorporates the assumption of constant returns to
scale (as the βfah sum up to 1). Again, it would be possible to model agricultural
production assuming more flexible production functions. Several functional forms
which are less restrictive and which offer a higher degree of flexibility are available
and commonly used. Examples include, for instance, generalizations of the C-D
function, such as the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), the Generalized
Leontief, the translog or the Constant Ratio Elasticity of Substitution Homothetic
(CRESH) production function (Christensen et al., 1973; Diewert, 1971; Fuss et al.,
1978; Hanslow, 2001). The great advantage of the C-D assumption, however, again
is its simplicity. In particular due to the function’s parsimony in parameters—all
parameters can be calibrated directly from the SAM—the choice has been made
in favour of this function in this analysis. Along with its ease of interpretation
and computational tractability it fulfills a number of criteria put forward for the
choice of functional forms (Fuss et al., 1978).10 Nonetheless, further developments
of the present model could well seek to test for the effects of different technologies
for agricultural production.
The output produced by each of the activities is sold by the households on
the market. Accordingly, it is necessary to convert the output quantities which
are defined over the activities into output commodities QQch. This is done via a
commodity production function:11
QQch =
∑
a∈A
ioqqqaach ∗QAah ∀ c ∈ CQ, h ∈ H. (6.17)
The formulation of Equation 6.17 not only allows to match activity output with
the commodity prices (which are defined over the set C), but in principle also offers
the possibility of introducing multiple outputs per activity. As mentioned above,
however, in the present application each activity produces only one output, which
10Apart from parsimony in parameters, ease of interpretation, computational ease these criteria
include interpolative and extrapolative robustness. These demand that within and outside
the range of observed data the function should be well-behaved, i.e. display consistency with
stated hypotheses such as the behaviour of marginal products or convexity (Fuss et al., 1978).
As the C-D function exhibits a diminishing positive marginal product and as the range of
data over which experiments are carried out is sufficiently small, the robustness criteria can
also be considered to be at least approximately fulfilled.
11Just as the entire system of agricultural production, this approach is also borrowed from
Lo¨fgren et al. (2002).
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means that the parameter ioqqqaach (the yield of output c per unit of activity a)
only takes the values 0 or 1.
Equations 6.9 to 6.17 constitute the production block of the model. Together
with the expenditure block, these equations describe the behaviour of the house-
holds in the village. The final and still missing elements to complete the household
modules of the model are the different constraints at the household level.
6.1.7. Household Level Balances
The household level constraints consist of the different balances which in their
entirety define the equilibrium conditions for the households. These comprise
balances for commodities and factors, including labour time, as well as income
constraints and resemble the constraints of the theoretical model.
The first set of household level constraints involves the household level com-
modity balances. These balances cover all commodities households trade on the
market, be it through sales or purchases. In the general form, the commodity
balances (Equation 6.18) state that the quantity of household production plus
purchases (QPch) must be equal to the total amount consumed plus sales:
QQch +QPch = QDTch +QSch ∀ c ∈ CM, h ∈ H (6.18)
In practice, different categories of market traded commodities are distinguished
in the model. The first category are commodities the households produce by
themselves, consume and sell. For these commodities, the variable for commodity
purchases is fixed to a level of zero. In this case, equation 6.18 ensures that
households’ own consumption and sales together must exhaust total household
production of the respective commodity. Put differently, (net) sales of households
are expressed as the residual of household production and own-consumption.
The second category includes commodities households consume and purchase
but do not produce by themselves. Here, commodity output and sales are fixed
to zero and total household consumption is directly translated into commodity
purchases by Equation 6.18.
The third category is made up of commodities which are produced and sold but
not consumed by households. These are the labour service commodities (off-farm
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work and migration). For these commodities total consumption and purchases
are fixed at zero and the commodity output is converted into commodity sales by
Equation 6.18.
The first one of the factor balances of the households is the household time
constraint. This constraint requires the use of household time in the different
productive activities and leisure consumption to be equal to the household’s total
time endowment:
FSHfh =
∑
a∈A
FDCfah +
∑
a∈A
FDDfah +QDT”cleis”,h ∀ f ∈ FU, h ∈ H.
(6.19)
In case of land, rentals by households from and to the village market are possible.
This implies that for each household the sum of land used by the agricultural
activities and the net rentals QR”clnd”,h must equal the land endowment of each
household:
∑
a∈A
FDCfah = FSHfh +QR(”clnd”, h) ∀ f ∈ FN, h ∈ H (6.20)
From Equation 6.20, net land rentals are defined as the residual from household
land endowments and land use by the specific household. Net land rentals among
households, in principle, should sum up to zero. As the land rental data from the
survey, however, exhibited large differences between expenses on and income from
land rentals, a migrated household has been introduced into the model (recall the
discussion in Chapter 5 on this issue). This household is represented by an own
land balance
QRMc = −
∑
h∈H
QR(”clnd”, h) ∀ c ∈ CV NT, h ∈ H. (6.21)
which is defined over a set of village non-traded commodities CV NT . In this land
balance, a variable QRMc accounts for the difference between land rent in and
land rent out within the village. This variable is fixed and adds to the total land
endowment of the village. Equations 6.20 and 6.21 together demand that the total
amount of land used by the villagers does not exceed the land endowment of the
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households residing in the village and those that already have left. Thereby, the
equations also represent the village level land balance and thus the equilibrium
condition for the village land rental market.
Following the commodity and factor balances, a household income constraint
ensures that households cannot spend more income than they earn:
Y Hh =HEXPCh +HEXPCONSh
+ hexpgifth + hexpshockh + hexpsih ∀ h ∈ H
(6.22)
Here, the exogenously fixed parameters for expenditures on gifts, shocks and sav-
ings and investment are added to expenses on consumption and construction.
Note also that, unlike in the budget constraint of the theoretical model, leisure
is now explicitly included. Furthermore, (net) expenses on variable inputs and
land rentals are neglected because the income Equation 6.7 states net household
income.12
As the expenditure system which describes consumption demand is defined with
a variable for consumption expenditure, an equation has been added to make sure
that total consumption expenditure be equal to the consumption values of the
individual consumption items:
HEXPCh =
∑
c∈CD
QDTch ∗ PDch +WALRASh ∀ h ∈ H (6.23)
The expenditure system, however, already causes Equation 6.23 to hold. Hence,
the equation can be considered redundant in the model and in principle could
be dropped. An alternative to the removal of the equation, however, is to intro-
duce a slack variable which takes a value of zero for all households in case the
model solves correctly. Thereby, this variable provides a consistency check for the
model. Following common practice in general equilibrium modelling, the variable
is denoted WALRASh in honour of the economist who has put forward the notion
that if in general equilibrium all but one markets are in equilibrium, the remaining
market would be in equilibrium, as well.13
12That is, instead of gross revenues only factor returns are taken into account.
13Please note how the fact that the slack variable is defined over all households highlights the
conceptual parallel of the present village equilibrium model with a multi-region CGE model
(compare, for example, the GLOBE model by McDonald et al., 2007, which features a slack
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A last equation included into the block of household constraints is an equation
which calculates the number of consumers present in the household in per adult
equivalent terms:
HSh =hadultsh −
∑
a∈HAOM FDD(f, a)
tp
+ hdepscal ∗ hdepsh ∀f ∈ FU, h ∈ H
(6.24)
According to Equation 6.24, total household size is calculated as the number of
adults in the household, captured by the parameter hadultsh from which the
number of migrants are subtracted and to which the adult equivalents of the
number of children (hdepsh) are added. The subtraction of the number of migrants
establishes the link between the level of migration and the consumption sphere
of the household. The parameter tp in the relevant term represents the duration
of the period under consideration by the model (recall the theoretical model in
Chapter 4). According to the unit of labour used for the construction of the SAM
it is set to 365 days. Due to the normalization of prices, however, the unit of the
quantities of labour and therefore the unit of tp no longer corresponds to days
or any other unit commonly used for measuring time periods. However, working
with the chosen value yields values for the household size HSh which are close to
those observed in the survey. In any case, as tp is a fixed constant, its precise
value is of minor relevance for the results obtained by the model.
The numbers of children are scaled to adult equivalents by multiplication with
a scaling factor hdepscal. This factor takes a value of 0.5. It is taken from
Glewwe and Twum-Baah (1991) (cited from Haughton and Khandker (2009)) who
used it for children aged 13-17 in the context of World Bank Living Standards
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Peru. Arguably, the
approach chosen can be considered a comparatively simple way of scaling to per
adult equivalents. Indeed, there are more accurate ways available which also take
into account, for example, economies of scale which play a role with increasing
household sizes (see, for example, Burniaux et al., 1998). Again, the choice made
here was to keep matters simple.
variable for each single region). As they carry out their own production activities and dispose
of their own commodity, factor market and income balances, households in a village take the
position of the regions in such a model.
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6.1.8. Village Level Balances
Following the household level balances, village level balances constitute the second
set of system constraints in the model. The village level balances define the village
equilibrium framework. In case of goods which are exported from the village,
amounts produced by the households less own consumption make up the exported
quantities:
QVXc =
∑
h∈H
QQch −
∑
h∈H
QDTch ∀ c ∈ CVX, h ∈ H (6.25)
Exported goods, included into a set CVX, comprise agricultural products as
well as the labour service commodities for off-farm work. In case of the latter,
household consumption always takes a value of zero and the entire output of the
household is exported.
Commodities imported into the village include capital and labour inputs for
agricultural production as well as market purchased goods consumed by the house-
holds. The balance for imported commodities is
QVMc =
∑
h∈H
QPch +
∑
h∈H
∑
a∈A
QINTcah ∀ c ∈ CVM, a ∈ A, h ∈ H (6.26)
Similar to the previous equation, the variable QPch always takes a value of zero
for imported inputs and the variable QINTcah is always zero for goods consumed
by the household.14
In addition to the balance for imported and exported commodities, three types
of balances could still be added to the model. First, a balance for household labour
would ensure that the total amount of family labour used by the households for
productive activities and consumed in form of leisure does not exceed the village’s
overall time endowment. As household labour is not traded between households
and due to the assumption of family labour and purchased labour being imperfect
substitutes, however, it is sufficient to formulate balances at the household level.
Second, a village level land balance would ensure the village market for land to
be in equilibrium. This equilibrium is already guaranteed by Equations 6.20 and
14Exceptions are the water and energy services commodities which are both used as inputs and
consumed by households.
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6.21. In fact, the land balance of the migrated household can be regarded as
the equivalent of the village level land balance. Third and finally, a balance of
payments for the village would ensure that all flows of payments out of the village
are financed by corresponding inflows. Given the absence of village institutions
other than households, this condition is fulfilled by the household level income
constraints as captured by Equation 6.22.
Again, there would be scope to leave one or more of the redundant village level
balances in the model and add a slack variable for each redundant equation in order
to incorporate additional consistency checks. Due to the comparatively simple
structure of the model, however, this variable instead of providing additional
information would merely replicate the information contained in the household
level slack variables.15
6.1.9. Prices
The final block of equations is a price block which establishes the price relation-
ships in the model. In general, due to the lack of indirect taxes, trade taxes and
transaction or transport costs, price relationships are straightforward. Consumer
prices and prices for household produced farm output are assumed to be equal to
the market prices which prevail outside the village. Likewise, wages, which are
included as activity prices for off-farm activities, are given by the wage rates on
the outside village labour market. In all cases, the village is assumed to be a price
taker in the respective markets. The identity of village prices with prices of the
outside world is established by a number of equations which fix the corresponding
prices of the model:
PAah = PAah ∀ a ∈ A, h ∈ H
PDch = PDch ∀ c ∈ CP, h ∈ H
PIch = PIch ∀ c ∈ CI, h ∈ H
(6.27)
Exceptions to this rule are given by the non-traded factor household labour, the
village traded factor land and some prices which are artificial constructs inherent
15Such an approach is taken by McDonald et al. (2007) who include a variable for a global
balance of payments into their multi-regional CGE model. This variable always has to take
a value of zero.
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to the production system. The prices inherent to the production system require
separate definitions. These prices are the price of value-added PV Aah and the
activity specific price of the aggregate intermediate input PIAah. The price of
value-added is calculated from the condition that for each activity total revenue
has to be exhausted by payments for value-added and intermediate inputs (Lo¨fgren
et al., 2002).
PV Aah =
PAah ∗QAah −QINTAah ∗ PIAah
QV Aah
∀ a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H (6.28)
The aggregate intermediate input price is the weighted average of the price of the
single intermediate input commodities used by activity a:
PIAah =
∑
c∈C
PIch ∗ icacah ∀ c ∈ CI, a ∈ HAC, h ∈ H (6.29)
The weighting factor icacah is the quantity of intermediate input c used per unit
of the activity specific aggregated intermediate input (Lo¨fgren et al., 2002).
In case of the non-traded factor household labour, which is used both as a factor
in household production and as a consumption good, the household shadow wage
defines the household specific consumer price of leisure:
PDch = WFfh ∀ c ∈ CN, f ∈ FU, h ∈ H (6.30)
As regards to land, as soon as land is traded on the village land rental market,
the shadow prices of the households are equalized across the village and a common
village land rental rate arises:
WFfh = WFV ∀ f ∈ FN, h ∈ H (6.31)
Equation 6.31 forms part of the village equilibrium framework for the land rental
market and is only included in a version of the model in which the households
are connected via the village land market. For the model version without a land
market, the equation is removed and a land market equilibrium is established
within each household. In this case, the equality between land supply and demand
is achieved through adjustments of the household specific shadow price for land.
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6.1.10. Model closure
The price block completes the equation system of the model. Yet, achieving a
fully determined model still requires to fix a number of variables, i.e. to ’close’ the
model. Apart from this purely mathematical notion—to obtain a model, which
consist of an equal number of equations and endogenous variables—the choice
of the closure by determining which variables are exogenous and endogenous also
introduces a portion of theoretical judgement into the model (Thissen, 1998). This
theoretical judgement concerns, in particular, the assumptions of the workings of
factor and commodity markets.16 Hence, closure rules are of crucial importance for
the behaviour of the model and, accordingly, deserve a more detailed discussion.
In a broader sense, Equations 6.27 of the price block represent the first set of
model closures. The fact that the greatest part of the prices for consumption
goods, inputs and outputs (including wages) are exogenously fixed implies that
the village, as mentioned earlier, is a price taker in the respective markets. The
village economy takes the prices as given and adjusts in response to price changes.
The village itself, in turn, does not exert any influence on the prices in the rest of
the country. Furthermore, all supply of village imported and demand for village
exported goods (i.e. those for which the village is a price taker) is infinitely elastic.
Given that the village makes only an evanescent contribution to the economy of
the province, let alone the country, this assumption appears to be justified.17
The next set of closure rules concerns the factor markets, that is the market
for household labour and for land. For both markets, total supply of the factor is
fixed at the initial level
FSHfh = FSHfh ∀f ∈ F, h ∈ H. (6.32)
As the model is built up from the household level, the factor supply variable
FSHfh is defined at the household level, as well. It represents the households’
16In country-level and multi-region CGE models, further important choices concern macroeco-
nomic features of the model, such as savings and investments (the famous distinction between
neoclassical and Keynesian closures), the exchange rate regime or the fiscal balance of the
government (Mitra-Kahn, 2008). As the village equilibrium model lacks exchange rates and
treats savings and investments as well as the government only in a rudimentary way, however,
these so called ’macro-closures’ do not have to be applied here.
17If one had the possibility to represent the whole rural China by a large number of interlinked
village equilibrium models the situation, of course, would be different.
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endowment with time and land, respectively. For both markets, the assumption
made by the choice of this closure is one of full factor employment. Given beliefs of
a huge amount of surplus labour Chinas’ rural areas are characterized by (Knight
and Song, 2003; Cook, 1999), in case of household labour this could be considered
unrealistic. Having said that, more recent studies find growing evidence of increas-
ing labour shortages in China (Zhang et al., 2010), at least in certain localities
(Bowlus and Sicular, 2003). Regardless of the outcome of this ongoing debate,
the crucial issue in this model is that for household labour the assumption of full
employment implies that the households’ time endowment is fully exhausted by
the time worked in the different activities and by the consumption of leisure. It
is the effect of Equation 6.32 that the total time endowment cannot change and
that a household internal equilibrium is achieved in which the shadow wage ad-
justs to clear the equivalent of a household internal labour market. At this, due
to the inclusion of leisure and a flexible household shadow wage, the model can
accommodate both a situation of labour surplus or one of labour scarcity.
In case of land, additional factor market closures are added to allow for two
different land rental market regimes. As mentioned above, Equation 6.32 implies
that land is fully employed, an assumption which is entirely realistic given the
general observation that land is a relatively scarce resource in China (Li and
Zahniser, 2002; Shi et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2005). The question is, however, via
which mechanisms this scarce resource is allocated, not only to its different uses
but also among the different users. The present model allows for two different
possibilities. The first one assumes that land is nontradable at the household
level. Under this assumption, households can only use the amount of land they
had in use at the time of the survey. In this case, net land rentals are fixed at the
level observed in the survey:
QRch = QRch ∀c ∈ CV NT, h ∈ H. (6.33)
Furthermore, the village market price for land has to be fixed
WFV = WFV (6.34)
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Equations 6.33 and 6.34 along with Equation 6.32 ensure that each household
internally balances supply and demand via adjustments in the shadow price of land
while the possibility to leave land fallow or to draw additional land in production
is ruled out. Lacking village markets for other village traded goods or factors,
Equation 6.33 essentially reduces the village model to a number of agricultural
household models which are solved in parallel. In order to fully implement this
land market closure, Equation 6.31 is dropped from the model.
The second possible mechanism to allocate land in the village is to allow for a
village land rental market. In this case, Equation 6.31 is included into the model
and the land rentals by the migrated household have to be fixed at their initial
level:
QRMc = QRMc ∀c ∈ CV NT. (6.35)
With the village market price for land and the households’ shadow price as well as
net land rentals being flexible, supply and demand for land are reconciled within
the village with a land rental rate which clears the village market. Under this
regime, due to Equation 6.31 household shadow prices for land are always the
same across households.
Of course, compared to the reality in the Guizhou villages, the assumptions
brought forward by the land market closures of the model are extremely sim-
plifying. In the villages, land transactions take place, but within an institutional
framework which prevents a land rental market which at least approximately could
be labelled perfect from emerging. This institutional framework is characterized
by the collective ownership of land under which rights of control and income are
granted to households for 30 years (Huang et al., 2008). This system entails that
farmers cannot sell land and that land can be subject to reallocations through
village authorities (Dollar, 2007; Fleisher and Yang, 2006). Although such real-
locations have not taken place in the Guizhou villages since the early 1980s, the
mere possibility and lack of legal sanction of land rentals leads to tenure insecurity
and shallow land markets (Gulati et al., 2005; Krusekopf, 2002; Xing et al., 2009).
This is also reflected in the wide variation in the value of rent paid for land which
can be observed instead of a relatively uniform village land rental rate (recall
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Chapter 5). Hence, rather than taking place in one of the two market regimes—
the complete absence of a land market as assumed by the first version of the land
market closure or the neoclassical ideal of a perfect market18 depicted with the
second one—land transactions follow more complicated arrangements which are
driven by the institutional framework of China’s land tenure regime. The land
market regimes of the model can be considered to represent the extreme ends of
a gradient on which the reality lies somewhere in between: land transactions take
place, but not at a scale which would be possible with a perfect land market.
Accordingly, the model version with a village land market should be regarded to
depict a situation as if the land markets were perfect in the neoclassical sense.19
The closure rules for the land market complete the equilibrium model for Chang-
tian village. Due to the emphasis on the households’ labour market behaviour,
the remaining components of the model are kept comparatively simple. Agri-
cultural production is depicted with a nested Leontief-Cobb-Douglas technology.
Consumption demand is modelled with a per-capita LES, other components of
household expenditure are included either as fixed shares of total expenditure or
assumed to be exogenously fixed.
The model features price formation at different trading domains. Household
labour is nontraded at the household level and its allocation to the different uses
is governed by a shadow wage which is endogenous to the households. Agricultural
land can be treated either as a household nontradable or as a village nontradable.
In the latter case, supply and demand are matched through land rental transac-
tions on a village land rental market. This market is characterized by endogenous
price formation at the village level. The remaining commodities covered by the
model, such as market purchased consumption commodities and purchased in-
puts for agricultural production as well as farm output and the labour service
commodities produced by the households are assumed to be tradable beyond the
village borders. In case of these commodities the village is a price taker and
prices are determined by the outside world and introduced into the model in form
18This refers to the notion of the neoclassical full employment factor market closure under which
a market under perfect competition ensures the respective factor to be fully employed under
a competitive wage rate (Bruno, 1979).
19Certainly, the exploration how land markets in the village actually work and their accurate
depiction in the village equilibrium model constitute a highly interesting field of work for
the future.
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of exogenous parameters.
As argued above, the contribution of the present model is the innovative depic-
tion of the labour market behaviour of the households. The inclusion of the utility
term into the factor allocation functions of off-farm employment offers a highly
flexible way of modelling households’ labour allocation in response to exogenous
price or wage shocks, including the possibility to closely reproduce observed be-
haviour. In order to give insights into the functionality of the model and especially
to illustrate the mentioned flexibility, in the following section a simplified version
of the model is used to run a first simulation analysing a simple migration wage
shock. The effects of different choices of key parameters in the off-farm labour
allocation functions on a selected number of key variables are presented.
6.2. Illustrating the Depiction of Households’
Labour Market Behaviour in the Model
The purpose of the present section is to illustrate the flexibility of the village
equilibrium model developed in Section 6.1 in the depiction of the labour market
behaviour of agricultural households. To this end, a basic version of the model is
used to simulate a migration wage shock under different values for the parameters
δah in the factor allocation functions for local off-farm work (Equation 6.10) and
migration (Equation 6.11).
The basic structure of the model is as presented in the previous section. Based
on a simplified and highly aggregated version of the village SAM, the model covers
only one household, two consumption goods, one intermediate input good, three
activities and two production factors. The consumption goods are the own pro-
duced agricultural good and a purchased manufactured good. The three activities
distinguish farm production, local off-farm work and migration. The production
factors are household labour and land. As there is only one household, there
is no village market for land, which is nontradable at the household level. The
government as well as transfers and savings are neglected. Although simple, this
very stylized version of the model which in its level of detail corresponds to the
theoretical model of Section 4.4 is sufficient to serve the purpose of illustrating
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the basic mechanisms at work in the depiction of households’ labour allocation
following an exogenous wage shock.
The wage shock analysed is a 1% increase in the migration wage rate, i.e.
of variable PAah in Equation 6.10. In order to analyse the effect of different
choices of δah on the simulation results, different values for both off-farm activities
are chosen. The parameter δah in the factor allocation function for migration
(Equation 6.10) takes thirteen different values, ranging from -2 to 4, increasing
by steps of 0.5. These thirteen simulations are repeated with different values of
δah in the factor allocation function for local off-farm work (Equation 6.11). The
values chosen are 0.1, 1, 1.01, 1.05 and 1.1.20 This results in a total number of
13× 5 = 65 simulations which cover the different possible combinations of δah in
the two factor allocation functions.
As Equations 6.10 and 6.11 apart from δah contain the share parameter of the
remittances function κh, the marginal utility of income λh and an activity spe-
cific shift parameter εah, a few words need to be spent on the calibration of the
equations. In general, for each equation the parameters have to be chosen in
a way that the equations, given the values of the prices and quantities present
in them, hold. In principle, for each equation there is an indefinite number of
possible combinations of the two, respectively three, parameters which fulfil this
condition. However, the values of the parameters cannot be chosen independently
of each other. At the same time, the calibrated combination of δah, λh and εah
determines the magnitude of the increase in the disutility components of the equa-
tions with increasing time spent in the respective activities. This, in turn, defines
the magnitude of the labour supply response to a given wage shock. Thereby,
although they do not directly represent them, the parameters together determine
the different labour supply elasticities of the households.
The calibration is carried out in four steps. First, given the normalized prices,
the quantities in the equations and in case of the labour allocation function for
migration κh are calculated from the SAM.21 Second, λh is set equal to 1, leaving
εah as the only undetermined shift parameter. Third, a value of δah is chosen.
20In fact, instead of 1 a value very close to one (1.000001) is used, as with δah = 1 the model
does not arrive at a unique solution when a shock is applied.
21Find more details on the calibration in Section 7.2.3.
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Finally, the equation is solved for εah to calibrate this parameter.
If this calibration procedure is followed, the value of δah drives the reaction
of the utility term to an exogenous shock. If δah is close to 1, a change in the
differential between WFh and PAah triggers a very strong (read: perfectly elastic)
response in the amount of labour FDDfah allocated to the respective activity and
correspondingly the labour supply response of the household. The farther away δah
moves from 1, the smaller becomes the change in labour demand by the activity
and the less elastic the labour supply response. Whereas for δah > 1 the supply
response to a rise in the own wage is positive, it becomes negative for δah < 1.
Figure 6.1 illustrates selected results of a simulation of a 1% increase in the mi-
gration wage rate with the values of δah presented above. Panel a) shows the own
price response, i.e. the change in the level of migration. Along the abscissa, δah in
the labour allocation function for migration increases successively. The ordinate
describes the %-change in the amount of labour allocated to migration. As a
1% change in the migration wage is simulated, this corresponds to the own-wage
elasticity of migration. The general course of the lines confirms what was said
about the behaviour of the function above: if δah comes closer to 1, the reaction
becomes more elastic. It is positive for values larger than 1 and negative for values
smaller than 1. The broad range of the own-wage elasticities of migration high-
lights that virtually any desired response can be achieved. Thereby, the layered
arrangement of the single lines shows that the precise magnitude of the own-wage
reaction is not independent of the value of δah chosen for the factor allocation
function for local off-farm labour. The farther δah for local off-farm work departs
from 1, i.e. the less elastic the reaction in this activity becomes (see panel b) of
the graph), the weaker gets the migration response. The explanation lies in the
way a new equilibrium in the household internal labour market is established. If
more labour is supplied to the migration activity, it has to be drawn from other
uses. At the same time, the household shadow wage increases (see panel d) of the
graph). This increase curbs the incentive to allocate more labour to migration. At
this, the relative size of the price (shadow wage) and the quantity (local off-farm
labour supply) adjustment depends on the cross-price elasticity of local off-farm
labour supply. If the cross-price reaction of this activity is elastic, the quantity
adjustment is large and the change in the shadow wage small. With a decreas-
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ing cross-price elasticity of local off-farm labour supply, the quantity adjustment
gets weaker and the change in the shadow wage more pronounced. This, in turn,
acts contrary to the migration wage effect in the labour allocation function for
migration and leads to a relatively weaker migration response.
The cross-price responses of local off-farm labour supply are depicted in panel b)
of Figure 6.1. In most of the cases considered, local off-farm work is a substitute for
migration: if households migrate more, they work less in local off-farm activities.
The magnitude of this cross-price relationship, as discussed, can be determined
by the value of δah in the labour allocation function for local off-farm work. The
depiction of the relationship between the two activities, however, is not limited
to substitutability. In cases the δah for local off-farm work becomes smaller than
1 (here exemplarily considered with a value of 0.1) the direction of the labour
supply response in local off-farm work corresponds to that in migration. The two
activities from the household’s point of view become complements.
In the current set-up of the model, such flexibility is not possible for the agri-
cultural activity (see panel c) in the graph). Rather, supply of family labour to
farm production is driven by the reactions of the other two activities. Through
the C-D factor demand Equation 6.16 agriculture adjusts following a change in
the shadow wage. In cases the shadow wage decreases due to a negative migration
response, farm labour demand increases. Increases in the shadow wage due to a
positive migration response, in turn, trigger a decrease in time worked in agricul-
ture. As argued above, the magnitude of the change in the shadow wage and in
the consequence also of the adjustment reaction in the agricultural activity de-
pends on the cross-price elasticity of labour supply by the local off-farm activity.
With an elastic reaction in off-farm work, the labour demand effect in agriculture
is weaker. With an inelastic reaction, the change in the shadow wage is larger and
the adjustments in farm labour demand become stronger.22
Of course, the version of the model used in this section is a very simple one.
In particular, the number of activities per household is of importance for the
depiction of the labour allocation of the households. With an increase in the
22Of course, demand for leisure also plays a role here. With the LES, leisure demand decreases
with a rising shadow wage and increases with rising income. However, this does not change
the pattern of labour allocation presented here and hence is left out of the discussion.
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Figure 6.1.: Impact of a 1% increase in the migration wage rate on key variables under
different values of δah.
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number of off-farm activities, the basic mechanisms of the model and thereby the
mechanisms of labour allocation remain the same as outlined above and the same
degree of flexibility is given. A first crucial aspect, however, is the behaviour of the
shadow wage. In case there are more than two off-farm activities per household,
the relative change in the shadow wage due to an external shock is driven by
the most elastic change in labour supply. So, if there is, for example, one local
off-farm activity with a very elastic response and a second one with a relatively
inelastic response it is the first one which determines the magnitude of the change
of the shadow wage, regardless of the values of the δah of the other activities.
The reason underlying this behaviour of the model is as above: the most elastic
response determines how easily labour can be drawn out of a particular activity
and made available for alternative uses. The more elastic it is, the less the shadow
wage has to be changed in order to achieve a new intra-household equilibrium.
A second aspect concerns the calibration of the labour allocation functions.
The critical influence of the least elastic labour supply response on the shadow
wage causes that the wage elasticities depend on the relative magnitude of the
strength of the responses in the individual activities (as this affects the change
in the shadow wage). Assume, as a hypothetical example, a situation of three
off-farm activities in which a wage increase in one of the activities by 1% causes
a labour supply response of + 0.5% in this activity. Also assume that in this
initial situation the calibration of the δah is such that labour supply to the second
activity decreases by 0.8%, to the third one by 0.2% and the shadow wage increases
by 0.3%. Holding everything else constant, a change in the calibration of the
labour allocation function of the third activity might reduce the response in this
activity to 0.1%. As labour now is less easily available, the shadow wage increases
a bit more, say by 0.4%. This alteration of the change in the shadow wage
exerts an influence on the labour allocation function of the first and the second
activity. The response of both activities will be reduced due to the counteracting
influence of the increase in the shadow wage. Regarding the calibration of the
model, this implies that the labour supply responses of the different activities
cannot be calibrated independent from each other. Along with the fact that
the δah of the labour allocation functions possess no direct real-world equivalent
which would allow for an empirical estimation, the calibration involves an iterative
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search procedure to find parameter values which yield labour supply responses of
households which might be considered realistic by the modeller. Thereby, the
modelling exercise most ideally would be accompanied by econometric work to
analyse household labour supply responses to changes in relative wage rates (see,
for example, Skoufias, 1994; Sicular and Zhao, 2004). The parameters in the factor
allocation functions would be calibrated to match the findings of this empirical
work. This approach would offer the perspective of obtaining results which have
a better empirical foundation.
A limitation of the model in its current setup is that it is not possible to further
disaggregate the agricultural activity. As no utility component is incorporated
into the C - D labour demand function, the household has the possibility to, for
example, satisfy the increased labour demand due to an increase in an off-farm
wage by a mere reallocation of labour from a more to a less labour intensive
agricultural activity. In case there are more than one of such activities (which
’follow’ the adjustments of the other activities), the labour supply response takes
place only within these activities.
Overall, the discussion of the stylized version of the village equilibrium model
in this section shows the merits of the approach taken towards the modelling of
households’ labour allocation decisions. Rooted in a sound theoretical framework,
the consideration of utility considerations in an agricultural household model offers
a substantial degree of flexibility in the modelling of the labour market behaviour
of rural households. Scope for the assumption of a broad range of labour supply
elasticities is given. Various labour supply patterns such as the different segments
of the S-shaped labour supply curve described and estimated by Dessing (2002)
can be modelled.23 Likewise, complementarity of different production activities
can now be easily dealt with in a village equilibrium model. Although somewhat
counter-intuitive at the first sight, such behaviour has, for example, been found in
an empirical study of the labour market behaviour of rural households in China by
Sicular and Zhao (2004). In fact, the authors provide evidence of complementarity
23In this context, studies by Miracle and Fetter (1970) and Miracle (1976) should be mentioned.
The authors explain the downward sloping shape of the labour supply curves of African
migrant workers in the copper belt of colonial-era Zaire and Zambia with the (expected)
hardships associated with the work, such as the risk of disease, the hardships of the journey,
the deficient quality and quantity of food and housing or the brutal treatment of workers.
This explanation would fit well into the utility based framework applied here.
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between non-agricultural household production and wage employment.
A further important feature of the model worth emphasizing is that households
are able to be engaged in several income generating activities simultaneously. This
happens without the necessity of reverting to analytical constructs, such as the
introduction of profits into off-farm activities or the imposition of quantitative
restrictions on off-farm employment. Instead, an equilibrium situation is achieved
in which households allocate certain amounts of labour to different activities. This
equilibrium depends on the preferences of households, on the one hand, and on the
market environment—demand for labour reflected in a particular wage rate—on
the other hand.
208
7. Analysing the Impact of Trade
Liberalisation on Migration,
Poverty and Inequality
In the previous chapter, the village equilibrium model is presented. A number of
simulations are carried out with a simplified and highly aggregated version of the
model. The basic mechanisms of the depiction of the labour market behaviour of
the households which constitute the village economy are illustrated and the merits
of the approach are demonstrated. In the present chapter, the model is used to
analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on migration, poverty and inequality
in Changtian village. The chapter proceeds with a first section which provides
details on the set-up of the model used for the simulations as well as on the level
of aggregation. In a second section, details on the calibration of the model are
provided, comprising the calibration of the agricultural production system, the
LES and the labour market behaviour of the households. This part is followed by
a section on the scenarios to be analysed. In that section, the trade liberalisation
scenario is described and information is given on the sources of this scenario.
Furthermore, the alternative assumptions regarding the village land market and
the labour market behaviour are summarized. The fourth and final section of
this chapter presents the simulation results, along with an interpretation and
discussion.
7.1. Set-up of the Model and Aggregation
In general, the village equilibrium model used for the simulation is the full model
presented in Chapter 6. Households are involved in farm production and off-
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farm activities, including migration. Apart from returns from the productive
activities, they receive income in the form of gifts and transfers, from savings
and from blood donations. This income is spent on own consumption, a range of
purchased consumption goods and leisure. Consumption expenditure is modelled
with a LES. Beyond this, household expenditures include spending on housing
(construction), gifts, unforeseen events (shocks) and savings. While the village
is a price taker for most goods, households have the possibility to interact via a
village land rental market on which a uniform rental rate is determined to reconcile
supply and demand. In order to assess the impact of a land rental market, two
versions of the model are applied. The first version does not allow for village
trade in land. In this version, the model is equivalent to a number of agricultural
household models which are solved in parallel. The second version of the model
allows for a village land rental market on which land can be redistributed among
the households via the market mechanism. As described in Section 6.1, the two
versions are distinguished by the land market closure and the number of equations
which are included. All simulations are carried out twice, once using the model
version without a land market and once with the version, which allows for such a
market.
The rationale for distinguishing the two land market regimes in the simulation
not least is given by the lively public debate about the issue (see, for example, The
Economist, 2008). While the current land regime is often seen as an obstacle to
improving competitiveness of agricultural production, proponents of privatisation
of land and the introduction of a land market regime argue that such reform
may allow for the consolidation of fragmented land, foster the expansion of farm
sizes and thereby lead to increases in productivity (Carter et al., 2009; Huang
et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2010). As the tenure insecurity which stems from the
present arrangements constitutes a barrier to migration, land reform also may
facilitate the transfer of labour from rural to urban areas and thereby reduce the
rural-urban income gap and enhance economic growth (Zhai and Hertel, 2010).
Another expectation is that a well-functioning land market in some instances
might mitigate the problem of rural inequality, which may be influenced by an
unequal distribution of land under the current regime (Xing et al., 2009). The
opponents’ view, in contrast, is shaped by the social insurance function which land
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possesses in China. The concern is that land reform may jeopardise this function
and hence pose a threat to social stability (Huang et al., 2008). Others argue that
the potential impact of land reform is possibly overstated (Carter et al., 2009).
Regardless of where the truth lies in this debate, modelling a land market, albeit
in a very stylised way, and contrasting it with a situation without a land market
can contribute a new village-level perspective to the current discussion.
In order to allow for analyses of the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty
and inequality, a module which allows to compute and update these measures for
each single household group is added.1 The procedure for the calculation of the
poverty and inequality measures is simple: For the base situation, the measures are
calculated from the data on per capita expenditure for the individual households
of each representative household group (recall Chapter 3). Following a simulation
run, the percentage changes in total household expenditure and in household
size are mapped to the household data. Using this data, the household data on
per-capita expenditure is updated and the measures of poverty and inequality
are computed anew. In order to take into account changes in consumer prices
following trade liberalisation and to avoid over- or underestimation of the poverty
impacts, the poverty lines are updated by multiplication with a consumer price
index calculated from the model.
Apart from the set-up of the model, the aggregation scheme chosen is of impor-
tance. Unlike the stylized version of the model which is used for the simulations of
Section 6.2, the model now distinguishes four activities which can be carried out
by each of the households. Agricultural production and migration are as before.
Local off-farm work is now disaggregated into formal and informal local off-farm
work, thus taking full advantage of the level of detail offered by the village SAM.
Likewise, all six household groups from the SAM are represented in the model.
In case of intermediate inputs used in agricultural production and purchased
goods consumed by the households, higher levels of aggregation as offered by
the SAM are chosen. This choice is because further disaggregation in the scope
of the analysis to be carried out would not have yielded important additional
insights.2 All in all, three commodities are modelled: a capital intermediate input
1Unlike the main part of the model, this module is programmed in R (R Development Core
Team, 2009).
2Due to the fixed-shares specification of intermediate input use, percentage changes in input
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commodity includes fertilizers and pesticides, seed, feedstuffs, veterinary services
as well as machinery. A services commodity represents the aggregate of water and
energy used in agricultural production. Only hired labour has not been added to
any aggregate and is kept separate as a labour input commodity. This inclusion of
hired labour into the set of intermediate input commodities effectively implements
the assumption that hired labour and family labour are imperfect substitutes.
Regarding the production factors owned by the households, a higher aggregation
than in the SAM is chosen. In the SAM, household labour is differentiated by
gender and by age groups. In the model, all household labour is aggregated into
a single factor. Likewise, land is treated as a single factor. No distinction is made
between irrigated and non-irrigated land.
In case of purchased consumption goods, four aggregate commodities are dis-
tinguished. Purchased food products of plant origin include grains and fruits
& vegetables. Other purchased food products are an aggregate of animal prod-
ucts and processed food. Furthermore, stimulants like alcohol and tobacco are
included here. A non-food commodity represents durable consumption goods.
Finally, households purchase a services commodity, which is made up by water,
energy, transport, health, education and other services consumed.
7.2. Model Calibration
When used in the context of CGE modelling, the term ’calibration’ refers to the
calculation of intercepts and other parameters of the mathematical functions of a
CGE model. The primary goal of the calibration is that the model parameters are
set such that the base SAM is replicated as a solution to the equilibrium problem
(Reinert and Roland-Holst, 1997). Where possible, the calibration shall be based
on exogenously given behavioural elasticities or, in case this is not applicable, allow
the model to replicate observed behaviour. As Mitra-Kahn (2008) rightly states,
the calibration of the parameters does not necessarily lead to a good empirical
foundation of the model. Rather, the calibration process allows for a certain
margin of error in the parameter values and involves a certain portion of judgement
demand resulting from the simulations are identical for for all items (see, for example, Table
7.14).
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by the modeller. Given the potential influence of the parameter choices on model
results, this section is dedicated to provide at least some transparency on the
calibration process, which is carried out.
In the present model, the calibration task basically involves three sets of equa-
tions: the production functions for agricultural production, the functions of the
LES and the labour allocation functions of the off-farm activities, which lie at the
core of the households’ labour market behaviour. In the following, the calibration
of the three sets of equations will be dealt with in a stepwise manner, starting
with the production functions for the agricultural activities, proceeding with the
LES and concluding with the functions governing the households’ labour market
behaviour.
7.2.1. Calibration of the Agricultural Production Block
At the current level of aggregation, the nested Leontief-C-D structure which is used
to model agricultural production consists of a function for aggregate intermedi-
ate input demand (Equation 6.12), a demand function for aggregate value-added
(6.13), a set of three functions for intermediate input demand (6.14), a C-D pro-
duction function for value-added (6.15) and two factor demand functions (6.16).
Together these functions contain eight parameters to be calibrated. As the pro-
duction equations are defined at the household level, the parameters have to be set
for each household group separately, leading to a total number of 48 parameters.
In this context it should be noted that the household specific definition of agri-
cultural production incorporates the assumption that the households use different
production technologies. This assumption could be criticized on the grounds that
it appears unrealistic to expect households in a village as small as Changtian to
have access to different technologies. As the general modelling approach, how-
ever, required the depiction of household specific off-farm activities (to allow for
the depiction of differences in labour market behaviour) it was also necessary to
model farm production at the household level. In any case, the differences in
parameter values between household groups are small and can be considered to
reflect differences in factors, such as soil fertility or the farmers’ knowledge, or
mere data errors (see Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1.: Calibrated parameters of the agricultural production block.
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Parameter
intaah 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.62 0.58 0.52
ivashah 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.38 0.42 0.48
icacah
Capital 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.99
Labour 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Services 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
αah 1.58 1.70 1.62 1.61 1.62 1.67
βfah
Labour 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21
Land 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.79
Given the simple functional forms chosen, the calibration of the agricultural
production system is straightforward. All parameters can be directly calibrated
from the SAM. The Leontief parameters for demand for aggregate intermediate
inputs by the household specific agricultural activities, intaah, are the household
quotients of the quantities of aggregate intermediate input demands QINTAah
and the outputs of the agricultural activities QAah. Being the complementary
to these values, the value-added coefficients of the agricultural activities ivashah
are calculated from the quantities of value added QV Aah and the quantities of
agricultural output. As Table 7.1 shows, the calibrated values of intaah range
from 0.52 to 0.62 and those of ivashah from 0.38 to 0.48. The pattern arises that
poorer households rely more on production factors owned by themselves rather
than purchased inputs. This would correspond to prior expectations that poorer
households are more cash constrained and tend to save on purchased inputs. Like-
wise, the high migration households appear to use higher shares of intermediate
inputs which both could reflect the better access to cash of these households and
the higher scarcity of labour.3
The calibrated values of icacah, the shares of each intermediate input commodity
in the quantity of the aggregate input, highlight the strong role of capital inputs
(fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, feed, etc.). By far the largest share (> 95%) of the
3This observation points to hypotheses of the New Economics of Labour Migration which state
that migration can help to loosen credit constraints by providing cash one the one hand,
but leads to lost labour effects in agricultural production on the other hand (Stark, 1991;
Taylor and Martin, 2001). For rural China, the hypotheses have been confirmed in a study
by Rozelle et al. (1999).
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aggregate intermediate input is made up by this aggregate commodity. Hired
labour and energy and water, in turn, play only a minor role.4 Again, there is
some minor variation between the households, but no clear pattern arises.
Just as the parameters discussed up to now, the parameters of the C-D produc-
tion functions are computed directly from the SAM. The share parameters βfah
are calculated as the share of the respective factor in the total value of value-
added. Once the values for βfah are determined, the efficiency parameters can be
computed by solving the C-D production function for αah. In general, land makes
up a much larger cost share, accounting for a share between 78 and 81%. It should,
however, be borne in mind that this result also reflects the low shadow wage used
for the valuation of household labour. Again, differences in the calibrated values
among households are not large (see Table 7.1).
7.2.2. Calibration of the LES
While the LES is a comparatively simple specification of a demand system, its
calibration is not as straightforward as that of the agricultural production sys-
tem. In principle, it would be possible to estimate the entire LES as a system of
equations applying an iterative estimation procedure based on OLS or using full-
information maximum likelihood techniques (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). For
the current purpose, however, a simpler approach is chosen. This approach con-
sists of the calibration of the system based on committed consumption quantities
calculated from income elasticities which can be estimated from the household
data. This calibration procedure resembles that of Kuiper (2005) who follows
approaches put forward by Keller (1980) and Dellink (2003). Basically, as indi-
cated, the calibration procedure consists of three steps: the estimation of income
elasticities, the calculation of committed consumption quantities based on these
elasticities and, finally, the calculation of the marginal budget shares of the LES.
In the following, the second and third step of the procedure are described, followed
by a presentation of the estimation of income elasticities from the household data.
According to Keller (1980), committed consumption quantities can be calcu-
4Given that prices of intermediate inputs are normalized to 1 in the model, the quantity shares
also reflect the value shares.
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lated from income elasticities ηch and total quantities consumed:
σch = (1− ηch)QDch h ∈ H, c ∈ CD. (7.1)
Based on this knowledge of σch, the marginal budget shares γch can be computed
by solving the demand functions (6.2) of the LES for these parameters.
In this context, the Engel equation, which forms part of the set of requirements
for a theoretically consistent demand system, reads
∑
c∈CD
ωchηch = 1 h ∈ H. (7.2)
where ωch is the budget share of commodity c in household h (Kuiper, 2005;
Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). In order to obtain income elasticities which obey
the properties of the LES, Equation (7.2) is imposed as a constraint on the pa-
rameters in the estimation of the elasticities (see below).
Kuiper (2005), however, notes that a calibration following Equation (7.1) would
result in negative subsistence quantities for commodities which have an income
elasticity larger than one. As an alternative, she applies a transformation of the
income elasticities which circumvents this problem while preserving the reproduc-
tion of the income elasticities by the LES. This transformation consists of the
normalization of the elasticities by division with the maximum income elasticity
(Dellink, 2003) and results in a modified version of Equation (7.1):
σch = (1− ηchmax(ηch))QDch h ∈ H, c ∈ CD. (7.3)
Income elasticities are obtained from estimates of Engel curves for each of the
consumption goods under consideration. The estimation requires the specification
of a functional form for the Engel curves. This specification determines the prop-
erties of the Engel curves, such as the behaviour of the income elasticities over the
observed range of income. Several functional forms are available. The most com-
monly used comprise linear, semi-logarithmic or double-logarithmic Engel curves.
While the linear one is the only Engel curve which per se satisfies the Engel
equation, it only gives relatively poor fits when estimated. The semi-logarithmic
or double logarithmic perform better from an empirical point of view, but lack
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Table 7.2.: Variables used for estimation of income elasticities.
Variable Description Mean
(Std.dev.)
Income Income available for consumption (yuan) 3406.5
(2133.0)
Own produced Consumption value of own produced goods (yuan) 463.1
(310.2)
Plant products Expenditure on purchased plant products (yuan) 769.7
(337.6)
Other food Expenditure on other food products (yuan) 175.6
(234.3)
Non-food Expenditure on non-food items (yuan) 654.0
(823.8)
Services Expenditure on services (yuan) 882.2
(1270.0)
Leisure Value of leisure consumption (yuan) 460.8
(878.1)
theoretical plausibility (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). For the present study, a
double-logarithmic specification is chosen, due to its empirical properties. Fur-
thermore, it is the only specification which yields constant elasticities (Sadoulet
and de Janvry, 1995) which can be taken directly from the estimated parameter
values. Theoretical plausibility is achieved by a restriction of the parameter val-
ues in the estimation (see below). The corresponding econometric model to be
estimated is
ln(QDch∗PDch) = ρc+ηc ln(ych)+µch h ∈ H, c ∈ CD (7.4)
where the index c indicates that a system of six equations (one for each con-
sumption commodity c) will be estimated. Due to the income constraint, which
is common to all the equations, disturbances of this system of equations can be
expected to be correlated. In this case, an OLS procedure which would estimate
each equation individually would result in biased parameter estimates. In order
to deal with this problem, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model which
relies on a generalized least squares estimation is applied (Greene, 2003). Fur-
thermore, in order to obtain a system of Engel equations, which are consistent
with economic theory, Equation 7.2 is imposed as a restriction on the parameters
in the model. The variables used in the estimation of income elasticities are pre-
sented in Table 7.2. The budget shares introduced into the model to restrict the
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Table 7.3.: Budget shares used for estimation and adjustment of income elasticities.
Migration group: Low migration High migration Village
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Commodity
Own produced 0.180 0.295 0.323 0.248 0.329 0.316 0.266
Purchased plant products 0.232 0.283 0.249 0.192 0.266 0.247 0.237
Other purchased food 0.041 0.045 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.033 0.029
Non-food 0.125 0.086 0.068 0.077 0.082 0.050 0.088
Services 0.361 0.169 0.107 0.298 0.185 0.159 0.242
Leisure 0.061 0.123 0.230 0.163 0.125 0.196 0.138
parameter estimates are calculated from the village SAM in its aggregation used
for the modelling exercise (see Table 7.3).5
Most ideally, income elasticities would be estimated separately for each rep-
resentative household group. Due to the small sizes of the household groups,
however, no meaningful results can be obtained. Instead, the estimation is car-
ried out for the village as a whole. Income elasticities for each single representative
household group are obtained based on this set of village level parameters. The
village level elasticities are reweighed with the household group specific budget
shares and scaled proportionately to obey Equation 7.2. The scaling factors which
are applied are presented in the bottom line of Table 7.4. The household group
specific budget shares, which again are calculated from the SAM can be found in
Table 7.3.
Table 7.4 contains the results of the SUR estimation for the village as a whole
and the adjusted values for the household groups specific income elasticities de-
rived from the estimates. According to the village level estimates in the second
column of the table, all food products are necessities to the households. Given
that the staple maize accounts for the largest share of this aggregate, it is, how-
ever, surprising that own produced food has an income elasticity which is higher
than that of purchased food. Nonetheless, it is in line with expectations that
purchased plant products have an income elasticity which is lower than that of
other purchased food, which include a large share of food of animal origin.
The estimated income elasticities for non-food items and services are both larger
than 1, classifying them as luxuries to the households. This result again is in
5The estimation has been carried out using the R ’systemfit’ package (Henningsen and Hamann,
2010).
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Table 7.4.: Estimated and adjusted income elasticities.
Village Low migration High migration
High Middle Low High Middle Low
Commodity
Own produced 0.818*** 0.764 0.877 0.877 0.778 0.861 0.867
(0.068)
Purchased plant products 0.549*** 0.513 0.589 0.589 0.522 0.578 0.582
(0.057)
Other purchased food 0.647*** 0.604 0.694 0.694 0.615 0.680 0.686
(0.166)
Non-food 1.363*** 1.275 1.463 1.463 1.297 1.435 1.447
(0.118)
Services 1.459*** 1.364 1.565 1.565 1.388 1.536 1.548
(0.095)
Leisure 1.163*** 1.087 1.247 1.247 1.106 1.224 1.234
(0.143)
McElroy-R2 0.490
Scaling factor 0.935 1.073 1.073 0.951 1.052 1.061
Estimation is carried out for the village level only. Elasticities for households are derived from the
village level estimates. Signif. codes: * sign. at α=10%, ** sing. at α=5%, *** sign. at α=1%;
standard errors in parentheses.
accordance with a priori expectations. Likewise, leisure is a luxury good, implying
that a comparatively strong income effect on leisure consumption can be expected
in the model simulations.
The system-wide goodness-of-fit of the model as indicated by the McElroy-R2
of 0.490 is relatively modest. The underlying equation specific adjusted R2 range
from 0.089 in case of the Engel curve for other purchased food to 0.515 in case
of services. A possible explanation for the generally low explanatory power of
the model is that income in general only is one of the determinants of households’
consumption decision. Accounting for own- and cross-price effects would certainly
improve the model fit.
The results obtained are broadly in line with other studies on demand of ru-
ral households in China. Using the same SUR approach, Kuiper (2005) reports
estimates for the income elasticities of demand for own produced food of around
0.6. Her income elasticities of demand for leisure are also similar to the one ob-
tained here, moving around a level of 1.3. Differences occur, however, in case of
purchased food and non-food products, for which the author presents values of
around 1.2 and 0.6, respectively. Given theoretical considerations that food can
be expected to be a necessity and non-food products luxuries, the results of the
219
7. Analysing Trade Liberalisation
present estimation appear to be more acceptable. This is also confirmed by Fan
and Wailes (1995), who after estimating a LES-AIDS model arrive at expenditure
elasticities of 0.7 for food.
The remaining columns of Table 7.4 present the adjusted income elasticities
for each representative household group of the village equilibrium model. As
the figures show, adjustments are minor. The actual calibration procedure of
the LES as outlined above are included directly into the program code of the
model. The income elasticities of Table 7.4 are read into the model and committed
consumption quantities and marginal budget shares of the LES are calculated from
these values. This approach offers a flexible way of calibration which allows for
quick changes in income elasticities, if deemed necessary.
7.2.3. Calibration of Households’ Labour Market Behaviour
The basic approach towards the calibration of the functions governing the labour
allocation by the households is already presented in Section 6.2. It is highlighted
that the calibration of the households’ labour market behaviour involves a search
procedure rather than a straightforward calibration as in case of the agricultural
production block or the demand system. The underlying reasons are the fact
that the parameters of the off-farm labour allocation functions have no real-world
equivalent, hence cannot be directly observed, as well as the cross-effects the
parameters of one labour allocation equation unfold on the behaviour of another.
In this context, the crucial role of the most elastic supply response for the overall
labour supply behaviour is emphasized.
Unlike the stylized model of Section 6.2, which covers only one household and
three activities, the model used for the policy simulations comprises six house-
holds and four activities, the latter of which consist of one agricultural and three
off-farm activities. Both the number of households and the quantity of the ac-
tivities add to the complexity of the calibration process. It is now necessary to
calibrate the labour allocation behaviour of each single household over each single
household specific activity. As the parameters of the labour allocation functions
lack a direct interpretation (e.g. in elasticity terms) and as households in prin-
ciple can be expected to exhibit differing labour market behaviour, the challenge
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here is to benchmark the households’ labour allocation reactions against each
other. Following the argumentation presented above, the best way to calibrate
the households’ labour allocation behaviour would be to back the calibration by
econometric studies. Such studies most ideally would provide estimates of wage
and/or cross-wage elasticities for each representative household group and thereby
offer an empirical foundation for the calibration which would take into account
differences in the behaviour which might exist between the groups.
Lacking the resources to carry out an own study, for the current modelling
effort a more pragmatic approach is chosen. In general, two sets of behavioural
assumptions are made. Under the first set of assumptions, all households are
assumed to behave according to the same underlying own-wage elasticities for all
off-farm activities. Under the second set of assumptions, the own-wage elasticities
of migration are assumed to differ between the households of the low migration
group and those of the high migration group, with the latter exhibiting stronger
responses to a given migration wage shock. In order to explore the effect of
different migration responses, the policy simulations are carried out for both sets
of assumptions, thus simulating two different migration scenarios.
This pragmatic approach, however, does not absolve from obtaining at least
some reference against which to benchmark the calibration. Such a benchmark is
provided by a study by Sicular and Zhao (2004) (SZ) who estimate labour supply
functions for rural households in China. Although the study differs with respect
to the activities under consideration from the present village model—the authors
distinguish agricultural production, non-agricultural self-employment and off-farm
work—it at least provides an indication, which can be used for the calibration of
the labour allocation functions in the model. Out of the wealth of detailed insights
the SZ–study provides into the labour market behaviour of rural households in
China, the piece of information used for our purposes is the own-wage elasticity of
off-farm labour supply. Depending on the specification of the econometric model,
the authors estimate it at values of 0.555 and 0.485 (Sicular and Zhao, 2004,
p.256).
In order to arrive at assumptions for the labour supply responses of the house-
holds in the model, the elasticity estimated by SZ (actually, its approximate av-
erage) is taken as a benchmark relative to which the remaining elasticities are
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calibrated. More precisely, to integrate the result of SZ into the model, it is
assumed that all households exhibit an own-wage elasticity of labour supply to
the informal local off-farm activity of 0.5. The rationale for this choice is that
informal local off-farm employment is assumed to be accessible to the households
without major market entrance barriers. In contrast, access to formal local off-
farm employment is more restricted and determined through non-wage rationing
mechanisms (recall the discussion in Section 5.2). Due to the restricted access
to formal off-farm jobs and the comparatively high remuneration, the own-wage
response of households in this activity is assumed to be inelastic. The own-wage
elasticity for formal local off-farm employment is calibrated to a value of (close
to) zero. That means, even if changes in the formal local off-farm wage occur,
households do not change the amount of labour allocated to this activity, both
because the characteristics of the respective segment of the labour market make
it difficult to increase employment in case of rising wages and because the wages
paid are so high that it is unattractive to leave even if they decline slightly.6
The final activity that still lacks an assumption on the own-wage elasticity of
the labour supply response is migration. Here, the elasticity for informal local
off-farm wage are also taken as a reference. Finding employment in migration and
arranging the journey to the destination is much more difficult than obtaining a job
in the local informal sector. Moreover, migration is often associated with physical
and psychological hardships (Zhao, 1999a).7 Following these considerations, the
own-wage response in migration can be expected to be considerably lower than
the one in informal local off-farm work. Accordingly, the own wage elasticity
of migration labour supply are calibrated to a value of 0.25 in case of the first
migration scenario, which assumes equal migration responses of all households. In
the second migration scenario, which introduces different migration responses, the
own wage elasticity in migration is calibrated to a value of 0.35 for the households
of the high migration group and to 0.15 for those of the low migration group.
Table 7.5 summarizes the preceding discussion and presents the calibrated values
of the own-wage elasticities by migration group and by migration scenario.
6In fact, the wage changes applied in the simulation to follow can be characterized as ”slight”
without any hesitation.
7For a further discussion, also see Kleinwechter (2009).
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Table 7.5.: Calibrated own-wage elasticities by migration scenario and household
group.
Calibration: Equal migration responses Different migration responses
Migration group: High mig. Low mig. High mig. Low mig.
Activity
Informal local off-farm 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Formal local off-farm 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Migration 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.15
As described in Section 6.2, the calibration is carried out in four steps. First,
the quantities in the labour allocation equations and the parameter κh in case
of migration are calculated from the SAM entries, the shadow wage and the off-
farm wages. In this context, in case of migration the assumption is made that all
households earn the same wage. This causes κh to differ among households.8 In
case of local off-farm activities, wage rates differ among households, depending
on the total returns and the time worked in the respective activity. Second, as
above the marginal utility of income λh is set equal to 1, leaving εah as the only
undetermined shift parameter. Third, a value for δah is chosen. Finally, the
equation is solved for εah to calibrate this parameter.
The choice of the values for δah, in turn, involves a search procedure. This
search procedure again consists of a number of steps which are iterated until the
desired own-price elasticities are obtained. These calibration steps are:
1. Given values for wages, labour quantities, λh and κh (if applicable), start
with perfectly elastic responses for all off-farm activities of all households.
This is achieved by setting all δah = 1.00000001.9
2. Simulate a 1% change in the migration wage and adjust δah in the house-
holds’ labour allocation functions for migration to arrive at migration wage
elasticities of migration supply of 0.25.
3. Simulate a 1% change in formal local off-farm wage and adjust δah in the
households’ labour allocation functions for formal local off-farm work to
8The assumed uniform wage rate is 35 yuan per unit of labour employed in migration. This
relates to a shadow wage of 1 yuan, informal local off-farm wages between 7 and 11 yuan
and formal local off-farm wages between 45 and 55 yuan.
9As discussed above, δah cannot be exactly equal to 1 because this would render the model
insolvable. In principle, of course, virtually any value can be chosen as a starting value from
which to depart.
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Table 7.6.: Calibrated parameter values of off farm labour allocation functions.
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Migration
κh 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01
δah 5.40 5.57 7.16 6.70 7.50 0.51
εah 1.23E-007 6.61E-006 7.38E-008 1.54E-011 1.50E-012 -5.65
Disutility 4.39 3.97 1.27 1.13 0.84 -0.62
Informal local off-farm
δah 3.22 3.23 3.15 3.21 3.16 3.20
εah 0.04 0.11 0.05 3.93E-003 0.15 0.15
Disutility 7.49 6.96 7.64 5.98 10.17 7.99
Formal local off-farm
δah 100.00 100.00 100.00
εah 3.29E+021 2.34E+022 2.35E+087
Disutility 49.85 48.34 44.85
achieve a reaction of labour supply to this activity as inelastic as possible.
4. Simulate a 1% change in informal local off-farm wage and adjust δah in the
households’ labour allocation functions for informal local off-farm work to
arrive at own wage elasticities of labour supply to this activity close to the
envisaged value of 0.5.
5. Due to the cross-effects of discussed above, the adjustments of δah in one
activity may have affected the responses in others. Hence, steps 2–4 are
repeated until the desired own-wage elasticities are obtained for all activities.
The calibration process is carried out with the model version without a village
land rental market, so the calibrated own-wage elasticities of labour supply take
the stated values for the disconnected household models. The calibration for the
second migration scenario works identically, only the target values for the own-
wage elasticities in migration are modified.
In order to provide more insights into the calibration, a number of detailed
figures related to the calibrated household labour market behaviour are presented
in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Table 7.6 contains the values of the parameters in the
equations of the off-farm labour allocation functions (6.10) and (6.11) as well as the
values of the utility terms. Table 7.7 gives an overview of the households’ labour
supply responses following 1% shocks in the different activity prices., i.e. the own-
and cross-price elasticities of labour supply which result from the calibration.
Table 7.6 is divided into three blocks which consist of the parameter and disutil-
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ity values of the different off-farm activities. In case of migration, the parameters
which appear in the labour allocation functions are κh, δah and εah. The param-
eter κh moves between 0.01 for the low income high migration household to 0.15
for the high income low migration household, indicating that migrants send home
between 1% and 15% of their earnings. Empirical studies on remittance behaviour
of rural-urban migrants in China speak of migrants remitting on average around
30% of their income (Du et al., 2005; Wang and Cai, 2007). Compared to these
figures, the calibrated values of κh appear to be low. It should be noted, however,
that the value of κh is sensitive to the assumptions made on the wage rate in
migration. The value of 35 yuan assumed for the model is chosen based on plausi-
bility considerations rather than empirical foundations: it should be higher than
the wage rate in informal local off-farm employment and lower than that in formal
local off-farm jobs (the latter being mainly village cadres and teachers, which can
be considered to receive higher remunerations than factory workers). In case the
actual migration wage rate is lower than the one used here, κh would increase and
move closer to the 30% mentioned. The pattern, which arises in the values of κh,
however, appears to be very plausible. Low migration households, that is, those
households with higher dependency ratios, receive higher shares of the migrants’
income. This may be due to the potentially higher needs of the families back
home for income support. This notion is also reflected by the size of the disutility
compensations: households with higher dependency ratios have higher disutility
compensations and exhibit higher κh. The sizes of the disutility compensations
also show that households of the low migration group indeed appear to experience
higher disutilities than those of the high migration group (of which the low income
household even has a positive marginal utility of migration).
The calibrated values of δah range between 5.40 and 7.50, with δah being con-
siderably lower for the low migration low income households, at 0.51. The εah,
which are calculated with given δah to solve the labour allocation equations, are
close to zero for all except the household mentioned, which has a value of -5.65.
According to the mere mathematics of the labour allocation equation for migra-
tion, one might expect that the parameter δah would follow a clear pattern, as
well. As with increasing κh the transmission of the migration wage shock to the
household becomes stronger, with equal δah households also should have increasing
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own-wage elasticities in migration. Put differently, in order to achieve the same
migration response, households with higher κh should require higher δah and vice
versa. Given the positive correlation between κh and the disutility components,
households with higher disutility compensations also should have higher values
of δah. The influence of other factors, such as the relative quantities of labour
supplied to the different activities, the differences in levels of activity returns or
the cross-effects of labour supply responses in the other activities (via effects on
the shadow wage), however, blurs the theoretical correlation between κh and δah.
Hence, the pattern described cannot be found in the parameters presented in
Table 7.6.
The second block of the table presents the parameters of the labour allocation
functions for the informal local off-farm activity. The values of δah for all house-
holds lie close together, ranging between 3.15 and 3.23. The corresponding εah are
slightly positive, taking values from 0.0004 to 0.15. Unlike in case of migration,
the differences in returns from the activity to the households are not captured
by a share parameter like κh, but by differences in activity prices. The a priori
expectation regarding the patterns in δah would be that households which earn
higher wages have higher own-wage elasticities with equal δah. The underlying
rationale is as above: with higher wages, a given wage shock translates into a
higher marginal increase in the left-hand side of the labour allocation equation
in informal off-farm work. This would trigger a stronger labour supply response.
Hence, in order to arrive at equal own-wage responses in the activity, δah should
be lower for households with higher wages. The wages, which are not reported
in the table, in turn, are strongly and positively correlated with the disutility
compensations. Indeed, the calibrated values of δah tend to be lower for those
households with higher disutility compensations. The correlation, however, is not
perfect. Just as in case of migration, other factors play a role and obfuscate the
pattern.
As only three out of the six households in the model engage in formal local
off-farm work at all, parameters are only set for this group. The values are pre-
sented in the third block of Table 7.6. In order to achieve own-wage responses
as inelastic as possible, the δah are set to a high value of 100 for each household.
Going beyond this point would make labour supply responses only asymptotically
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lower.10 The corresponding εah are substantially higher than in case of migration
and the informal off-farm activity, owing to the higher values of δah, as well as to
the higher formal off-farm wages.
A final point worth noting is the relative size of the disutility terms between
the three activities. Disutility compensation appears to be highest in formal local
off-farm work and lowest in migration. Arguably, the potentially higher burden
and the comparatively good working conditions in formal off-farm work would
lead to the expectation that the pattern goes the other way round. At the current
stage of investigation, the difference between the observed pattern and intuitive
expectations can be explained only by the higher difference between shadow wages
and market wages in case of formal off-farm employment. It has, however, to be
pointed out that the current model, by including only the utility considerations of
the households is far from complete. In fact, what is included into the disutility
term here in reality consists of many other components than the mere disutility
compensations. These components may comprise any kind of transactions costs11
or simply rents which accrue to job holders in a labour market with restricted
access to particular market segments. Certainly, further research is indicated
here.
Following the presentation of the calibrated parameter values, Table 7.7 pro-
vides details of the labour supply responses to different activity price shocks. Each
of the four blocks of the table depicts the percentage change in labour supply to
the different activities as well as the percentage change in the shadow wage fol-
lowing a 1% wage (price) shock in each of the activities—migration, informal and
formal off-farm work and agriculture.
Of primary interest in the context of this study is the migration behaviour of
the households. The own- and cross-wage responses in the migration activities
of each household are presented in the first line of each of the four blocks. The
own-wage response of each household is the value which is used as the target for
the calibration: 0.25. The cross-price responses differ among households. The
cross-wage elasticities of migration labour supply to the informal off-farm wage
10Furthermore, beyond certain values the model becomes insolvable, due to the limited ability
of the computer to handle very small numbers.
11These are dealt with, for example, in the de Janvry et al. (1991) model.
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Table 7.7.: Labour supply responses to different activity price shocks (% change).
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
1% increase in migration wage
Migration 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Informal local off-farm -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Formal local off-farm 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture -0.54 -0.39 -0.21 -0.49 -0.44 -0.20
Shadow wage 0.45 0.30 0.17 0.40 0.36 0.16
1% increase in informal local off-farm wage
Migration -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.36
Informal local off-farm 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Formal local off-farm 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture -0.19 -0.23 -0.48 -0.44 -0.19 -0.21
Shadow wage 0.16 0.18 0.40 0.36 0.15 0.17
1% increase in formal local off-farm wage
Migration 0.00 -0.01 -0.04
Informal local off-farm 0.00 0.00 0.00
Formal local off-farm 0.01 0.01 0.01
Agriculture -0.04 -0.06 -0.02
Shadow wage 0.04 0.05 0.02
1% increase in activity price for agricultural output
Migration -0.07 -0.09 -0.21 -0.19 -0.30 -2.02
Informal local off-farm -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05
Formal local off-farm 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriculture 1.04 0.68 0.43 1.63 0.73 1.58
Shadow wage 1.48 1.80 1.79 1.30 1.76 0.81
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range from -0.01 to -0.36. As desired, the two activities are substitutes to the
households. The migration response to an increase in the formal off-farm wage is
slightly negative in case of two of the three households who are engaged in formal
off-farm work. As the own-wage response of formal off-farm work is very small,
the changes reflect the income effect of the wage increase. The increase in income
from formal off-farm work increases demand for leisure (not reported here) and
the resulting rise in the shadow wage decreases labour supply to migration, among
others. The cross-price elasticities of migration labour supply to the price of the
agricultural activity are also consistently negative, ranging from -0.07 to -2.02.
The negative effect is triggered by an increase in the shadow wage following the
agricultural price shock and, again, shows the substitutional relationship between
migration and agriculture.
Regarding migration, perhaps the most striking observation which can be made
from Table 7.7 is the exceptionally strong cross-price responses of labour supply
to migration of the high migration low income household. Regardless of whether
the increase happens in informal or formal off-farm wages or in the price of the
agricultural activity, the response of this household exceeds that of the other
households by a factor of around ten. This comparatively strong cross-price re-
sponse is rooted in the low share of remittances sent home by the migrants of this
household, as reflected in the value of the parameter κh. The fact that only 1%
of migrants’ income is sent to the household implies a very low transmission of
migration wage shocks to the household itself. As discussed above, this requires
δah in the migration function of this household to take a very low value in order to
achieve a migration response which is as strong as that of other households. The
corollary of this relatively elastic calibration of the utility term of the household’s
migration function is that a given change in the shadow wage triggers a much
stronger migration response than in case of the other households. As increases
in cross-wages or the agricultural activity price all cause increases in the shadow
wage, the cross-price response of the household becomes strongly negative. This
behaviour is logical insofar as the household which earns least in terms of monetary
returns out of migration is the quickest one to pull out of this activity as soon as
alternative income opportunities arise. It appears, however, counter-intuitive that
this household is also the one with the lowest marginal disutility, which should
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have the highest interest in migration and tend to stick to this activity. A possible
interpretation of this apparent contradiction might be that monetary aspects have
a higher weight for the household than utility considerations.
Following the argumentation on the seeming outlier, a more general scheme
which is at the bottom of the migration behaviour of the households in the model
can be identified. As the value of δah in the migration function determines the
strength of the migration response to a change in the shadow wage, households
with higher δah should exhibit weaker cross-price responses. Indeed, the cross-
price responses of migration labour supply in Table 7.7 point to such a pattern.
Both the cross-wage response to an increase in the informal off-farm wage and
the response to an increase in the price of the agricultural activity tend to follow
the order of the values of δah in the migration functions. Again, however, the
correlation is not perfect and masked by the influence of other factors.
As in the case of the high migration low income household, which is discussed in
the previous paragraph, due to the tendency of increasing disutility compensation
with rising δah it would again be the households with higher marginal disutilities
which tend to stick to migration. As stated above, this would be against the intu-
ition that those households which gain least utility of migration keep on working
there instead of changes in incentives. Moreover, recalling that the dependency
ratio is the variable, which underlies the grouping of the households, one might
expect that migrants of the low migration group (with the high dependency ra-
tio) will seize the opportunity to return home as soon as conditions there improve.
Indeed, such behaviour would be in accordance with results of empirical studies
on return migration in China. Studying the duration of migration spells, Hare
(1999), for example, finds that the share of workers in a household significantly in-
creases the migration spell. This suggests that migrants of households with higher
dependency ratios tend to return earlier. Wang and Fan (2006) emphasize family
demands as reasons for return. They underpin their argument by econometric
results which show that return migrants are more likely to be married and tend
to have more children in school age than continuing migrants. Likewise, Zhao
(2002) finds that the number of laborers in a household significantly decreases the
likelihood to take a decision in favour of return migration. The author’s model,
however, also points to a negative influence of the number of children and elderly
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in the household on return decisions, albeit not at a statistically significant level.
Apart from the argument brought forward above—that the low migration house-
holds would face a higher marginal income loss from drawing out of migration—it
might, however, be argued that the underlying hypothesis of the studies men-
tioned is different from the one which is implicit to the present model. The
studies discussed deal with the general patterns of return migration and seek to
identify factors, which can explain the decision in favour of eventual return. The
scenario analysed with the village equilibrium model, in contrast, is one in which
migrants respond to rather short-term economic shocks. The responses to such
shocks might be different from the long-term strategic behaviour which might
drive the results of the studies mentioned. While it might be part of the strategy
of migrants with more dependants to eventually return back home, it might also
be their intention to work in migration for a certain time to supply their fami-
lies with fund in form of remittances. In this context, they may not be willing
to give up their job at the destination when relative prices and wages change
slightly, in particular as their families depend more on remittances income and as
the marginal income loss from reducing the level of migration might be higher for
the household as a whole. Migrants with less dependants (and less responsibili-
ties), in contrast, might be generally more flexible in their responses to changes in
price incentives. Moreover, they might be more willing to give up their job at the
destination of migration and to return home into a potentially uncertain labour
market environment.
The type of behaviour just described fits with the theories of the New Eco-
nomics of Labour Migration (NELM). According to this framework, households
consider migration as a means to manage risk. As such, migration forms part of a
family strategy to insure against income and production risks (Stark, 1982; Stark
and Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999). Return as response to small changes in relative
prices may not, or to a lesser extent, form part of this strategy. Similarly, in a
theoretical model of return migration, Dustmann (1997) explains the return deci-
sion with the comparison of expected income at home and at the destination. In
this model, relatively high perceived uncertainty in the home labour market might
decrease expected income there and have a prolonging influence the duration of
migration. Transferred to the model of this study, this would mean that migrants
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face uncertainty with respect to returning home and finding an alternative occu-
pation there. Those with more dependants, and higher responsibilities for their
families, might be more averse to take this kind of risk.
To summarise this discussion, the cross-price behaviour in migration exhibited
by the households in the village equilibrium model does not correspond to what
one a priori might expect. Likewise, empirical studies of return migration point
into a different direction. There are, however, insights from theories like the
NELM, which suggest that there are reasons to assume that migrants’ behaviour
in a situation in which relative prices change and which is simulated with the
model is different from these expectations and empirical findings. On the grounds
of these reasons, the current outcome of the first basic simulations carried out
here can be defended.12
The effects of wage and price changes on households’ supply of labour to the
informal local off-farm activity appear to be more uniform than those to migration.
Own-wage elasticities again correspond to the aspired target value which in case
of this activity is 0.50. The cross-wage elasticities of labour supply to the informal
off-farm activity to the migration wage range from -0.01 to -0.03. The order of
magnitude of the elasticities follow the order of labour employed in migration.
Households with higher amounts of labour allocated to migration have higher
cross-wage elasticities, as the same relative change in labour supplied to migration
corresponds to a higher absolute amount of labour which has to be drawn from
other activities (compare Table 5.20). The (small) differences in the cross-price
elasticities of labour supply to the informal off-farm activity to the price of the
agricultural activity, in contrast, are mainly driven by the different changes in
shadow wages due to this price shock. These, in turn, are the combined product of
the cross-price responses in the other activities and the effect on labour allocation
which are determined by the calibration of the respective labour allocation and
consumption demand functions.
The own- and cross price elasticities of the formal off-farm activity are straight-
forward. The own-wage elasticity of labour supply in this activity is 0.01 for the
12In fact, the outcome of the model simulations presented here provides hypotheses for further
research to investigate the behaviour of migrants in response to economic shocks, as opposed
to the general analysis of return migration behaviour carried out by the authors cited.
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three households. Although this is not perfectly inelastic, it fits into the set of
assumptions regarding the workings of the labour market presented above to al-
low for very small changes in employment in this activity following a wage shock.
Caused by the low own-wage elasticities, cross-price responses in the formal off-
farm activity are zero for all households.
The final activity included into the model is agricultural production. As argued
above, due to the absence of a utility term in agriculture it is not possible to
calibrate the own-price response of labour supply to this activity to a particular
value. Rather, the own-price elasticities in agriculture are determined by the in-
teraction of the different labour supply responses in the off-farm activities and
the demand for leisure, which jointly drive the change in the shadow wages. As
this interaction is complex and as the calibrations differ among households, the
own-price responses of agricultural labour supply also differ and it is not possible
to identify a particular pattern. Compared to the other activities, own-price elas-
ticities in agriculture are high, taking values between 0.43 and 1.63. Cross-wage
elasticities in agriculture are also higher than those in other activities, ranging
from -0.02 to -0.04 in case of an increase in the formal off-farm wage to -0.20 to
-0.54 in case of a migration wage shock. In the tendency, the magnitude of the
cross-wage elasticities again is determined by the amount of labour employed in
the activity in which the wage shock occurs. Again, however, it is blurred by the
complexity of the interactions taking place within the model.
The contemplation of the households’ labour market behaviour under the cur-
rent calibration teaches some lessons on the properties of the model itself. It
becomes evident that the households’ migration, or, more generally the labour
market behaviour, differs, although the own-wage responses are calibrated to the
same levels. The differences materialize in the cross-price responses of labour sup-
ply and can be traced back to the sizes of the disutility terms as well as to the
different amounts of labour the households supply to the different activities. On
the one hand, this means that the model is capable to capture differences in labour
market behaviour which arise due to the utility considerations of the households
represented in the model. On the other hand, the magnitudes of the cross-price
responses is determined by factors which are exogenously given. Furthermore,
the complexity of the interactions between the labour supply responses in the
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different activities also exerts an influence on the magnitudes of the cross-price
responses. Thus, it is difficult if not impossible for the modeller to fully control the
households’ labour market behaviour. At least with the simple functional forms
currently chosen there will always be at least one aspect of the labour market
behaviour—own-price responses, cross-price responses or in the best conceivable
case only the labour allocation to the agricultural activity—which is determined
by the calibration of the remaining aspects. In the consequence, this implies a loss
of flexibility for the modeller as she is forced to make a choice about which aspect
to calibrate to match a desired behaviour. Regarding the perspective to calibrate
the model to replicate the results of an econometric study of labour market be-
haviour it remains to be tested whether it is actually possible to obtain a fully
identical behaviour. Most likely, it will be possible to calibrate a few aspects such
as the own-price elasticities to resemble the econometric results and leave others
to be determined by the calibration. A more flexible functional form, however,
may also offer additional flexibility here. A more flexible specification may also
be conducive to address the issues associated with the cross-price responses of
migration which are discussed above.
Regarding the way the calibration is carried out—the calibration of the own-
wage responses to meet assumptions on the size of these made previously—
alternative approaches are conceivable. One might, for example, set all the δah
of each household to the same activity specific value. Labour supply responses
would be different then and the differences could be interpreted as the manifes-
tations of the households’ utility considerations. Alternatively, the focus could
be set on the cross-price responses instead of the own-price responses. In this
case the latter would be determined by the former. In these cases, however, own-
wage migration responses would differ from the onset. One of the purposes of
the current study, however, is to analyse the impact of policy changes under dif-
ferent migration scenarios. Hence, it is necessary to have a benchmark of equal
migration responses against which to assess a scenario with different migration
responses. Under these considerations, the current approach, although there is
certainly scope for improvement, is clearly warranted.
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7.3. Scenarios
7.3.1. Policy Scenario
In order to carry out the policy simulations with the village equilibrium model,
results on price and wage changes are taken from a national level CGE model
and fed as a shock into the village model. In the present study, national level
results from an existing study on China are used. This approach, of course, is
only a second best option. Most ideally, one would carry out an own macro-level
simulation, which is tailored to match the requirements of the village model in
terms of commodity or spatial disaggregation and in which it would be possible
to take full control of the scenario to be analysed and the assumptions made.
Nonetheless, a CGE study on the impact of trade liberalisation on China could
be found which at least offers a sufficient level of disaggregation at the commodity
level and which is sufficiently transparent with respect to the core assumptions
that are made.
The study chosen is part of a recent and broad based undertaking to analyse the
impact of different types of trade liberalisation on inequality and poverty (Ander-
son et al., 2010a). In this effort, a number of modelling studies have been accom-
plished, focusing on global and national level impacts of trade reform. Drawing
upon recent estimates of agricultural protection (Valenzuela and Anderson, 2009),
three different global analyses are carried out, using the World Bank’s Linkage
model (Anderson et al., 2010c), the Global Income Distribution Dynamics tool
(GIDD) (Bussolo et al., 2010) and the GTAP model (Hertel and Keeney, 2010).
Ten further studies apply national CGE approaches to deal with specific develop-
ing countries.
The national CGE study this work draws upon is a simulation of impacts of
different trade and domestic reform scenarios on China conducted by Zhai and
Hertel (2010). It employs a comparative static CGE model for the Chinese econ-
omy which has been first presented by Hertel et al. (2004b) and further applied
and developed by Hertel and Zhai (2004) and Zhai and Hertel (2006). The model
distinguishes 100 representative households, classified by their primary source of
income as well as by relative income levels. Rural households are stratified by
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agriculture specialised and diversified households, urban households grouped as
transfer-specialised, labour-specialised and diversified. Consumption demand is
modelled using an extended LES.
The model has several features, which allow taking into account some of the
unique institutional factors, which shape the functioning of the factor markets in
China. Households are assumed to be constrained in moving labour from the on-
farm to the off-farm labour market; thus, a constant elasticity of transformation
function is implemented to model imperfect transformation of labour between
the two sectors. Similarly, the barriers to migration constituted by the hukou
system, among others, as well as the resulting rural-urban income gap are depicted
with a constant elasticity transaction cost function. The tenure insecurity which
results from the current land regime is represented by making income from land
dependent on the amount of labour worked on the farm.
Production in each sector is modelled using nested constant elasticity of substi-
tution functions. Constant returns to scale are assumed. In each sector, imperfect
substitutability of rural and urban labour is assumed in order to proxy the geo-
graphic distribution of industrial activity in the country. Similarly, rural labour
markets are segmented in the model, with imperfect transformation of agricultural
and non-agricultural labour. Capital, in turn, is fully mobile across sectors. The
Armington approach is implemented for the modelling of import demand, but no
such assumption is made on the export side.
A SAM for the year 2002 constitutes the benchmark data for the model. The
SAM includes 48 sectors of production and the mentioned 100 representative
household groups. In the agricultural sector, eight crop sectors and four livestock
sectors are distinguished. The data on agricultural protection used in the model
is taken from Huang et al. (2009) and the GTAP Database, version 7 (Narayanan
and Walmsley, 2008).
The closure rules correspond to a common set of closures adopted in the overall
research project (Anderson et al., 2010b). Fixed aggregate stocks of factors are
assumed and land is specific to the agricultural sector, but mobile across crop
and livestock activities. The current account is fixed in foreign currency. Real
government spending is fixed and fiscal balance is assumed. A uniform income
tax is applied to replace possible losses in revenue which may arise from policy
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Table 7.8.: Sectoral structure of GDP, trade, import tariffs, and export subsidies,
China, around 2004, in %.
Tariff Export GDP Export Import
Sector rate subsidy rate share share share
Agriculture 6.5 0.8 13.4 1.6 2.5
Mining 0.7 0.0 4.9 1.5 6.2
Food manufacturing 5.0 0.0 3.8 3.0 2.0
Non-food manufacturing 2.9 0.0 28.6 74.9 80.5
Utilities, construction, services 0.0 0.0 49.3 19.0 8.8
Source: Zhai and Hertel (2010).
reforms.
In their contribution to the volume by Anderson et al. (2010a), Zhai and Hertel
(2010) analyse six different policy scenarios. In the context of trade reforms,
unilateral liberalisation by China is contrasted with liberalisation in the rest of
the world. Accordingly, four analyses are carried out. A first simulation deals
with the liberalisation of the agricultural sector China. In a second simulation, the
liberalisation of all merchandise trade is added, thus arriving at a full liberalisation
scenario for China. A third one simulates agricultural liberalisation in the rest
of the world. The fourth simulation is a full liberalisation scenario for the rest
of the world, combining reforms in the agricultural as well as the merchandise
sectors. In the more ambitious full liberalisation scenarios, production taxes and
subsidies as well as export taxes and subsidies in the agricultural and lightly
processed food sectors are eliminated. Furthermore, import tariffs are eliminated
in all sectors.13 The analyses of the trade reform scenarios are complemented by
two further simulations, which deal with the relaxation of the hukou system and
with a land reform to improve tenure security.
For the present study, the scenario for unilateral full trade liberalisation by
China is chosen. This scenario involves the elimination of all export taxes and
domestic subsidies in the agricultural and lightly processed food sectors and the
elimination of import tariffs in all sectors. This scenario is selected because it of-
fers, by the structure of its results, a suitable case for illustrating the consequences
of differences in household migration for the potential outcomes of a trade reform
at the level of a rural community.
13Liberalisation of trade in services, however, has not been included into the analysis (Anderson
et al., 2010b).
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Before carrying out a modelling study on the impacts of trade liberalisation, it is
always useful to have a picture of the initial situation of the economy in question.
At this, it is not only important to know about the structure of the economy, but
also about the initial patterns of protection. As Table 7.8 shows, the agricultural
sector contributed 13.4% to the national GDP. A further 4.9% came from mining,
the second component of the primary sector. The manufacturing sector accounted
for about a third of GDP. Food manufacturing had a share of 3.8%, non-food
manufacturing 28.6%. The tertiary sector, consisting of utilities, construction
and services with 49.3% made up the largest share of national GDP. With export
and import shares of around 80%, the non-food manufacturing sector is the most
trade intensive sector of the economy. Trade shares of primary as well as food
manufacturing products are low, typically below 3%. As a direct consequence of
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the overall level of protection has been
low by the middle of the first decade of the millennium. The agricultural and the
food manufacturing sectors receive the relatively highest levels of protection in
terms of tariffs and export subsidies.
According to the simulation by Zhai and Hertel (2010), the elimination of the
support measures summarised in Table 7.8 leads to increases in GDP and trade,
but to some welfare losses. Real GDP is 0.2% higher after unilateral trade reform
and exports and imports expand by 5.8% and 5.5%, respectively (see Table 7.10).
The increase in GDP is mainly a consequence of the movement of labour out of
agriculture into urban non-agricultural activities. Overall welfare, as measured by
the equivalent variation, decreases by -0.1%.14 The deterioration in welfare is a
result of the decline in the terms of trade, which in turn stems from the relatively
limited import protection and the impact of China’s exports on export prices.
Thus, although the economy apparently becomes more efficient, the population is
not better off as compared to the situation before reform.
Except for capital and skilled wages in the urban sector, factor returns decrease
relative to the consumer price index (CPI). Most negatively affected are the re-
turns to agricultural land, as well as the wages for unskilled agricultural labour.
Returns to capital and skilled wages, in turn, increase relative to the CPI, or re-
main constant. Semi-skilled and skilled wages tend to be favoured over unskilled
14For an explanation of the concept of equivalent variation, see below.
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Table 7.9.: Effects of unilateral trade liberalisation in China on income inequality and
poverty.
Indicator Base Scenario
Inequality
Urban-rural income ratio 3.538 3.547
Gini coefficient 0.442 0.443
Urban 0.259 0.259
Rural 0.315 0.315
Poverty headcount ratio, US$ 2 a day
Total 36.4 36.7
Urban 2.5 2.5
Rural 58.1 58.6
Source: Zhai and Hertel (2010).
Table 7.10.: Unilateral trade liberalisation in China - National level simulation results
(% change against baseline).
Indicator
Macro-economy
Equivalent variation -0.1
Real GDP 0.2
Exports 5.8
Imports 5.5
Terms of trade -0.8
Consumer price index -0.9
Factor prices
Return to agricultural land -3.5
Return to capital -0.8
Unskilled wages
Urban -1.1
Rural non-agricultural -1.3
Agricultural -1.8
Semi-skilled wages
Urban -1.2
Rural non-agricultural -1.1
Agricultural -1.1
Skilled wages
Urban -0.9
Rural non-agricultural -1.0
Labour force
Farm labour -0.4
Unskilled -0.1
Semi-skilled -0.7
Rural-urban temporary migration 1.5
Unskilled 0.4
Semi-skilled 2.6
Skilled 0.0
Source: Zhai and Hertel (2010).
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wages and urban labour over rural labour (Zhai and Hertel, 2010). This pattern is
a result of the relatively stronger decline in agricultural protection, which leads to
a steeper decline in agricultural prices as compared to the prices of other sectors
(see Table 7.11).
Unsurprisingly, an outcome of the relative changes in prices and factor returns
is an increase in the urban-rural income ratio from 3.538 to 3.547 (see Table
7.9). In a similar manner, the overall Gini coefficient increases from 0.442 to
0.443. The Gini coefficients for urban and rural areas, however, remain constant.
Poverty also increases slightly. The poverty headcount ratio rises by 0.3 percentage
points to 36.7%. Following the relative decline in rural wages and returns to land,
the increase in poverty entirely happens in rural areas, where the poverty rate
increases from 58.1% to 58.6%. Due to the relatively low initial level of protection
and the corresponding minor changes in relative prices, overall changes in poverty
and inequality are small. This, however, in parts is also a consequence of the
specification of the model, in particular its comparative static set-up and the
assumptions of fixed factor endowments, perfect competition and constant returns
to scale (Anderson et al., 2010b; Zhai and Hertel, 2010).
Along with the wage changes presented in Table 7.10, the simulations with
the village equilibrium model draw upon disaggregated results on the commodity
price effects of unilateral trade liberalisation in China. As Table 7.11 shows,
commodity prices consistently fall with trade reform. While the overall magnitude
of the reforms’ price effects is modest—typically between -0.5% and -1.5%—, price
decreases are most pronounced in the agricultural sector. In this sector, prices
fall by between -0.8% in case of fishery and -7.4% in case of the sales price for
oilseeds.15 The food manufacturing sector experiences price decreases between
-0.5% in case of the output price for tobacco products and -3.4% in case of the
sales price for refined sugar. On average, the deterioration of prices in this sector
is less than in agriculture, but more than in the non-food manufacturing sector,
in mining or in services.
A price and wage shock which can be fed into the village equilibrium model
15Output prices refer to the prices of domestic output. Sales prices are composites of the prices
of domestic output and imported goods and hence might differ from output prices (Zhai,
2011).
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Table 7.11.: Price effects of unilateral trade liberalisation in China (national level,
% change against baseline).
Commodity Output Sales
price price
Agriculture
Paddy rice -1.0 -1.0
Other grains -1.7 -1.7
Fruits and vegetables -1.0 -1.1
Oilseeds -3.6 -7.4
Other crops -0.9 -2.1
Cattle, sheep, and so on -1.2 -1.3
Other livestock -1.3 -1.3
Raw milk -1.2 -1.2
Fishery -0.8 -0.8
Forestry -0.7 -0.9
Food manufacturing
Meat products -1.1 -1.7
Grain, milled -0.9 -0.9
Vegetable oils -1.8 -3.0
Sugar, refined -1.9 -3.4
Prepared fish products -0.7 -0.7
Other processed food -1.1 -1.4
Beverage -0.8 -0.9
Tobacco products -0.5 -0.8
Forage -0.9 -0.9
Non-food manufacturing
Textiles -0.7 -0.6
Apparel and leather -0.7 -0.6
Sawmills and furniture -0.7 -0.8
Paper, printing, and so on -0.8 -1.0
Chemicals -0.9 -1.3
Metal products -0.7 -0.8
Transport equipment -1.6 -3.6
Electronics -0.9 -1.1
Instruments -0.9 -2.0
Other manufacturing goods -0.5 -0.5
Mining
Coal mining -0.6 -0.6
Crude oil and natural gas -0.5 -0.7
Services
Utilities -0.5 -0.5
Transport and postal services -0.7 -0.7
Other services -0.6 -0.5
Source: Zhai (2011).
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is constructed by calculating average percentage changes for the different type of
labour and commodity aggregates which are considered in the model. In order
to do so, the percentage change results obtained by Zhai and Hertel (2010) are
mapped to the individual items of the original sample. Price changes for the
aggregates used in the model are calculated as weighted averages of the price
changes of the individual items. As weighting factors, the value shares of each
item in the corresponding aggregate of the model are used. Generally, results
on sales prices from Zhai and Hertel (2010) are used for purchased consumption
goods as well as intermediate inputs. In case of agricultural output and own-
produced food, results for output price changes are applied. Apparently, the
sectoral aggregation of the Zhai and Hertel (2010) model does not fully match the
structure of the survey data. While in some instances an item of the survey data
is exactly represented in the aggregate level results, in others assumptions have
to be made to match the survey data with CGE results. In some cases, average
changes are computed for a single item in the data. In case of rice, for example, the
corresponding change in the output price can be taken directly from the national
CGE results. For both fertilizers and pesticides, in contrast, the assumption is
made that the price change in these items corresponds to the sales price change
for the chemical sector of the CGE model. Another example is the change in the
consumer price for textiles in the sample, which is approximated by an unweighted
average of the change in the sales prices for textiles and apparel and leather from
the CGE study. A detailed overview on the mapping of CGE results into the
survey data and the following computation of aggregate price changes to be used
in the policy simulations can be found in Annex E.
With respect to wage changes, one most ideally would seek to obtain national
level CGE results which are disaggregated by skills level as well as by region. The
former would allow to assess the different impacts of trade reform on different
types of labour, whereas the latter would permit taking into account the spatial
dimension, which is inherent to the village model because of the distinction of
local off-farm and migration activities. Unfortunately, the Zhai and Hertel (2010)
study does not offer this level of spatial detail. The differentiation of labour by
skills levels and between rural and urban sectors, however, allows to match each
of the activities of the village equilibrium model with one or more of the types of
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labour of the national CGE model.
The differentiation of labour by skills levels made by Zhai and Hertel (2010)
is based on the educational attainment of the workers. Unskilled workers are il-
literate or semi-literate, semi-skilled workers have visited middle or high school
and skilled workers have education higher than high school level (Hertel et al.,
2004b). From the survey data it is possible to calculate the average score for the
educational attainment of the individuals working in the different activities. In
agriculture, the average score of individuals working in this activity corresponds
to incomplete primary school education. Hence, the changes of unskilled wages
would apply here. Individuals from the village who take irregular local off-farm
jobs have an average educational attainment between incomplete and complete
primary school. Again, this matches unskilled labour of the Zhai and Hertel
(2010) classification. The average educational attainment of self-employed vil-
lagers is slightly higher (complete primary education); hence they are classified
as semi-skilled. People working in formal local off-farm jobs, however, on average
have visited junior high school, which is semi-skilled in the national CGE model.
Migrants on average also have completed primary school and are assumed to be
semi-skilled.
The second layer of stratification of labour in the Zhai and Hertel (2010) model
is the sector of employment. In case of agricultural labour as well as the wages
in formal local off-farm employment in the village model, the correspondence
is straightforward. Agricultural labour receives the agricultural wage whereas
labour in the local off-farm activity is paid the rural non-agricultural wage. In
the informal local off-farm activity as well as in migration, however, it is less
easy to tell which sector of the aggregate model applies. People working in the
informal local off-farm activity are either self-employed, take agricultural or non-
agricultural jobs. In case of self-employment, rural non-agricultural wages are
taken. In case of irregular jobs, which can be agricultural or non-agricultural, a
weighted average of the changes in unskilled agricultural and rural non-agricultural
wages is calculated. The weighting factor corresponds to the sample shares of
irregular workers who work in agriculture (27%) and outside agriculture. A small
share of migrants also works in agriculture. For these individuals, the change in
unskilled agricultural wages can be assumed to apply. In case of other migrants, it
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Table 7.12.: Price changes derived from aggregate simulation results.
% change
Activity prices
Agriculture -1.79
Formal local off-farm work -1.03
Informal local off-farm work -1.32
Migration -1.17
Intermediate input prices
Capital -1.28
Imported labour -1.80
Services -0.52
Consumer prices
Own-produced food -1.79
Food of plant origin -1.26
Other food -1.81
Non-food -0.83
Services -0.66
Source: Zhai and Hertel (2010); Zhai (2011); own calculations.
unfortunately is not known whether they take employment in urban or rural areas.
Hence, a weighted average of urban semi-skilled and rural non-agricultural wages
is calculated, assuming that two thirds of them work in urban and one third in
rural areas. The aggregate change in migrant wages is calculated as the weighted
average of the wage change for migrants working in agriculture and those who
take non-agricultural jobs. The weighting factor again corresponds to the sample
shares of migrant workers employed in agriculture.
Summarising the above discussion, Table 7.12 presents the price changes, which
are derived from the national CGE simulation results and which constitute the
policy scenario to be analysed with the village equilibrium model. Reflecting
the negative impact on agricultural production in the national level CGE model,
agricultural production is the most adversely affected of the three activities. The
price of this activity, i.e. the aggregate price of agricultural output, deteriorates
by -1.79%. Activity prices in the off-farm activities, i.e. wages, decline less. Wages
in formal local off-farm work decline by -1.03%, in informal local off-farm work
the decrease is at -1.35% and in migration workers have to accept -1.17% lower
payment. As discussed above, the differences mirror the differences in skills levels
of the individuals who work in the different activities.
Intermediate input prices are by between -0.50% and -1.80% lower after trade
reform. The strongest decline is in the price of village imported labour, which
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is the wage for unskilled agricultural labour. The decrease in consumer prices is
between -0.66% in case of services and -1.81% for other purchased food. The price
for own-produced food is assumed to be the same as the agricultural output price,
reflecting the opportunity cost of self-consumption. Hence, the same price change
applies.
7.3.2. Simulated Scenarios
The previous section deals with the policy scenario to be analysed with the village
equilibrium model. Along with the two different possible land market regimes in
the model (recall Section 7.1) and the two calibrations for the different assump-
tions on households’ migration behaviour (Section 7.2.3), this results in a total
number of four policy simulations which are carried out:
• Simulation 1: Unilateral trade liberalisation without a land rental market
and with equal own-wage responses in migration.
• Simulation 2: Unilateral trade liberalisation without a land rental market
and with different own-wage responses in migration.
• Simulation 3: Unilateral trade liberalisation with a village land rental mar-
ket and with equal own-wage responses in migration.
• Simulation 4: Unilateral trade liberalisation with a village land rental mar-
ket and with different own-wage responses in migration.
In the following section, the results of the four simulations are presented and
discussed. We start out with the results of the two first simulations, the impacts
of trade liberalisation without a land market. In this part, a first insight in the
impacts of trade reform on the village is provided. Further, the two calibrations of
the migration behaviour of the households are compared and discussed. Finally,
statements about the overall quality of the model are made.
In a second part, the results obtained under the assumption of a village land
rental market with the calibration for equal migration responses are contrasted
with the corresponding results from the simulations without a land market. These
discussions are followed by the presentation of results from the two different cal-
ibrations of households’ labour allocation behaviour. This allow assessing the
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effects of the differences in own-wage responses in migration in a situation with
a land market. The section concludes with an assessment of the role of a village
land rental market for the outcome of the policy reforms.
7.4. The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on
Migration, Poverty and Inequality
7.4.1. Policy Impacts Without a Land Rental Market
7.4.1.1. Household Level Impacts
Households, which face price and wage changes induced by trade liberalisation
adjust in order to cope with this shock. The adjustment reactions captured by
the model comprise changes on the production side—labour allocation and input
demand—as well as adaptations on the consumption side. At the household level,
the consequences are new levels of activity outputs, sales and purchases, as well
as income, expenditure and welfare impacts. Starting from income, expenditure
and welfare, which represent the most general level of policy impacts, the present
subsection discusses each of the single impacts in detail and provides a clear picture
of the effects of trade liberalisation on Changtian village as well as of the pathways
via which these impacts are generated. All percentage change results will be
presented with two decimals. This choice is not made to pretend accuracy. Rather,
due to the small relative changes actuated by the policy shock it is necessary in
order to make visible the small differences between the different simulations.
7.4.1.1.1. Household Income, Expenditure and Welfare I
Table 7.13 shows the effects of the policy reforms on household income levels,
expenditure and welfare. The upper part of the table contains the results of
the simulation with the calibration, which assumes equal own-wage responses in
migration. The lower part presents the results for the one assuming different
own-wage responses.16
16Given the differences in cross-price responses, the expressions “equal migration responses”
and “different migration responses” of course are not fully correct (recall the discussions in
Section 7.2.3). For the sake of simplicity in presentation, however, they are used in the tables
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Table 7.13.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on per capita income and
expenditure (in value terms, % change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.14 -1.42 -1.73 -1.32 -1.46 -1.69
Remittances -1.39 -1.37 -1.22 -1.24 -1.16 1.09
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.86 -1.85 -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.92
Agriculture -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
Expenditure
Consumption expenditure -1.32 -1.52 -1.84 -1.48 -1.65 -1.91
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.05 - 0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17
CPIa -0.88
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.12 -1.40 -1.73 -1.32 -1.46 -1.71
Remittances -1.30 -1.29 -1.20 -1.27 -1.15 1.98
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.87 -1.85 -1.87 -1.85 -1.88 -1.94
Agriculture -2.56 -2.51 -2.36 -2.76 -2.52 -2.74
Expenditure
Consumption expenditure -1.29 -1.50 -1.83 -1.48 -1.65 -1.93
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -2.56 -2.51 -2.36 -2.76 -2.52 -2.74
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17
CPIa -0.86
a Average value for all households.
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The figures on changes in net income in the upper part of the table reveal that
the households in general suffer from decreases in net income. Differences be-
tween household groups are small, but visible. Low income households of both
migration groups face the highest relative decreases, followed by the middle in-
come households. The high income households are hurt least in terms of relative
income losses. The overall magnitude of the deteriorations in income, however,
is comparatively small, ranging between -1.14% for the low migration high in-
come household and -1.73% for the low income households of the same migration
group. The households of the high migration group tend to have slightly higher
relative income losses from trade liberalisation. This mainly is a consequence
of the stronger contraction of farm incomes, which weighs more heavily for this
group, as its household on average also have higher shares of agricultural income
in the initial situation (see Table 5.8 in Chapter 5).
Regarding the income from remittances, all households of the low migration
group experience losses. The magnitudes of these losses range between -1.22% and
-1.39%. The decrease is lower on average for the households of the high migration
group. The high income household even earns around 1.09% more income from
migration. The differences between low and high migration households stem from
the different migration responses to the policy shock (see Table 7.14). As will
be discussed more in detail below, migrants of the low migration group tend to
return home, whereas the households of the high migration group return to a
smaller extent or even expand their migration activity.
The comparatively large increase in remittances of the low income household of
the high migration group is caused by its strongest and most positive migration
response. As is further explained in the context of the labour supply responses
of the households (Table 7.14), this reaction is related to a stronger migration
response to a decline in the shadow wage. This strong reaction, in turn, stems
from a more elastic calibration of the utility term in the migration function.
With respect to the relative income levels of the households within the migration
groups, households with higher income appear to have higher losses of remittances.
This observation can again be traced back to the stronger reduction of the time
worked in migration. Furthermore, the higher share of their income the migrants
of the present chapter.
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of these households send home and the higher marginal income losses a given
reduction in migration consequently entails play a role.
By and large, however, relative changes in remittances are low, reflecting the
only small changes in wages in the scenario and the correspondingly small mi-
gration responses. The exception, as mentioned, is the low income household of
the high migration group, which responds to the relatively smaller decline in mi-
gration wages by putting comparatively high amounts of additional labour into
migration.
Income from formal local off-farm employment contracts by -1.04% for all house-
holds, which are involved in this activity. As households are assumed to exhibit
very inelastic labour supply reactions in this activity, this change in activity in-
come mainly reflects the deterioration in formal local off-farm wages due to trade
liberalisation. At around -1.9%, relative decreases in income from informal local
off-farm work are virtually the same for all households.
In case of agricultural income, the combined effect of stronger price decreases
and the reduction of agricultural production causes relative declines to be substan-
tially larger than in the other activities. Furthermore, there is a tendency towards
stronger income deterioration for the high income households of both migration
groups. The explanation which applies to this observation again is related to the
household shadow wage: A less pronounced decrease in the shadow wage (Table
7.15) lets farm labour be relatively more expensive to these households than to
others. Therefore, the households reduce the time worked in farming more than
others (Table 7.14) and the overall level of this activity declines relatively more.
The magnitudes of the decreases in shadow wages, in turn, are related to a number
of factors. First, the calibrations of the labour allocation functions of the different
off-farm activities plays a role. Second, the behaviour of the utility terms in the
migration functions influences how much the shadow wage moves as a response
to a migration wage shock. Third, different endowments of household with family
labour, differences in the earnings structure and differences in the parameters of
the LES have an influence.
When comparing the two migration groups, the reductions in agricultural in-
come appear to be higher in case of the households of the high migration group.
This pattern arises because high migration households withdraw less labour from
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migration and on average reduce the time worked on the farm more than the low
migration households. In the consequence, they also reduce their levels of the
farming activity more than others. This leads to a lower demand for land and
therefore to higher decreases in the returns from this factor.
The differences in losses of income from the different activities can contribute
to explain the pattern which can be found in the net income changes. This be-
comes particularly visible when comparing the two migration groups. As said,
overall higher relative decreases in agricultural income cause stronger declines in
net incomes of the high migration group. The effect of the relative agricultural
income changes appears to be sufficiently strong that the high migration house-
holds on average have higher relative income losses. This is true even in spite of
the relatively stronger reduction of remittances of the low migration group.
The factors which contribute to the differences in relative income changes in
the different activities also have already been mentioned. First, households have
different labour supply decisions, which influences the allocation of time to the
different activities and therefore the income earned. Second, the composition of
the income of the households in the initial situation plays a role. Lower shares
of remittances income increase the weight of decreases in income from the other
sources and dampen the negative impact of losses in remittances. Higher initial
shares of agricultural income boost the effect of relative decreases in returns from
this activity. In both cases, it is in particular the low income households of both
migration groups which are most negatively affected (compare also to Table 5.8
in Chapter 5).
Changes in consumption expenditure follow the pattern of net income changes.
Compared to the changes in net income, the fact that consumption expenditure
constitute a fraction of total expenditure (and, thereby, total income) causes per-
centage values to be slightly higher.
While trade liberalisation obviously decreases income and expenditure levels of
all households, the actual welfare impact remains an open question. Given that
the trade policy reforms analysed result in declines over the full range of prices
and wages and that the households’ adjustment reactions may entail changes in
household shadow wages (which constitute the consumer price of leisure), declining
incomes and expenditures might not be sufficient for losses in household welfare.
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Even if incomes are lower, a decrease in consumer prices might still result in net
welfare gains. On the other hand, the fact that net incomes and consumption
expenditure decline relatively more than the CPI decreases leads to the expecta-
tion that overall welfare effects are indeed negative. Thus, in order to assess the
combined net welfare impact of price and income changes, the equivalent variation
(EV) is presented in addition to the results on income and expenditure changes in
Table 7.13. The EV measures the amount by which the income of the household
in the situation without a price change had to be changed for the household to be
equally well off as in the situation after a price change (Varian, 1999). Positive
values indicate welfare gains from the reform, negative values welfare losses.17
According to the results in Table 7.13, trade liberalisation leads to per capita
welfare losses which range between -2.36 yuan and -2.77 yuan under the specifica-
tion with equal own-wage responses in migration. Generally, the high migration
households are more negatively affected in absolute terms than the households
of the low migration group. Furthermore, the high income households of both
migration groups experience the highest welfare losses in their respective group.
Differences in the EV between households, however, are small. Bearing in mind
that the period under consideration is one year and that total expenditures per
adult equivalent in the base data range between 1,299 yuan to 5,600 yuan per
capita (Table 5.8), the welfare losses appear to be almost insignificant.
If the welfare effects of the reform, however, are compared with the per capita
expenditures of the representative household groups in Table 5.8, the size of the
EV obtained from the simulation relative to per capita expenditure varies greatly
among the households. In fact, the low income households benefit most. While
the EV of the low migration high income household makes up only 0.05% of its per
capita expenditure in the base situation, it accounts for 0.18% in case of the low
migration low income household. Similarly, in the high migration group, the EV
17Due to the possibility to use the base period as the reference point, the EV has become the
standard measure of welfare changes in general equilibrium analyses (Kuiper, 2005). The
EV presented here is calculated in per capita terms. Using the notation as in the model and
following the approach by Blonigen et al. (1997), the EV for the LES is computed as
EVh =
[ (HEXPCPh −∑c PDch ∗ σch)∏
c PD
γch
ch
]∏
c
PD0γchch +
∑
c
PD0ch ∗ σch
.
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of the high income household makes up 0.06% of the initial expenditure, whereas
it is 0.16% for the low income household. Following this line of argumentation,
the reforms could be considered to disproportionally hurt the poor, albeit at a
very small scale. This, as in case of Zhai and Hertel (2010), stems from the
disproportionate reliance of poorer households on agricultural income and low
skilled employment.
Turning to the lower part of Table 7.13, the outcome of the reforms under
the assumption that households have different own-wage responses in migration is
similar to that obtained from the first simulation run. Changes in net income differ
by at most 0.02 percentage points from the results of the previous simulation with
the calibration for equal migration responses. A similar statement can be made
for income from formal and informal off-farm work, as well as for the changes
in consumption expenditure. Here, the maximum difference between the two
simulations is 0.03 percentage points. In case of agricultural income, differences if
existent are also a mere 0.01 percentage points. The exception is the low income
household of the high migration group whose agricultural income decreases by
0.12 percentage points more in the second simulation with different migration
responses.
The effects of the differences in the calibration, however, are somewhat more
visible in case of remittances income. The decreases in remittances income of
the high and middle income household of the low migration group are almost 0.1
percentage points lower than under the assumption of equal migration responses.
The low income household has a by 0.02 percentage points lower decrease. This
is related to a weaker migration response of the households under the new cali-
bration: The households withdraw smaller amounts of labour from migration and
hence have less pronounced declines in remittances.
In case of the households of the high migration group, the picture is less clear.
The high income household has a reduction in remittances which is by 0.03 per-
centage points larger than before. This is caused by the stronger migration re-
sponse of the household due to the more elastic calibration. The household now
pulls more labour out of the migration activity and correspondingly experiences
higher losses in remittances. In case of the low income household, the differ-
ence between the two calibrations is most pronounced. The remittances income
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now increases by 1.98%, as compared to 1.09% before. This is related to a more
positive migration response. Thus, as was intended, the new calibration gener-
ally leads to more pronounced migration responses in the high migration group.
These responses, however, are more negative for the high income household and
more positive for the low income household than under the calibration with equal
migration responses.
Regarding the EV measure, differences are also very small, As compared to
the first simulation, welfare losses are the same or change by 0.01 yuan for most
households. The exception again is the low income household of the high migration
group. The welfare losses of this household are 0.12 yuan higher than before.
In summary, with respect to the most aggregate outcome variables at the house-
hold level, the different calibration of households’ labour market behaviour ap-
pears to create little differences in model results. On should bear in mind, how-
ever, that the differences that can be observed may turn larger when simulating
policy scenarios which entail price and wage changes of higher magnitudes.
7.4.1.1.2. Production, Factor Allocation and Input Demand I
The discussion of the simulation results up to now show the relative changes in
income, both of net income and of its components. As already noted in different
occasions, the net income changes depend not only on the size of the changes
in income components but also on the production structure of the households.
Thereby, the changes in income components largely stem from the decisions of
the households regarding factor allocation and input demand following the policy
shock. Accordingly, Table 7.14 presents the impact on factor allocation and input
use by the different household specific activities. Closely related to this are the
changes in endogenous prices—the shadow prices for labour and land—which are
provided in Table 7.15. The result of the adjustments in factor allocation, which
also ultimately cause the changes in income from the respective activities, are
alterations in output and sales. These are shown in Tables 7.16 and 7.17.
The changes in factor allocation and input use reported in Table 7.14 represent
responses by the profit-maximising households to the new set of relative prices of
inputs and outputs, including the endogenous changes in the shadow prices of land
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Table 7.14.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on factor allocation and
input use (quantities, % change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture
Labour -0.36 -0.27 0.05 -0.66 -0.21 -1.39
Land - - - - - -
Capital intermediates -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
Imported labour -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
Services -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 3.19
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.63
Agriculture
Labour -0.45 -0.31 0.04 -0.64 -0.21 -1.98
Land - - - - - -
Capital intermediates -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.42
Imported labour -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.42
Services -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.42
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and labour. The upper part of the table covers the results from the simulation with
the calibration for equal migration responses. As can be seen from the first line
of the table, the amounts of labour allocated by households of the low migration
group to the migration activity decline slightly. In the high migration group, the
middle and the low income households migrate more, whereas the high income
household reduces its level of migration.
At this, it might be somewhat surprising that the households of the low migra-
tion group migrate less although local wages and returns from the factors employed
in agriculture (see Table 7.15) decrease even more than migrant wages. The ex-
planation lies in a strong price (read: substitution) effect of the lower household
shadow wage on the consumption of leisure. As Table 7.18 shows, both house-
holds consume more leisure and thereby reduce their total supply of labour to
productive activities. This is consistent with the theoretical notion that the low
migration households require more work to be done in the household because of
the higher shares of dependants. The fact that the households with lower income
draw less labour out of migration and reduce their total supply of labour by a
smaller amount also fits into this scheme, as poorer households can afford less to
experience income losses.
Regarding the results that the high migration households on average maintain
more labour in migration or even migrate more, the same explanation applies. In
case of this group, the same two counteracting effects arise: On the one hand,
the relative increase in the migration wage sets incentives to migrate more. These
incentives are accentuated by the cross-wage and cross-price effects mediated via
the decline in shadow wages which in the tendency would lead to higher levels of
migration. On the other hand, the incentives for more migration are counteracted
by a price effect of the deterioration of the shadow wage on leisure demand. As
the decline in shadow wages, however, on average is not that pronounced in the
high migration group, in case of the high and middle income households it is only
sufficient to make them maintain broadly constant levels of migration instead of
returning home at a significant scale. In case of the low income household the
decline in the shadow wage in turn is so weak that the household expands its total
labour supply and responds to the incentives to migrate by migrating more.
Driven by the assumption of inelastic labour supply, households cannot change
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the time worked in the corresponding activity very much. Thus, the time worked in
formal local off-farm work remains almost constant in spite of the relative increase
of the wage in this activity. All three households reduce the time allocated to
formal local off-farm work by a mere -0.01%. In case of informal local off-farm
work and agriculture, however, households allocate significantly less labour. The
time worked in informal local off-farm jobs decreases by between -0.54% and -
0.61% (Table 7.14).
In agriculture, all but one household reduce the time worked in this activity.
The reduction is between -0.21% and -1.29%. Only the low income low migration
household works slightly more on the farm, however only 0.05%. The pattern in
the reduction of work in agriculture again is explained by the different changes in
shadow wages (see Table 7.15). As compared to households with stronger increases
in the shadow wage, households with relatively weaker decreases reduce the time
worked in agriculture more, as family labour remains relatively more expensive.
This implies that the change in the amount of household labour allocated to the
agricultural activity is inversely related to the change in shadow wages .
The reduction in time worked in agriculture leads to a decline in the overall
levels of this activity as well as the demand for other inputs. The households,
which work less on the farm also decrease their demand for intermediate inputs
by between -0.04% to -1.39%. Similarly, demand for land becomes lower. This, in
turn, has the consequence of lower shadow prices of this factor. In fact, shadow
prices for land are from -2.36% to -2.77% lower after reform. The explained
effects on the demand for intermediate inputs and land are a direct consequence
of the C-D specification of the agricultural production function. A lower use of
household labour decreases output levels and thereby the demand for other inputs.
Furthermore, households tend to substitute labour for land.
It is interesting to take a broader look at the relative changes in time allocated
to the different activities reported in Table 7.14. Five out of the six households
reduce the time worked in informal local off-farm work and agriculture more than
the time worked in migration. Thus, they substitute migration for the different
types of local activities. This is a logical consequence of the relative increase in
migration wages.
All in all, however, there are two exceptional cases. The first case is the low
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Table 7.15.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on endogenous prices (%
change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.20 -2.24 -2.40 -2.12 -2.31 -1.25
Land -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.12 -2.20 -2.40 -2.14 -2.31 -0.78
Land -2.56 -2.51 -2.36 -2.76 -2.52 -2.74
income household of the low migration group, which works more on the farm
but migrates less, thus increasing the ratio of time worked in agriculture and
migration. This seemingly perverse effect is caused by the interplay of several
effects in the model:
• The low value of the share parameter κ in the remittances function causes a
more elastic reaction of labour supply to the migration activity with respect
to a fall of the shadow wage. This means that the time allocated to migration
increases ceteris paribus (recall the discussion in Section 7.2.3). This effect
acts contrary to the deterioration of the migration wage and causes the
contraction of migration to be weaker for this household.
• At the same time, the comparatively small increase in demand for leisure—
a consequence of the high income losses—lets the shadow wage fall by a
relatively large amount. This, in spite of falling agricultural prices, causes
an expansion of the time worked in farming.
The second exceptional case is the low income household of the high migration
group. The household also substitutes migration for other activities, but exhibits
a disproportionally strong positive migration response. This response is the strong
effect of a shrinking shadow wage, i.e. a decline in the opportunity cost of mi-
gration. The strong effect, as is explained in Section 7.2.3, stems from the elastic
calibration of the utility term in the migration function of this household. To
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summarise, the two examples of the exceptional cases once more illustrate the im-
plications of the inclusion of the utility terms into the labour allocation functions
of the migration activities.
The discussion up to now shows that the outcome of the policy reform in terms
of the households’ labour allocation crucially depends on the changes in the en-
dogenous shadow wages. Repeating what is already said above, the differences in
the changes in shadow wages are the result of the workings of a number of factors:
• The calibration of the factor allocation functions of the different off-farm
activities which determines the relative strength of the price and quantity
effects.
• The behaviour of the utility terms, as demonstrated by the cases of the low
income households of both migration groups discussed above.
• Different endowments of households with family labour as well as differences
in the earnings structures.
• Differences in the parameters of the LES.
Specifically the different labour endowments, differences in earnings structures
and in the parameters of the LES cause that a given response in labour supply to
the three off-farm activities results in different changes in the household shadow
wage.
Tables 7.16 and 7.17 present the consequences the adjustments in factor alloca-
tions have on activity output and marketed surplus. Due to the direct translation
of factor use in outputs and sales in case of the off-farm activities, the figures
there are identical to the changes in the households’ supply of labour to these
activities. In case of agriculture, the comparatively strong decline in input de-
mand results in more modest relative decreases in outputs. The low income low
migration household keeps its agricultural output roughly constant. In case of all
other households, output decreases by between -0.04% and -0.29%, with the low
income household in the high migration group reducing its output most. But in
spite of declining or at best constant levels of agricultural output, marketed sur-
plus increases for all households at a scale by between 0.26% and 1.02%. This is a
consequence of the decrease in consumption of own-produced food which follows
from lower income levels (see Table 7.18).
Up to this point, the discussion of the effects of the trade policy scenario on
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Table 7.16.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on activity outputs (%
change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Activity output
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.29
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Activity output
Migration -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 3.19
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.63
Agriculture -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.42
production, factor allocation and input demand focuses entirely on the results
obtained from the simulation with the calibration which assumes equal own-wage
responses in migration. The lower parts of each table contain the simulated effects
under the assumption of different own-wage responses.
Focusing first on the impacts on low migration households, it can be seen that
these households draw less labour out of migration. At the same time, they
tend to reduce their time worked on the farm more or increase farm time at a
lower scale. This change with respect to the first simulation stems from the less
elastic migration response, which causes overall adjustments in labour quantities
allocated to migration to be weaker. Households now draw less labour out of
migration as the migration wage falls. On the other hand, they also respond
less positively to the lower opportunity costs of migration, as given by a lower
shadow wage. This weaker effect of the shadow wage is caused by the less elastic
calibration of the utility terms.
In this context, the weaker migration responses, i.e. the fact that less labour
is drawn out of migration, leads to less pronounced declines of the shadow wages.
This, in turn, further accentuates the per se weaker reactions to falling opportunity
costs of labour. A further consequence of the lower reduction in shadow wages is
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that the decreases in time worked in the agricultural activity are steeper.
In the high migration group, the high income household ends up with a higher
ratio of time worked in agriculture and migration as in the first simulation. In case
of this household, the more elastic calibration of the migration function causes the
decline in the migration wage to yield a stronger reduction in migration. This,
in turn, triggers a larger decrease in the shadow wage than before, leading to a
smaller contraction of the time worked in agriculture.
The low income household in the high migration group, in contrast, exhibits a
much stronger response to the decline in the shadow wage and increases its supply
of labour to migration significantly more. All in all, the decline in the shadow
wage is now smaller as before, leading to a stronger reduction of the time worked
on the farm and even a slightly more reduced allocation of labour to informal local
off-farm work. The middle income household of the high migration group shows
similar difference, however not at the level of two decimals presented in the table.
Regarding the shadow prices, the discussion of the simulation with the cali-
bration with equal migration responses already points to a less strong decline in
shadow wages in case of the low migration households. This results from the fact
that these households draw less labour out of migration in the simulation with
different migration responses (Table 7.24).
The lower demand for agricultural inputs other than family labour, in turn,
depresses shadow prices of land even more than in the first simulation. In the high
migration group, in contrast, the shadow wage decreases more only in case of the
high migration household which retreats more from migration in the simulation
with different migration responses. The enhanced cross-wage responses of the
other two households which cause higher increases in migration lead to weaker
declines in shadow wages. The shadow prices for land change accordingly.
The differences in agricultural output and marketed surplus of farm products
between the two simulations follow the differences in the changes in the use of
family labour which are observed. The high and middle income households of the
low migration group as well as the low income household of the high migration
group reduce their output more than before. In case of the other households,
differences in labour use between the two simulations are not pronounced enough
to materialize in output changes. Accordingly, marketed surplus decreases less
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Table 7.17.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on marketed surplus (%
change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Sales
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture 0.28 0.55 1.02 0.39 0.45 0.26
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Sales
Migration -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 3.19
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.63
Agriculture 0.24 0.52 1.01 0.40 0.45 0.09
for the low migration group and the low income household of the high migration
group. The high migration high income household has a slightly higher increase
in marketed surplus and that of the middle income household is as before.
7.4.1.1.3. Household Consumption I
The combined effect of changes in relative prices and income causes households
to adjust their consumption bundles. Given that all prices as well as income levels
decrease, it is a question specific to each commodity whether the price (substitu-
tion) effect or the income effect dominates. Under both calibrations, the picture
which arises from the simulations is similar. Demand for own produced food de-
creases by -0.79% to -1.45%. Changes in demand for food of plant origin and
other food are slightly positive or negative, depending on the level of decrease in
income of the respective household. At this, the markedly stronger decrease in
consumption of own-produced food stems from the differences in income elastici-
ties of demand. They are higher in case of own-produced food and the resulting
income effect is sufficient to overcompensate the relatively stronger decline in the
price of the commodity due to trade liberalisation.
Similarly, households consistently consume less of the non-food and the ser-
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Table 7.18.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on consumption (% change
against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Household consumption
Own produced food -0.81 -1.04 -1.32 -0.96 -1.17 -1.42
Food of plant origin -0.07 -0.23 -0.41 -0.17 -0.31 -0.48
Other food 0.16 -0.02 -0.24 0.05 -0.13 -0.33
Non-food -0.58 -0.97 -1.43 -0.82 -1.19 -1.60
Services -0.79 -1.21 -1.70 -1.05 -1.44 -1.88
Leisure 0.61 0.31 0.04 0.34 0.18 -1.03
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Household consumption
Own produced food -0.79 -1.03 -1.32 -0.96 -1.17 -1.45
Food of plant origin -0.06 -0.22 -0.41 -0.17 -0.31 -0.50
Other food 0.18 -0.01 -0.24 0.04 -0.13 -0.35
Non-food -0.55 -0.95 -1.43 -0.83 -1.19 -1.65
Services -0.76 -1.18 -1.70 -1.06 -1.44 -1.94
Leisure 0.58 0.30 0.04 0.35 0.18 -1.45
vices commodity, reflecting the comparatively high income elasticities of these
items. As already noted above, consumption of leisure is positively affected by
the comparatively strong decreases of the households’ shadow wages. Although
income elasticities for leisure demand are also relatively high, the income effect
is dominated by the substitution effect and demand for leisure increases at rates
between 0.04% and 0.61% in case of five out of the six households. The exception,
again, is the low income household of the high migration group which decreases
its consumption of leisure by -1.03% and -1.45%, respectively.
As already noted in the context of labour supply, the corollary of the increase
in leisure demand of most households is that total labour supply declines. Thus,
the lower wages and prices not only lead to reallocations of labour between the
activities, but also cause the household to work less.
7.4.1.2. Village Level Impacts
Taken together, the household level impacts of trade liberalisation lead to a par-
ticular outcome for the community as a whole. From the perspective of the village
262
7.4. Liberalisation, Migration, Poverty and Inequality
Table 7.19.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village trade (% change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal Different
migration migration
Exports
Migrant labour 0.20 0.32
Formal local off-farm labour -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm labour -0.55 -0.55
Agricultural outputs 0.46 0.44
Imports
Capital intermediates -0.08 -0.09
Imported labour -0.06 -0.07
Food of plant origin -0.24 -0.24
Other food 0.00 0.00
Non-food -0.91 -0.90
Services -1.08 -1.07
economy and its contribution to the national economy, exports and imports are
relevant variables. As Table 7.19 shows, the village as a whole exports more mi-
grant labour to the rest of the country. The increase is 0.20% for the simulation
with equal migration resonses and 0.32% in case of the simulation with different
migration responses. Formal local off-farm labour remains practically constant,
but villagers seek less informal employment outside the village. At -0.55% for
both simulations the decrease corresponds to the average of the household level
values. The trend to raise the marketed surplus of the agricultural commodity
results in an overall increase in exports of farm outputs from the village by about
half a percent.
Shrinking imports of the capital intermediate input and hired labour by -0.06%
to -0.09% mirrors the lower agricultural production activity in the village. Imports
of food of plant origin decline by about quarter a percent and those of other food
remain constant. The latter reflects the higher consumption by some households
and reductions by others. Imports of non-food products and services, however,
decrease more, by roughly 1% for both commodities. In case of services, this
decrease stems not only from lower consumption levels, but also from the lower
use of services in agricultural production.
The issue this research ultimately is concerned with is the impact of trade
liberalisation on poverty and inequality in the village. As the first line of Table
7.20 indicates, total village income, which can be regarded as a rough indicator
for the living standard in the village as a whole, decreases by about -1.4% in both
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Table 7.20.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village income, poverty and inequality.
Scenario: Base Trade liberalisation
Calibration: Equal Different
migration migration
Total village incomea 0.0 -1.39 -1.38
Poverty indices
P0 (low) 0.220 0.220 0.220
P0 (high) 0.447 0.449 0.449
P1 (low) 0.049 0.050 0.050
P1 (high) 0.105 0.107 0.107
P2 (low) 0.018 0.018 0.018
P2 (high) 0.043 0.044 0.044
Gini coefficient (%) 29.410 29.493 29.495
a %-change against baseline.
simulations. This overall decline in income, however, only translates into minor
increases in the poverty measures used.
The poverty headcount ratio (P0) remains constant when using the low poverty
line. Under the high poverty line, the share of poor in the population rises by 0.2
percentage points to a post-reform level of 0.449. The latter corresponds to an
increase in poverty by about -0.2% trough trade reform. Seen in the context of
estimated annual rate of poverty reduction for Guizhou during the years 1988-2000
of -6.5% (Ravallion and Chen, 2007), this figure appears to be small.
The poverty gap index (P1) increases by about 0.1 percentage points for both
model calibrations when calculated with the low poverty line. For the high poverty
line, the change again is larger with a rise of P1 from 0.105 to 0.107. Expressing the
average shortfall of income of the poor from the poverty line, these results suggest
that the poor on average have moved a little further away from the poverty line.
Expressed in percentage terms, the poverty gap from the high poverty line is
increased by around 2.0%. As in case of the poverty headcount, this appears to
be small when compared to the longer term rate of reduction of -7.7% provided
by Ravallion and Chen (2007).
The poverty severity index, which puts a higher weight on higher poverty gaps,
remains constant for the low poverty line and increases from 0.043 to 0.044 for
the high poverty line. This is equivalent to a rise by 2.3%, again with the high
poverty line. As in case of the poverty headcount and the poverty gap, this rate
seems small when compared to the annual rate of poverty reduction of -8.35% in
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Guizhou during the 1990s as estimated by Ravallion and Chen (2007).
The relatively higher decrease in net incomes of the low income households
in both migration groups results in a distributional impact at the village level.
Following trade reform, the Gini coefficient increases from 29.410 to 29.493 and
29.495, respectively. Thus, in this model trade reform appears to accentuate the
general trend of increasing inequality in China (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
7.4.1.3. Summary
At this point, it is possible to provide a first assessment of the village equilibrium
model. Overall, the relative changes in model variables compared to the base situ-
ation are small. Due to only minor price and wage changes in the policy scenario,
this is within expectations. In general, magnitudes of the results and directions of
change are comparable to those found in the national level simulations. Returns
to land decrease by around -2.6% in the village model as compared to -3.5% in the
national model and returns to agricultural labour decline by -2.0% on average in
the village model and by -1.8% in the national level CGE (Zhai and Hertel, 2010).
Regarding the allocation of labour, both models find an increase in migration at
the expense of the agricultural sector. The change in migration, however, is of
a lower magnitude in the village model. In the Zhai and Hertel (2010) model,
semi-skilled rural-urban temporary migration increases by 1.3%, whereas the vil-
lage model predicts around 0.25% more migration. One of the reasons for this
difference certainly is the impact of reform on households total labour supply in
the village model. The advantage of the village model, however, is that it offers
much more detailed insights with respect to the question of who migrates and
why.
The two models also coincide with respect to the direction of the impact of the
trade reform on poverty and inequality. Regarding poverty, both models predict
an increase in the poverty headcount ratio, but again the change in the village
model (0.02 percentage points) is smaller than in the national model (an increase
by 0.5 in the rural poverty headcount ratio). In inequality, the slight increase in
the Gini coefficient by around 0.08 compares to a Gini coefficient which remains
constant for rural areas and which increases by 0.001 in general in the Zhai and
Hertel (2010) model. In spite of the higher increase in poverty, Zhai and Hertel
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(2010) also expect relative welfare losses higher than those resulting from the
village model. While welfare losses make up around -0.5% for the income of rural
diversified households in the former case, they account only for -0.05% to -0.18%
of expenditures in the latter. As several reasons for these differences can be found,
such as the inclusion of leisure consumption into the village model and the use of
potentially different income or expenditure measures, the important result is that
the direction of change is identical.
Regarding the results at the household level, several patterns arise from the
village model. With respect to the welfare impact of the reform, high migration
households tend to be slightly worse off than low migration households in terms of
absolute EV. Likewise, high income households tend to lose more than low income
households. This result is consistent insofar as home time generally is attached
a positive utility and those who can spend more time at home result to have the
lowest welfare losses. Attention, however, should be paid to the explanation that
the price of leisure plays a role for rise of the observed patterns. As this price,
i.e. the shadow wage, depends on the migration responses of the households, this
clearly shows how the labour market behaviour of the households indeed matters
for the outcomes of the model simulations.
At this, the migration patterns predicted by the model appear to make sense.
The low migration households with relatively more dependants migrate less, i.e.
they shift relatively less labour from local activities to migration. At the same
time, the result that migration levels decrease due to an overall reduced supply
of labour does not stand contrary to this statement.
Some interesting aspects related to the results on households’ labour allocation,
however, should be mentioned. Apparently, different migration responses arise
although factor allocation functions in migration are calibrated to the same own-
wage responses. This is a consequence of the differences in the effect of changes
in shadow wages which in turn are ultimately determined by the values of κ (also
recall the discussion in Section 7.2.3). The implication is that the share of income,
migrants send home has a substantial influence on model results.
This influence becomes especially visible in the cases of the low income low mi-
gration household, which contrary to the general trend increases the time worked
in agriculture relative to migration, and the low income household of the high
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migration group, which has comparatively strong migration responses. The inter-
pretation of these behavioural patterns is found in the calibration of the utility
terms in the labour allocation functions for migration: Falling values of κ cor-
respond to lower marginal returns from migration. This increases the weight of
the opportunity cost of labour in the households’ labour allocation decisions and
causes strong reactions to changes in the shadow wage.
From the perspective of the households, this appears to be fully rational. If the
financial returns from migration to the household are low, the household loses little
in monetary terms when it reduces migration and puts the labour to alternative
local uses. Therefore, it appears preferable to pull comparatively large amounts
of labour out of migration as soon as the opportunity cost of labour declines. On
the other hand, such a behaviour in the model also implies the assumption that
the perspective of the migrant is neglected and that the household back home
exerts full control about the fate of the migrant.
Thus, in general the differences between the two calibrations that are observed
are very small. In fact, many of them are invisible when presented with only one
decimal. As regarding the practical outcome of the examined trade liberalisation
scenario, the differences might be largely irrelevant. They might matter, however,
when applying a scenario which involves stronger price changes. Furthermore,
from a technical point of view the discussion on the differences throughout this
section illustrated the properties of the model. In particular, with respect to
household labour allocation it is possible to highlight the symmetry of less elastic
migration responses. While in the calibration the less elastic response was only
calibrated to an increase in the migration wage, households also exhibit a less
elastic response when the situation requires return migration. Although logical,
it is however somewhat disturbing that high migration households which should
be more interested in working in migration also might return home quicker under
the assumption of more elastic own-wage responses in migration.
7.4.2. Introducing a Land Rental Market
Well functioning markets are generally expected to increase the allocative effi-
ciency in an economy and to enhance the potential welfare gains of policy reforms
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aimed at reducing economic distortions. In the two simulations studied previ-
ously, the assumption of absent land markets was made, thus restricting land use
by households to their initial levels. All adjustments are made by a shadow price
for land which was endogenous to each household. In the second set of simula-
tions, the results of which are discussed in the present section, the existence of a
village land market, which is perfect in a neoclassical sense, is assumed. Land can
be traded among households and a uniform village land rental rate which clears
the land market arises.
The section is subdivided into three parts. In the first part, the household
level and village level impacts of trade liberalisation are dealt with. Unlike in
the section on the simulations without a land market, in this first part only the
results of the simulations under the calibration with equal migration responses
are discussed. In order to facilitate the assessment of the role of the land market,
however, they are directly contrasted with the corresponding results obtained from
the simulations without a land market.
The second part seeks to assess the effects of the different assumptions regard-
ing the households’ migration responses in the simulations with a land market.
Selected results from the two simulations with the different calibrations are com-
pared. The third part summarises the section and provides an assessment of the
role of a land market in the village.
7.4.2.1. Comparing Reform Impacts With and Without a Land Market
7.4.2.1.1. Household Level Impacts I
Table 7.21 presents the impact of the trade liberalisation scenario on income,
expenditure and welfare for the two closures regarding the land market regime.
The upper part of the table contains the results from the simulations with a land
market, the lower part repeats those obtained from the simulations without a land
market, both with the calibration assuming equal migration responses.
Focusing on the upper part of the table first, households experience losses in net
income by between -1.14% and -1.77%. High migration households have higher
losses on average and those with low income tend to be affected more negatively
by the reform in terms of relative income losses. Compared to the effects of trade
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Table 7.21.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on per capita income and
expenditure, equal migration responses (in value terms, % change against
baseline).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.14 -1.39 -1.54 -1.41 -1.44 -1.77
Remittances -1.40 -1.39 -1.34 -1.11 -1.21 1.63
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.87 -1.87 -1.92 -1.79 -1.90 -1.91
Agriculture -2.51 -2.43 -1.99 -3.27 -2.43 -2.82
Expenditure
Consumption expenditure -1.31 -1.49 -1.63 -1.58 -1.62 -2.00
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -2.22 -1.89 0.64 -6.06 -1.90 -3.73
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.27
CPIa -0.86
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.14 -1.42 -1.73 -1.32 -1.46 -1.69
Remittances -1.39 -1.37 -1.22 -1.24 -1.16 1.09
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.86 -1.85 -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.92
Agriculture -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
Expenditure
Consumption expenditure -1.32 -1.52 -1.84 -1.48 -1.65 -1.91
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17
CPIa -0.88
a Average value for all households.
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reform on net income in a situation without a land market, four out of the six
households lose less, whereas two have more pronounced income reductions.
This latter observation can be directly traced to the existence of the land mar-
ket. The two households which have higher income losses than in the situation
without a land market, i.e. the high and the low income household of the high
migration group, reduce the area they use for agricultural production (see Tables
7.22 and 7.23). This leads to comparatively high decreases in income from farming
and ultimately also to the observed higher losses in net incomes. Even the fact
that the two households also have lower reductions in remittances and informal
off-farm income than in the situation without a land market cannot compensate
for these losses.
In case of remittances income, the households of the low migration group as
well as the middle income household of the high migration group have to accept
losses which are higher than without a land market. Overall, these losses range
between -1.21% and -1.40%. The high and the low income household of the low
migration group, in contrast, end up with larger amounts of remittances than
without a land market. Remittances of the high income household are reduced by
-1.11%, as compared to -1.24%. The low income household after reform receives
1.63% more in remittances, up from 1.09%.
A look at the changes in agricultural income confirms that this pattern is related
to the possibility to trade land on the village market. The households which have
higher reductions in remittances have lower losses in farm incomes (and vice versa)
than in the situation without a land market. This stems from stronger reductions
in the involvement in off-farm activities and lower reductions of the time worked in
agriculture by these households. These effects, in turn, are rooted in an expansion
of land use (Tables 7.22 and 7.23).
In summary, the existence of a land market has a perceivable impact on the
relative income changes experienced by the different households due to trade re-
form. Thereby, at the level of the single activities, the land market allows some
households to focus more on agriculture by using more land. In comparison with
the situation without a land market, the consequence is a lower reduction in farm
incomes, but higher losses in off-farm incomes for these households. Other house-
holds draw out of agriculture and apparently put more emphasis on migration
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and local off-farm work. This results in lower reductions in income from these ac-
tivities for these households, but stronger declines in farm income. As the former,
however, are not sufficient to compensate for the latter, the net income effects of
trade reform for them is more negative in the situation with a land market.
The decreases in consumption expenditure again follow the pattern of the
changes in net income. After reform, households spend by between -1.31% and
-2.00% less on consumption and the decline is higher for the high migration house-
holds. According to the high reductions in net incomes (relative to the CPI), the
welfare outcome of the reform is negative for five out of the six households. The
EV in absolute terms ranges between a positive 0.60 yuan per capita for the low
income household in the low migration group and -6.06 yuan per capita for the
high income household in the high migration group. Relative to initial levels of
per capita expenditure, welfare losses are between -0.04% and -0.27%. The welfare
gain of the low income household of the low migration group is 0.05% of initial
expenditure.
Compared to the situation without a land market, the reforms’ welfare impacts,
as expressed by the absolute as well as the relative EV, differ much more between
the households. The pattern observed previously that poorer households tend to
loose out more in relative terms now vanishes. Rather, the four households which
manage to at least partly mitigate the losses in farm income by using more land
also have smaller welfare losses than in the situation without a land market, or
even gains. The two households which reduce their land use incur higher losses in
farm income and therefore also higher reductions in net income, in contrast, are
worse off.
At this, although little intuitive at the first sight, this behaviour is entirely
rational. In fact, if the households’ initial utility functions are recovered from the
calibrated parameters and if values for utility are calculated from these functions,
the two households which reduce their land use and migrate more have higher
utility levels if a land market exists. This also suggests that the EV as used in
the current analysis does not capture all welfare impacts of trade reforms and
perhaps should be modified to include the utility connotations which are attached
to labour market participation.
Table 7.22 presents the simulation results for the household level impacts of
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trade liberalisation on factor allocation and input use. According to the upper
part of the table, the changes in relative prices caused by trade liberalisation bring
about a return of migrants from the low migration group to the village. These
households reduce the time worked in migration by between -0.16% and -0.22%.
Households of the high migration group migrate more. The high and middle
income households show a slightly positive migration responses, with increases in
the time worked in migration by 0.06% and 0.03%, respectively. The low income
household of the high migration group responds strongly positive to the relative
increase in the migration wage and allocates 2.83% more time to the activity.
When contemplated against the changes in supply of household labour to the
agricultural activity and land use by the households, the patterns already iden-
tified in the context of the discussion of the income changes, become more pro-
nounced. Four out of the six households, namely those from the low migration
group and the middle income household of the high migration group, use more land
following trade reform. The two remaining households reduce the area farmed.
Those which increase their land use, also work more on the farm, or at least reduce
the time worked less than in the situation without the land market. This reaction,
however, happens at the expense of local off-farm activities and/or migration, as
the time worked in these activities declines more than before.
This observation inevitably leads to the question for the reasons why a particular
household uses more land after trade reform, or less. The explanation involves
the changes in shadow prices for land in the situation without a land market. The
bottom part of Table 7.23 reveals the two important points:
• The two households which make land available to other households have
relatively large decreases in their shadow prices. This reflects an implicit
and relatively strong reduction in demand for land.
• The decline in the shadow prices of the remaining four households, in con-
trast, is lower.
The consequence is that, as soon as land can be traded on the market, a uniform
land rental rate arises within the village. This land rental rate is, as the upper
part of Table 7.24 shows, higher than the shadow prices for land of the high and
low income households of the high migration group in the situation without a
land market and lower than those of the remaining households. Hence, the former
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Table 7.22.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on factor allocation and
input use, equal migration responses (quantities, % change against base-
line).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 0.06 0.03 2.83
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.48 -0.58 -0.60
Agriculture
Labour -0.18 0.08 2.12 -3.19 0.15 -2.35
Land 0.36 0.70 3.30 -3.58 0.70 -1.19
Capital intermediates 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Imported labour 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Services 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture
Labour -0.36 -0.27 0.05 -0.66 -0.21 -1.39
Land - - - - - -
Capital intermediates -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
Imported labour -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
Services -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29
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make land available to the latter.
Table 7.23.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on land rentals, equal mi-
gration responses (quantities, % change against baseline).
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Net land rentals
Net area rent in 4.54 - - -46.60 5.09 -36.78
Net area rent out - -95.10 -70.01 - - -
This leads to an adjustment in agricultural land use by the households. These
adjustments result in changes in land rentals, as already indicated during the
above discussions and depicted in Table 7.23. The high income low migration
household, which rented in land in the initial situation, increases its rentals by
4.54%. Similarly, the middle and low income households of the same migration
group rent out less land after trade liberalisation, reducing the area rent out
substantially by -95.10% and -70.01%, respectively. The middle income household
of the high migration group, which also increases its land use, rents in around
5.09% more land. The land demand by the four households mentioned is matched
by increases in supply by the high and low income households of the high migration
group, which reduce the area they rent in to around a half and two thirds of the
initial levels.
Regarding changes in output, presented in Table 7.25, the figures for the off-
farm activities again correspond to those on input use. Changes in agricultural
production reflect the adjustments in land use and therefore differ substantially
from the results obtained from the simulations without a land market. The high
and the low income household of the high migration group both reduce their levels
of output by magnitudes between -3.51% and -1.43%, as compared to -0.12% and
-1.43%, respectively. The households which use more land after reform produce
between 0.27% and 3.07% more of the agricultural commodity, which means a
reversal in sign for three and a substantial increase for all households when put
against the results without a land market.
Changes in marketed surplus of agricultural products as reported in Table 7.26,
once again reflect the effect of the land market and in most cases are more pro-
nounced than output changes. Households with increased outputs raise their
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Table 7.24.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on endogenous prices, equal
migration responses (% change against baseline).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.05 -1.97 -1.45 -2.96 -2.04 -1.42
Land -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.20 -2.24 -2.40 -2.12 -2.31 -1.25
Land -2.55 -2.50 -2.36 -2.77 -2.52 -2.62
marketed surplus by higher margins than without a land market. The high and
low income households of the low migration groups no longer increase their mar-
keted surplus as in the situation without without a land market, but reduce their
sales.
Table 7.27 illustrates how consumption levels and patterns of the households
in the village are affected by trade liberalisation under the different assumptions
regarding the presence of a village market for land. As the upper part of the table
shows, the effect of lower consumption expenditure, i.e. income, prevails over the
effect of lower consumer prices for all households in case of own produced food,
purchased food of plant origin, non-food products and services. That means,
for these products the decline in income leads to a reduction in consumption
levels. Consumption of own produced food contracts by between -0.81% and -
1.49%. Demand for food of plant origin declines by between -0.07% and -0.53%.
Between -0.58% and -1.72% less non-food items are consumed. Regarding services,
households reduce their purchases from -0.79% to -1.15%.
In case of other purchased food, the picture is more mixed. The high income
household of the low migration group increase its consumption by 0.17%. The
other households maintain their consumption levels constant or reduce them. The
reduction, however, is less pronounced than in case of the commodities discussed
before. Similarly, in response to a relative decline of the prices for labour, three out
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Table 7.25.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on activity outputs, equal
migration responses (quantities, % change against baseline).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Activity output
Migration -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 0.06 -0.03 2.83
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.48 -0.58 -0.60
Agriculture 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Activity output
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.29
Table 7.26.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on marketed surplus, equal
migration responses (quantities, % change against baseline).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Sales
Migration -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 0.06 -0.03 2.83
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.48 -0.58 -0.60
Agriculture 0.76 1.54 6.31 -5.03 1.35 -1.40
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Sales
Migration -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.61
Agriculture 0.28 0.55 1.02 0.39 0.45 0.26
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Table 7.27.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on consumption, equal mi-
gration responses (quantities, % change against baseline).
Land market closure: Land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Household consumption
Own produced food -0.81 -1.03 -1.18 -1.01 -1.15 -1.49
Food of plant origin -0.07 -0.22 -0.32 -0.21 -0.30 -0.53
Other food 0.17 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 -0.38
Non-food -0.58 -0.94 -1.20 -0.92 -1.16 -1.72
Services -0.79 -1.18 -1.45 -1.15 -1.41 -2.01
Leisure 0.50 0.11 -0.53 0.95 -0.01 -1.00
Land market closure: No land market
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Household consumption
Own produced food -0.81 -1.04 -1.32 -0.96 -1.17 -1.42
Food of plant origin -0.07 -0.23 -0.41 -0.17 -0.31 -0.48
Other food 0.16 -0.02 -0.24 0.05 -0.13 -0.33
Non-food -0.58 -0.97 -1.43 -0.82 -1.19 -1.60
Services -0.79 -1.21 -1.70 -1.05 -1.44 -1.88
Leisure 0.61 0.31 0.04 0.34 0.18 -1.03
of the six households substitute towards the consumption of leisure and increase
the time spent at home by 0.11% to 0.95%, thus decreasing their total supply of
labour. For the two low income households and the middle income household of
the low migration group, in comparison, shrinking household incomes makes them
spend more time working.
Not surprisingly, the differences between the two simulations with the different
land market regimes follow the pattern of the differences in income changes. This
pattern, however, is not maintained in case of leisure. Here, not only the income
changes matter, but also the shadow wages. As the possibility to create land
allows the households to reduce the time worked in agriculture less or even spend
more time on the farm as compared to the situation without the land market, the
decline in the shadow wage is weaker for the households which expand their land
use (see Table 7.24). Hence, the increase in the consumption of leisure is weaker
than before or even reversed (in case of the low income household of the low
migration group and the middle income household of the high migration group).
The two households which make land available, in comparison, have stronger
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decreases in the shadow wage in the situation with a land market and therefore
increase their leisure consumption more or reduce it by a lower extent.
7.4.2.1.2. Village Level Impacts I
Regarding village exports, the existence of a land market leads to considerable
differences in migration and the export of agricultural output as compared to
the situation without such a market (see Table 7.28). Mostly due to the strong
increase in migration by the low income high migration household, exports of
migrant labour are by 0.28% higher after trade reform. This compares to 0.20%
without a land market.
In case of agricultural output, village exports increase by 0.26%, which is sub-
stantially lower than the 0.46% obtained before. Once more, however, the strong
decrease of marketed surplus by the low income household of the high migration
group dominates the picture, as it dwarfs the increases by other households. While
the changes in exports of local off-farm labour are practically the same in both
simulations, the differences in migration and agricultural exports reflect the effect
of the stronger specialisation of the households made possible by the land market.
It is also notable that with a land market, although the picture at the level of
individual households is different, the village as a whole unlike in the situation
without a village market increases migration by a larger extent than the supply of
agricultural products. This would correspond to prior expectations regarding the
impact of a relatively strong decrease in agricultural prices as compared to migrant
wages. It can also be seen, however, that the magnitude of this outcome very much
depends on the calibration of the factor allocation functions for migration. If, for
example, the calibration for the low income household of the high migration group
would be less elastic, it would show a weaker migration response. This might
reverse the picture.
On the import side, substantial differences between the two land market regimes
can be found with respect to the commodities which are used as intermediate
inputs. While imports of capital intermediates decrease by -0.08% in the situation
without a land market, they are by -0.29% lower with a land market. This is
caused by the reduction in demand for this input from the high and low income
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Table 7.28.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village trade, equal migration responses
(quantities, % change against baseline).
Land market closure: Land No land
market market
Exports
Migrant labour 0.28 0.20
Formal local off-farm labour -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm labour -0.54 -0.55
Agricultural outputs 0.26 0.46
Imports
Capital intermediates -0.29 -0.08
Imported labour 0.20 -0.06
Food of plant origin -0.23 -0.24
Other food 0.00 0.00
Non-food -0.90 -0.91
Services -1.12 -1.08
households of the high migration group, which overcompensates the increase in
demand by the remaining households (Table 7.22). The same effect is visible in
case of the services commodity.
Interestingly, village imports of farm labour increase with a land market, al-
though relative changes in demand for this input at the household level are the
same as for capital and services. As Table 7.1 shows, however, the high and low
income households of the high migration group happen to have the lowest shares
of labour in the quantity of the aggregated input. Therefore, the reduction in
demand by these households has a lower weight for the village and imports rise.
This also reverses the reduction observed in the situation without a land market.
The development of the imports of consumption commodities reflects the changes
in consumption demand. Imports of food of plant origin, the non-food commod-
ity and services decline by between -0.23% and -1.12% under both calibrations.
Imports of other food remain constant. As the differences in changes in consump-
tion demand are small between the simulations for the two land market regimes,
changes in imports are also virtually the same.
Given that income levels of the households are differently affected under the
two land market regimes, it is interesting to contemplate the changes in poverty
and inequality in the village. As Table 7.29 shows, however, the poverty impacts
of trade reform are identical in both situations. Thus, the differences in income
changes have not been sufficient to affect the values of the poverty measures.
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Table 7.29.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village income, poverty and inequality;
equal migration responses.
Scenario: Base Trade liberalisation
Land market closure: Land No land
market market
Total village incomea 0.0 -1.38 -1.39
Poverty indices
P0 (low) 0.220 0.220 0.220
P0 (high) 0.447 0.449 0.449
P1 (low) 0.049 0.050 0.050
P1 (high) 0.105 0.107 0.107
P2 (low) 0.018 0.018 0.018
P2 (high) 0.043 0.044 0.044
Gini coefficient % 29.410 29.466 29.493
a %-change against baseline.
In case of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, the differences between
the land market regimes have a perceivable impact. In the situation with a land
market, the inequality enhancing effect of trade reform is somewhat dampened.
The Gini coefficient rises to 29.466%, which is lower than the increase to 29.493%
obtained without a land market.
7.4.2.2. Effects of Different Migration Responses
The discussion up to this point has elaborated the differences between the two land
market regimes, which arise in the simulations with the calibrations for equal mi-
gration responses. In order to present the effects of different migration responses,
this part contrasts the results from the simulation runs carried out with the closure
for a village land market and the two calibrations for equal and different migration
responses. To avoid repetitions and to present a more compact analysis, not all
variables are considered.
7.4.2.2.1. Household Level Impacts I
Table 7.30 presents selected results on household income and welfare obtained
from the simulations carried out with the presence of a land market. The upper
part contains the results from the simulation with the calibration for equal migra-
tion responses, the bottom part those with different migration responses. When
comparing the results of the two simulations, small but visible differences can be
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Table 7.30.: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on per capita income and
expenditure, with land market (values, % change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.14 -1.39 -1.54 -1.41 -1.44 -1.77
Remittances -1.40 -1.39 -1.34 -1.11 -1.21 1.63
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.87 -1.87 -1.92 -1.79 -1.90 -1.91
Agriculture -2.51 -2.43 -1.99 -3.27 -2.43 -2.82
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -2.22 -1.89 0.64 -6.06 -1.90 -3.73
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.27
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Income
Net income -1.11 -1.36 -1.49 -1.38 -1.42 -2.26
Remittances -1.31 -1.31 -1.29 -1.14 -1.29 7.02
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.89 -1.88 -1.94 -1.81 -1.91 -1.92
Agriculture -2.48 -2.39 -1.90 -3.12 -2.34 -4.29
Household welfare
EV (yuan per capita) -1.78 -1.52 1.38 -5.09 -1.25 -10.38
EV (% of initial expenditure) -0.03 -0.07 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.63
found. The introduction of different migration responses in the second simulation
has the consequence that five out of the six households experience slightly weaker
net income losses. The exception is the low income household of the low migra-
tion group, which has stronger income reductions in the simulation with different
migration responses.
It can be seen that this outcome for the first five households is mainly a conse-
quence of weaker reductions in agricultural income. For all these households, the
decline in income from this source is lower with different migration responses. In-
come of the low income household of the high migration group from these sources,
in contrast, shrinks by larger magnitudes.
As is shown below (Table 7.31), the more elastic calibration of the migration
functions of the high migration households causes a very strong positive migra-
tion response of the low income household of that group. In the consequence,
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this household makes land available to all other households. These households
therefore can expand their levels of the agricultural activity more or reduce it to a
lesser extent than in the simulation with equal migration responses. Hence, they
incur lower losses of farm income.
Regarding income from remittances, the change in the calibration also leads
to differences in the simulation results. Due to their less elastic migration re-
sponses, the low migration households are slower to draw out of migration under
the calibration with different migration responses (Table 7.31). Therefore, they
have less pronounced reductions in income from that activity. In case of these
households, this contributes to the differences in net income changes between the
two simulations.
Similarly, the low income household of the high migration group shows a much
more positive migration response to the policy shock, which leads to a stronger
increase in remittances. In case of the high and middle income households of the
high migration group, however, the picture is more complex. A weaker decline in
shadow wages lets these households respond less positively to the migration shock
and their remittances income is reduced more than in the simulation with equal
migration responses.
The explained changes in net income levels are materialised in welfare losses
which are smaller than in the simulation with equal migration responses. Fur-
thermore, the household which has welfare gains, is even better off. Once again,
the low income household of the high migration group represents the exception:
the household is more negatively affected with respect to both measures.
Table 7.31 shows selected impacts of trade reform on the production side of
the households. Regarding the time worked in migration, differences in return
migration between the two household groups are less pronounced with different
migration responses (again with the exception of the low income high migration
household). The households of the low migration group return home less than
before. The migration responses of the high and middle income households of
the low migration group are weaker. As said above, this is caused by a lower
decline in the shadow wage which unfolds a stronger effect due to the more elastic
calibration of the migration function of these households. The middle income
household even migrates less.
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Table 7.31.: Production impacts of trade liberalisation, with land market (% change
against baseline).
Calibration: Equal migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 0.06 0.03 2.83
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.48 -0.58 -0.60
Agriculture
Labour -0.18 0.08 2.12 -3.19 0.15 -2.35
Land 0.36 0.70 3.30 -3.58 0.70 -1.19
Capital intermediates 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Imported labour 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Services 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Net land rentals
Net area rent in 4.54 - - -46.60 5.09 -36.78
Net area rent out - -95.10 -70.01 - - -
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.05 -1.97 -1.45 -2.96 -2.04 -1.42
Land -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58 -2.58
Agricultural outputs and sales
Outputs 0.27 0.56 3.07 -3.51 0.59 -1.43
Sales 0.76 1.54 6.31 -5.03 1.35 -1.40
Calibration: Different migration responses
Migration group: Low migration High migration
Income level: High Middle Low High Middle Low
Factor allocation and input use
Migration -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 0.03 -0.12 8.29
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.57 -0.57 -0.62 -0.49 -0.59 -0.61
Agriculture
Labour -0.02 0.24 2.61 -2.45 0.55 -9.30
Land 0.88 1.14 4.12 -2.52 1.43 -7.95
Capital intermediates 0.72 0.94 3.84 -2.50 1.26 -8.23
Imported labour 0.72 0.94 3.84 -2.50 1.26 -8.23
Services 0.72 0.94 3.84 -2.50 1.26 -8.23
Net land rentals
Net area rent in 11.00 - - -32.80 10.46 -246.44
Net area rent out - -154.66 -87.55 - - -
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -1.76 -1.76 -1.20 -2.71 -1.79 -1.19
Land -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64
Agricultural outputs and sales
Outputs 0.72 0.94 3.84 -2.50 1.26 -8.23
Sales 1.40 2.13 7.62 -3.43 2.31 -11.31
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The low income high migration household shows the largest differences as com-
pared to the simulations with equal migration responses. The time worked in
migration increases by 8.29%, almost three times the value of the first simulation.
Again, this is a strong effect of the decline in the shadow wage, rooted in the
elastic calibration of the utility term of the migration function of this household.
In order to cover the labour requirements for such an expansion in migration, the
household reduces the time worked in agriculture by -9.30% and uses similarly
less land.
As this land becomes available on the village market, all other households use
more land than in the simulation with equal migration responses, or reduce their
land use less. These changes in land use are also reflected in the village price of
land and the changes in land rentals. The low income high migration household
shifts from renting in land to renting out. This causes that the land rental rate
decreases more in the second simulation which in turn allows the other households
to rent in even more land or rent out less. The middle income household of the
low migration group even ceases to rent out land and turns to renting in.
The fact that more land is available in the simulation with different migration
responses also affects the changes in the time allocated to farming. The five house-
holds which use more land in the simulation with different migration responses
than in the one with equal responses reduce the time worked on the farm to a
lower extent or can expand it more. This prepares the ground for the weaker
declines in agricultural incomes of these households described above.
The differences in input demand by the agricultural activities between the two
simulations are manifested in the changes in farm outputs as reported in Table
7.25. The low income high migration household reduces its output much more
than before. The remaining households, in turn, increase outputs by a higher
margin or at least reduce it less. Marketed surplus changes accordingly (see Table
7.26).
7.4.2.2.2. Village Level Impacts I
The comparison of the simulated impacts of trade liberalisation on household
production under under the two different calibrations of the households’ migration
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Table 7.32.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village trade, with land market (quanti-
ties, % change against baseline).
Calibration: Equal Different
migration migration
Exports
Migrant labour 0.28 0.92
Formal local off-farm labour -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm labour -0.54 -0.55
Agricultural outputs 0.26 0.30
Imports
Capital intermediates -0.29 -0.21
Imported labour 0.20 0.64
behaviour shows that the adjustment of the calibration leads to differences in
factor allocation and production between the two simulations. As can be seen in
Table 7.32, these differences are also reflected in the results for village imports
and exports.
Mostly due to the stronger reaction of the low income household in the high
migration group, the increase in migration from the village becomes more pro-
nounced. While migration in the simulation with equal migration responses is
by 0.28% higher after trade reform, this increase rises to 0.92% in the simulation
with different migration responses. Similarly, the increase in agricultural exports
is 0.64%, up from 0.20%.
The differences in the changes in imports of intermediate inputs reflect the
higher levels of agricultural production in the simulation with different migration
responses. The decline in capital inputs is reduced from -0.29% to 0.21%. Imports
of labour increase by 0.64%, as compared to 0.20%.
Regarding poverty, however, the change in the calibration has no effect on the
simulation results (see Table 7.33). This, along with the only minor differences
between the changes in total village income, implies that the differences in income
changes are not sufficient to change the overall picture of poverty in the village as
a whole.
Turning to inequality, the increase in the Gini coefficient is slightly more pro-
nounced in the simulation with different migration responses. This is a result of
the smaller net income losses of the high and middle income households and the
higher reduction in income of the low migration household in the high migration
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Table 7.33.: Impact of trade liberalisation on village income, poverty and inequality,
with land market.
Scenario: Base Trade liberalisation
Calibration: Equal Different
migration migration
Total village incomea 0.0 -1.38 -1.39
Poverty indices
P0 (low) 0.220 0.220 0.220
P0 (high) 0.447 0.449 0.449
P1 (low) 0.049 0.050 0.050
P1 (high) 0.105 0.107 0.107
P2 (low) 0.018 0.018 0.018
P2 (high) 0.043 0.044 0.044
Gini coefficient 29.410 29.466 29.492
a %-change against baseline.
group.
7.4.2.2.3. Assessment I
As can be seen, the attempt to incorporate different assumptions on households’
migration behaviour again brings about only small, albeit perceivable, differences
with respect to most of the more aggregate variables such as net household income,
consumption expenditure, welfare, village trade or inequality and poverty.
Regarding the factor allocation of the households, however, the differences be-
come more significant. This is in particular the case for migration and agricultural
production, including land rentals. In the consequence, the associated village level
variables are also affected. This suggests that the differences in the labour mi-
gration behaviour may well play a role for the outcome of a particular reform.
This is all the more true for reforms which entail larger changes in relative prices.
Also, if the primary focus of the modelling effort is different, say, for example, on
the impacts of a reform on agricultural output, the current set-up of the model
can help to shed light on important aspects of the interplay between migration,
land markets and agricultural production. It might be of great interest, however,
to find a better calibration of the households’ factor allocation functions for off-
farm labour which might yield better results and which could help to control the
strong effects of the shadow wage which occur in particular in cases of more elastic
specifications of the utility terms.
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7.4.2.3. Assessment of the Role of a Land Market
At this point, it becomes possible to summarize the above discussions of the
simulation results obtained under the assumption of an existent village land rental
market. The section starts with a short general evaluation of the results from the
model with this second land market closure and proceeds to provide an assessment
of the role of the land market.
By and large, the results correspond to prior expectations. Net incomes as well
as overall welfare are negatively affected by the trade reforms and impacts are more
severe for low income households. The patterns of the households’ migration re-
sponses appear to make sense. Low migration households return from migration
whereas high migration households tend to work more outside the province. In this
context, the result that people work less in local off-farm activities as compared
to migration is in line with the fact that local wages decline relatively more than
migrant wages. It is, however, somewhat surprising that some households again
get more involved into farming, whereas agricultural prices are affected most neg-
atively by the policy changes. The discussion of the corresponding results shows
that simulation outcomes here are strongly driven by the adjustments in the prices
for household labour and land which take place in the context of the households’
adjustment to the price shock. In parts, these results are unexpected but cannot
be discarded as unrealistic.
In general, simulation results again are in line with those obtained from the
national CGE analysis by Zhai and Hertel (2010). Poverty as well as inequality
increases, although poverty effects are weaker in the village equilibrium model. At
a more detailed level, returns to agricultural labour as well as land decline in both
simulations. The effect for agricultural labour (if comparable) is about the same in
both models, but the village model leads to smaller decreases in case of land (-2.6%
against -3.5%). Differences, however, are small. In accordance with the study by
Zhai and Hertel (2010), the village model predicts an increase in migration from
the village. The rises in migration by 0.28% and 0.92%, respectively, from the
village model compare to 0.1% for unskilled labour and 1.3% for semi-skilled
labour in the CGE model. The village model, however, shows that this migration
response may not be uniform among households, but some might return home
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while others migrate more.
In the course of the comparison of the two sets of simulations—those with a
village land market and those without—the implications and relevance of the dif-
ferent land market regimes are discussed. Unsurprisingly, the impact of a land
market is most visible in the context of the factor allocation to agricultural pro-
duction. The two households which decreased their demand for land most in
the situation without a land market, i.e. those with the strongest decline in the
shadow price for land, now start to make land available on the village market.
This benefits also other households which can draw more land into farming and
thereby expand their levels of agricultural production. On the other hand, house-
holds which tend to migrate more in the situation without a land market do so
more easily if such a market is present.
At the level of household income and welfare changes this translates into small
differences between the simulations with and without a land market. With re-
spect to net income, those which can increase the use of land are better off with
a land market, those which reduce it are worse off in terms of net income. As a
consequence, similar differences appear in the welfare impacts of the reform: low
migration households as well as middle income household of the high migration
group are better off with a land market, the other two, which reduce their land
use, suffer higher welfare losses in terms of EV. This happens because their prefer-
ences with respect to labour allocation let the two households put more emphasis
on migration which offers lower monetary returns than agricultural production.
Thereby, net incomes are reduced further than under the assumption of a missing
land market. It has been argued that this behaviour may be fully rational, even
if it looks counter-intuitive at the first sight. In this context, doubts about the
adequacy of the EV for the current analysis have been raised.
A further question of interest in terms of income and welfare is whether the
land market in the second set of simulations supports the poorer strata of the
village population in coping with trade reform. Regarding the effect on impacts
on net incomes and welfare, the picture is mixed. The low income household of
the low migration group is hurt less by trade reform and can even increase its
welfare, albeit by a very small amount. The low income household of the high
migration group, in contrast, looses more with a land market, both in terms of net
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income and welfare. The comment made above on the use of the EV as a welfare
measure, however, applies here, as well.
As regards to the consequences of a land rental market for the simulation out-
comes at the village level, several statements can be made. First, as the amounts
of migrant labour exported from the village are higher with a land market, its
presence apparently facilitates migration at the village level. It should be noted,
however, that a large part of this result comes from the strong migration response
of the low income high migration household. Agricultural exports, in comparison,
are lower with a land market. This result, however, again is related to the steep
decline in farm outputs by the household mentioned.
Second, in the present model, the existence of a land market has no perceivable
impact on the poverty outcomes of trade reform. Results for the poverty measures
are the same for both sets of simulations. Regarding inequality, however, the land
market sightly dampens the inequality enhancing impact of the reform. This latter
effect, although small, certainly warrants more investigation into the issue. It
may be particularly interesting to assess the impact of a land market if the strong
changes in the low income household of the high migration group are controlled
for. The latter might be achieved, for example, by choosing a calibration which
assumes less elastic migration responses for this household.
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8. Conclusions and Outlook
In the course of three decades after the onset of economic reforms, China has
undergone an enormous economic and social transformation. Arguably one of the
greatest successes is a substantial reduction in poverty in the country. The current
situation, however, is characterised by increasing tensions caused among others by
rising rural-urban and inland-coastal disparities as well as by a divergent devel-
opment of the different sectors of the economy. Furthermore, pockets of poverty
remain, in particular in rural areas. At the same time, increasing inequality makes
the fight against poverty ever more difficult. In this context, further trade lib-
eralisation can play a highly important role, not least due to the comparatively
strong impacts it may unfold on the agricultural sector and on China’s rural areas
as a whole.
Against this background, the present work presents a village level analysis car-
ried out in order to study the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty and in-
equality in a rural community in Guizhou Province in South-western China. A vil-
lage equilibrium model is developed and embedded into a macro-microsimulation
framework. The salient feature of the village model is an innovative approach
towards the modelling of labour allocation, putting special emphasis on migra-
tion. It is based on a composite utility function, which allows taking into ac-
count households’ preferences towards the work in different occupations. Through
this approach, differences in migration responses, which stem from differences in
household demographics as well as relative income levels, are explicitly taken into
consideration in the model.
The model is applied to a scenario of unilateral trade liberalisation in China.
Overall, four simulations are carried out. Two different calibrations of the migra-
tion behaviour are implemented. Under the first calibration, all households have
identical own-wage responses in migration. Under a second calibration, house-
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holds with higher shares of dependants exhibit weaker own-wage responses. This
incorporates the assumption of lower propensities to migrate of these households.
For each of the two calibrations, the impact of trade reforms is simulated once
with the assumption of an absent land market and once allowing for land rentals
within the village.
Overall, as a result of the relatively small price changes brought about by the
policy scenario, the simulations find only comparatively weak impacts of trade
liberalisation on the village. According to the initial patterns of trade protection—
a relatively high support to the agricultural sector—returns to land as well as
to agricultural labour decrease. Along with generally lower off-farm wages, this
causes losses in income for all households and leads to slight increases in poverty
in the village. Higher relative income losses for low income households result in
rising inequality due to trade reform.
As intended, the specification of the labour allocation behaviour of the house-
holds in the model leads to differences in labour supply responses, in particular in
case of migration. Overall, households with higher shares of dependants tend to
return home whereas those with less dependants respond more positively to the
enhanced incentives to migrate. Thereby, differences arise also within migration
groups as low income households appear to have a stronger affinity to migration
and migrate more or return home less than other households.
Not surprisingly, the introduction of a village land rental market into the model
leads to more pronounced adjustments in agricultural production. At this, a rela-
tionship between migration and land rentals can be observed: households which
have stronger and more positive migration responses make land available on the
village market, whereas others increase their land use. In the consequence, the
possibility to trade land within the village obviously facilitates migration and
leads to a higher level of migration from the village. This affects the impacts of
trade reform on households’ income levels by accentuating the differences between
migration groups already observed in the set of simulations without a land mar-
ket. As monetary returns from migration are comparatively low, low migration
households are less negatively affected than without such a market. High migra-
tion households on average have to accept higher income losses. In spite of these
differences at the household level, the land market has no perceivable impact on
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the poverty outcome of reform. The increase in inequality, in turn, gets slightly
weaker with a land market, pointing towards an inequality reducing effect of such
a change in institutions.
With respect to the different calibrations of the households’ migration be-
haviour, differences mostly appear at the level of the households’ labour allo-
cation. Higher level outcomes, such as changes in income, expenditure or welfare,
let alone village level variables, are affected only marginally. The exception is
one household whose already comparatively strong migration responses under the
calibration with equal migration responses are accentuated substantially.
8.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Village Model
The discussions in the respective sections show that the overall quality of the out-
come of the model simulations is acceptable. Both with respect to the directions
of change and the magnitude of the impacts of trade reform results correspond
to prior expectations and are in line with results reported by macro-level studies.
This statement refers not only to the study by Zhai and Hertel (2010), which
serves as the source of the policy scenario, but can also be extended to other CGE
studies of trade liberalisation in China as are discussed in earlier sections of this
work.
Nonetheless, it is sensible to make an assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the village model. In this context, the depiction of the labour allocation
behaviour based on a composite utility function, which represents the innovative
element of the model, is of particular importance.
In general, the model proves to be capable of depicting differences in migration
behaviour. Thereby, migration can be identified as a factor which explains differ-
ent reform outcomes at the household level. Thus, a principal objective of this
work is achieved. It can also be demonstrated that the approach offers substantial
(albeit not full) flexibility in the calibration of households’ occupational choices.
This aspect definitely represents one of the strengths of the model.
As regarding the households’ labour migration behaviour in the model, it is
worthwhile to take another closer look. In general terms, the simulated policy
scenario consists of changes in price incentives, which favour migration over local
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Table 8.1.: Migration responses, parameter values of migration functions and depen-
dency ratios.
Low migration High migration
High Middle Low High Middle Low
Migration responsea -0.22 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 2.29
Disutility 4.39 3.97 1.27 1.13 0.84 -0.62
κh 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01
Dependency ratio 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.17 0.21 0.22
a %change with calibration for equal migration responses and no land market.
activities and agricultural production. As desired, low migration households show
a tendency to migrate less than high migration households, which appear to re-
spond more positively to the migration shock. These differences in the migration
responses mostly arise from the mathematics of the labour allocation functions
in the households’ migration activities. Further, a substitution effect in leisure
consumption which causes the low migration households to reduce their overall
labour supply plays a role.
In this context, a connection between the shares of dependants in the house-
holds, the sizes of the disutility terms, the value of the share parameters in the
remittances functions and the migration responses can be identified. Table 8.1
puts the households’ migration responses obtained from the simulation with equal
migration responses and without a land market against selected parameter values
of the migration labour allocation functions and the dependency ratios. It can be
seen that the low migration households on average have higher dependency ratios,
higher disutility terms and higher values of κh. These households also appear to
be less inclined to migrate and indeed withdraw labour from migration. High
migration households, in contrast, have lower disutility terms and lower share pa-
rameters in the remittances functions. These households tend to migrate more.
Hence, the households’ migration behaviour so far appears to be theoretically con-
sistent, as lower marginal disutilities lead to more positive migration responses.
At this, the higher shares of income migrants of the low migration group send
home would only underline the stronger ties between migrants and their families,
which may exist.
The pattern, which arises between the two migration groups is resembled within
the groups. In both groups, the low income households respond more positively
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to the policy shock and reduce migration by a lower amount or expand it more
than the middle and high income households. Considering the differences in the
sizes of the disutility terms, this behaviour again is consistent: the lower the
marginal disutility from migration, the more positive the revealed attitude of the
households toward migration.
It is, however, more difficult to defend the result that there also appears a
positive correlation between the migration response and the dependency ratio
as well as a negative one with the share parameter of the remittances function
within the migration groups. Why should households, which have relatively more
dependants, stick more to migration? And why do households, which receive lower
shares of the migrants’ incomes, i.e. which have lower marginal returns from this
activity, respond more positively to incentives to migrate?
An answer to these questions would be given when recognising that there is a
strong link between the magnitudes of the migration responses and the changes in
overall labour supply of the households. As is discussed in Section 7.4.1, poorer
households tend to have higher dependency ratios and therefore might be less able
to afford income losses. Hence, they tend to reduce the time spent in productive
activities less than their richer peers.
On the other hand, even with higher income losses for the poorer households,
the observed behaviour could be defended by invoking a hypothesis of the NELM
according to which migration would constitute an element of a strategy to di-
versify income sources and a means for the households to cope with risk (Stark,
1982; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999). Thereby, it is not even necessary to
explicitly model risk, as the utility considerations incorporated into the model in
principle include all concerns of the households related to migration. Thus, all
in all the results of the simulations can be considered to be meaningful from a
theoretical point of view.
In this context, two other related aspects of the labour market behaviour of
the households as simulated by the model are worth emphasising again. First,
the more stylised simulations presented in Section 7.2.3 reveal strong cross-wage
responses in migration. These cross-wage responses are caused by strong effects of
changes in shadow wages in the migration functions. In cases in which local wages
or prices for agricultural output increase ceteris paribus, households respond by
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drawing labour out of migration. Thereby, households of the low migration group
tend to retain more family labour in migration whereas high migration households
return home more quickly (recall Table 7.7). Furthermore, within the migration
groups, low income households, i.e. those with lower marginal disutilities, lower
values of κh and higher dependency ratios, are also faster to draw labour out of
the migration activity as a response to improved economic conditions at home.
Once more, two lines of argumentation can be used to explain the observed
phenomena. The first argument again involves the NELM hypothesis already
mentioned in the context of the explanation of the differences between the two
migration groups. According to this argument, the slower return of household
with higher dependency ratios would form part of the mentioned strategy of the
households to diversify economic risk: Following their objective to ensure a more
constant flow of remittances back to the households, the low migration households
may be less willing to give up jobs at the destinations.
The second argument is concerned with the differences in cross-wage responses
within the migration groups. Here, low income households, apart from lower
marginal disutilities due to the lower share parameters in the remittances func-
tions, also experience lower marginal income losses when reducing the time worked
in migration. Thus, they would be more inclined to reduce the time worked in
migration as soon as alternative opportunities to earn income arise or present ones
improve. From a theoretical point of view, this interpretation implies that mone-
tary aspects would dominate the households’ utility considerations. Furthermore,
it would entail the questionable assumption that the household exerts full control
over the labour supply decisions of the migrant. While of course rooted in the
specification of the theoretical model with a utility function for the household
alone and not one for both the household and the migrant, this latter notion can
be considered as overly simplifying.
The second aspect to be discussed in the context of the households’ labour mar-
ket behaviour concerns the labour market responses of the low income household
in the high migration group. In principle, the reactions of this household to wage
and price shocks in general fit into the patterns described and discussed above.
When compared to the remaining households, however, they appear to be overly
pronounced. Apart from appearing little realistic, this is in particular worrying
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as, given the small number of representative households in the model, extreme
behaviour by a single household can well drive (some of) the village level results
obtained from policy simulations.
A last concrete issue regarding the depiction of the households’ labour allocation
in the model refers to the problem of limited flexibility. In the current version
of the model, certain aspects are still determined by others. This concerns, for
example, the mutual exclusiveness of simultaneously setting particular values for
own-wage and cross-wage elasticities in the labour allocation functions. Similarly,
as no utility considerations are attached to agricultural production, allocation of
household labour to the farm is driven by the households’ labour supply reactions
in the remaining activities in the current model.
These considerations lead to a more general assessment of the utility function
based approach towards the modelling of migration taken in this study. Most
generally and as already mentioned, the model shows that migration matters for
the outcome of policy reforms and that it is worthwhile to take this aspect into
account in a simulation analysis. At this, the approach developed has proven
capable of capturing differences in the migration behaviour of different household
groups.
The simulations under the calibration schemes chosen yield results, which at
least from a theoretical point of view, can be defended. The quality of the model
results from an empirical point of view, however, still remains an open question.
Due to the still rather experimental character of the present work, a possible
empirical weakness of the model, can be fully defended. That said, and as is
explained below, there are several conceivable routes to improve the empirical
quality of the model.
Apart from the treatment of the households’ labour allocation behaviour, other
aspects of the model also deserve some discussion. A stated goal of the mod-
elling effort was to allow for specific local market conditions and to introduce a
substantial level of disaggregation at the household level in order to take into ac-
count differences in factor endowments, production structures and consumption
patterns in the model. As regarding the former, the modelling of a village land
rental market highlights the importance of such an institution for the nature of
the outcome of policy reforms. The assumption of a perfectly neoclassical market,
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however, still constitutes a substantial deviation from the institutional reality in
the village and would certainly require further improvement.
In the depiction of product markets, a number of simplifying assumptions are
made, as well. Most notably, perfect price transmission from the rest of the
country is assumed. Furthermore, the SAM structure as well as the model treat
sales within the village and outside the village as being the same. The assumptions
made can be defended against the background of the analyses of marketing and
commercialisation of the villagers’ outputs and a number of studies on market
integration and price transmission in China. On the other hand, a more thorough
look at the transmission of prices may still reveal that the village is not perfectly
integrated. In this case, the changes in relative prices could be different. For
example, it might be possible that agricultural prices as assumed are transmitted
well. The development of wages following a policy shock, however, due to the
characteristics of the local and regional labour market could be different than
assumed. Apparently, this would affect the character of the policy shock.
Regarding the level of disaggregation and the consideration of specific household
characteristics in the simulation, the model definitely succeeds in that the repre-
sentative household groups of the model consist of a comparatively small number
of households (around 50), thus offering a disaggregate view on the village com-
munity. It is shown that households with different demographic characteristics
and different levels of income are affected differently by the simulated policy re-
forms. Thereby, results appear to be driven by the households’ labour allocation
behaviour, which in turn can be linked to the mentioned characteristics of the
households. The role of other aspects, such as factor endowments, production
structures and consumption patterns, however, at the first sight is eclipsed by the
consequences of the relatively pronounced patterns in labour market behaviour
which emerge. They do, however, contribute to a certain extent to ultimate
changes in net incomes and consumption expenditure as well as to the household
specific welfare outcomes of the reform.
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8.2. Policy Implications
In spite of the several qualifications made regarding the village model, some careful
policy implications can be identified from the results obtained. The first impor-
tant insight gained from the modelling exercise is that trade liberalisation has
adverse impacts both on poverty and on the distribution of income in the vil-
lage. Against this prospect, the authorities in charge should seek to improve
the social safety net available to the population before embarking on further re-
forms which go in the direction as those simulated in this study. Although this
recommendation amounts to little more than the standard recommendation of
Post-Washington Consensus thinking (Marangos, 2009), it cannot be overempha-
sised in the Chinese context where the social security system still is considered to
be of low quality and to provide too low levels of support (Lu and Feng, 2008)
and where there is a permanent menace of social tensions. The result from the
model that poorer households are affected more negatively in terms of net income
losses only underlines this statement.
In addition, a careful approach to further trade reforms should be taken. In any
case it would be preferable to undertake further reform steps only in the context of
multilateral trade reform, which, as has been shown by other studies, would entail
more positive impacts on the agricultural sector. Given the ambitious unilateral
liberalisation China has carried out in the context of its accession to the WTO,
further reform steps are anyway more likely to take place only in a multilateral
context of multilateral liberalisation. On the other hand, given the current state of
the WTO Doha Round, it is questionable how likely at all a multilateral agreement
in the near future would be.
The comparative analysis of the simulation results obtained under the two as-
sumptions regarding the presence of a land market gives hints that a reform of
the land rental regime would partly offset the inequality enhancing effects of trade
liberalisation. Furthermore, the possibility to rent out land without restrictions
would facilitate migration by households that wish to leave the village. In the
consequence, this would lead to higher levels of rural-urban migration. Thus, if
the patterns observed in the model would prove to be true for the village as well as
for rural China as a whole, land markets could contribute to reduce rural-urban
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disparities and should be assessed positively. On the other hand, this positive
assessment should be considered against the observation that households which
migrate more would be more negatively affected in terms of income losses in a
situation with a land market. The question remains, however, how strongly this
effect should be weighted as the observed outcome is a result of the households’
stronger preferences towards migration.
A highly important result of the simulations is that clear differences in the
impacts of trade liberalisation arise between the two migration groups as well as
within them. The fact that the former as well as the latter can be traced back
to different migration responses clearly shows that the migration behaviour of
rural households matters for the outcome of trade (and other policy) reforms.
This underlines the importance of the rural-urban linkages provided by migration
and suggests bearing in mind these linkages when assessing future policy reforms.
Lacking a sound counter-factual with fully identical migration responses, however,
it is difficult to arrive at clearer policy recommendations here.
8.3. Outlook
The preceding discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach to
village modelling taken in the present study points out some promising directions
for future research. Apparently, one important direction concerns the treatment
of labour allocation and, in particular, migration in the model. As the present
work overall constitutes a first step towards the consideration of utility aspects of
labour market participation in the context of a village equilibrium model, there
is still substantial room for improvement.
A first area of the critique raised concerns the empirical quality as well as the
theoretical consistency of the results obtained for the households’ labour alloca-
tion. A part of this critique is rooted in the in parts strong reactions of a particular
household in the model. From a technical point of view, these strong reactions
are explained by strong cross-wage effects on migration, which stem from what
is called an elastic calibration of the utility term in the household’s migration
function.
A possible way to tackle this problem would be to choose a different calibration
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scheme for the migration functions in the model. Such a scheme would involve
a less elastic own-wage reaction in migration of the household concerned. While
an ad hoc calibration aimed at dampening the strong reactions of this household
could be readily accomplished, it would be more desirable to do it in a theoretically
convincing manner.
One possibility of doing so would be to introduce differences in the own-wage
responses to migration within the migration groups, for example by giving higher
own-wage elasticities to the high income households and lower ones to the low in-
come households. More precisely, the size of the own-wage elasticities could be set
to values which move in proportion to the share parameters κh of the remittances
functions. The underlying assumption would be that households which have lower
marginal monetary returns from migration are less inclined to invest more labour
time in this activity, even if the corresponding wages rise.
Due to the negative correlation between κh and the dependency ratios, this
intuitively would also fit with expectations regarding the influence of household
demographics on the migration behaviour: households with relatively more de-
pendants would migrate less. Another implication of this type of calibration,
however, would also be that households with lower marginal disutilities from mi-
gration have lower propensities to migrate (and vice versa). This points to a
conflict between two alternative strategies of the calibration of the households’
migration behaviour: one following considerations in which monetary aspects re-
ceive a higher weight or a second in which utility aspects play a greater role.
In any case, a better empirical foundation for the calibration of the labour
market behaviour would add a great deal to the quality of the model. To this end,
a modelling study as undertaken here can be supplemented with empirical studies
of the labour market behaviour of rural households. In this context, different
types of studies suggest themselves. One direction of work could seek to obtain
econometric estimates of labour supply parameters following the approach by
Sicular and Zhao (2004). Most ideally, such work would be tailored to the village
model, for example in terms of the aggregation of the productive activities.
Another suggestion would involve exploring the actual behaviour of migrant
households in situations as those simulated in the model. Questions about the
(hypothetical) reactions of migrants and households to relative wage and price
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changes as delivered by trade liberalisation would be of central importance here.
A third line of work could start at a much more fundamental point and seek to
shed light on the utility perceptions of households in the village regarding farm-
and off-farm employment, including migration. Such research would probably
start with qualitative surveys and would not least serve to assess the fundamental
assumption of increasingly negative marginal utility, which has been made in the
model.
An additional critique raised concerns the weight of the household and the mi-
grant in the decision making problem depicted by the model where the perspective
of the migrant is neglected. While this stems from the specification of the theo-
retical model with a utility function for the household alone and not one for both
the household and the migrant, this aspect can be considered as overly simplify-
ing. Consequently, it is certainly a good recommendation for further research on
village modelling to integrate a joint utility function for the household and the
migrant into the household modules. An example for an econometric application
of such a joint utility function can be found, for instance, in Hoddinott (1994).
Concerning the limitations in the flexibility of labour allocation, which are still
present in the model, the logical direction for future research would seek to obtain
a fully flexible depiction of households labour market behaviour. A conceivable
way of doing so, for example, would be to apply more flexible functional forms in
the labour utility component of the composite utility function. In the particular
case of agricultural production, the incorporation of a utility term into the labour
allocation functions for agriculture would add substantially to the flexibility of
the approach.
Going beyond the modelling of labour allocation, a further issue is related to the
depiction of the land market. As mentioned, the village land market closures in
the current model can only be considered to be a highly stylised representation of
reality. Hence, and not least in light of the ongoing political debate on China’s land
tenure regime, further work on this issue is certainly indicated. At this, it would
be particularly interesting to take into account interactions between migration
and the land market. A possible effect of migration on the land market would be,
for example, a higher demand for land due to increased income from remittances.
Next, the problem of market integration and price transmission represents a
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field for further research efforts. In addition to what is already done in this
work, further studies of price transmission to the village would provide a valuable
background for the depiction of the state of local output markets in the model.
Similarly, based on more detailed inquiries into the decisions of the village house-
holds regarding sales and purchases of farm commodities, involving, for example,
the presence of transaction costs, it would become possible to more accurately
model the market positions of the households (net-buyers, net-sellers, autarky).
Such efforts essentially would amount to an incorporation of the price band model
by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) into the model and would represent a fusion of
the approach presented in this study with the village model proposed by Kuiper
(2005), but could well go beyond that. The problem of wage changes mentioned
above also indicates further investigation on the functioning of national, regional
and local labour markets.
Further applications of the present model might also seek to improve the treat-
ment of agricultural production in the village model. Currently, for reasons related
to the labour market reactions, all agricultural production is aggregated into a
single agricultural activity. As the focus of the present study is on the allocation
of family labour between farming and different off-farm activities, this approach is
sufficient for that purpose. It may, however, become relevant to take into account
the substitutional relationships which exist between land intensive and labour
intensive crops. Accordingly, further efforts should be put into addressing this
problem.
Two additional aspects which, in spite of their relevance, have only received
a rudimentary treatment in the present study, merit additional consideration in
future research. These aspects are gifts and blood donations. As other studies of
the Guizhou villages highlight, both gifts and blood sales play a highly important
role for the village economy and for the livelihoods of the population. Blood
donation is identified by Xing et al. (2009) as a major source of cash income,
which is a particularly important element of the livelihood strategies of the poorer
population segments, but which also may result in adverse health impacts in the
longer run. Brown et al. (2010) find that spending on gifts is motivated by status
concerns, leading to potentially severe welfare implications, especially for poorer
households. Consequently, blood sales and gifts as well as their depiction in the
303
8. Conclusions and Outlook
village equilibrium model would be a promising and highly relevant direction for
further research.
The final recommendation for future research amounts to a call to apply the
model to different policy scenarios. As mentioned at several occasions throughout
the text, the price changes brought about by trade liberalisation are comparatively
small. When fed into a comparative-static modelling framework—as represented
by the village model—the overall impacts of these changes are also small. In order
to illustrate the mechanisms at work in the model, this might be sufficient. From
both a scientific and a policy point of view, however, more relevant scenarios are
in the waiting. As a first example, one may only mention the increasingly volatile
behaviour of food prices on the world market during the past years, which involves
changes by 100% or more within a few months. Such shocks may not only yield
much stronger results in the model, but also matter much more to the villagers
in Guizhou.
As a summary of the above discussion, it can be stated that the treatment of
labour allocation based on a composite utility function in an agricultural house-
hold model represents a novel way of the modelling of labour market behaviour
in village equilibrium models. Thereby, in spite of the qualifications made, the
approach offers substantial flexibility in the modelling of migration and other as-
pects of off-farm employment of rural households based on a sound theoretical
framework.
The simulations carried out show that the village model is capable of offering
important insights into the relevance of migration and differences in labour mar-
ket behaviour as a whole. At this, the efforts undertaken here still are of a rather
experimental nature. Nonetheless, the model already in its current set-up repre-
sents a highly useful tool for the thorough analysis of migration behaviour along
the lines of household demographics and income levels. It constitutes an excel-
lent source of hypotheses on the migration behaviour of rural households under
changing economic environments.
Due to its innovative character, the current work offers an important contri-
bution to the methodological development of village equilibrium modelling. By
providing a basic modelling framework, it paves the way for similar applications
in different settings. And finally, the approach to include household group specific
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non-monetary disutilities resulting from certain occupations in labour allocation
functions in a CGE model opens an interesting field for applications, which may
also extend to levels of higher regional aggregation.
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A. Contents of the Electronic
Annex
The electronic annex is enclosed as a CD and provides complementary information
to the present text.
Table A.1.: Contents of the electronic annex
Folder Description
Guimod 1.01 This folder contains the village equilibrium model. It includes the
GAMS code, data files as well as program files used for the analysis
of poverty and inequality in R.
SAM This folder contains the SAM for Changtian village, including the
coefficient matrix. Furthermore, it includes the R code used for
the compilation and balancing of the SAM.
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B. Measuring Poverty and
Inequality
The descriptive statistics on Changtian village presented in Chapter 3 as well as
the simulation analyses of Chapter 7 employ a number of measures of poverty and
inequality. The objective of this annex is to provide some background information
on the measures used.
For the measurement of poverty, three different indices, known as represen-
tatives of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty measures (Foster
et al., 1984), are used. The first of these indices is the poverty headcount index
P0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(yi < z) (B.1)
where N is the total population, yi the income or expenditure of individual i,
z a poverty line and I(·) an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if the
expression yi < z is true and a value of 0 otherwise. The poverty headcount index
measures the proportion of the population which lives below the poverty line, i.e.
the share of the poor in the population (Haughton and Khandker, 2009).
While being convenient in terms of data requirements and simplicity, the poverty
headcount index is not able to capture the extent to which the income or expen-
diture level of an individual falls short of the poverty line. That is, the index
does not take into account the intensity of poverty nor is it sensitive to changes in
income of expenditure levels of the poor, unless they pass the poverty threshold.
This might imply the risk that poverty reducing policies only focus on the most
wealthy among the poor, which would be easiest to be brought out of poverty
(Haughton and Khandker, 2009; Ray, 1998).
The second index used, the poverty gap index, addresses these issues by mea-
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suring the average income shortfall of the poor from the poverty line, expressing it
as a percentage of this poverty line (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). The poverty
gap index reads
P1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Gi
z
(B.2)
with the index function
Gi = (z − yi)× I(yi < z). (B.3)
According to Haughton and Khandker (2009), a common interpretation of the
poverty gap index is to take its value as the minimum cost of eliminating poverty.
The poverty headcount index and the poverty gap index share the drawback
that they both ignore the issue of inequality among the poor (Ray, 1998). It is
possible to take this relative deprivation among the poor into account by squaring
the poverty gap index, thus taking a weighted sum of the poverty gaps (Haughton
and Khandker, 2009). The resulting index, the third one used in this study, is the
poverty severity index
P2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
Gi
z
)2
. (B.4)
By elevating the poverty gap to the power of 2, a higher weight is put on cases
which fall farther below the poverty line (Haughton and Khandker, 2009).
For the measurement of inequality, the widely used Gini coefficient is applied.
The Gini coefficient takes the difference between all pairs of incomes or expendi-
tures and sums up the absolute differences which then is normalised by the square
of the population:
Gini = 12N2y¯
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
njnk|yj − yk| (B.5)
where y¯ is the mean income in the sample, m are distinct incomes or expenditures,
j and k are income classes and nj and nk are the number of individuals earning
the respective incomes (Ray, 1998). In the above form and when all incomes
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or expenditures are positive, the Gini coefficient takes a value between 0 and 1.
Thereby, 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality. However, following
common practise (see, for example, Ravallion and Chen, 2007) we multiply the
above formula by 100 to obtain values between 0 and 100:
Gini = 12N2y¯
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
njnk|yj − yk| × 100 (B.6)
The Gini coefficient fulfils the four criteria commonly formulated for measures
of income inequality, namely mean independence, population size independence,
symmetry, and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Haughton and Khandker,
2009).
The indices chosen represent only a small selection of a broad range of mea-
sures which are available. Although certainly more comprehensive and accurate
indicators can be found, those applied here have the great advantage of being in
widespread use and comparatively easy to generate. Taken together, they provide
a set of indicators which allow for a quick and convenient assessment of poverty
and inequality impacts of policy reforms and therefore are sufficient for the present
purpose.
From a technical point of view, the calculation of the poverty and inequality
measures requires the definition of a poverty line and the computation of a measure
of income or expenditure from the survey data. Regarding the poverty line, a low
poverty line of 668 Yuan and a high poverty line of 892 Yuan per capita and
year in 2004 prices have been chosen. These are the poverty lines used by Brown
et al. (2010) and Xing et al. (2009) in their analyses of poverty and inequality in
the Guizhou villages. The low poverty line reflects China’s official poverty line1.
The high poverty line, which has been introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2007),
corresponds to a daily consumption allowance of US$ 1.08. As the survey period
of the present study is 2006, the poverty lines by Xing et al. (2009) are further
adjusted by the development of the consumer price index for China (World Bank,
2010). Accordingly, the low poverty line used is 653 Yuan per capita and year.
The high poverty line becomes 871 Yuan.
1The official poverty line was defined as 300 Yuan per capita annual income in 1995 and
adjusted for inflation by the authors (Xing et al., 2009).
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With respect to the choice of the welfare measure, the present study also follows
the work by Brown et al. (2010) and Xing et al. (2009) and uses total annual per
capita consumption expenditure. This measure comprises all living expenditures
of the households except for expenditures on housing, durable goods, and wed-
dings/funerals of family members (Brown et al., 2010). Therefore, as the streams
of utility which originate from these latter items are neglected in particular the
results for the poverty indices have to be considered to represent likely upper
bounds of the actual levels of poverty.
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C. Model Sets
Table C.1.: Model sets (as in GAMS code).
Set Description
Activities A All activities
AC(A) Cobb-Douglas activities
AO(A) Off-farm work activities
AOM(A) Migration activities
AOL(A) Local off-farm activities
AOF(A) Formal local off-farm activities
AOI(A) Informal local off-farm activities
Commodities C All commodities
CI(C) Intermediate input commodities
CQ(C) Commodities produced by households
CD(C) Commodities consumed by households
CM(C) Commodities traded by households on the market
CN(C) Nontraded commodities consumed by households
CVNT(C) Village nontraded commodities
CVX(C) Village exported commodities
CVM(C) Village imported commodities
Factors F Factors
FU(F) Utility factors
FN(F) Non-utility factors
Households H All households
Cross-sets to map activities to households
HA(H,A) All household specific activities
HAC(H,A) Household Cobb-Douglas activities
HAO(H,A) Household off-farm activities
HAOL(H,A) Household local off-farm activities
HAOF(H,A) Household formal local off-farm activities to households
HAOI(H,A) Household informal local off-farm activities to households
HAOM(H,A) Household migration activities
Sets with household specific activities
HALMHI(A) Activities of low migration high income household
HALMMD(A) Activities of low migration middle household
HALMLO(A) Activities of low migration low household
HAHMHI(A) Activities of high migration high income household
HAHMMD(A) Activities of high migration middle income household
HAHMLO(A) Activities of high migration low income household
Table C.1 describes the sets of the village equilibrium model as used in the
GAMS code. The notation follows the convention of GAMS, i.e. XY(X) indicates
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that the set XY is a subset of X.
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D. Model Parameters and Variables
Table D.1.: Parameters.
Parameter Description
actfacshfah Share of activity a in use of factor f in household h
alphaah Efficiency parameter in CD production function
betafah Share parameter of CD production function
deltafah Exponent for labour in activity a in labour utility function
epsilonah Shift parameter in labour utility function
gammach Share parameter of Stone-Geary utility function
hactiveh Number of economically active members in household
hdepsh Number of dependants in household
hdepscal Scaling factor for dependants in household
hexpgifth Expenditure of household h on gifts
hexpshockh Expenditure of household h on shocks
hexpsih Expenditure of household h on savings
hobloodconsth Income of household h from blood sales
hoexpconsshh Share of household h of expenditure on construction
hogiftconsth Income of household h from gifts
hogovconsth Government transfers received by household h
hosiconsth Income of household h from savings
hoshoconsth Income of household h from shocks
icacah Share of intermediate input commodity c in quantity of
aggregate input in activity a of household h
ielastch Income elasticity of household h for commodity c
intaah Leontief Parameter for demand for aggregate intermediate
input by CD activity a of household h
ioqqqaach Share of commodity c in output by activity a of household h
ivashah Value-added coefficient of C-D activity a of household h
kappah Share parameter of remittances function of household h
lambdah Marginal utility of income of household h
pcscalh Scaling parameter for household per capita consumption in
the labour allocation function for migration
sigmach Per capita subsistence consumption quantity of commodity c
of household h
tp Time period covered by the model
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Table D.2.: Variables.
Variable Description
FDCfah Use of factor f by CD activity a in household h
FDDfah Use of factor f by off-farm work activity a in household h
FSHfh Household endowment with factor f
HEXPCh Consumption expenditure of household h
HEXPCONSh Expenditure of household h on construction
HEXPCPh Per-capita consumption expenditure of household h
HSh Number of persons (consumer equivalents) living in the household
PAah Price of activity a to household h
PDch Consumer price of commodity c to household h
PIch Price of intermediate input c to household h
PIAah Aggregate price of intermediate input in activity a of household h
PVAah Value-added price of activity a to household h
QAah Output of activity a in household h
QDch Per capita demand of household h for commodity c
QDTch Total demand of household h for commodity c
QINTach Demand of activity a in household h for intermediate commodity c
QINTAah Aggregate demand of activity a in household h for intermediate commodity c
QPch Quantity of commodity purchased by household h
QQch Quantity of commodity c produced by household h
QRch Net quantity of village traded commodity c rented by household h
QRMc Net quantity of village traded commodity c rented by migrated household
QSch Quantity of commodity c sold by household h
QVAah Quantity of value-added of C-D activity a of household h
QVMc Quantity of commodity c imported into the village
QVXc Quantity of commodity c exported out of the village
WALRASh Slack variables
WFfah Price for factor f in activity a of household h
WFV Village price for land
YHh Total income of household h
YRh Remittance income of household h
YT Total income of all households
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E. Derivation of a Price Shock for
Policy Simulations from National
Level CGE Results
The following Table E.1 provides additional information on the calculation on the
derivation of the trade liberalisation scenario used in the policy simulations. The
table gives detailed insights into the mapping of the national level CGE results
obtained from the study carried out by Zhai and Hertel (2010) to the survey data
and the subsequent aggregation of to the level of aggregation used in the village
model.
The first column of Table E.1 names the individual items as they appear in
the survey data. The second column gives evidence about the result(s) of the
national level CGE model which is assumed to correspond to the respective item.
For cases in which no direct correspondence between the items of the survey data
and the sector of the national CGE existed, assumptions have been made. These
assumptions are also explained in Column 2. The third column contains the price
shock expressed in percentage change terms as obtained by Zhai and Hertel (2010)
from the simulation of unilateral trade liberalisation in China. Column 4 gives
the value share of each item in the respective item of the aggregation of the village
model, which is named in the fifth column. The value shares of the fourth column
are the weighting factors for the aggregation of the price shocks from the national
level CGE into an aggregate price shock. This aggregate price shock, which is
used for simulations with the village model, is presented in the sixth column of
Table E.1.
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